Man with alu hat cleans surface from chemtrails.

The Power of Conspiracy

Conspiracy theories have a long history. And today, with the advent of fake news and internet trolls, they are more prevalent than ever. Their impact on the public also depends on a nation’s cultural factors.

Conspiracy theories. Hardly a day goes by without the term appearing in the news, and a quick search reveals countless books and websites uncovering alleged conspiracies. And it’s true that conspiracy theories are experiencing a renaissance in terms of their dissemination and impact.

This is being fuelled by two factors: the advent of the internet and the rise of populist movements. In Europe and the US, conspiracy theories are much less influential than in the past, but their impact on politics is once again proving to be highly problematic.

US political scientist Michael Barkun identifies three characteristics of conspiracy theories: they assume that nothing happens by chance, nothing is as it seems, and everything is connected. So conspiracy theorists believe in the existence of a secret group – the conspirators. They are systematically plotting to take control of an institution, a country or even the whole world, or they have done so in the past and now want to consolidate and expand their power. Therefore, conspiracy theories convey an almost romantic image of today’s world and humankind. They assume that small groups of people can put their intentions into practice over the space of years, decades or even centuries – such as the conspiracy theories about the Illuminati. Since this contradicts the assumptions of modern social sciences that emphasise chaos, contingency, and structural factors, Barkun describes conspiracy theories as ‘stigmatised knowledge’.

Conspiracy theories became increasingly stigmatised and migrated from the centre of society to the fringe. In the terminology of the sociology of knowledge, they moved from being orthodox knowledge to heterodox knowledge and the term “conspiracy theorist” became an insult.

They may have a considerable following, but they are not taken seriously by the scientific discourse and the public at large because they are based on false assumptions. The people who formulate them must expect to be excluded from the scientific community and may even be socially ostracised.

However, this diagnosis only applies to the last few decades and to the Western world. From the 18th century until well into the 20th century, conspiracy theories were both mainstream and elite phenomena in Europe and North America. The scientific debate of the time made it inevitable, as demonstrated by numerous studies.

The mechanistic world view of the 18th century promoted belief in conspiracies and the belief that the moral quality of an action always corresponded to the intention that motivated it. Accordingly, intellectuals and politicians believed that large-scale conspiracies determined the course of history.

Echo Chambers and Filter Bubbles

Businessmen walk around with boxes on their heads and cell phones in their hands.
The internet has significantly accelerated and intensified the fragmentation of Western societies: Former subcultures have become virtual and real counterpublics, photo: Sergey Nivens/Shotshop via picture alliance

Conspiracy theories only began to lose this status in the late 1950s, when they became increasingly stigmatised and migrated from the centre of society to the fringe. In the terminology of the sociology of knowledge, they moved from being orthodox knowledge to heterodox knowledge and the term ‘conspiracy theorist’ became an insult.

However, this loss of legitimacy was limited to the US and parts of Europe. In the Arab world and Eastern Europe, conspiratorial ideas continue to be part of everyday discourse. Bookshops in every major Arab airport stock the latest edition of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the most notorious conspiracy theory text of all time. Meanwhile, in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s chief ideologist Alexander Dugin has even elevated ‘conspirology’ to the status of a scientific discipline. Politicians in these countries adopt such ways of thinking as naturally and uncritically as the media that report them.

However, it should be stressed that conspiracy theories retained a degree of popularity in the West, it’s just that they disappeared from the public eye, where they were no longer accepted, and migrated to subcultures. Conspiracy theorists had a correspondingly difficult time reaching a wider audience. They often had to self-publish, and as a result, their alternative explanations had little impact. Anyone who doubted that John F. Kennedy was actually killed by a lone gunman or that the Americans really landed on the moon had to invest a lot of time and effort into finding alternative explanations for these events. This meant doubts often failed to solidify into conspiracy theories.

But all this changed with the advent of the internet. It is now very easy for conspiracy theorists to present their ideas to their fellow man (or, more rarely, fellow woman). You only have to Google: ‘What’s happening in Ukraine?’ or ‘Who’s responsible for the refugee crisis?’ to find links to conspiracy sites on the first or second results page, depending on the particular search algorithm. As a result, the internet increases the visibility and availability of conspiracy theories, and it means that conspiracy theorists are now more connected, making it easier to solidify their beliefs. As a result, more people once again believe in conspiracy theories.

When studies show that more than half of Americans believe in at least one conspiracy theory, or that popular theories in Germany resonate with a quarter to a third of the population, it is clear that they are affecting more people than thirty years ago, though still much less than a hundred or two hundred years ago. It seems we are indeed experiencing a renaissance of conspiracism, but we are not (yet) living in an age of conspiracy theories.

But the fact that the situation has drastically changed over the last twenty years is partly due to how the internet has significantly accelerated and intensified the fragmentation of Western societies. Former subcultures on the fringes of society have become virtual and real subpublics and counterpublics with their own media systems generating their own truths.

Populism and Conspiracy

People in Germany who get all their information from Russia Today, KenFm and Compact magazine live in a totally different world to someone who reads the respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and watches public broadcaster ARD. In some of these echo chambers and filter bubbles, conspiracy theories have once again become orthodox knowledge, while they are still stigmatised in other parts of the public sphere. To put it simply, some people are afraid of conspiracies and others are afraid of conspiracy theories.

On the other hand, the presence of conspiracy theories in the (far-right) populist movements that have been gaining enormous traction in the US and Europe over recent years is a source of concern to many observers. This is explained by a series of parallels between populism and conspiracy theories: both are conservative in the sense that they are concerned with preserving a threatened order or restoring a lost order. Both tend to be based on a sense of nostalgia for a past that never existed. Both reduce the complex political arena, in which a multitude of actors are pursuing partly identical, partly divergent goals, to a binary opposition: the people against the elites in populism and the victims of conspiracy against the conspirators in conspiracism. Since becoming stigmatised, conspiracy theorists tend to accuse elites of plotting, so populism and conspiracy theories generally target the same group.

In Hungary, where conspiracy theories have always retained more legitimacy than in the West, Prime Minister Orbán can openly accuse American philanthropist George Soros of orchestrating a secret plan for the Islamisation of Europe, known as the “great replacement” theory.

Ultimately, conspiracy theories provide a specific explanation of why the elite is acting against the interests of the people. Non-conspiratorial populists might state that elites are detached, corrupt and simply looking to enrich themselves. But for conspiracy theorists, they are part of a plot whose interests run diametrically opposed to those of the people. But when it comes to joint protests, it generally makes little difference whether or not they are accusing the elite of conspiracy. They can all chant ‘Merkel out’, regardless of whether they believe the Chancellor is simply useless or whether they see her as being part of a global conspiracy.

Equal Stigmatisation

After all, populism and conspiracy theory are equally stigmatised. In everyday discourse, both are generally used in a derogatory way and often even as explicit insults. We can, therefore, assume that members of populist movements who reject conspiracy theories may still sympathise with their supporters because they are also looked down on by the elites.

Despite a lack of reliable data on how many supporters of populist movements believe in conspiracy theories about power elites, initial surveys and studies suggest that although they are not in a majority, they make up a significant proportion. So it is hardly surprising that populist leaders regularly seek to fuel these conspiracies. This is where conspiracy theories can turn into fake news. They are usually spread by people who are genuinely convinced that they have uncovered a hidden truth, but we can assume that not all populist leaders really believe their claims.

The degree to which populist leaders are able to articulate these claims depends on the specific national context, and particularly on whether conspiracy theories are orthodox or heterodox knowledge. In Hungary, where conspiracy theories have always retained more legitimacy than in the West, Prime Minister Orbán can openly accuse American philanthropist George Soros of orchestrating a secret plan for the Islamisation of Europe, known as the ‘great replacement’ theory.

Scoring Point With Former Non-Voters

In the US, Donald Trump also made strategic use of conspiracy theories in his election campaign. This strategy worked for two reasons: firstly, conspiracy theories are even more widespread in the US than in Europe, which is why Trump was able to score points with them, especially among former non-voters. Secondly, in the extremely polarised political climate of the US, many voters supported him not because of, but in spite of, his conspiracy theories – simply because he was the Republican candidate.

In Germany, this public espousal of conspiracy theories would still be counterproductive. Conspiracy theories such as the ‘great replacement’ are very popular with Pegida supporters and the AfD’s base, and parts of these theories have been integrated into the party’s manifesto. Despite this, the AfD’s leaders are still reluctant to explicitly articulate conspiracy theories in public, because they are aware that they are still very stigmatised in Germany and would deter voters.

A man holds up a Q sign in colors of the U.S. flag.
Conspiracy theories are even more widespread in the US than in Europe, which is why Trump was able to score points with them, especially among former non-voters, photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS | Matt Rourke via picture alliance

As a result, they make insinuations that are understood by the initiated but not by the general public. However, the AfD has had a lasting impact on the public discourse as a whole, not only but chiefly with regard to migration and refugees. The CDU’s sister party the CSU has now fully adopted the AfD’s line. When we bear in mind that these are essentially fuelled by conspiracy theories, it becomes clear that such theories also have a political impact on Germany, though not – yet – to such a direct extent as in other countries.

About the Author
Michael Butter
Professor of American Literary and Cultural History

Michael Butter is a German specialist in American studies. He has been Professor of American Literary and Cultural History at the University of Tübingen since 2014. His research interests include conspiracy theories, film and television, the colonial period and the Early Republic. An English translation of his recent publication Nichts ist, wie es scheint: Über Verschwörungstheorien, Edition Suhrkamp Berlin 2018 is due to be published in 2020. This article is based on an article that appeared on the Forschung und Lehre website, a German site that provides information on the latest academic research.

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