Illustration: Woman with head in locked box surrounded by barbed wire and balloons.
Remedy for Populist Politics

We need to remember, states Francis Fukuyama, that the identities dwelling deep inside us are neither fixed nor necessarily given to us by our accidents of birth. Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.

Liberal democracies benefit greatly from immigration, both economically and culturally. But they also unquestionably have the right to control their own borders. A democratic political system is based on a contract between government and citizen in which both have obligations. Such a contract makes no sense without delimitation of citizenship and exercise of the franchise.

All people have a basic human right to citizenship, something that, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cannot be arbitrarily taken away from them. But that does not mean they have the right to citizenship in any particular country. International law does not, moreover, challenge the right of states to control their borders, or to set criteria for citizenship.

Liberal democracies benefit greatly from immigration, both economically and culturally.

The situation in the United States is somewhat different. The country has been very inconsistent in the enforcement of its immigration laws over the years. This enforcement is not impossible but is a matter of political will. While levels of deportations began rising under the Obama administration, the often arbitrary nature of these actions does not make for a sustainable long-term policy.

Enforcement does not require a border wall; a huge proportion of undocumented aliens have entered the country legally but have remained on expired visas. Rather, the rules could be better enforced through a system of employer sanctions, which requires a national identification system that will tell employers who is legitimately in the country. This has not happened because too many employers benefit from the cheap labour that immigrants provide and do not want to act as enforcement agents.

It has also not come about because of a uniquely American opposition to a national ID system, based on a suspicion of government shared by left and right alike. As a result, the United States now hosts a population of some 11 to 12 million undocumented aliens. The vast majority of these people have been in the country for years and are doing useful work, raising families, and otherwise behaving as law-abiding citizens.

A man at a demonstration wears a sweatshirt with the inscription "will trade racists for refugees".
Policies related to immigrants, refugees and citizenship are at the heart of current identity debates, but the issue is much broader than that, photo: Amir Hanna via unsplash

The new groups vociferously opposing immigration are actually coalitions of people with different concerns. A hard-core group are driven by racism and bigotry; little can be done to change their minds. They should not be catered to, but simply opposed on moral grounds.

But others are concerned whether newcomers will ultimately assimilate. They worry less about there being immigration than about numbers, speed of change, and the carrying capacity of existing institutions to accommodate these changes. A policy focus on assimilation might ease their concerns and peel them away from the simple bigots. Whether or not this happens, a policy focusing on assimilation would be good for national cohesion. Policies related to immigrants, refugees and citizenship are at the heart of current identity debates, but the issue is much broader than that.

Identity politics is rooted in a world in which the poor and marginalised are invisible to their peers. Resentment over lost status starts with real economic distress, and one way of muting the resentment is to mitigate concerns over jobs, incomes and security. Particularly in the United States, much of the left stopped thinking several decades ago about ambitious social policies that might help remedy the underlying conditions of the poor. It was easier to talk about respect and dignity than to come up with potentially costly plans that would concretely reduce inequality.

For much of the twentieth century, politics in liberal democracies revolved around broad economic policy issues. The progressive left wanted to protect ordinary people from the vagaries of the market, and to use the power of the state to more fairly distribute resources. The right for its part wanted to protect the free enterprise system and the ability of everyone to participate in market exchange. Communist, socialist, social democratic, liberal and conservative parties all arrayed themselves on a spectrum from left to right that could be measured by the desired degree of state intervention, and commitment alternatively to equality or to individual freedom.

There were important identity groups as well, including parties whose agendas were nationalist, religious or regional in scope. But the stability of democratic politics in the period from the end of World War II up to the present revolved around dominant centre-left and centre-right parties that largely agreed on the legitimacy of a democratic welfare state.

This consensus now represents an old establishment that is being hotly contested by new parties firmly rooted in identity issues. This constitutes a big challenge for the future of democratic politics. While fights over economic policy produced sharp polarisation early in the twentieth century, democracies found that opposing economic visions could often split the difference and compromise.

Harder to Reconcile

Identity issues, by contrast, are harder to reconcile: either you recognise me or you don’t. Resentment over lost dignity or invisibility often has economic roots but fights over identity often distract us from focusing on policies that could concretely remedy those issues. In countries such as the United States, South Africa, or India, with racial, ethnic, and religious stratifications, it has been harder to create broad working class coalitions to fight for redistribution because the higher-status identity groups did not want to make common cause with those below them, and vice versa.

The rise of the politics of identity has been facilitated by technological change. When the internet first became a platform for mass communication in the 1990s, many observers (myself included) believed that it would be an important force for promoting democratic values. 

Any number of anti-authoritarian uprisings […] were powered by social media and the internet.

Information is a form of power, and if the internet increased everyone’s access to information, it should also have distributed power more broadly. Moreover, the rise of social media in particular seemed likely to be a useful mobilisation tool, allowing like-minded groups to coalesce around issues of common concern. The peer-to-peer nature of the internet would eliminate the tyranny of hierarchical gatekeepers of all sorts, who curated the nature of information to which people had access.

And so it was: any number of anti-authoritarian uprisings, from the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine to the failed Green Revolution in Iran to the Tunisian revolt and the Tahrir Square uprising in Egypt, were powered by social media and the internet.

Government operations were much harder to keep secret once ordinary people had technological means of publicising abuses; Black Lives Matter would likely not have taken off in the absence of ubiquitous cell phones and video recordings. But over time authoritarian governments such as that of China figured out how to control use of the internet for their own populations and to make it politically harmless, while Russia learned how to turn social media into a weapon that would weaken its democratic rivals.

But even absent these external players, social media has succeeded in accelerating the fragmentation of liberal societies by playing into the hands of identity groups. It connected like-minded people with one another, freed from the tyranny of geography. It permitted them to communicate and to wall themselves off from people and views that they didn’t like in ‘filter bubbles’.

In most face-to-face communities, the number of people believing a given outlandish conspiracy theory would be very limited; online, one could discover thousands of fellow believers. By undermining traditional media’s editors, fact-checkers and professional codes, it facilitated the circulation of bad information and deliberate efforts to smear and undermine political opponents.

Illustration of a man and a woman with geometric heads facing each other.
Social media permitted like-minded people to communicate and to wall themselves off from people and views that they didn’t like in ‘filter bubbles’, illustration: Gary Waters / Westend61 via picture alliance

New Imagined Dystopias

And its anonymity removed existing restraints on civility. Not only did it support society’s willingness to see itself in identity terms; it promoted new identities through online communities, as countless subreddits have done.

Fears about the future are often best expressed through fiction, particularly science fiction that tries to imagine future worlds based on new kinds of technology. In the first half of the twentieth century, many of these forward-looking fears centred around big, centralised, bureaucratic tyrannies that snuffed out individuality and privacy. George Orwell’s 1984 foresaw Big Brother controlling individuals through the telescreen, while Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World saw the state using biotechnology to stratify and control society.

But the nature of imagined dystopias began to change in the later decades of the century, when environmental collapse and out-of-control viruses took centre stage. However, one particular strand spoke to the anxieties raised by identity politics. Cyberpunk authors such as Bruce Sterling, William Gibson and Neal Stephenson saw a future dominated not by centralised dictatorships but by uncontrolled social fragmentation that was facilitated by a new emerging technology called the internet.

Our present world is simultaneously moving towards the opposing dystopias of hypercentralisation and endless fragmentation. China, for instance, is building a massive dictatorship in which the government collects data on the daily transactions of every one of its citizens and uses big-data techniques and a social credit system to control its population. On the other hand, different parts of the world are seeing the breakdown of centralised institutions, the emergence of failed states, polarisation and a growing lack of consensus over common ends. Social media and the internet have facilitated the emergence of self-contained communities, walled off not by physical barriers but by belief in shared identity.

The nice thing about dystopian fiction is that it almost never comes true. That we can imagine how current trends will play themselves out in an ever more exaggerated fashion serves as a useful warning: 1984 became a potent symbol of a totalitarian future we wanted to avoid and helped inoculate us from it.

Our present world is simultaneously moving towards the opposing dystopias of hypercentralisation and endless fragmentation.

We can imagine better places to be in, which take account of our societies’ increasing diversity, yet present a vision for how that diversity will still serve common ends and support rather than undermine liberal democracy. Identity is the theme that underlies many political phenomena today, from new populist nationalist movements, to Islamist fighters, to the controversies taking place on university campuses.

We will not escape from thinking about ourselves and our society in identity terms. But we need to remember that the identities dwelling deep inside us are neither fixed nor necessarily given to us by our accidents of birth. Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.

The text is based on Francis Fukuyama‘s book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux, September 2018.

About the Author
Portrait of Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama
Professor of political science at Stanford University, California

Francis Fukuyama is a professor of political science at Stanford University, where he directs the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. In his 1989 essay "The End of History?" he described liberal democracy as the culmination of social evolution. In May 2022, his new book "Liberalism and its Discontents" was published, which deals with the threat to liberalism. One of the most important political theorists in the USA, Fukuyama chairs the editorial board of American Purpose.
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