Illustration: Hands pull apart a power cable with plug.

The Western Balkans: The Genesis of the Frozen Conflict Lines

12.09.2023

By Beqë Cufaj

How can Europe learn from the experiences of recent decades in the Western Balkans? First of all, through an analysis of what happened, the genesis of the frozen lines of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On this basis, the European Union and its Member States should develop a coherent foreign, development, security and migration policy.

The Western Balkans and the states that emerged from the bloody wars of the 1990s in former Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia and Kosovo—continue to move at different speeds towards the adoption of European values and the institutionalization of their relations. While Slovenia and later Croatia have already secured their place at the European family table, the rest of the former family of nations that constituted the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia is still trying to overcome problems of two kinds: internal democratic development and interethnic tensions.

A Seat at the European Peace Table

Countries of the Western Balkans and their status for admission to the European Union, August 2015, Graphic: dpa-infografik via picture alliance

Internal democratic struggles are particularly pronounced in Montenegro and North Macedonia. Tectonic political shifts have brought to the fore a new generation of politicians and democratic governments as a result of vigorously disputed voting tests. Power rotations seem to occur without interference. Both in Podgorica and Skopje the internal democratic order of the two small Balkan republics seems to be stable, it’s political protagonists preferring stability over chaos.

This is also due to the fact that both Brussels and Washington in parallel with challenges posed by the democratic tests involved in the EU accession process—tasks that will still continue for several years—have, for years and decades, been investing massively in the two countries. The aim is to reform their armies and meet the conditions for NATO membership.

It turned out that this vision of Brussels and Washington was more than accurate. After Putin's invasion of Ukraine, Russia is finding it even more difficult to exert its influence on the Western Balkans, as a solid majority of these countries have their seats in NATO and are thus part of the Western strategy against any Russian threat in the region.

Three problem states still pose a major challenge to the West two and a half decades after the end of the Balkan wars: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. In these three countries, not only does democratic progress seem to have stalled, but the threat of ethnic escalation following Russia's attack on Ukraine has heightened fears of a possible Putin-led infiltration that could lead to a new front in Europe. Like it or not, both Europe and the U.S. are paying the price for the many concessions they have, for a decade, made to the main instigator and organizer of the destructive Balkan wars, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.

For ten years, from 1990 to 2000, Brussels and Washington, Paris, London and Berlin sought arrangements with a man who took the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the unrest in North Macedonia and Montenegro not only to be a strategic approach aiming at the formation of a "Greater Serbia", but also as the only means of maintaining his power in Serbia. Each retreat from a battlefield opened a new one—step by step and year by year.

Faithfully Serving Personalities

However, the two countries that suffered the most from these wars—triggered by their immediate neighbor Serbia—were undoubtedly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Now it is a fact that Serbia in 2023 is not the same as it was in 1995 when the war in Bosnia or 1999 when the war in Kosovo ended. But it is also a fact that the key figures in today's Serbian politics are personalities who faithfully served the regime of Slobodan Milošević at that time. The current president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, was the Minister of Information in the Milošević government in 1999, while the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić, was the spokesman for the Socialist Party of Serbia then led by Slobodan Milošević.

Is this the reason for the difficulties these two states have with today's Serbia? Undoubtedly. In early 2000, the new Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić attempted to create another, ‘democratic’ Serbia. Đinđić was assassinated by Serbian paramilitaries, leading to a resurgence of a toxic nationalist discourse in Serbia.

After Putin's invasion of Ukraine, Russia is finding it even more difficult to exert its influence on the Western Balkans […].

Serbia has never reconciled with the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, much less with that of Kosovo. Following the defeat of the Serbian military and paramilitaries, the nature of the so-called Serbian ’war‘ and the battles for Serbian territories in Bosnia and Kosovo certainly differed from those of Milošević. ’Serbian territories‘ were renamed the ’Serbian world‘ according to the tactics developed by Vučić and his allies.

The ’Serbian World’

The ‘Serbian world’ has become a term used and applied by Belgrade to justify all actions Serbia undertakes in favor of the Serbs outside the borders of the Serbian state. This includes the constant launching of new verbal disputes with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia, as well as the provocative mention of a geopolitical alliance with Russia, China and, if necessary, with Germany and the U.S.

It comprises economic investments, the threat of escalation and new conflicts and, above all, the instrumentalization of the Serbian leadership in Bosnia and Kosovo to make life in these two states as difficult as possible. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo remain under the spell of their Belgrade-controlled Serbian element even after their independence. Two decades after the wars, rapprochement with the EU is the only carrot for the region. Belgrade holds the key to this and, paradoxically, with its policy of blackmail, is the biggest beneficiary of the European integration process.

Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo remain under the spell of their Belgrade-controlled Serbian element even after their independence. Two decades after the wars, rapprochement with the EU is the only carrot for the region.

Serbia, more than any other state in the region, has made progress in EU membership negotiations. The ‘carrot and stick’ policy for the former Yugoslavia has benefited the policies of Vučić and Dačić more than Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo. This is also due to the fact that the internal organization of these two states gives considerable political power to the Serbs in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Serbs in northern Kosovo: any decision related to their internal administration requires their approval, starting with constitutional amendments and ending with the lifting of parliamentary paralysis.

Serbian President Aleksander Vučić in front of EU flag. — Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić at a meeting with EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák (not pictured), Belgrade, Serbia, 05 July 2023, Photo: Amir Amazagic / AA via picture alliance

People shaking hands. — Signing of the Balkan Treaty at the Elysee Palace in Paris on December 14, 1995, photo: Michel Lipchitz / Associated Press via picture alliance

The Dayton Peace Conference, held in the United States in November and December 1995, was a compromise in favor of Milošević's interests and thus also of the Serbs. The creation of a kind of internal confederation with two entities – Serbs and Bosnian Croats – makes Bosnia and Herzegovina even now, 30 years after the bloody war a state that is deeply paralyzed and dysfunctional, since any decision requires a consensus of all three entities.

This consensus is hardly reached, especially due to the Serbian entity, also known as Republika Srpska, which sees itself more as a republic under the control of Serbia than as part of the Bosnian-Croat federation. To make the tragedy even more perfect, the Western coordinator exercising oversight of this country’s integration efforts has the authority to suspend any decision of the three entities.

However, the High Representative cannot change anything about the Dayton Peace Agreement. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a labyrinthine state where, even after 30 years, Western leaders and diplomats come and go, none of whom seem to have any understanding of what happened there in the 90s, let alone in Dayton. They come across the legacy of the Serb, Croat and Bosnian conflicts of the 90s and cannot change anything.

Everyone (in the West) is satisfied with the fact that there is no serious risk of interethnic conflicts. Whenever there is a threat of conflict, the leaders of the powerful Quint states (USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy) send their envoys to knock on Belgrade's door, and the situation calms down. The mechanisms by which crises are resolved always produce new crises. This endless cycle is nourished by the naïve hope that things will naturally improve through the process of EU integration.

The second, equally complicated problem, the relationship between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia. It poses an even greater risk of triggering a new conflict in the Western Balkans. The West first tried to deal generously with the Kosovo conflict, at least initially. After losing the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, and after the Dayton Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milošević returned to his first crime scene – Kosovo.

Exhausted by the Pacifist Political Discourse

Exhausted by the pacifist political discourse of the then leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, and politically disillusioned with Germany, Switzerland and America, young Albanian men and women of Kosovo, began to organize themselves in an effort of self-defense against Milošević's troops. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the insurgent organization of Kosovo Albanians was active for only one year, from 1998 to 1999. It moved away from Rugova's pacifist agenda and thus attracted the attention of the West.

The final chapter of the disintegration of Yugoslavia had begun. Mass killings of Albanian civilians and the punishment of entire villages in Kosovo served as both a warning and a lesson to the West, especially after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This led to the proposal to hold a Dayton-style conference for Kosovo in the hope of preventing bloodshed like the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The donor conferences and the promises made by the West for the region's European accession perspective were innumerable.

Encouraged by the success he had achieved with peace in Bosnia, Milošević sent his delegation to the Castle of Rambouillet near Paris. Many books have been written and much testimony has been given about what happened behind the walls of this castle. What is known, however, is that Milošević, encouraged by his success in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only lost Kosovo but also his power as a result of his mistakes made at Rambouillet.

By refusing to grant autonomy to the Albanians, withdraw his paramilitary forces, reduce the presence of regular Serbian military troops in Kosovo, and allow UN peacekeepers to enter, the West had no choice but to intervene militarily with NATO air strikes. This happened without the consent of the UN, as Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution.

Obviously, relations between Kosovo and Serbia would have been different if Milošević had accepted the proposal of the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy for a partial withdrawal of the army to the barracks and granted Kosovo extensive autonomy within Serbia. But Milošević decided to go to war. During the three-month NATO air strike, more than ten thousand people died, around a million were displaced.

In June 1999, when Milošević withdrew his army from Kosovo and NATO entered, a new chapter began in the relations between the two countries. Kosovo came under the administration of the UN, while Serbia had to wage its internal war to free itself from its dictator Milošević. Thus, the past century ended with a war in Europe, precisely in the same region where the First World War began – in the Balkans.

The donor conferences and the promises made by the West for the region's European accession perspective were innumerable. Ethnic tensions in Macedonia and the rapid intervention of the West, as well as the unrest in Serbia, further weakened Milošević's regime, and brought about the massive support the promising new Serbian leader Zoran Đinđić received from the West.

The fragile peace in Kosovo, backed by the strong American presence and that of other NATO forces, massive investments throughout the peninsula, the EU's written commitment in the Thessaloniki Declaration that all the countries of the Western Balkans have a place in the European Union led to great hopes that the first decades of this century would become brighter for the Balkan peoples traumatised by ferocious nationalism than the past, war-torn decade.

It seemed as if Europe and America had learned from their mistakes and wanted to move the Balkans forward with determination to make it part of their community of values. But history teaches us to always be ready for nasty surprises

The fragile peace in Kosovo, backed by the strong U.S. presence and that of other NATO forces, massive investments and the EU's commitment to provide a place for all Western Balkan countries, led to great hopes, photo by Senior Airman Greg L. Davis / DoD via picture alliance

New Fronts

With the 9/11 terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the US and the opening of new fronts in NATO's global ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and later against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Western Balkans slipped significantly in the list of priorities of the Western powers. The promise of swift EU membership turned into crisis management, with peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, ambassadorial visits, and a carrot-and-stick policy for troublemakers.

It is perhaps not entirely fair to say that the West had completely forgotten about the Balkans. However, proposed perspectives and delivered analyses—always beginning and ending with the same formula of a possible revival of ethnic conflicts—eventually led to the fact that each nation’s only choice was to chose between ethnic leaders who had fought each other for a decade. With the fragile peace and the new state structures came new dimensions of corruption which, in the course of privatization, spread to the new states and their administrations, still encouraged by international aid. It gave rise to new political and economic elites whose narrative differed little from the destabilizing rhetoric of the 1990s.

The promise of swift EU membership turned into crisis management, with peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, ambassadorial visits, and a carrot-and-stick policy for troublemakers.

The people of Kosovo, however, which was under the inefficient administration of the United Nations and secured by NATO troops, began to lose patience with the endless delays. The assassination attempt on Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić is the most convincing example and argument that the very country that was the main instigator of devastating wars not only showed no willingness to confront its monstrous past but glorified it and its nationalist leader.

Consequently, it was inevitable that the neighboring countries, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, would see the possible Serbian threat every morning even before they did anything else. After all, more than a century of history had taught them that all evil comes from a hostile neighbor. While Bosnia and Herzegovina fell into oblivion, it was Kosovo that needed to be repaired.

EU member states such as Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia still do not recognize this act of the small Balkan country, even 15 years after the declaration of Kosovo's statehood, due to their own ‘internal’ territorial autonomy problems.

This happened when, shortly before the end of his second term, US President George Bush rallied his allies for the declaration of Kosovo's independence, first under international supervision, and then with all political powers. Independence was the result of lengthy and exhaustive negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade in Vienna, brokered by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.

Since Belgrade not only refused to accept any form of Kosovar statehood but also glorified its past with nationalist leaders, the West was forced to support Kosovo in the unilateral act of declaring independence on February 17, 2008. It was the first time since the end of the Kosovo war that the great powers refocused on the Balkans and endorsed a new state. Within only two years, the International Court of Justice in The Hague recognized the Declaration of Independence as a legitimate act of statehood.

However, not all Western states were satisfied with this step by Kosovo and the great powers. EU member states such as Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia still do not recognize this act of the small Balkan country, even 15 years after the declaration of Kosovo's statehood, due to their own ‘internal’ territorial autonomy problems.

About the Author

Beqë Cufaj

Author, Ambassador (ret.)

Beqë Cufaj (born 1970) was born in Deçan, Kosovo. He has written for the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) for years and has also published several novels and essay books. From 2018 to 2021, Cufaj held the position of Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo in Germany. Today, he resides in Berlin with his family.

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