Kosovo After the Election - A New Era in Serbia’s Shadow?

The situation after the February elections is complicated. Although incumbent Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his left-wing nationalist party Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) won the most votes, they also lost the election by a large margin compared to 2021. As Kurti and his party no longer have an absolute majority, they are dependent on a coalition partner. So far, however, none of the three opposition parties, which together hold the majority of seats in the Pristina parliament, has shown any willingness to join forces with Kurti. If Kurti is unable to find a coalition partner, Kosovo risks political stalemate. Kosovo has a powerful neighbour: the Republic of Serbia, which still refuses to recognise Kosovo's independence proclaimed in 2008.

But who is Albin Kurti, this populist left-wing nationalist? And how long can he count on the trust of the majority of his people?

Albin Kurti was on his way to victory. His campaign slogan “Cep më Cep” (“To the last corner”) promised political control over the whole of Kosovo, from north to south and from east to west. On the evening of 9 February 2025, however, disillusionment set in. Although Kurti and his party won the election again with just under 41 per cent of the vote, they fell far short of the absolute majority they had hoped for. The Albanian opposition, long divided and weak, had rallied around Kurti and lost by around 9.5 percentage points. For Kurti, who was born in Pristina in 1975, the result was a defeat disguised as a victory.

The political situation is as heated as it has been for a long time. Kosovo society is deeply divided. Disillusionment with the political stalemate is growing. The economic situation is bleak.

When Kurti took office after winning the 2021 elections, he was seen as a great hope for reform. For the first time in the short history of the young Republic of Kosovo, a prime minister had his own absolute majority in parliament. With populist rhetoric, Kurti promised transparent governance, a determined fight against corruption and a reorientation of the country's political culture. After four years, however, his rough handling of power has not only disappointed many of his supporters at home, but has also alienated foreign partners and allies to such an extent that Kosovo is becoming increasingly isolated internationally.

Domestically, despite his absolute majority in the legislature and his control of the executive, Kurti was never satisfied and came into ever sharper conflict with the judiciary and also with the “fourth estate”, the media. He led open campaigns against the judiciary, accusing prosecutors and judges of corruption and of belonging to the “old regime” – by which he meant the opposition parties. At the same time, he attacked the media as being against him, even though Kosovo has one of the most diverse and independent press landscapes in the Balkans.

Anyone who reported on corruption in his government was seen by him as a Serbian canal worker. Those who denounced corrupt ministers were vilified as quislings of the 'old regime'.

Kurti's attacks on the judiciary and journalists were no accident. Prosecutors targeted several of Kurti's ministers on suspicion of corruption and embezzlement of state funds, and when journalists reported them accurately, Kurti branded them as elements of an alleged “hybrid war” by Serbia and Russia against him. Kurti tried to portray criticism of his government and himself as an attack on the Kosovar state as such. Anyone who reported on corruption in his government was seen by him as a Serbian canal worker. Those who denounced corrupt ministers were vilified as quislings of the “old regime”.

Although only 50 years old, Albin Kurti is a veteran of Kosovan politics with almost three decades of experience. His career began in 1997, at the age of 22, as one of the main leaders of the student protests in Kosovo against the Belgrade regime of Slobodan Milošević. At the time, Kosovo was part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), which in turn had emerged from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which collapsed in 1992 and had previously consisted of six constituent republics.

Milošević's political rise began with the abolition of the autonomy of the Albanian-dominated province of Kosovo, which he pushed through in 1990. This was followed by the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995 – and finally in Kosovo in 1998-99. While Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina fought defensive wars against Milošević's aggression and were able to free themselves from Belgrade's rule with varying degrees of bloodshed, Kosovo took the path of peaceful resistance under the leadership of the pacifist literary scholar Ibrahim Rugova.

All political movements and orientations of the Kosovo Albanians since 1989 have been characterised by close coordination with the West. Both Rugova's pacifist strategy and the armed resistance of the UÇK, and later the self-administration of Kosovo from June 1999 until the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 and beyond, were always carried out in close coordination with Washington and Brussels, London and Berlin, Paris and Rome – and with the blessing of the Western capitals. Ibrahim Rugova had already followed this course in the 1990s, and the former UÇK fighters who entered politics after the war and independence continued to do so.

During the Kosovo war, Albin Kurti was arrested in Pristina in April 1999 by Serbian dictator Milošević's police forces, tried in Belgrade and sentenced to 15 years in prison on terrorism charges. Following the change of government in Serbia in September 2000, Kurti was released by the new Serbian government on 7 December 2001 after international pressure.

During the Kosovo war, Albin Kurti was arrested in Pristina in April 1999 by the police forces of the Serbian dictator Milošević, tried in Belgrade and sentenced to 15 years in prison for terrorism.

Upon his release and return to Kosovo, which was then under UN administration, Kurti immediately became involved in politics. He was initially active in the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), a non-governmental organisation that campaigned for inter-ethnic reconciliation after the war. However, Kurti soon changed course and renamed the organisation Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination). From then on, he protested against the UN, against negotiations with Serbia and against the mediation of the international community in the dialogue process.

For more than a decade, Albin Kurti pursued a confrontational course, opposing Kosovo's independence, the presence of the international community, the mainstream political parties and dialogue with Serbia. Instead, he called for Kosovo's annexation to Albania and for further protests.

On 17 February 2008, Kurti's movement was the only political force in the country to boycott Kosovo's independence celebrations. In the months and years that followed, however, he realised that he and Vetëvendosje were in danger of being overtaken by reality. So he decided to run in the parliamentary elections. In 2010, he entered parliament with 10 percent of the vote. Between 2010 and 2019, Kurti alternated between street activism and parliamentary politics. Realising that he could not come to power on the issue of nationalism alone, from 2017 onwards he focused on corruption and nepotism, while the desired unification with Albania and dialogue with Serbia took a back seat.

In the 2019 election campaign, Kurti hardly talked about his old favourite issues, focusing instead on the fight for social justice, better living conditions and job creation. This helped him win a good 26 per cent of the vote. He formed a coalition with the LDK, the party founded by Ibrahim Rugova in 1989. But the alliance collapsed after only 100 days. As Kurti did not have his own majority in parliament, the other opposition parties tried to form a new government with the LDK. Avdullah Hoti of the LDK was elected prime minister of the new coalition. However, the Constitutional Court subsequently annulled Hoti's election, leading to new elections in February 2021.

This was Kurti's moment. During the election campaign, he presented himself as the victim of an intrigue by the “old parties” and their power apparatus, but above all of the interference of “foreign countries”, namely Richard Grenell, President Donald Trump's special envoy for peace negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. According to Kurti's version, Grenell forced the LDK – Rugova's political heirs – to leave the coalition with him and his party.

During the election campaign, he presented himself as the victim of an intrigue by the ‘old parties’ and their power apparatus, but above all of the interference of ‘foreign countries’.

Kurti and Vetëvendosje won the 2021 elections with an absolute majority, and Kurti did not need any coalition partners to form his second cabinet. It was the first victory for a (left-wing) populist party and an openly “Greater Albanian” politician in the young history of the Republic of Kosovo. A few days after the elections, Kurti was asked by journalists when Kosovo's unification with Albania would take place. “Kosovo's constitution does not allow it”, he replied. It was an abrupt departure from a key election promise.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who began his political career in 1998 as Milošević's Minister of Information, knows all about Kurti – the former Serbian political prisoner – and deliberately provoked him through the protests of northern Kosovo Serbs against the government in Pristina, which were fuelled by Belgrade. Kurti took Vučić's bait and tried to impose Kosovo's state authority by force in the Serb enclave around the town of Mitrovica on the northern bank of the Ibar River. Implementation of the landmark Ohrid Agreement stalled. The agreement set out two key steps. First, Kosovo and the government in Pristina are to grant autonomy to the Serbs in the north in the form of a federation of Serb municipalities. Second, Serbia and the government in Belgrade should stop opposing the accession of the Republic of Kosovo to the relevant international organisations.

In the end, both Kurti and Vučić torpedoed the Ohrid Agreement. Kurti's political self-image was based on the principle that there should be no self-government for the Serb minority in northern Kosovo. Conversely, the Serbian nationalist Vučić had been politically socialised by his rejection of Kosovo's independence and would have had to abandon this principle in the course of implementing the Ohrid Agreement.

Kurti's biggest diplomatic challenge remains the deadlocked dialogue with Serbia. Instead of seeking solutions, he continues to provoke the other side and the international mediators and is uncompromising. Kurti has effectively ignored the Ohrid Agreement of 2023, which provides for greater autonomy for Serb communities in northern Kosovo. This has led to a dramatic deterioration in Kosovo's relations with Brussels and Washington.

With the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the geopolitical situation has changed fundamentally. Shortly before the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February, Richard Grenell, Trump's former special envoy to Kosovo and Serbia and now special envoy for global crisis situations, spoke at Platform X. Grenell stressed that Kurti had always been an opponent of the US, and remained so to this day, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans were in power in Washington. This was the case under Bill Clinton, under George W. Bush, then under Barack Obama, in Donald Trump's first term, and finally under Joe Biden, Grenell explained. Some media, particularly in Germany, took offence at Grenell's alleged interference in Kosovo's internal affairs and in the election campaign. But Grenell's post was merely a response to Kurti's curious claim that Pristina's relations with Washington had developed "excellently" under his administration.

While Kurti's stubbornness towards the EU and the US has led Kosovo into isolation, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is pursuing a far more intelligent strategy. Vučić presents himself as a stabilising force on the international stage, while deliberately fomenting instability at home and behind the scenes.

His strategy is to use the Ohrid Agreement as political leverage. Sometimes he demands implementation of the agreements, sometimes he thwarts it. He also maintains close relations with Moscow and Beijing, while constantly signalling to Brussels that Belgrade is pressing ahead with its EU aspirations – albeit on Vučić's own terms. The Serb minority in northern Kosovo is Vučić's political tool of choice. He repeatedly stirs up tensions in order to divert attention from domestic problems.

Kurti's biggest diplomatic challenge remains the deadlocked dialogue with Serbia. Instead of seeking solutions, he continues to provoke the other side and the international mediators and is uncompromising.

The fuelled escalation in May 2023, when protests by Serbs in northern Kosovo against local elections imposed by Pristina led to bloody riots, was just one example of many. Another was the attack by Serb terrorists on the village of Banjska, north-west of Mitrovica, in September 2023, in which an Albanian policeman from the Republic of Kosovo was killed. But instead of using Belgrade's targeted provocations to accommodate the West and corner his opponent Vučić diplomatically, Kurti stubbornly blocked any solution or rapprochement. In return, Vučić gained diplomatic stature and consolidated his position. By the time Trump was inaugurated for his second term on 20 January, Vučić had managed to exploit the EU's disunity and the power vacuum in the US for his own ends and to expand his influence in the region.

While Kurti is becoming increasingly isolated internationally, pressure is mounting on him at home in Kosovo. The economic situation is still unsatisfactory. Unemployment is high, particularly among young people. Many Kosovars see no future in their country and are emigrating – mainly to Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The economy is suffering not only from a lack of investment, but also from ongoing tensions and political uncertainty.

The next few months will show whether Kurti will change course or continue to focus on confrontation. The signs are bad. The EU has signalled that it will not accept further blockages in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Most importantly, the US expects a more pragmatic approach under Trump II - Trump, and especially his special envoy Grenell, are known to lose patience sooner rather than later. If Kurti does not return to diplomatic sanity soon, he may be manoeuvring himself and Kosovo into a dead end from which there is no quick exit. Without its allies in Brussels and Washington, Kosovo will remain deeply isolated. And the population risks sliding deeper into social depression and possibly economic recession. In the end, domestic discontent and political disenchantment could leave him unable to find a coalition partner and unable to govern.

At the same time, Serbia's influence is growing. Vučić has managed to capitalise on the West's weakness and position himself as a major player in the Balkans. His dual strategy of being pro-EU while looking to Russia and China makes him unpredictable for Brussels, but also indispensable.

Vučić has managed to capitalise on the West's weakness and position himself as a major player in the Balkans. His dual strategy […] makes him unpredictable for Brussels, but also indispensable.

However, Kosovo is facing one of the most serious (geo-)political crises since its independence. The unlikely twins Albin Kurti and Aleksandar Vučić are holding the Balkans politically hostage. In the end, it may once again be external actors – the US under Trump II or perhaps a more resolute EU – that force a solution. It is questionable, however, whether Trump and his colleagues are interested in a long-term stabilisation of the Balkans after the experiences of his first term in office, or whether they are merely pursuing the tactical goal of a short-term pacification of this Central European trouble spot.

One thing is clear: Kosovo, with a population of just under 1.6 million, cannot afford further political and economic stagnation. If the uncertainty continues, the people will have to foot the bill. While Kurti and Vučić continue their cynical game.