Cultures of We?

Over the past years, there seem to have been two competing narratives. On the one hand, the world is more closely connected than it has ever been. Economies are more closely knit together, and information travels across the world instantaneously. Many of the traditional measures of prosperity appear to be improving, and technology is viewed as the great panacea.

Yet on the other hand, the world sometimes appears to be tearing itself apart, as cultural and national divisions become much more prominent and a new era of asymmetric warfare driven by age-old prejudices and resentments — and also enabled by technological advances — seems to be on the march. This has been especially marked in the West, which has both been the driver of our modern economic structure and now, perhaps, the place where we see one of the largest reactions against it.

In trying to make sense of this and bring forth global co-operation, comforting narratives and slogans are sought. One of these is that the world should develop a ‘culture of we’. I don’t like the idea of a ‘culture of we’. Such a culture assumes that the best outcome for human society is for everyone to believe the same things, live in the same kinds of societies, and consume the same things.

The End of History

The difference between a ‘culture of we’ and ‘us vs. them’ connects to one of the central debates since the end of the Cold War. The ‘culture of we’ is Francis Fukuyama’s End of History. For Fukuyama, the fall of the Soviet Union meant the end of the only competitor to Western liberal democracy. Thus, all countries and governments would eventually become ‘Western’: there would be no other alternative.

The narrative of ‘us vs. them’, in contrast, is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations. For Huntington, humanity is irrevocably separated into different civilisational blocs. Societies would clash not on the basis of universal ideologies, but on cultural values, which were too fundamental for there to be any compromise. As the world globalised and contact between different peoples increased, these cultural divisions would become more obvious, and spark tensions and conflict between societies.

Those who push the most for such a universal culture tend to be Western or influenced by Western ideas

These works were written in the Nineties in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and were written from a Western perspective. Thus, neither of these schools of thought have held up well in light of recent events. Clearly, the rise of China and its alternate model for economic development and governance challenges the idea that Western liberal democracy is the only game in town. Even Fukuyama has changed his tune, growing disappointed with his own school of thought during the run-up to the American invasion of Iraq.

Es ist klar, dass der Aufstieg Chinas und seines alternativen Modells von wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und Regierungsführung die Vorstellung infrage stellt, die westliche liberale Demokratie sei die einzig mögliche Variante. Selbst Fukuyama hat eine andere Tonart angeschlagen und zeigte sich im Vorfeld des amerikanischen Einmarsches im Irak zunehmend enttäuscht von seiner eigenen Theorie.

The problem with the clash of civilisations argument is different. It is true that one could apply the model to today’s world. But then the problem becomes self-fulfilling. If countries believe that compromise with other cultures is impossible, they will not try to work with them, creating the tension and conflict predicted by Huntington.

Technocrats ended up as leaders of many developing countries: a person that was Western-educated, perhaps with experience working for a Western multinational or bank, who promises to implement the ‘right’ economic policies as defined by Western economists and institutions. These arguments would trump even popular sentiment, as support services and protections by the government are removed in order for the country to more cleanly fit the Western model.

This narrative worked so long as Western countries were the world’s most wealthy, powerful and respected. But the rise of the rest has challenged the prime position of Western countries and institutions. This has unnerved Western populations, who were used to considering themselves at the top of the heap. These populations have now turned against the elite schools of thought that pushed for liberalisation and globalisation, and populist politicians have capitalised on the fear created by the rise of the rest.