However, in Germany and other European countries, support for Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Stabilisation Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was largely bought with the argument that they were also promoting the country’s development, democracy and human rights, particularly women’s rights. There is no doubt that many cooperation partners in urban regions have seen major improvements in their lives as a result of the international presence, development cooperation, and initiatives to support the media and culture. Nevertheless, it is clear that the idea of establishing Western political concepts, norms and value systems in the Hindu Kush alongside military action (against the Taliban and other Islamist groups) was a failure. Many political actors who supported or took part in the Afghanistan operation for twenty years still find it very difficult to admit the serious contradictions that were associated with this mission.
It is research institutions and civil society, rather than politicians, that have provided serious impetus for conducting a reappraisal of the failure in Afghanistan. In October 2021, the Berlin Peace Dialogue hosted by the Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention, which advises the German government on the implementation of its guidelines Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflict, Building Peace (2017), provided an opportunity for experts from Germany and abroad to discuss this topic in detail.
There is no doubt that many cooperation partners in urban regions have seen major improvements in their lives as a result of the international presence, development cooperation, and initiatives to support the media and culture. Nevertheless, it is clear that the idea of establishing Western political concepts, norms and value systems in the Hindu Kush alongside military action (against the Taliban and other Islamist groups) was a failure.
Their conclusions are summarised below:
Firstly, the actions of the Western allies were totally inconsistent. The decision to allow former warlords (whose influence had been suppressed under Taliban rule) to participate in government undermined efforts to unify the country politically. Corruption and fraud further destroyed the population’s trust in political structures. The military presence, which included combat operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Enduring Freedom) on the one hand and trying to ensure reconstruction (ISAF) on the other, gradually became perceived as an occupation. ‘War and development do not go together’, was the conclusion of one politician, something that should have been realised much earlier and the consequences understood. The incompatibility of the goals (counterterrorism, stabilisation, development, etc.) was highlighted, along with the fact that it was largely a military defeat that the parties involved refused to acknowledge for far too long.
Moreover, insufficient attention was paid to the regional context and Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan was ignored. The fact that the Afghan government was not involved in the negotiations in Doha hampered peace efforts because it removed any incentive for the Taliban to engage in a power-sharing model.
The fact that several times more money was spent on military operations than on civil reconstruction and development was also criticised. At the same time, the strategies for reconstruction and democratisation were characterised by exaggerated expectations; a realistic vision would have been: ‘Change Afghanistan into something like Tajikistan, but it was like: change Afghanistan into something like Denmark.’ The attempt to transfer ‘Western values’ and political ideas to a region with a totally different culture as part of a nation-building strategy failed, and it had also become clear that centralised forms of politics and administration could not be established in a decentralised country.
The strategies for reconstruction and democratisation were characterised by exaggerated expectations; a realistic vision would have been: ‘Change Afghanistan into something like Tajikistan, but it was like: change Afghanistan into something like Denmark.’
Those responsible for the operations in Afghanistan had moved in ‘echo chambers’, repeating the same arguments and perspectives over and over again, without learning anything new. Yet there was no lack of material to back up a change of course. In 2013, the Norwegian government commissioned an independent study that concluded the actions of the Western allies in Afghanistan were inconsistent and incoherent. In 2015, the European Court of Auditors presented a critical evaluation of the EU police mission in Afghanistan and recommended its termination in view of the bleak security situation. As a result, therefore, was no lack of facts and analysis to gain a more differentiated assessment of the situation, but there was a reluctance to draw appropriate conclusions.
In Afghanistan, allies with highly divergent and incompatible agendas were on the move, and aid organisations were among those who felt the impact. While certain players were focused on the war on terror (such as the US), others wanted to engage primarily in nation building, reconstruction and development cooperation (such as Germany). International forces established civilian/military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and used them to launch civilian assistance and reconstruction programmes. This was intended to create greater acceptance for the military presence among the Afghan people. As a result, humanitarian actors, who were keen to remain impartial, became barely distinguishable from military actors as far as the Western alliance’s opponents were concerned. Aid organisations became targets. Some decided to withdraw, others severely curtailed their activities and continued to emphasise their independence and neutrality.
The UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was supposed to secure reconstruction, gradually morphed into a counterinsurgency force as the Taliban and extremist networks ramped up their efforts to gain territory. ISAF coordinated closely with Operation Enduring Freedom units, and ultimately both were under US command. As a result, the perception of ISAF among Afghanistan’s civilian population began to change, and its ongoing presence was increasingly viewed as an occupation. Many humanitarian actors directly experienced the difficulty of reconciling waging war and promoting development, and some have left the country as a result. Western, and European, politics suffered a massive loss of credibility.
The images of Kabul have been etched into people’s memories all over the world and are accompanied by a serious loss of credibility. The message that will be taken from this in the Global South is that it is better not to engage with Western institutions that claim to be bringing democracy, human rights and gender equality to distant regions of the world, because you will end up being abandoned, alone and defenceless.
There is more to the images of desperate people at Kabul airport in August 2021 than just another human tragedy in the context of the ‘war on terror’. They mark a historical caesura, similar to the US withdrawal from Vietnam, which began in 1973 and ended with the Viet Cong’s capture of Saigon in 1975. Indeed, there are some quite astonishing parallels. There, too, it was obvious that the deployment of American troops was not about the people in Vietnam but related to quite different considerations of military strategy and power politics. At that time, too, negotiations were not conducted with a view to building a future and bringing peace to the country, but focused on a quick exit at any price, regardless of losses. The images of Kabul have been etched into people’s memories all over the world and are accompanied by a serious loss of credibility. The message that will be taken from this in the Global South is that it is better not to engage with Western institutions that claim to be bringing democracy, human rights and gender equality to distant regions of the world, because you will end up being abandoned, alone and defenceless.
Not only Western governments, but also NGOs and actors in the cultural sphere must ask themselves to what extent they are prepared to accept such contradictions, and what kind of operations they want to be involved in going forward. In Germany, in its coalition agreement, the newly elected government promised to examine the Afghanistan mission through a parliamentary investigative committee and a commission of inquiry.
The following questions arise with regard to German policy:
- Why was the evacuation of local staff and people at risk not organised in parallel with the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr?
- Why, despite being informed about the deteriorating security situation, had the German government issued visas to only a fraction of those in need of protection by mid-August?
- And how did it come to downscale the number of Afghan personnel at risk and keep it to a minimum (local Bundeswehr staff since 2013, contractors working for the German foreign office and involved in development cooperation for the last two years only, with no mention at all of NGO partners)?
It is to be hoped that this reappraisal will take place with the involvement of peace researchers and European and Afghan civil society. However, the focus should not simply be on asking what needs to be done differently in the next international mission, but rather on the question of whether to participate in such missions at all, and on non-military alternatives to combating extremism and terrorism. An honest reappraisal and policy shift is the only way to potentially mitigate the damage and loss of credibility that has occurred. Politicians in Europe must also learn from the experiences in the Hindu Kush.