Liberty, Equality and Intolerance

One of the key problems facing liberal democracies in Europe today is that Islamophobic attitudes – which may be considered a specific form of racism – are extremely common in bourgeois society. The generally inclusive character of the political system and the basically positive attitude of majorities and minorities towards the political system have not, unfortunately, brought about the kind of social peace we might have hoped for.

Beneath the patina of loyalty to the system and the apparent stability of political systems, conflicts smoulder between Europe’s Muslims and non-Muslims. If the majority do not believe that a minority is loyal to the constitution and are convinced that this minority is completely unwilling to integrate socially and adapt culturally, and if this minority generally feel discriminated against, then we are living in an unstable and fear-ridden society.

In present-day Europe, constructs of the “enemy” are booming and extend far into bourgeois society. Though only a minority are open about their racism, the greater part of the majority society believe that Islam is more violent than Christianity and/or incompatible with Western values and Western culture. Everyday discrimination is not inevitable but it is certainly a widespread reaction. Islamophobic violence is relatively rare but it is a problem that exists throughout Europe, despite the fact that there is as yet little public recognition of this fact.

If the majority do not believe that a minority is loyal to the constitution [...] and if this minority generally feel discriminated against, then we are living in an unstable and fear-ridden society.

The turning point for images of Islam was not the attacks of 11 September 2001 but the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979. Here the latent Islamophobia inherent in Europe’s cultural legacy was reanimated through the politicization of a fundamentalist movement. The attacks of 2001 did little to alter the substance of the image of Islam, but they were of crucial importance to the approach taken towards Islam within Western society.

They massively bolstered the notion of Islam as the ‘enemy’ among right-wing populist parties, increased discrimination and led to violence towards Muslims. There are certain differences in the perception of Islam in specific European countries. A fundamental Islamophobia is widespread in Central Europe, while it is present in a somewhat attenuated form in Western Europe.

The turning point for images of Islam was [...] the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979. Here the latent Islamophobia inherent in Europe’s cultural legacy was reanimated through the politicization of a fundamentalist movement.

Public constructions of Islam in Europe show clear signs of collective perceptual extremism: they are highly selective, sloganeering, disparaging and marked by a radical mentality. To describe these negative images of Islam as 'racist' is justified in that what we see today is a racism 'without races', whose key differentiating criterion is not so much physical characteristics as affiliation to a particular culture or religion. So far, most Europeans and the major media have managed not to relapse into genetic racism.

Cultural racism, meanwhile, is not even regarded as racism and is generally trivialized. It is only this restructuring of concepts of the enemy that has made it possible for a majority of contemporary Europeans to claim that they are not racist, to openly denounce anti-Semitism while at the same time cultivating negative prejudices towards Islam and Muslims. Through this interplay, Islamophobia has become a kind of politically correct, respectable form of prejudice, whose reach extends far into bourgeois circles. Far from representing an extreme and radical element, this is a component of European popular culture.

This sense that there is an asymmetry of cultural perception is quite explainable. It is congruent with the power gap that exists between the two groups in Europe. Similar resentment is often felt towards autochthonous religious minorities in the Islamic world. The existence of cultural hegemony in modern immigrant societies is an unresolved problem across the world. Despite its liberal-democratic political framework, Europe is no exception here.

Not every image of the enemy is unjustified. Some enemies are real. Certain sections of Europe’s Muslim population do in fact exhibit high levels of criminality, educational shortcomings and signs of economic deprivation. None of these problems should be dismissed even if we are critical of the concept of 'integration'.

From the perspective of the liberal-democratic theory of politics and society, we must make a sharp division between minimal political, economic and cultural requirements of immigrants and the freedom to be different within a pluralist society, a freedom both intended and generated by the system.

Statistically, it is quite clear that it is not religious affiliation and not even the degree of religiosity that is decisive but rather immigrants’ social background, which is in turn often linked with their regional origins.

But the problems currently faced by many immigrants do touch on the foundations of social solidarity, such that policies of integration and recognition must be fused together. We must remember that all the empirical studies show that the integration problems of Muslims in Europe have very little to do with the religion of Islam. Statistically, it is quite clear that it is not religious affiliation and not even the degree of religiosity that is decisive but rather immigrants’ social background, which is in turn often linked with their regional origins.

The sociodemographic structure of Turkish immigration to Germany, for example, is quite different from Arab and Iranian immigration. Arab immigration to France, on the other hand, is quite different from that to Germany. Iranians and many Arabs in Germany exhibit very high levels of integration. Even within socially deprived strata, often of Turkish origin, there are many different aspects to integration.

Despite the problems that exist, there is absolutely no cause for social alarmism or excessive fears of 'parallel societies'. Furthermore, Muslims as a whole not only exhibit a high degree of trust in the political and social system of the European states, but extremist political views are no more common than in the rest of society. There is absolutely no reason for culturalization or Islamophobia.

A large number of publications have appeared dealing with tolerance and recognition from a theoretical perspective. But the views expressed in this literature are rarely connected with the theory of liberal democracy. This weakness of liberal thought has been criticized by other theoretical schools. In the United States, much of this criticism has come from communitarianism, which ultimately includes 'multicultural nationalism'. It seems implausible that we might create a society based on positive tolerance in which multicultural ideals of community prevail on the basis of liberal theory’s demands for negative toleration.

If we look at racism, regardless of the ideological and power-political guidelines set by the political system, a large number of causal complexes lie hidden deep within the societal structures of modernity. The dearth of intercultural contact, global educational deficiencies, social deprivation and the exclusion of immigrants will not be resolved solely through a liberal theory of politics.

This form of recognition is open to conflict and dialogue-intensive. So far, the discourse of recognition and tolerance has largely remained an annex to constitutional debates. For the most part, however, the problems we are faced with in liberal democracy and the battle against Islamophobia cannot be solved by the legal and political system alone.

Value deficiencies: there is a pronounced connection between Islamophobia and authoritarian, dogmatic values, particularly in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. Values of religious freedom are certainly widespread, but in Europe – in clear contrast to the United States – they have not been fused with the values of an immigrant society and seemed to be limited to the Christian, and perhaps Jewish, religion.

Social deprivation: Islamophobia is partly dependent on socioeconomic factors. It is to some extent ‘determined by the economy’ in much the same way as the anti-Semitism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But it would be reductive to regard Islamophobia as a consequence of poverty, because what matters is relative deprivation. Any trends towards middle-class decline reinforce habitual-cultural defensive responses among members of this group.

Cultural distinction and the cultural rejection of 'others' are a key characteristic of this new middle class. Furthermore, we should not overlook the fact that socioeconomic crises tend to reinforce rather than trigger Islamophobia, which has also existed during periods of economic boom.

Lack of intercultural contact: while Muslims are often accused of failing to integrate socially, many non-Muslim citizens of Europe do nothing to cultivate contact with Muslims and consciously keep their distance, which is a significant factor in maintaining stereotypes and prejudices. Regardless of their growing numbers and immediate presence in local spaces, Muslims often remain the 'absent other'.

[Lack of intercultural contact] is a significant factor in maintaining stereotypes and prejudices.

Eurocentric education: education is generally believed to diminish racism. With regard to Islamophobia, there is evidence of a positive influence of a high level of formal education, though even among educated people Islamophobia remains much stronger than anti-Semitism and other forms of racism.

European democracy seems stable yet European societies exhibit a high degree of xenophobia and Islamophobia. This is partly bound up with the failures of the political system and legal system. In their key spheres of activity, namely the legislative, executive and judicial branches, they have made major progress towards achieving legal equality for Islam. But there are major deficiencies in their ideological development and this influences how societies’ core, shared values are defined.

The political system of liberal democracy has two key characteristics: the liberal constitutional state and democratic sovereignty. The highest principle of the constitutional restate is equal treatment. Secularism means the equality of the individual before the law. Other aspects of secularism such as the separation of religion and politics or the 'privatization' of religion, which amounts to the withdrawal of religion from the public into the private sphere, are secondary. The relationship between liberal law and democracy is conflictual, since in reality democracy embodies the principle of hegemony.

Therefore democratic majorities intervene in much of Central and Northern Europe. What we see in these states is a belated adaptation to the requirements of immigration. It is also apparent that the European Union has strengthened cultural pluralism. Islamic organizations are given a hearing in Brussels, and the antidiscrimination laws that have now been introduced in Europe have to a large extent been at the instigation of European policymakers.

Overall, European national governments and policies formulated in Brussels are clearly playing an increasing role as immigrants’ guardians, protecting them against discrimination in society. This is evident, for example, in the many statements by heads of state over the last few years and decades promoting the idea of Islam as part of Europe, as well as in state-run conferences on Islam and state advisory committees.

Islamic organizations are given a hearing in Brussels, and the antidiscrimination laws that have now been introduced in Europe have to a large extent been at the instigation of European policymakers.

Leading European politicians still make statements critical of Islam as representatives of their parties or the official opposition, but ministers, heads of government and above all representative heads of state tend to deploy an inclusive rhetoric. At least on the level of symbolic politics, this is consonant with the requirements of the multicultural liberal constitutional state. Taking power at the state level thus has a 'civilizing' effect. State policies of tolerance in Europe continue to make their presence felt.

In much the same way as in the United States, collective characteristics such as actual or alleged affiliation to Islam become criteria of prosecution (ethnic profiling), which is an infringement of human rights and allowed by European courts only if there are very strong grounds for suspicion. On the whole, from the perspective of the liberal theory of democracy, state policies on Islam are ambivalent. Executive policies will main susceptible to discrimination against Muslims as long as there is no comprehensive multicultural consensus among the political class at the level of political parties and ideologies. The legislative sphere in particular, however, finds itself exposed to increasing pressure from right-wing populist parties and an Islamophobia that extends deep into the heart of bourgeois society.