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South Caucasus: Struggle for Peace

For decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan conquered the region. Since then, the neighbours have been struggling to reach a peace treaty. What do the two countries need for lasting peace? And how can the EU support them?

Barren mountain ranges dominate the landscape of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. The winters in the high altitudes are draughty and cold, the summer months with little rain and hot. Sought-after water resources and fertile soils are rare and present in a unique concentration only in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region between neighbouring countries.

In Soviet times, Nagorno-Karabakh was autonomous and wanted to remain so after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Azerbaijan was against it: although a majority of Armenians lived in Nagorno-Karabakh, they lived on Azerbaijani territory. Ethnic conflicts flared up between the Muslim Azeris and the Christian Armenians at the end of the 1980s, and several wars followed.

Sought-after water resources and fertile soils are rare in the region but present in a unique concentration in Nagorno-Karabakh alone.

Armenia won the first Nagorno-Karabakh war between 1991 and 1994, while Azerbaijan won the second in 2020. Rising energy prices had enabled the oil state of Azerbaijan to gain economic and military superiority over Armenia. Despite this, Armenians continued to live in parts of Nagorno-Karabakh after 2020. The question of the status of the de facto state of "Artsakh", as Nagorno-Karabakh called itself, remained unresolved.

Due to the imbalance of power, Azerbaijan gained control of the entire region in September 2023 after a lightning military operation. Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians left the green mountains and valleys. Most of them went to Armenia, one in ten to Russia.

Peace According to Its Own Rules

For Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, the conflict was thus resolved. On November 8, 2023, he celebrated the national victory over Armenia in a pompous military parade in the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, the warring states seem to be closer to a peace agreement than ever before. And yet we are far from true peace. Because Azerbaijan wants peace according to its own rules.

In the meantime, the authoritarian country is also making claims to regions that are located on Armenian territory. Specifically, it is about individual settlement areas, such as in the northern Armenian border region of Tavush. There are four uninhabited villages where Azerbaijanis lived until the early 1990s. They are located along the connecting road between the Armenian capital Yerevan and the Georgian border, so they are of strategic importance for Armenia. For Azerbaijan as well.

Another bone of contention is the demarcation of the almost 1000-kilometre-long common border. It is still closed and militarily occupied by both sides. Armenia wants to use military maps from the 1970s as the basis for a border agreement. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, wants a reassessment and in this way wants to hold many strategic positions.

Armenia wants to use military maps from the 1970s as the basis for a border agreement. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, wants a reassessment and in this way wants to hold many strategic positions.

Ilham Aliyev has stated that the Azerbaijani army will not retreat from positions taken during the fighting in May 2021 and September 2022 – even if they are on Armenian territory. Along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, firefights continue to occur even after the conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both sides reported fierce shootings in the spring of 2024. In a statement, in addition to clashes, the Armenian Foreign Ministry also reported the movement of military vehicles, accusing the neighbouring country of provocation.

Driven Armenia

Azerbaijan, which is currently militarily superior, is also trying to corner Armenia in other areas. As in Soviet times, Azerbaijan wants a land connection to its exclave of Nakhchivan, which lies between Armenia's west and Turkey. Secondly, the Sangesur corridor should be under Azerbaijani control – an absolute no-go for Armenia. From the Armenian point of view, the danger is too great that the south of the country, the Syunik region, will then fall to Azerbaijan, separated from the rest of the country. Aliyev had already threatened to do so in 2021 and he continues to pour oil on the fire: In recent television appearances, the Azerbaijani president refers to southern Armenia as "West Azerbaijan".

A land corridor through Armenia's Syunik region would also entail geostrategic disadvantages for Europe: Turkey and Azerbaijan would have control over a link between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, an important trade route between Europe and Central Asia.

In the meantime, there is hope for an agreement, at least on this point: Azerbaijan has announced that it will build a road to its exclave through Iran. This could also bring economic benefits to Iran. Iran, at its Northern frontier, borders Armenia and is close to it in the conflict, while Turkey sees Azerbaijan as a brother within the Turkic family.

Divisive Genocide

Turkey and Armenia are separated by the Ottoman genocide of over a million Armenians more than 100 years ago – the borders are closed, as are those between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And that's how it should stay, according to Aliyev: he will only grant the construction of the Iran route if his country's borders with Armenia remain closed. In both cases – whether via the corridor or Iran – Russia would also benefit from a connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. The country is interested in restoring Soviet-era railway links with Iran and Turkey.

This shows that, just as in the struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, other countries with their geopolitical interests are also interwoven in the new conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. A peaceful solution is not in everyone's interest. For Russia, for example, the wars over Nagorno-Karabakh had always meant good earning opportunities: the former Soviet republic sold weapons to both countries, even though Russia was considered Armenia's protecting power.

For Russia, for example, the wars over Nagorno-Karabakh had always meant good earning opportunities: the former Soviet republic sold weapons to both countries, even though Russia was considered Armenia's protecting power.

Since Russia invading Ukraine, Moscow's interest in the South Caucasus and its function as a protecting power for Armenia has dwindled. In Azerbaijan's victory in 2020, Russia acted as a peacemaker, sending 5,000 troops to Nagorno-Karabakh to ensure peace in the region by 2025. The Kremlin let Aliyev go anyway in 2023, even when Azerbaijan attacked Armenian territories in 2021 and 2022, Putin did not help Armenia. Good Armenian-Russian relations are history. Marija Sacharowa, the spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated on Telegram in early 2024 that Armenia would have to make concessions to Azerbaijan. From their point of view, the reason is Yerevan's deepening relations with the West.

Armenia is increasingly willing to make concessions, even without Russia's division of the world into "the good" and the "collective West". Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, for example, proposed returning Armenian-controlled Azerbaijani land. For this, Armenia would build roads that bypass Azerbaijani territory.

Fragile Democracy

But his offers to Ilham Aliyev are repeatedly met with reluctance in Armenia. In 2023, Pashinyan had to withstand a wave of protests. According to the Armenian government, Russia is fuelling these protests in order to overthrow the democratic government, which is already under pressure. The country with a population of just three million must now succeed in integrating more than 100,000 refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nikol Pashinyan is also exposed to pressure from outside: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, during his visit to Armenia in March this year, called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign a permanent peace agreement. Both sides are willing to do so in principle, but apart from the new conflicts, the neighbours cannot agree on a process. Armenia wants Western countries at its side for negotiations. However, Azerbaijan rejects a Western-led negotiation format and rejects offers of mediation from third countries.

Armenia wants Western countries at its side for negotiations. However, Azerbaijan rejects a Western-led negotiating format and rejects offers of mediation from third countries.

Ilham Aliyev would be most likely to include Turkey and Russia as regional actors. In this constellation, the European Union (EU) and the United States would be excluded, and the pressure on Armenia to make concessions would be greater. And this would continue to threaten Armenia's internal political stability and make it more vulnerable to external interference. That would also be detrimental to the EU. If it allowed only regional actors to have a say, it would lose credibility. Their commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine would thus be discredited.

So what can the EU do? It should support Armenia's foreign policy in asserting its national interests vis-à-vis Azerbaijan as far as possible. Otherwise, there is a risk that Armenia will fall into an unbalanced dependence on Azerbaijan and the regional powers. Further conflicts would be inevitable.

Economic Pressure and Extension of the Mandate

In order to prevent current escalations, an extension of the mandate of the EU mission in Armenia would be helpful. Their goal since 2023 has been to observe ceasefire violations. At the same time, Europe should exert diplomatic and economic pressure on Azerbaijan to prevent military force and establish a balance in the negotiations.

But both the US and the EU are showing little commitment. While condemning Azerbaijan's attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, the EU announced in the same breath that both parties would have to engage in a transparent dialogue. On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament also called for such a dialogue.

Overall, however, it seems that the EU simply wants to draw a line under the conflict. Especially since individual countries such as Italy and Germany do not want to jeopardize their good economic relations with Azerbaijan.

To prevent further escalation, the Europeans would also have to work diplomatically with other countries. On the issue of borders, for example, the EU could work to become a partner in the protection of transit routes or border crossings. The EU could offer technical assistance and investment to facilitate transit and connectivity in the wider region, while incentivising the opening of borders. The opening of the borders will be needed in the long term in order to establish lasting peace.

Lack of Dialogue on an Equal Footing

The biggest obstacle on the way to peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the lack of dialogue on an equal footing and a rapprochement that does not take place only between the politicians. Contacts with the other side have hardly been possible for over 30 years. Also due to the closed borders. There are very few people in either country who have not been affected by the wars over Nagorno-Karabakh themselves or who know people affected in their immediate environment. 20,000 to 30,000 deaths, more than 100,000 refugees and war crimes committed by both sides have led to a division between the two countries.

In order to prevent a further hardening of the fronts, the EU should work more actively towards genuine reconciliation. This can be achieved by supporting civil society actors on both sides. The Armenian non-governmental organization "Women's Agenda", for example, is trying to move closer to Azerbaijan.

Basically, scientists, researchers or artists, as multipliers of both sides, need frameworks where they can meet. This is the only way to gradually dismantle the strong nationalism and hatred that both countries have been stirring up for decades.

In Azerbaijan, on the other hand, there are hardly any opportunities to get involved in civil society. The authoritarian regime prevents such initiatives, especially if they are not conducive to national pride. But there are Azerbaijani peace activists abroad who, as in the Armenian-Azerbaijani organization "Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation" in Berlin, are committed to peace with dialogue events and the reappraisal of history.

Basically, scientists, researchers or artists need opportunities to meet as multipliers on both sides. This is the only way to gradually dismantle the strong nationalism and hatred that both countries have been stirring up for decades. Such exchanges and cooperation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis is currently only possible in projects that are funded, for example, by the EU and take place in neutral states such as Georgia. People who bring peaceful attitudes and not military solutions to their own countries are crucial for long-term peace. From the point of view of the above-mentioned organizations, the respective suffering, expulsions and pogroms, for example, must be addressed.

Coming to Terms With Ethnic Cleansing

The ethnic cleansing of both sides must be dealt with. In 1992, for example, there was one in the city of Khojaly in Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, Armenian and Russian soldiers killed several hundred people of Azerbaijani origin. And there were pogroms against the Armenian population in the Azerbaijani cities of Sumgait (1988) and Baku (1990).

The triggers and culprits of such acts often cannot be clearly named, and the events were subsequently politically instrumentalized. In contrast to authoritarian Azerbaijan, counter-narratives are publicly possible in Armenia. Armenia, which has been halfway democratic since the 2018 revolution, also allows attempts to come to terms with its own history.

Nevertheless, the influence of peace and especially women's organizations on the government and the peace process is hardly greater in Armenia than in Azerbaijan. This is due to the unequal treatment of women and men, which does not exist by law, but which can be found at all levels in everyday life. As a result, women's organisations often have to use international levers to be heard by their own government.

Armenia, which has been halfway democratic since the 2018 revolution, also allows attempts to come to terms with its own history.

Here, too, the EU could do more. The goal should be to involve women on both sides in the peace negotiations. After all, peace agreements are more than 60 percent more successful when women participate in them. This is shown by a study of the „Geneva Graduate Institute"1,which analysed 40 peace processes as of October 2022. Their statistical analysis shows a significant correlation between peace agreements signed by female delegates and lasting peace.

Strengthening Societal Resilience

Fundamentally, it is now more important than ever to strengthen Armenia's social resilience. Because a democracy can only survive with a strong civil society, Armenia needs help from outside to strengthen its civil society. Humanitarian support for refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh must also be ensured. Their integration has a major impact on political stability in the country.

A peace treaty and accompanying security guarantees for Armenia are still possible. Azerbaijan can choose either to sign a treaty that strengthens its international prestige or to sabotage the process in such a way that a military escalation can be constructed and justified from its point of view.

It should not be underestimated that an ongoing conflict is helping Ilham Aliyev to consolidate his power within the country. In the end, it is the Azerbaijani president who has the greatest influence on whether a landmark peace agreement is reached. But even then, lasting peace in the region can only be guaranteed if Armenia can assert itself in the negotiations. In the current situation, the country cannot do this without the help of the EU and the USA.

About the Author
Ira Peter
Journalist and Blogger

Ira Peter is a German journalist and blogger who was born in Kazakhstan. She studied literature and psychology at the universities of Heidelberg and Nice. Since 2017, she has been publicly addressing Russian-German issues in journalistic articles, social media, cultural projects in Germany and Ukraine, in the Aussiedler (resettler) podcast "Steppenkinder" and as a speaker at events. In 2022, Ira Peter was an ifa cultural assistant and interviewed people of German origin from Ukraine about their experiences and their current situation during the Russian war against their homeland.

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