The Tunisian Tsunami and Its Aftermath

On March19 the world commemorates the anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq in 2003. By coincidence, it was on 19 March 2011 that the Anglo-French intervention in Libya began. The USA’s initial reluctance to be dragged into the conflict backed up our view that Paris and London were keen to seize the opportunity to re-establish themselves as regional and global powers outside Washington’s control, after the humiliation of Suez in 1956, when they had to withdraw their troops under pressure from the USA and the Soviet Union. This applies even more in light of the USA’s declining influence in the region and the shift in US interests from Western Europe and the Mediterranean to Asia.

In 2011 the EU was suddenly forced to decide whether it would make a multilateral response to the upheavals or whether its Member States would react individually, based on their own national interests. This emerging division within the EU was reflected in the opposition between the oil-rich and the poor countries of the Arab world.

Once the tumult of the Arab Spring gathered pace, the oil-rich regimes were more effective at fending off attempts to unseat them. The King of Saudi Arabia provides a good example – on returning from a trip to the USA for medical treatment, he poured 140 billion dollars into social welfare. Initially, the European Union reacted hesitantly to the ‘Jasmine Revolution’, but over time it responded more and more decisively to this uprising as it developed into a tsunami whose waves reached Egypt, Libya, Syria and even the Gulf States.

We should not forget how, in its formative stages, the European Economic Community (EEC) initiated a Mediterranean Policy because France, a former colonial country, wanted to continue to maintain it’s presence and influence, even after Tunisia and Morocco gained independence in 1956.

The former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was replaced by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its remit was expanded to include joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilisation, and, as if these were not taxing enough in themselves, the fight against terrorism. 

For many years, France under President Jacques Chirac tried to create a European military force with the UK and Germany.

Ironically, less than 18 months after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the EU stood on the sidelines as France and the UK carried out a military intervention on the Union’s doorstep under the auspices of NATO. 

Although part of the problem may have been the EU’s internal ‘burden-sharing’ – similar to the one between the US and its European allies within NATO – EU members have been struggling with the thorny question of cost. Other differences of an ideological nature emerged within France when philosopher Regis Debray initiated a sharp and public debate with former Foreign Affairs Minister Hubert Vedrine about the reintegration of France into NATO.

Despite its slow response to the Arab Spring, the EU did generally adopt a comprehensive, rational, and very generous policy towards its Mediterranean neighbours. What other implications did the Arab Spring have?

• The Arab Spring has revealed the failure of neo-liberalism, showing that the market and economic growth on their own are not sufficient to bring about social change.
• After their united surge for liberty, Mediterranean societies have become fragmented and ideologically divided. Their thirst for freedom of expression and association led to the artificial creation of some 114 political parties, some of which had only 4 or 5 members.

Today we have to ask ourselves how the Arab Spring has affected the EU’s Mediterranean policy and to what extent the EU has been able to reassure its Mediterranean neighbours that it has genuine and good intentions in the region. This is all the more relevant now that the destabilisation of the whole region and of some individual countries – particularly Libya and Syria – is making it more difficult for the EU to offer aid. At times it is very dangerous for the personnel who are based in these countries, some of which have already been infiltrated by jihadists.

The EU now has to deal with a great many concerns. These include the fear of more social polarisation at a time when the transition phase seemed so promising and when Tunisia was, and still is, considered to be the Arab Spring country that not only has the best chances of success, but also of being the best potential model for the other Arab states.

The EU’s offer to help the Arab Spring countries to achieve sustainable economic growth is closely linked to the establishment of democratic institutions. These will be necessary for the creation of a peaceful socio-economic environment that is attractive to investors. Unfortunately it currently seems unlikely that there will be any major changes in the foreseeable future, due to the fact that tourism is such an important source of income in Tunisia and Egypt.

It becomes even more complicated for the EU to offer assistance when it has to address each case according to its specific needs, as the countries are so different geographically, ethnically, and politically.

The EU has been very wise in identifying the positive aspects of the Arab Spring, such as democratic elections. But here too, after a short period of optimism, the situation in Tunisia and in Egypt has now sunk into uncertainty. Too often, all we see are efforts to ‘build a democracy without democrats’. The EU’s wisdom is also seen in its awareness that the transition towards democracy may take more time, perhaps years rather than months. This ‘strategic patience’ on the part of the EU is linked to some strict conditions. 

The EU has made it clear that its aid comes with conditions. Its aid recipients have to play their part by creating the economic and institutional tools that lead to democratisation. 

In its clearest expression of support for its Mediterranean partners, the EU has also strongly recommended that the parties concerned should work towards their own regional integration. During EEC debates about the Yaounde Convention in the early 1960s and more especially during my time at the EEC as a guest researcher for the European Commission in the early 1970s, a German member of the Commission who was in charge of EU-Maghreb relations told me how difficult it was for the EU to convince the Maghreb states that it was truly in their interests to achieve regional integration in order to be better equipped to negotiate with the EEC.

That of how to build a genuine co-existence based on mutual trust, respect, and tolerance within each country and across the Mediterranean. What role can cultural or civil society initiatives play?

Although scholarships and academic collaborations already exist, it falls to EUNIC and its counterparts in the Maghreb and the Middle East (if they exist) to be very creative in initiating a strategic plan for forms of cultural, religious and civic cooperation. All of Europe, with its large Muslim communities and its Mediterranean Muslim partners, is facing one common enemy: the radicalisation of religious and xenophobic movements that are robbing the three monotheistic religions of their Shalom! Pax! Salam!

Although scholarships and academic collaborations already exist, it falls to EUNIC and its counterparts in the Maghreb and the Middle East (if they exist) to be very creative in initiating a strategic plan for forms of cultural, religious and civic cooperation.

In a letter dated 8 February1952 from General Charles de Gaulle to the French Orientalist, Vincent Monteil to thank the latter for a copy of his book Les Musulmans Sovietiques, General de Gaulle wrote: “By reading you, we learn that everything is in the Islamic universe, and the problem of problems is in the destiny of Islam.” Half a century later, Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours find themselves facing many obligations. They have to find the best educational and cultural means of attaining maximum mutual respect and tolerance.

Seminars could also be organised on both shores of the Mediterranean to commemorate and study the pioneers of peace-making in the context of the general Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The EU’s Mediterranean policy can never make genuine, meaningful progress without a final, comprehensive and just Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

The late French Orientalist Jacques Berque taught us a valuable lesson about Islamism. In his analysis of a book by Egyptian jurist Mohammed Aal-Ashmaw, he tried to show the connections between Islamists from Hassan Al-Banna to Ayatollah Khomeini. Berque’s key point was that throughout the centuries Islam has not been used for theological debate but as a political and ideological substitute.

Ultimately, a parallel study of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a comparative study of religions will help EUNIC, Europe, and the southern Mediterranean partners to better understand the compatibility between Divine Law and Human Rights, especially at a time when there is a real and urgent need for global awareness and sensitivity towards the ‘Other’.

As for the dire and sometimes tragic problem of illegal migration from North Africa via the island of Lampedusa, the Mediterranean partners need to recognise its impact on relations between EU members, and in particular between major EU members that border the Mediterranean. In his book published more than ten years ago, President Moncef Marzouki puts forward some important ideas for his northern EU partners in the context of the 5+5 dialogue.

In conclusion, we can turn to another great intellectual and expert in peace studies, Professor Johan Galtung. He understood the culture of violence to mean those cultural aspects incarnated by religion and ideology, language and art that serve to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence. “If the opposite of violence is peace, then the opposite of the culture of violence is the culture of peace, that is the aspects of a culture which would serve to justify and to legitimise direct peace and structural peace.”