A blurry face.
The Two Faces of Identity Politics

One of the striking characteristics of global politics today is that the dynamic new forces shaping it are nationalist or religious parties and politicians, the two faces of identity politics, rather than the class-based left-wing parties that were so prominent in the politics of the twentieth century.

The Arab Spring of 2011 disrupted dictatorships throughout the Middle East, but then profoundly disappointed hopes for greater democracy in the region as Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria descended into civil war.

The terrorist upsurge that produced the September 11 attacks was not defeated by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, it mutated into the Islamic State, which emerged as a beacon for profoundly illiberal and violent Islamists around the world. What was as remarkable as ISIS’s resilience was that so many young Muslims left lives of comparative safety elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe to travel to Syria to fight on its behalf.

More surprising and perhaps even more significant were the two big electoral surprises of 2016, Britain’s vote to leave the European Union and the election of Donald J. Trump as president of the United States. In both cases, voters were concerned with economic issues, particularly those in the working class who had been exposed to job loss and deindustrialisation.

But just as important was opposition to continued large-scale immigration, which was seen as taking jobs from native-born workers and eroding long-established cultural identities. Anti-immigrant and antiEU parties gained strength in many other developed countries, most notably the National Front in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Alternative for Germany, and the Freedom Party in Austria. Across the Continent there were both fears of Islamist terrorism and controversies over bans on expressions of Muslim identity such as the burka, niqab, and burkini.

Left-Right Spectrum in Politics

Twentieth-century politics had been organised along a left–right spectrum defined by economic issues, the left wanting more equality and the right demanding greater freedom. Progressive politics centred around workers, their trade unions and social democratic parties that sought better social protections and economic redistribution. The right by contrast was primarily interested in reducing the size of government and promoting the private sector. 

3D illustration: bull and bear standing on a financial newspaper page.
A long tradition sees political struggles as a reflection of economic conflicts, illustration: Cigdem Simsek / Zoonar via picture alliance

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, that spectrum appears to be giving way in many regions to one defined by identity. The left has focused less on broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of groups perceived as being marginalised— blacks, immigrants, women, Hispanics, the LGBT community, refugees, and the like.

The right, meanwhile, is redefining itself as patriots who seek to protect traditional national identity, an identity that is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion. A long tradition dating back at least as far as Karl Marx sees political struggles as a reflection of economic conflicts, essentially as fights over shares of the pie.

Indeed, this is part of the story of the 2010s, with globalisation producing significant populations of people left behind by the overall growth that occurred around the world. Between 2000 and 2016, half of Americans saw no gains to their real incomes.

The Politics of Resentment

The proportion of national output going to the top 1 percent went from 9 percent of GDP in 1974 to 24 percent in 2008. But as important as material self-interest is, human beings are motivated by other things as well, motives that better explain the disparate events of the present. This might be called the politics of resentment.

In a wide variety of cases, a political leader has mobilised followers around the perception that the group’s dignity had been affronted, disparaged, or otherwise disregarded. This resentment engenders demands for public recognition of the dignity of the group in question. A humiliated group seeking restitution of its dignity carries far more emotional weight than people simply pursuing their economic advantage.

Thus, Russian president Vladimir Putin has talked about the tragedy of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and how Europe and the United States had taken advantage of Russia’s weakness during the 1990s to drive NATO up to its borders. He despises the attitude of moral superiority of Western politicians and wants to see Russia treated not, as President Obama once said, as a weak regional player, but as a great power.

Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, stated in 2017 that his return to power in 2010 marked the point when ‘we Hungarians also decided that we wanted to regain our country, we wanted to regain our self-esteem, and we wanted to regain our future’.

In a wide variety of cases, a political leader has mobilised followers around the perception that the group’s dignity had been affronted, disparaged, or otherwise disregarded.

The Chinese government of Xi Jinping has talked at length about China’s ‘one hundred years of humiliation’, and how the United States, Japan, and other countries were trying to prevent its return to the great power status it had enjoyed through the past millennia of history.

When the founder of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was fourteen, his mother found him fixated on Palestine, ‘tears streaming down his face as he watched TV from their home in Saudi Arabia’. His anger at the humiliation of Muslims was later echoed by his young coreligionists volunteering to fight in Syria on behalf of a faith they believed had been attacked and oppressed around the world. They hoped to re-create the glories of an earlier Islamic civilisation in the Islamic State.

Resentment at Indignities also in Democratic Countries

Resentment at indignities was a powerful force in democratic countries as well. The Black Lives Matter movement sprang from a series of well-publicised police killings of African Americans in Ferguson (Missouri), Baltimore, New York, and other cities and sought to force the outside world to pay attention to the experience of the victims of seemingly casual police violence.

On college campuses and in offices around the country, sexual assault and sexual harassment were seen as evidence of men not taking women seriously as equals. Sudden attention was paid to transgender people, who had previously not been recognised as a distinct target of discrimination. And many of those who voted for Donald Trump remembered a better time in the past when their place in their own societies was more secure and hoped through their actions to ‘make America great again’.

Black and white photograph: poster with the inscription "resist".
Over the past two generations, the world has seen a large number of spontaneous uprisings against authoritarian governments, photo: Sides Imagery via pexels

While distant in time and place, the feelings among Putin’s supporters over the arrogance and contempt of Western elites were similar to those experienced by rural voters in the United States who felt that the urban bicoastal elites and their media allies were similarly ignoring them and their problems. The practitioners of the politics of resentment recognise one another. The sympathy that Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have for each other is not just personal but rooted in their common nationalism. Viktor Orbán explained, ‘Certain theories describe the changes now taking place in the Western world and the emergence on the stage of a U.S. president as a struggle in the world political arena between the transnational elite—referred to as ‘global’—and patriotic national elites’, of which he was an early exemplar.

Insufficient Recognition of Identities?

In all cases a group, whether a great power such as Russia or China or voters in the United States or Britain, believes that it has an identity that is not being given adequate recognition—either by the outside world, in the case of a nation, or by other members of the same society.

Those identities can be and are incredibly varied, based on nation, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender. They are all manifestations of a common phenomenon, that of identity politics.

The terms identity and identity politics are of fairly recent provenance, the former having been popularised by the psychologist Erik Erikson during the 1950s, and the latter coming into view only in the cultural politics of the 1980s and ’90s.

Identity has a wide number of meanings today, in some cases referring simply to social categories or roles, in others to basic information about oneself (as in ‘my identity was stolen’). Used in this fashion, identities have always existed. Identity grows, in the first place, out of a distinction between one’s true inner self and an outer world of social rules and norms that does not adequately recognise that inner self ’s worth or dignity.

While the economic inequalities arising from the last fifty or so years of globalisation are a major factor explaining contemporary politics, economic grievances become much more acute when they are attached to feelings of indignity and disrespect.

Identity has a wide number of meanings today.

Over the past two generations, the world has seen a large number of spontaneous uprisings against authoritarian governments, from the protests that brought down Communist regimes in 1989, to the South African transition from apartheid, to other citizen mobilisations in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, to the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s in which recognition of basic human dignity was a central issue.

One of those uprisings, indeed, came to be known as the Revolution of Dignity. In November 2013 Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych announced that he was suspending his country’s attempt to finalise an association agreement with the European Union and would seek instead closer cooperation with Russia and Russian president Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union.

The Battle for Dignity

The choice between aligning with the EU or with Putin’s Russia was seen as a choice between living under a modern government that treated people equally qua citizen and living under a regime in which democracy was manipulated by self-dealing kleptocrats behind a veneer of democratic practice.

Putin’s Russia represented the epitome of this kind of mafia state; closer association with it rather than Europe represented a step into a world in which real power was held by an unaccountable elite. Hence the belief that the Euromaidan uprising was about securing the basic dignity of ordinary citizens.

But the effective recognition of citizens as equal adults with the capacity to make political choices is a minimal condition for being a liberal democracy.

Authoritarian governments, by contrast, fail to recognise the equal dignity of their citizens. They may pretend to do so through flowery constitutions such as those in China or Iran that list copious citizen rights, but where the reality is different. In relatively benevolent dictatorships, such as those of Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore or China under Deng Xiaoping, the state adopted a paternalistic attitude toward its citizens. Ordinary people were regarded as children who needed protection from a wise parent, the state; they could not be trusted to run their own affairs.

In the worst dictatorships, such as those of Stalin and Hitler, large swaths of the population— kulaks (rich peasants), the bourgeoisie, Jews, the disabled, non-Aryans—were regarded as subhuman trash that could be discarded in the name of collective good.

But the effective recognition of citizens as equal adults with the capacity to make political choices is a minimal condition for being a liberal democracy.

The desire for the state to recognise one’s basic dignity has been at the core of democratic movements since the French Revolution. A state guaranteeing equal political rights was the only rational way to resolve the contradictions that Hegel saw in the relationship between master and slave, where only the master was recognised.

This is what drove Americans to protest during the civil rights movement, South Africans to stand up against apartheid, Mohamed Bouazizi to immolate himself, and other protesters to risk their lives in Yangon or in the Maidan or Tahrir Square, or in countless other confrontations over the centuries.

Nationalism, Islamism and Modernisation

Photo: Room with old television set.
In other cases, the modern world came to them in their villages via satellite TV: People living in traditional villages with limited choices are suddenly confronted with different ways of life, photo: Lanyjade Monddou via pexels

Ernest Gellner was a major theorist of nationalism, and he suggested that modern Islamism needed to be seen through a similar lens of modernisation and identity. Both nationalism and Islamism are rooted in modernisation. The shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft has been occurring in the contemporary Middle East, as peasants or Bedouin have left the countryside for cities such as Cairo, Amman, and Algiers.

Alternatively, millions of Muslims experienced modernisation by migrating to Europe or other Western countries in search of better lives, settling in Marseille or Rotterdam or Bradford and confronting there an alien culture. In other cases, the modern world came to them in their villages via satellite TV from stations such as Al Jazeera or CNN International. People living in traditional villages with limited choices are suddenly confronted with a pluralistic world with very different ways of life in which their traditional norms are not respected.

One of the striking characteristics of global politics in the second decade of the twenty-first century is that the dynamic new forces shaping it are nationalist or religious parties and politicians, the two faces of identity politics, rather than the class-based left-wing parties that were so prominent in the politics of the twentieth century. Nationalism may have been sparked initially by industrialisation and modernisation, but it has in no way disappeared from the world, including in those countries that have been industrially developed for generations.

The text is based on Francis Fukuyama‘s book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux, September 2018.

About the Author
Portrait of Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama
Professor of political science at Stanford University, California

Francis Fukuyama is a professor of political science at Stanford University, where he directs the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. In his 1989 essay "The End of History?" he described liberal democracy as the culmination of social evolution. In May 2022, his new book "Liberalism and its Discontents" was published, which deals with the threat to liberalism. One of the most important political theorists in the USA, Fukuyama chairs the editorial board of American Purpose.
Books and monographs

Recommended Reading