

CULTURE REPORT

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PROGRESS EUROPE

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Imprint

Publisher: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) and Robert Bosch Stiftung, in cooperation with British Council Germany, Schweizer Kulturstiftung Pro Helvetia and Stiftung für Deutsch-Polnische Zusammenarbeit

Editors: Sebastian Körber, Jenni Roth (ifa); Detlef Thelen (British Council)

Collaboration: Dr. Stephan Hollensteiner, Claudia Judt, Kornelia Serwotka

Design: Eberhard Wolf

Photos: Bettina Flitner

Address: Charlottenplatz 17, 70173 Stuttgart

Print: Offizin Andersen Nexö Leipzig

Translation: Barbara Andrunik, Agna Baranowa, Małgorzata Gula, Dr. Stephan Hollensteiner, Krystyna Kopczyńska, Marielle Larré, Jenni Roth, Henning Schimpf, Angelika Welt, Birgit Wittlinger

Europe Needs Emotions



When I was a boy, I dreamt of a Europe without borders. Now I am travelling across Europe – virtually and in reality – without showing my passport. I even pay with one currency, but where is my emotion?” Wim Wenders asks himself in this report. Many citizens of Europe – particularly young people who neither feel represented by the institutions of the European Union nor see their needs addressed – feel exactly the same as the German film director, which does not surprise Wenders. According to him, nobody loves their country because of its politics or its market strategies. In its external relations and its internal interactions with its inhabitants, Europe always uses economic or political arguments. Emotional aspects do not feature.

However, the representatives of the European institutions in Brussels have long understood that they have to revive the concept of European unity. “A soulless organism is dead. A unified Europe needs a soul“, was the presumption the former President of the EU Commission, Jacques Delors, made once. His current successor José Manuel Barroso even goes one step further: “Europe is the cornerstone for the sense of cohesion required by Europe“, he stated at the Berlin Conference in November 2006. Europe – “having ‘invented’ tolerance towards individuals, their opinions, convictions and differences – has to make its special voice heard.

Culture and cultural policy play a vital strategic role in the European process of unification. Yet what is their practical use? What is the situation of cultural relations in Europe? Which contributions can European cultural policy make to form a European identity? In order to find potential answers,

the Robert Bosch Stiftung has launched this Culture Report in cooperation with the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen. I would like to thank the authors who have dealt with these questions from various points of view. And I am delighted that our projects partners - British Council Germany, the Schweizer Kulturstiftung (Swiss Cultural Foundation) Pro Helvetia and the Stiftung für Deutsch-Polnische Zusammenarbeit (Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation) - supported the publication of this report in English, French and Polish.

Ingrid Hamm

Executive Director, Robert Bosch Stiftung

Culture on the Rise



What do some have and do not want any longer and others long for so much? While most Americans admire Europe as the museum of high culture – even if they have emptied their Bordeaux bottle down the drain with ostentation – as Andrew Ian Port describes wryly in his contribution to this report – Europe is still looking for an identity. Even fifty years after the foundation of the European Union, pan-European media projects are still progressing slowly and even urgent transnational problems are mainly discussed in a national context. Is Europe really just “an agglomeration amiably arranged – but lacking any wish or ability for deeper conversation”, as conjectured by the British columnist and former editor-in-chief of the “Guardian”, Peter Preston? Even if one does not agree with this pessimistic view, one thing is certain: Those who think that the European Union would only need a bit more PR to explain its agreements better are on the wrong track. Those who take the project of European unification seriously perceive a stronger challenge for European cultural policy than ever before to shift the actual substance of European unification to the foreground; Europe has a lot to offer to this world. It represents enlightenment, belief in progress and tolerance. It has a lot of experience with the transformation of countries and societies into democracies, constitutional states and market economies. It offers attractive scholarship programmes, international libraries and a rich world cultural heritage in the arts, in music, literature and film.

This report examines the constituents of cultural Europe very closely. Among the authors are cultural policy makers, journalists, education ex-

perts, theatre and film-makers, festival organisers and scientists from all over the world. I would like to thank all these authors as well as the Robert Bosch Stiftung – which enabled the realisation of this book together with the ifa. And I would particularly like to thank the many translators who enabled its publication in four languages. Their work – largely taking place quietly behind the scenes – is not only an essential requirement for a publication of this kind, but also for a Europe that does not only communicate about each other, but above all engages in direct dialogue.

Kurt-Jürgen Maaß
Secretary General, Institut für
Auslandsbeziehungen ifa



Women with Visions Portraits of 48 European Women

For two years, **Bettina Flitner** travelled through Europe to take photographs of “Great European Women“. She sat in Miep Gies living room in Amsterdam – the woman who hid Anne Frank and rescued her diary a long time ago. She stood in the laboratory of the German Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. She accompanied Franka Potente to her ballet school in Berlin-Kreuzberg, visited Marion Dönhoff in Hamburg-Blankenese shortly before her death and went to the fiercely fought over olive fields in Calabria with Baroness Cordopatri, who is threatened by the Mafia. She created 48 portraits of great European women from the worlds of culture, economy, politics and society. The culture report Progress Europe introduces 12 of these personalities.

The Portraits: 8/9 Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, journalist • 28/29 Franziska Becker, cartoonist • 48/49 Christa de Carouge, fashion designer • 58/59 Maria Lassnig, painter • 82/83 Irene Khan, director amnesty international • 114/115 Kati Outinen, actress • 148/149 Inge Feltrinelli, publisher • 176/178 Lea Linster, cook • 192/193 Judit Polgar, chess player • 222/223 Pina Bausch, choreographer • 236/237 Magdalena Abakanowicz, artist • 254/255 Dörte Gatermann, architect

EUROPE – CONTINENT WITHOUT CONTOURS?





INVISIBLE PUBLIC? For the author, there is no doubt about the existence of a European public sphere. He however identifies a gap between public sphere and institutional practice. Debates mostly mirror controversial issues nationally and are not addressed at European institutions. For him, the Nice Summit was a missed opportunity to represent Europe as a whole and to culturally back up the economic unification process. *By Bo Stråth*



What is the European public sphere? Does it actually exist? And if so, when did it emerge? Who are the players, the senders and the receivers, the authors and the readers involved in this continental communication, this transnational process of interpretation and re-interpretation that could constitute a European public sphere? And what are the issues implied in the title of this article?

Definition problems have their origin in diverging starting points or perceptions about the structure of a public sphere. Democratic structures of European nation states in the second half of the 20th century are a popular benchmark. Often, this results in arguments against a European public sphere, based on a mere

accumulation of national public spheres. One argument frequently used by advocates of this point of view is the issue of language barriers as an essential obstacle for a transnational public sphere.

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I believe in the existence of a European public sphere, though – in spite of language barriers that can be overcome with translations. And I even believe that this European public sphere is constantly growing. A European public sphere had existed when a national public sphere was still a very alien concept and indeed before this concept of the nation state gained ground on the Continent. The history of European integration – becoming manifest in an institutional context from the 1950s – made the concept of a public sphere more palpable.

The European public sphere had sur-

faced in the eighteenth century, during the period of the Enlightenment, before the European nation states had even emerged. The 'République des Lettres' comes to mind in this context. Travelling and corresponding with intellectual and political circles as well as the circulation of journals and books on the Continent provided the breeding ground for an emerging market of ideas and opinions – even though censorship restricted the access to this market, thus strictly confining the public sphere.¹ Seemingly, language barriers did not play a role, as the players of the public sphere communicated either in French or in Latin. Furthermore, the topic of Europe was very high up on the agenda in this context. The significance of the European civilisation concept was discussed throughout the Continent.² It may be that this once penetrable public sphere was hermetically sealed with the emergence of the nation states in the nineteenth century. However, there are no comprehensive sources providing a reliable explanation for this development. Only one thing seems to be clear: The European public sphere has not been displaced by the nation states.

Those with a sceptical attitude towards the influence of a European public sphere argue that the majority of Europeans does not participate in this public sphere. After all, the Republic of Letters was a closed elitist circle. However, it needs to be asked whether wanting unlimited access and mass participation is a *sine qua non* for the definition of a European public sphere.³ Such a claim becomes even more explosive considering recent developments in the media world in terms of technological and economic concentration. Instead of expanding from a merely

elitist approach towards an involvement of the masses – as indicated by the term mass media – we are confronted with a diametrically opposed development, concentrating on a few media mouthpieces addressing the masses in a unilateral way. The old-fashioned idea of a rational debate based on the representation of interests has been turned upside down and the former understanding of the concept of representation has been replaced by the creation of news and fiction. Thus, public sphere does not necessarily stand for participation and it has to be considered to what extent opinion clashes in the public sphere are based on rational calculation and the communication of interests or on manipulated thought patterns. Jürgen Habermas' assumption of a subliminal ultimate truth and the pursuit of this truth by policy and public debate must be critically challenged by any theory about a public sphere.

The European public sphere paves its way

Historically, the public sphere in Europe has struck deep roots throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. It experienced its heyday within the Republic of Letters and active participation increased steadily. The growth in the literature market, the end of censorship, mass production of newspapers and journals and the international character of cultural life in theatres and concert halls stimulated continental exchanges. Furthermore, after the First World War, international organisations such as the League of Nations or international post and telephone associations enabled the implementation of pan-European stan-

dards, thus enhancing transnational communication.

A public sphere can be perceived as a communication platform - with players from the fields of politics and culture exchanging and negotiating their ideas from an early stage. This was reinforced by the development of the mass media, involving ever larger segments of the population in the debate. A strong argument - among others developed by the social scientist Klaus Eder - is that this European public sphere has primarily emerged in transnational crisis debates in the context of the European integration process during the second half of the last century. The same issues - Haider, Berlusconi or the concept of a European Constitution - are discussed all over Europe, thus overcoming language barriers. The European public sphere speaks many languages.

In some respects, the public sphere has always focused on problems. The intellectuals of the Republic of Letters invariably reflected on the same core issues, with the number of topics growing significantly in the context of European integration since the 1950s.

It gets problematic if we link the public sphere with democracy. The public sphere with its debates and social negotiations is often perceived as the backbone of Western democracies. The public sphere is the cornerstone of the civil society - the prerequisite for a functioning democracy. Habermas' point of view assumes the more or less automatic connection between the public sphere and democracy. In that case, if a European public sphere really exists, why is there no European democracy?

One crucial question in this context is about the degree of participation in the

debate. The mobilising force of the European public sphere does not seem to be very high. Voter participation in the elections to the European Parliament, for instance, is a clear indicator of a lack of democratic legitimacy for the whole European integration project.

Harmonious Europe?

Nevertheless, the question remains why we should assume a link between the public sphere and European integration at the European level. Originally, the *raison d'être* of the European integration project was the protection of free markets and peacekeeping during the Cold War. At that time, free markets were still a preventive measure against capital concentration and the armed peace was based on military strength. According to Alan Milward, European integration research specialist, the aim was to protect the Western European nation states through free trade as the prerequisite for the welfare state.⁴ European integration was intended to safeguard democracy in the member states, whereas the issue of a supranational European democracy was never raised.

The idea of a supranational European democracy can be vaguely dated back

The same issue - Haider, Berlusconi or the Idea of a European Constitution - is debated all over Europe and in this way language barriers are transgressed. The European public sphere is multilingual.

to the EEC Summit in Copenhagen in 1973, where the concept of a European identity was introduced for the first time. The general opinion was that this could stimulate integration during a time of economic depression. In 1979, this idea was reflected in the decision to introduce direct elections to the European Parliament and in the introduction of the concept of European citizenship in 1980. However, the concept of supranationality overcoming national identification and policy patterns neither established itself within the individual citizens nor at an institutional level. The direct elections to the European Parliament did not lead to one European Constitution and the identity discourse did not lead to European citizenship. In the end, public debates in the emerging nation states in Europe led to parliamentarianism. The democratic dimension of the public debate was reinforced by many overlaps in public and parliamentary debate. This is hardly the case in the institutional setting of the EU. The problem-oriented European debate is channelled towards national focal points of political decision-making, with a potential to erode the legitimacy and authority of Brussels as a political centre. It is precisely the debate about values in a social context that seems to demote Brussels as the “Other”, not being able to fulfil the role of an adroit and diplomatic political centre that can handle the protests. This is a fundamental problem of the EU that is rarely discussed. At a European level, national parliaments and the principles of parliamentarianism that have emerged in response to protests and pressure from public spheres of nation states, have a different political agenda in terms of social criticism. This gap between the Eu-

ropean public sphere and the European institutions is a legitimacy issue for the EU. The gap as such is the problem - not the actual question whether such a public sphere exists or not.

In terms of the legitimacy issue, two other factors also play a role. Since the 1950s, market harmonisation has expanded into more and more areas of society to abolish restrictions of free competition. Free trade between the member states, common customs barriers towards third countries, environmental and social standards, standards for food, transport, communication, education and health – all these areas were perceived as potential technical trade barriers - to be overcome by a harmonisation of standards and rules. The more claims for Europeanisation have penetrated social life, the more sensitive European citizens have become about this issue. Why should Brussels decide the size of a strawberry or the length of a banana? The answer lies in the logic of market developments towards more competition, because competition leads to standardisation.

The second factor is the dramatically growing social inequality in the EU after the Enlargement from 15 to 25 member states. This growing inequality has provoked fears of social dumping, which, in turn has provoked social protectionism.

A confrontation between social dumping and social protectionism is a great risk for Europe, which must not be ignored under any circumstances. The political pressures in response to the EU Services Directive are a case in point which demonstrates the risk potential. The analogy to the role of the public sphere in the development of the nation states suggests that a closer connection between the Eu-

European public sphere and European political institutions as a target of criticism provided political legitimacy.

The growing legitimacy deficit not only raises issues of power and governance, but also, and perhaps most importantly, questions of ethics and identification. Will the EU stay together and if so, does it have the potential to provide EU citizens with a sense of belonging? Does such a sense of belonging exist side by side with national allegiances or are they mutually exclusive? What is the role of current and future political leaders and the mass media for these developments?

Media and shifting values

The media can be seen as the discursive universe, where national and European values, ethics and identities develop. One major lesson learnt in recent years was the discovery of a moody, short-lived and fickle Europe - a far cry from the perceptions of Europe as a firmly anchored and rigidly institutionalised continent - whether as a community or in economic terms. Instability is lurking behind an alleged stability. Solutions to one problem produce new challenges and new problems. On the one hand, Europe resembles an in-depth project, enhancing its integration potential with "functional growth". On the other hand, Europe has manoeuvred from crisis to crisis over half a century. If there is a certain continuity of a European public sphere in institutional terms, it is much more difficult to pin down in terms of substance and values.

Two spectacular events within one year demonstrate the extreme shifts in the media coverage on Europe and its values - the Nice Summit in December

2000 and the introduction of the euro one year later, on 1st January 2002. Media coverage of the two events demonstrates how fast moods can shift and shows the significance of the media play for these mood swings. It feels like speeding up time itself. When the European leaders met in Nice, they could have proudly and euphorically announced a project initiated by them. They had fixed a schedule for the biggest EU Enlargement ever - marking the definite end of the Cold War and the whole post-war period - and thus the start of a new era. The agenda of the unification of Europe had gained a new dimension and the spotlight was on Europe as an entity.

This potential for euphoria collapsed in a general chaos when the *grande geste*, the opening towards the East, was translated into institutional questions such as: How many votes should be allocated to each member state in the Council of Ministers? Which majority is required for decisions? Representatives from the different member states accused each other of narrow-mindedly pursuing their own interests. The media thrived on descriptions of European leaders that seemed to participate in a big European poker game, trying to see the other players' cards and playing tricks on them. The distance to the population was emphasised by the police fighting violent demonstrators in paramilitary street battles that more or less "belong to" political summits these days.

Euphoria and Europhoria

The leaders withdrew their initiative a year later. The 1st January 2002 was a remarkable manifestation of European unification. The euro was celebrated as

the symbol of a new Europe, more unified than ever since the Roman Empire. Political leaders getting their first banknotes from cash machines among ordinary people in the streets dissolved hierarchies between elites and masses. Europe was really unified - horizontally as well as vertically. The euphoria was a euphoria - and it was exactly as a symbol for unity that the new currency was celebrated. The media and the elites did not focus on the strictly economic side of the event very much, rather emphasising the symbolic aspects. Proud references were made to the Roman Empire and Charlemagne. Critical questions about a harmonisation of fiscal systems in the course of the monetary union were not discussed.

The schizophrenic pattern continues. The debates about the European Constitution and the Iraq War are two clear examples. The Iraq debate was a *da capo* of Nice, although more intense and with a greater mobilisation of the population in some member states - opposing other member states. The contrast between the beneficial new proposal for a Constitution at the summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 and the ensuing pessimism at the next summit in Brussels half a year later is another example that confirms and emphasises the pattern. As we know, the distance to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's

If there is a certain continuity of a European public sphere in institutional terms, it is much more difficult to pin it down in terms of substance and values.

aristocratic appearance and his triumph in Thessaloniki grew in May and June 2005.

The crucial question is, of course, what this oscillation between extremes, between euphoria and feelings of crisis, really mean in terms of the stability of the whole institutional setting. To what extent are the dramatic shifts ephemeral, rapidly stirred up by the media and as rapidly calming down in the face of new spectacular events? Does the fast shift of media opinions about the EU result in long-term de-legitimisation? Or will the growing level of attention for the EU - positive or negative - result in a "naturalisation" of the EU as a polity, i.e. to its reinforcement through its function as a platform for conflict and debate? What does a problem-oriented European public sphere really mean? The media can be seen as the discursive universe shaping national and European values and identities, but it seems clear that these values cannot be defined in a simple way. Depending on external circumstances, values in the context of Europe can always be contested and might change. There is no such thing as a European canon of values - no matter whether it is defined from a Christian, rational, enlightened or scientific point of view.

Perhaps we can talk about a large inventory of values which can be accessed and used depending on the context.

The EMEDIATE project is a European research consortium coordinated by the European University Institute in Florence and financed by the EU Framework Programme. The acronym EMEDIATE stands for Ethics and Media of a European Public Sphere. From the Treaty of Rome to the War on Terror, we have

investigated the degrees of conflict and change during phases of experiencing intensive crisis - from the 1950s to the Iraq War. Considering all these conflicts and changes, it is difficult to see the concept of European values as a linear development from the Ancient World and Christianity. The quality and the substance of the media debates on Europe and its role and responsibilities are subject to constant changes.

The period between 2003 and 2005 was particularly dramatic in terms of European values. Europe as a bastion of peace in the commotion of the War on Terror was unable to find a common denominator for its communication of values to the public sphere. With Europe actively supporting - or not supporting - the USA on the side of the “axis of good” against the “axis of evil” - Western values were played off against European values. Human rights as European basic rights were played off against the Hobbesian tradition of state reason in the Kosovo and in Iraq. The question of social solidarity, which had been so crucial during the nineteenth century nation building process in Europe, became a controversial European core issue after the EU Enlargement from 15 to 25 member states in 2004. Different member states accused each other of social dumping and social protectionism. One (dangerous) way to try and resolve the tension about social values seems to lie in redrafting the question of European social borders into a question of external cultural borders and to define culture in ethnic and religious terms. Turkey is a case in point here. In view of European history, we should know the risks inherent in any form of evoking the power of cultural cohesion.

The theory of a European public sphere

In many respects, the theory of a problem-oriented European public sphere is based on Habermas’ world view, putting the public sphere on one level with rational communication - with the result that problems are approached rationally. The public sphere is the locus of rational argumentation - leading to constitutional patriotism and the development of a “European demos”. A European Constitution would be the spin-off of the European public sphere and a European identity a spin-off of the European Constitution.

In the 1990s, Dieter Grimm and others challenged this view by arguing that - in direct opposition to Habermas’ theory - a European public sphere could only emerge from a European demos and not the other way round.⁵ This discussion between Habermas and Grimm looking for the ideal solution does not take us any further. A more relevant objection to the model developed by Habermas was raised by Reinhart Koselleck. He described modern times as a constant and accelerating movement between criticism and crisis. Acceleration increasingly reduces the space between our experiences and their translation into future expectations. Our horizons have broadened to such an extent that it is getting increasingly more

There is not such a thing as a European value basis, irrespective of whether it is called Christian, rational, enlightened, science-based, or something else.

difficult to keep an overview as the basis for new experiences. The very foundations of the public sphere as a mediator of information have been shaken at its core by the acceleration and exponential growth of the amount of information. This development of a closing gap between experiences and expectations seems to have been particularly strong after the end of the Cold War. At first, the events in 1989 were interpreted as a dramatically growing divide and the expectations in the one unified world did not know any borders in space or time. In the eyes of many, a chapter in history had been closed. The developments in Yugoslavia demonstrated the presumptuousness of these new expectations and led to the rapid closure of the gap between experiences and expectations. The most recent contributions to these developments are undoubtedly the growing signs of a social conflict in the wake of the Enlargement, which is an ironic development indeed, given all the eloquent expectations about a final European unification proclaimed on 1st May 2004.

Habermas is perceived as an optimistic theoretician with regard to a European public sphere. Developments during the last 10 to 15 years demonstrate that a closer examination of Koselleck's more pessimistic view is required. Habermas' theory also needs to be confronted with alternative views in another respect. I particularly think of Adorno's and Horkheimer's critical views of the mass media as instruments of mass consumption and market manipulation rather than messengers of rational arguments, as market-conditioned manipulators of opinion rather than neutral distributors of information and knowledge. I am not

saying that Habermas' theory is outdated in every respect, but I think that his assumptions need to be confronted with other, more pessimistic or more realistic prospects. We might need Habermas as a source of inspiration and ought to keep using his point of view as a benchmark that we need to watch. However, in order to prevent naive perceptions about the future of Europe and its values within the European public sphere, Habermas can simply not be ignored.

Editing: Angelika Welt

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1 E. François and H.-E. Bödeker (eds.): *Aufklärung/Lumières und Politik. Zur politischen Kultur der deutschen und französischen Aufklärung* (Leipzig, 1996).

2 J. Osterhammel: *Die Entzauberung Asiens. Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert*, (München, 1998).

3 In fact, research about the period between WW I and WW II has shown that it was not just the intellectual, political and economic elites that participated in a European public sphere, dealing with pan-European issues, but also the wider population. See K. Orluc: "A last Stronghold against Fascism and National Socialism? The Pan-European Debate over the Creation of a European Party in 1932", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 2002, Volume 8, Number 2, pp. 23-43.

4 Alan S Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation States*. London: Routledge 1994.

5 Dieter Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" in *European Law Journal* 1:3 1995: 282-302. Jürgen Habermas, Jürgen. "Verfassungspatriotismus – im allgemeinen und im besonderen" In *Die nachholende Revolution*. Jürgen Habermas. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1990. Ibid, "Ein Ruck muss durch Europa gehen" *Die Weltwoche* 21, 2004. Peter Graf Kielmansegg, "Lässt sich die Europäische Gemeinschaft demokratisch verfassungs?" in *Europäische Rundschau* 22:2 1994: 23-33. Fritz W Scharpf, "Governance in Europe: Effective and Democratic?" Oxford 1999.

BRAND EUROPE Individually, European countries score high in the global reputation of nation rankings the author publishes in his Anholt Nation Brands Index since 1996. According to the principle of „the whole is more than the sum of its parts“ Europe in theory should score perfectly as well. But if you look at Europe as the totality of its member states the continent struggles. A blurry image creates problems in a world that demands simplification and tangible clichés. *By Simon Anholt*



Today, every place on earth wants to do something to manage its international reputation. Yet we are still far from a widespread understanding of what this means in practice, and just how far commercial approaches can be effectively and responsibly applied to government, society and economic development. Many governments, most consultants and even some scholars persist in a naïve and superficial interpretation of ‘place branding’ that is nothing more than standard product promotion, public relations and corporate identity, where the product just happens to be a country, a city or a region rather than a bank or a running shoe.

Yet the need for proper understanding in this area is crucial. Today, the world is

one market; the rapid advance of globalisation means that every country, every city and every region must compete with every other for its share of the world’s consumers, tourists, investors, students, entrepreneurs, international sporting and cultural events, and for the attention and respect of the international media, of other governments, and the people of other countries.

In such a busy and crowded marketplace, most of those people and organisations don’t have time to learn about what other places are really like. We all navigate through the complexity of the modern world armed with a few simple clichés, and they form the background of our opinions, even if we aren’t fully aware of this and don’t always admit it to ourselves: Paris is about style, Japan about technology, Switzerland about wealth and precision, Rio de Janeiro about carnival and football, Tuscany about the good life, and most African nations about poverty, corruption, war, famine and disease. Most of us are much too busy worrying about ourselves and our own countries to spend too long trying to form complete, balanced, and informed views about six billion other people and nearly two hundred other countries. We make do with summaries for the vast majority of people and places – the ones we will probably never

know or visit – and only start to expand and refine these impressions when for some reason we acquire a particular interest in them. When you haven't got time to read a book, you judge it by its cover.

These clichés and stereotypes – whether they are positive or negative, true or untrue – fundamentally affect our behaviour towards other places and their people and products. It may seem unfair, but there's nothing anybody can do to change this. It's very hard for a region or a country to persuade people in other parts of the world to go beyond these simple images and start to understand the rich complexity that lies behind them. Some quite progressive places don't get nearly as much attention, visitors, business or investment as they need because their reputation is weak or negative, while others are still trading on a good image that they acquired decades or even centuries ago, and today do relatively little to deserve.

All the places with good, powerful and positive reputations find that almost everything they undertake on the international stage is easier; and the places with poor reputations find that almost everything is difficult, and some things seem virtually impossible.

So all responsible governments and regional administrations, on behalf of their people, their institutions and their companies, need to discover what the world's perception of their place is, and to develop a strategy for managing it. It is a key part of their job to try to build a reputation that is fair, true, powerful, attractive, genuinely useful to their economic, political and social aims, and honestly reflects the spirit, the genius and the will of the people. This huge task has become one of the primary skills of national and

regional administrations in the twenty-first century.

How place image is built

Most countries and regions – indeed, most places – communicate with the outside world, and thus create their images in the minds of certain publics, through six basic channels or areas of activity:

1. Their tourism promotion activity, as well as people's first-hand experience of visiting the country as tourists or business travellers. This is often the loudest voice in branding the nation or region, as tourist boards usually have the biggest budgets and the most competent marketers.
2. Their exported products and services, which act as powerful ambassadors for each country and region, but only where their place of origin is explicit.
3. The policy decisions of the region's governments, whether it's foreign policy which directly affects us, or domestic policy which gets reported in the international media. Diplomacy is traditionally the main route by which such things are communicated to the outside world, but there is an increasing closeness between the policy-makers and the international media.
4. To business audiences, the way the region or country solicits inward investment, recruitment of foreign 'talent', and expansion into the country or region by foreign companies.

5. Through cultural exchange and cultural activities and exports: a world tour by a national opera company, the works of a famous author, the national sports team.
6. The people of the region themselves: the high-profile leaders and media and sports stars, as well as the population in general; how they behave when abroad and how they treat visitors to their countries.

For clarity, these ‘natural’ channels of communication can be shown as the points of a hexagon:



The Hexagon of Competitive Identity © 2002 Simon Anholt

The basic theory behind managing the identity and reputation of a country or region is that if you have a good, clear, believable idea of what the region really is and what it stands for, and manage to coordinate the communications, investments, actions and behaviours of all six points of the hexagon so that they reinforce this message, then you stand a good chance of building and maintaining a powerful and positive internal and external reputation – to the lasting benefit of exporters, importers, government, the culture sector, tourism, immigration, and pretty much

every aspect of international relations.

Competitive Identity, just like any other national or regional project, needs clearly stated and properly agreed goals. It is quite common for regions to set a mixture of precise, shorter term goals (such as a certain increase in foreign direct investment or the hosting of a prestigious international event) and longer-term changes in national image, which might be decades away. Countries and regions with a powerful and positive identity should find:

- o Clearer domestic agreement on regional identity and societal goals
- o A climate where innovation is prized and practised
- o More effective investment promotion
- o More effective tourism and business travel promotion
- o A healthier ‘region of origin effect’ for exporters of goods and services
- o Greater profile in the international media
- o Simpler accession into other regional and global bodies and associations
- o More productive cultural relations with other countries and regions.

That sounds like a lot to be asking for, and it is. But without a powerful and positive regional identity, few of these aims are possible at all.

A portrait of ‘Brand Europe’ today

In early 2005, I began a collaboration with Global Market Insite in Seattle, USA, to develop regular global surveys of consumer perceptions of countries and cities: these are known as the Anholt Nation Brands Index (NBI) and City Brands Index (CBI).

In 2006, I started to include a ‘guest slot’ in the quarterly NBI reports, so in addition to the 35 countries that are regularly monitored in the survey, we can take a global snapshot of perceptions of any other country which happens to be of interest at the time.

For the Second Quarter of 2006, I decided to devote the ‘guest slot’ not to a country, but to the European Union. Fourteen of the 25 members of the EU are already included in the NBI, so we have a clear picture of how they rank as individual ‘brands’, but no sense of worldwide attitudes to ‘Brand Europe’ as a whole. It therefore seemed like a good idea to use the NBI to measure Europe’s overall brand health.

From the point of view of our 26,000 NBI respondents in 35 countries, a large and diverse region is a rather different proposition from a nation-state, and it is correspondingly harder to offer general opinions about it. Nonetheless, a fascinating picture emerges of how the world sees Europe.

Very favourably indeed, is the clear verdict. This is a surprising result to some people, especially within Europe itself, where the EU is not always thought of as an admired or even aspirational global “brand”. In fact, the European Union takes first place in the ranking in the NBI, above the United Kingdom, the previous top scorer. The region scores no top rankings on any of the individual points of the nation brand hexagon, but its performance is sufficiently strong and consistent to give it a higher overall score than any of the 35 countries in the list.

In one sense, this should come as no surprise. If Europe is perceived as the sum total of its member states, one would cer-

tainly expect it to be highly ranked: more than half of the top 20 nations in the QI survey are European. Few places in the world could be more attractive than a composite of Brand Italy plus Brand France plus Brand UK plus Brand Germany plus Brand Sweden, and so forth.

And here is the point. One of Europe’s many reputational issues is a technical one: the word ‘Europe’ can mean quite different things to different people in different contexts, and it’s sometimes quite hard to know which “brand” one is actually measuring. For many people in Asia and the Pacific, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa, ‘Europe’ simply refers to the continent of Europe – in other words, a fairly loose geographical, historical and cultural entity rather than a precise political one. For these populations, the idea of ‘Europe’ embraces a wide range of attractive concepts, including a wonderful collection of desirable consumer brands (think German cars and domestic appliances plus Italian and French food, fashion and lifestyle plus Swiss technology plus Scandinavian design), one of the most attractive clusters of desirable tourism and cultural destinations, a bloc of some of the world’s most stable democratic governments, several of the biggest and fastest growing economies in the world, and so forth. The fact that we specify “The European Union” rather than just “Europe” in the survey doesn’t appear to affect this perception – informal research suggests that many people in other parts of the world simply take “The European Union” to be an official name for the continent of Europe. People are also relatively imprecise about which countries are perceived to be European (because they are on the continent of Europe) and which are actually members

of the European Union.

This perception of Europe-as-continent only changes when we specifically ask questions about governance: here, respondents are compelled to think about the governance of the European Union as a region rather than as a group of separate states, and on this point of the hexagon the average ranking of the EU is ninth, by far its lowest score. A picture begins to emerge of very high esteem for Europe-as-continent and relatively low esteem for Europe-as-institution.

For Europeans, “The European Union” isn’t the same thing at all as the continent of Europe, and their strongest associations are with Europe-as-institution. For them, the phrase “European Union” stands unequivocally for the political and administrative machinery of Europe, and is associated by some Europeans with factors that are at best tedious and worst dysfunctional, even corrupt: bureaucracy gone mad, reams of petty and interfering legislation, outdated ideologies, and so on. These are doubtless the same associations that prompted a majority of Dutch and French voters to reject the Constitutional Treaty in 2005.

Not surprisingly, there is a distinction in viewpoint between the long-standing member states and the more recent and future accession states. For the latter, the brand image of Europe is associated with prosperity, with finally joining the ‘community of free nations’, an act of closure for the ex-Soviet states.

The table above shows how each of the 35 countries in the Nation Brands Index ranks the EU for each point of the Nation Brands Hexagon. The data shows that the broad perception is of the EU as a region of opportunity: most people in most coun-

tries see it as a good place to live, work and study. Its industry and research and development are seen as strong; people value having Europeans both as friends and as senior employees. Again, EU governance is not seen so positively, particularly by its own citizens, but this is not a serious problem area. The rankings for European contemporary culture are strong, but perhaps unexpectedly, heritage and tourism – including the welcome our respondents expect to receive from European people – are its weakest areas.

The countries where people rate the brand image of Europe most highly (1st, 2nd or 3rd place) include four of the founding members of the Union (Belgium, France, Germany and Italy), some later accessions (Ireland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Poland, Spain and Hungary), a small group of far-flung countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia and Mexico), Egypt, Russia and Switzerland. Turkey, one of the EU’s aspirant member states, is just outside this positive group, ranking Europe in 4th place. The Netherlands, the only other 1952 member of the original ECSC (apart from Luxembourg where the NBI is not carried out), also ranks the EU in overall fourth place, with noticeably lower scores on several points of the he-

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tagon than its founding partners.

The countries with the least positive perceptions of Europe (those which rank the EU in 7th place or lower) include Sweden, Denmark and the persistently Euro-sceptic Norway – although it is interesting to note that our non-EU Norwegian panel is more favourably inclined towards the EU than the EU member states Sweden and Denmark. Nordic-leaning Estonia also ranks the EU poorly; the UK (bearing out the result I noted in the last NBI that our UK panel consistently ranks other English-speaking Commonwealth countries higher than its European partners); the old Commonwealth countries themselves (Australia, New Zealand and Canada), the United States (where respondents really only rank the EU highly as a provider of branded products), Malaysia and Japan.

Taking the governance dimension, the picture changes somewhat. There are fewer EU countries in the most positive group: only Ireland and Spain (both of which are acknowledged to have done well economically out of their membership) and Germany rank the EU higher than 9th for governance, whereas 7 non-European countries plus Turkey are in this group. Those least positive about EU governance include Hungary and Netherlands. The investment/immigration picture is closer to the all-question one. One exception is that Estonia moves up to join the other new accession states in the most positive group.

Some other results are interesting at a more detailed level: for example the Netherlands' and Denmark's strong lack of identification with the EU in terms of its culture, its people and tourism. Portugal, Ireland and the UK – three Atlantic nations – similarly do not seem to warm to

How the World Sees Europe

Ranking of EU's brand dimensions by the 35 panel countries in the ANHOLT NATION BRANDS INDEX (Quarter 2, 2006)

	All	Exports	Governance	Culture/heritage	People	Tourism	Investment/immigration
All Countries	1	4	9	7	4	7	4
Argentina	1	4	10	6	6	4	3
Czech Rep.	1	3	9	4	2	4	1
Egypt	1	4	4	4	6	4	1
Poland	1	3	9	4	1	6	1
Portugal	1	4	10	10	2	3	1
Russia	1	3	9	4	2	6	3
Brazil	2	3	6	5	7	7	2
Hungary	2	4	13	3	1	2	2
Belgium	2	1	9	3	5	4	3
France	2	4	9	2	6	7	3
Germany	2	3	7	2	7	5	2
Ireland	2	3	4	10	6	6	2
Italy	2	3	9	2	3	2	2
Spain	2	4	7	3	2	3	2
Switzerland	2	3	10	5	6	10	3
China	3	3	5	6	4	5	3
Indonesia	3	4	3	6	3	10	3
Mexico	3	4	15	7	5	6	3
India	4	6	8	4	8	3	6
Netherlands	4	4	12	11	9	17	3
Turkey	4	3	6	4	11	8	2
Singapore	5	7	9	10	10	5	7
South Africa	5	5	12	9	10	8	6
South Korea	5	5	3	7	8	8	8
Estonia	7	4	11	12	6	7	2
Norway	7	8	11	13	12	8	7
UK	7	5	12	11	10	16	6
Japan	9	6	7	7	12	14	9
New Zealand	9	7	9	11	12	4	8
Sweden	9	5	12	15	15	20	7
Canada	10	6	10	11	14	13	10
Malaysia	10	5	11	14	11	13	8
Australia	11	9	12	10	13	16	8
USA	12	8	13	12	17	18	11
Denmark	16	7	11	20	15	21	7

Source: www.nationbrandsindex.com

the rest of the EU culturally, unlike the Treaty of Rome heartlands and Spain.

Defining “Brand Europe”

There has been a great deal of debate recently about the image of Europe, both

internally and externally. Even the European Commission, in the week before the Q2 edition of the 2005 NBI went to press, announced a Europe-wide student competition to design a new logo and slogan for Europe in celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The decision to base the competition on a ‘brand identity’ is no coincidence: for young people especially, Europe is undergoing something of an identity crisis, and it would certainly be most convenient if Europe suddenly found itself able to unite under a single slogan and a single logo. (The chances of such a consensus occurring are undoubtedly greater if the proposal originates with innocent young people rather than the Commission itself, or one of the member states).

The competition is just a piece of fun, but it does reflect an important point about the reputation of places: just like commercial and corporate brands, a powerful brand identity tends to stem from a powerful and united sense of common purpose within the organisation itself. Ask any company about its brand, and it may well talk first about its corporate culture – how the staff “live the brand” – rather than questions of external promotion and publicity.

So just in case anybody should fall into the trap of thinking that logos and slogans can achieve anything more significant than mild publicity for an important anniversary, the point needs to be stressed that without a common purpose there can be no community, and without community there can be no identity. One reason why the brand image of Europe-as-institution falls so far short of the powerful ‘natural’ brand of Europe-as-continent is because the region is lacking a powerful

and widely-agreed internal brand, a sense of common purpose and common identity. Asking for logos and slogans for Europe at this stage is like walking into a restaurant and asking for the bill – it is most certainly doing things the wrong way round.

When the memory of two world wars was still fresh in people’s minds, Europe did not have this problem because its founding principles of ensuring lasting peace and prosperity were highly relevant. Today, the EU is suffering the price of its own success: it has gone so far towards creating peace and prosperity that it may have done itself out of a job, or at least done itself out of a defining purpose.

And yet the defining purpose is plainly still there, and merely needs defining, updating and crystallising. Europe finds itself once again at the heart of an issue which threatens global stability just as surely as it did in the first half of the twentieth century. The increasing tensions between the Moslem world and “the West”, and the critical need to avoid the self-fulfilling prophecy of labelling this as a clash of civilisations, is nowhere more visible than in Turkey’s EU accession process, and in the ways in which most EU member states are now struggling with updating their own national identities to include expanding immigrant populations from different regions, different cultures and different religions.

The challenge for all countries in Europe and beyond is to find ways of continually presenting and re-presenting their past cultural achievements alongside their modern equivalents in ways that are fresh, relevant and appealing to younger audiences. This task is made ever more complex by the increasing plurality of modern societies – to celebrate the glories

of a typically somewhat mono-cultural past without marginalising or seeming to ignore the multi-racial reality of the country's modern day population is a real quandary for most countries. Still, since the only solution is to give equal emphasis to present-day cultural enterprise, it is basically a productive dilemma, because it lessens the temptation for countries to rest on their laurels and live in the past.

Race is a critical factor in national and regional identity, and indeed is one of the main reasons why so many countries – richer European countries in particular – need to start thinking very hard about how well their traditional international image reflects their present reality, even though that image might appear to be in very good shape. Perhaps this is one part of the explanation for France's current racial tensions: the „brand story“ of France, the way the country is viewed, and to some extent the way it still represents itself to the outside world, is still an old story of a white Christian European power. But many French people who are neither white nor Christian feel that the national story leaves them out: and of course that causes bitter internal resentment as well as impacting on the country's external reputation. France's scores for governance in the Nation Brands Index,

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indeed, have on several occasions dropped quite noticeably following international media focus on its inner-city disturbances; and the NBI is a survey which is notable for the almost unwavering stability of its results.

Many countries now need to reassess the way they identify themselves and communicate that identity to the world in the light of their changing populations. It's one of the biggest tasks facing governments today, and is an acute challenge for the way in which countries and regions understand and manage their external reputation and internal purpose.

Another reason for the EU's weak „brand image“ is the long-standing habit of member state governments to ascribe all successes to their own country and all failures to the EU. It is certainly not impossible for people to feel multiple loyalties – to community, to region, to country, to continent – but wherever those loyalties are weakest, it provides an opportunity for politicians to use the place as a scapegoat or dumping-ground for anything unwanted, negative or undesirable, and over time this habit will further weaken and eventually kill the brand.

Finally, if a strong image is the result of a place proving itself to be competent, innovative and attractive on all points of the hexagon, the EU as an institution really only fires on one cylinder: it seldom touches its own populations through any of the points of the hexagon that really inspire them (culture, tourism, people, business and brands) and almost always through the one that they are most likely to find boring or unwelcome (governance).

The identity task for Europe is therefore mainly an internal one: to defi-

ne what its job must be for the next fifty years, and to generate consensus, passion and ambition around this. Unless this purpose is relevant, credible and inspiring to people in the areas that they care about most, the brand of Europe-as-institution will never be more than a weak shadow of the brand of Europe-as-continent.

Perception, whether we like it or not, is inseparable and often indistinguishable from reality. Unless the institutions of Europe can learn to treat the issues of identity and reputation with as much gravity and respect as they do the ‘harder’ issues, they may find that real progress on Europe’s most significant challenges will remain beyond their reach.

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Europe is not only a market for economic goods, but also for values and cultures.

In the value system, culture ranks above economy.

The economy is indispensable to life and culture makes our lives worth living.

José-Manuel Barroso, President of the EU Commission





WHO IS SCHOPENHAUER? For Japan, Europe is near and at the same time far away. The Japanese happily spend large sums on a bottle of French wine, an Italian handbag or on tickets for a German opera. Yet they are increasingly influenced by the US – no longer just in economics and politics, but also culturally. Japanese people are less and less interested in learning European languages – Kant and Schopenhauer have all but disappeared from the vocabulary. *By Atsuko Onuki*



In August 2006, the exchange rate of the Euro against the Japanese Yen hit record levels. Yet Japanese economic experts remained largely unperturbed. According to them, the developments had no effect on day-to-day life. Only the luxury goods imported from Europe, such as Vuitton and Chanel products, BMW and Mercedes Benz cars or the French wines fanatically sought after by the Japanese were affected. This observation completely matches the predominant Japanese view of Europe. In spite of a sluggish economy that lasted for over ten years, branded products from Europe have always remained very popular. The company Louis Vuitton generates almost one third of its overall sales volume in Japan. Young white-collar workers with a tiny

flat and a diet of cheap fast food dream of owning a French designer handbag at a price that is double their monthly salary. If it wasn't for the Japanese market, European companies barely keeping afloat with their traditional brands would have perished a long time ago.

Europe is also a very popular travel destination that many Japanese aim to visit at least once in a lifetime. Many of these travellers embark on a quick tour across the entire continent to visit Rome, Paris, Vienna, London and the sights of these cities – contented if they find exactly what they know already from Japanese television or films. At the airport, they proudly present their 'booties': Ferragamo or Gucci handbags, Chanel perfume and sometimes the original 'Mozartkugeln' (truffles with marzipan).

'Old Europe' is also very much in demand in the cultural scene. Exhibitions with French Impressionist paintings always attract large numbers of visitors; tickets for a tour performance of any European opera house quickly sell out in spite of their high price (around 300 Euros).

The exchange rate of the US-Dollar, the oil price and the relationship to Korea and China are much more important. The differentiation between 'old' and 'new' Europe by the former US Minister of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in the con-

text of the debate about the legitimacy of the military invasion in Iraq hardly influenced the image of Europe in Japan. With a few exceptions, hardly anybody listened to the arguments used by the countries from 'old' Europe – France and Germany – against the military intervention.

Who is Schopenhauer?

Around 130 years ago, when the modern nation state was created under the Meiji government, Europe not only served as the model for the foundation of the state, but also for a particular lifestyle – including fashion and cuisine. “Say good-bye to backward Asia and join in with the great powers of Europe!” – so the motto of catching up on modernisation and the establishment of the nation state. Europe was the role model for the constitution, the parliament, the military structure and the educational system. The government sent the elite representing the interests of the state to universities in Europe. As Japan’s political approach at

This is Europe as most Japanese imagine it. Far away from their day-to-day lives, it represents traditions that have stood the test of time, sweet romanticism and a refined and sophisticated attitude. Epoch-making economic and political experiments of the European states – for example the European Union – go largely unnoticed and rarely feature in the Japanese media.

the time was largely modelled on Europe, French and German were obligatory foreign languages in grammar schools and at universities. Texts by European philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Schopenhauer were compulsory reading. Yet who knows the names of these philosophers in today’s Japan?

Even a lot of students of Romance or German Studies have never heard of these philosophers and the number of people learning German or French has drastically gone down over the last ten years.

What are the reasons for this growing disinterest in European culture and languages? It is certainly related to the general orientation towards America after World War II – not only noticeable at government level, but also in everyday life. The constitutional monarchy established before the war following the German model – incorporated the concepts of democracy and basic human rights absorbed from European Enlightenment only to a limited extent. The citizens were the Tenno’s subjects and already restricted basic human rights were abolished in favour of national security. These developments started in 1937 with the beginning of the war against China (and the Japanese invasion in Asia). Only under American occupation after World War II, the Japanese experienced real democracy and freedom. Jazz, chewing-gum and chocolate stood for America and a new feeling of liberty.

Since that time, Japan has become increasingly dependent on America – both economically and politically. In international economic relations, a cynical saying states that “a sneeze in America causes a cold in Japan”. Due to its military dependency, Japan marches lock-step with

American foreign policy. At the time of the invasion into Iraq, many people labelled the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi as “America’s faithful poodle“. On the other hand, America has a particular cultural attraction for many young artists and pseudo artists, which is probably a result of the American society’s potential to absorb foreignness. Regardless of the latest adverse political developments, American subculture still excites a lot of young Japanese people. No matter what is currently ‘in’ in the United States - it is immediately copied in Japan.

The declining importance of Continental Europe

In the field of academics, the orientation towards America is also increasingly noticeable. A series of more recent scientific approaches from the USA such as ‘linguistic turn’, ‘cultural studies’, ‘post-colonial studies’, ‘gender studies’, etc. have become so dominant that English has also turned into the lingua franca in those subjects relating to Continental Europe. In the labour market, English is the prevalent language and even among European companies, there is little demand for French or German language skills. Subsidiaries of German companies in Japan prefer graduates with good English language skills. Who would still invest any effort into learning another Continental European language in the light of these professional opportunities? Forced by declining student numbers, Departments of Philology at several universities either had to close their institutes or to merge with neighbouring disciplines, which leads to diminishing numbers of next generation scientists and a lowering

of future quality standards.

Another world-wide by-product of globalisation can be observed in South Korea with the dwindling significance of Continental European languages. According to a recent report in the German magazine “Der Spiegel”, the global number of learners of the German language has decreased by 3.4 million learners in as little as five years (from 2000 to 2005). This development is all-too understandable considering that globally 90 % of all scientific publications are published in English and only one-hundredth of all publications in German. Nowadays, the cultural and linguistic diversity that continues to exist in Europe seems to be steamrolled by ‘global standards’ in the academic world.

The latest developments at German universities with their anticipatory obedience to adhere to ‘global standards’ are equally worrying. In Japan, we are observing this development with a certain sense of *déjà-vu*. The dismantling of the egalitarian principle, the reduction in education budgets and the introduction of the economic competition principle were all developments pushed under the neo-liberal governments of Thatcher and Reagan. Japan followed in the nineties, when the efficiency of science became the single benchmark. The humanities suffered the greatest damage as their ‘efficiency’ is difficult to measure. In terms of the willing introduction of ‘global standards’, Japan has already gained the negative experiences.

This also applies to the concept of the welfare state - a positive Japanese antithesis to American capitalism - at least among the scientists with an orientation towards Continental Europe. Yet what

will remain for those who thought they were able to identify a certain critical potential against the ongoing globalisation led by America in 'old' Europe, if this concept is gradually reversed? If nothing further can be expected from the so-called 'old' Europe, an interest could only be sparked in Japanese students by telling them: Go and travel to Europe, where you will be able to experience everything you already know from McDonalds, Rap and hip hop – coupled with old castles that you know from Disneyland in Tokyo!

Globalisation equals Americanisation equals Europeanisation

What is perceived as globalisation in Japan nowadays seems to be identical with a cultural Americanisation - with Europe seemingly losing its outlines.

At the same time, people overlook that the USA are not the superior winner in the global market. Globalisation also provided great opportunities for European capital. A large part of the companies that once stood for 'America' have since been overtaken by European corporations or merged with them. Chrysler is now owned by Daimler-Benz and some originally American products such as Vaseline, Dove and Pond's belong to a British-Dutch group. The Swiss company Nestlé dominates the American food

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industry and the market leader in music distribution is Bertelsmann. In view of the growing share of European capital in the overall American market (as much as 65 per cent until 2000), the American journalist Tom R. Reid states in his book "The United States of Europe" (2004): "The actual winner of globalisation is Europe." Nevertheless, he adds, it is surprising that even Americans seem to barely notice this fact. They still believe that the brands they know are produced with American capital. What is not very well known in America is even less well-known in Japan, as the Japanese look at the world with American-tinted. Hence, the increasing importance of European capital in the global market will hardly change the view of Europe in Japan.

Yet, the consequences of globalisation are not solely limited to the economy. Ulrich Beck counters it with the political dimension of globalisation, which has led to the foundation of transnational organisations like the European Commission or the European Court of Justice with their positive potential for autocorrection. Unfortunately, founding transnational organisations in Asia – where the long historical process of the EU could function as a role model – is not realistic in present-day Japan. The country is not ready to take the first step to establish such an organisation by coming to terms with the past and by seeking reconciliation with other Asian nations, above all with Korea and China. The strong neo-conservative and neo-nationalist voices in the government itself as well as in the political public have enhanced this tendency even further over the last few years. A similar approach to come to terms with the past as in the Federal Republic of Ger-

many which enabled the reintegration of the country into 'Europe' was considered by the political left in Japan approximately twenty years ago. In the meantime, German neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism are used as rather negative examples. It is said that Germany has traded in its national pride for its economic boom. On the other hand, those voices wanting to learn from the distressful past of Europe and its ensuing commitment to the concept of transnational self-organising perceived as an alternative to globalisation are barely audible nowadays..

Exchange and networking rather than division

For Japan, Europe is near and at the same time far away. There is a deep divide between the two concepts of Europe. The question is how to bridge that divide? I can see one possibility in multilateral youth exchange programmes such as the school exchange programme organised by AFS (formerly 'American Field Service', in Germany 'AFS Interkulturelle Begegnungen e. V.'). One of the main objectives of the AFS programme is the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly between non-English speaking countries. This programme sends around 100 Japanese schoolchildren to a European country every year (including 'smaller nations' such as Norway, the Czech Republic, Denmark or Hungary). Smaller cities are deliberately chosen as the places to live as the Japanese students have to function without English. After one year, they return and have learned how important linguistic and cultural diversity are - particularly in times of globalisation - and how dangerous complacent nationalism

currently promoted by the Japanese government can be in today's world. Compared to the Japanese tourists travelling to Europe, the number of these exchange students is low, yet their experiences in Europe will bridge the current divide in the future. Rather than official relations, it is primarily the young people's experience and the volunteers working on the exchange programme that have contributed to the global network of AFS - an altogether different approach to globalisation. We should not look at the relationship between Europe and Japan which will always be of a bilateral nature. It would be much more important to think about the contributions Europe and Japan could make to the development of multilateral-intercultural relations.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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MUSEUM EUROPE For most US-Americans, Europe is an attractive and picturesque museum that they gravitate towards and are disgusted by at the same time. Comments on a mutual love and hate relationship. *By Andrew Ian Port*



Not unlike European views about the United States, American perceptions of Europe and its culture are marked by a curious ambivalence: one of admiration and appreciation tempered with disdain and tinged with resentment. Most Americans may find German art house films dull and stodgy, and they may chuckle at claims that the French are nothing more than “cheese-eating surrender monkeys.” But most maintain a steadfast respect for the impressive achievements of European high culture and have done so for centuries. Beginning with the first settlements of the colonial period, Americans long looked to the old world for inspiration and guidance, emulating its fashions in thought, behavior, and artistic expressi-

on. Europe set the standard, in short, and served as the arbiter of taste and culture in all of its guises.

That changed profoundly over the course of the last century, long before unelected American officials began to speak dismissively of “old Europe” and thanks in large part to the Second World War. That conflagration, as well as its predecessor three decades earlier, demonstrated that culture alone – however impressive and however broadly defined – had not been enough to prevent the Europeans from descending into barbarity at home (their behavior in their overseas possessions had already amply demonstrated what cultured Europeans were capable of abroad). Shrewd observers even suspected that it was that very culture itself that had somehow helped produce those two epic conflicts. Among those who thought so were several of the intellectual and artistic luminaries who had fled fascist Europe for safe haven across the Atlantic – and who brought with them to America the more positive aspects of European thought and culture. They educated a new generation and helped transform elite American universi-

ties into what they are today. The artistic and intellectual torches consequently passed from London, Paris, and Berlin to New York, Chicago, and Cambridge, all of which represented a re-Europeanization of America, so to speak. But at the same time, and as a result, it paradoxically made Europe itself, prostrate after the war, much less interesting from an intellectual and cultural point of view.

The Europeanization of the USA

There has been a new wave of Europeanization over the last two and a half decades, one that arguably came in the wake of mass travel following the deregulation of the airline industry in the late 1970s. Americans began flying to Europe en masse and on the cheap, and they apparently liked what they saw. This has had a profound effect on their tastes, both literally and figuratively, and largely accounts, I suspect, for the discernible improvement in culinary offerings in recent years. In most American cities and suburbs, it is now possible to buy an astounding variety of imported European foods and beverages, as well as domestically produced “European-style” wares. And American innocents who have spent time abroad can now, in the comfort of their own continental-style cafes and bistros, relive at home the trauma they once experienced sitting for the first time in front of an inscrutable French menu.

Some Americans may be renaming French fries or pouring bottles of Bourdeaux down the drain once again (how

symbolic and suggestive) to make a political statement, but – and this is the point – Europe and most things European still enjoy great cachet in the United States. American universities continue to buy up many of Europe’s best professors, and American academics who fail to doff their caps to Foucault, Habermas, or Bourdieu in their papers and articles do so at their own risk. But there is another point as well: Much of what has long made Europe so culturally attractive to Americans is now widely accessible in the United States itself. Fine wines and superior cuisine, world-class museums and top-notch architecture – all of this and more are no longer limited to elites living in New York or elsewhere along the East coast.

A museum with patina

Yet Americans still continue to flock to Europe, despite that increased availability and despite the rising costs of travel, the weakness of the dollar, and the dangers of terrorism. What explains the continuing attraction? It has proven technically possible to reconstruct the London Bridge in Arizona and medieval cloisters in the north of Manhattan. Americans have also learned (again) how to bake “real” bread, brew strong coffee, and cultivate fine wines that would satisfy perhaps even the

How happily American tourists sit for hours in outdoor cafes, lazily sipping wine while “people watching” on a central square devoid of cars and full of sauntering pedestrians!

most discerning European palette. But what they have not been able to recreate with much success is that which they arguably find most attractive about Europe: its patina. How American hearts begin to flutter when they see an old church, a medieval town gate, or the ruins of a castle! The inflationary use of the term historic to designate every other tourist attraction in the United States strongly hints at this deep-seated longing for a greater sense of permanence and (at the risk of cliché) history – a longing that Europe still seems able to satisfy.

But what also attracts Americans are the less tangible, immaterial aspects of European culture writ small, namely those webs of practices and patterns of everyday behavior so foreign from their own back home. How happily American tourists sit for hours in outdoor cafes, lazily sipping wine while “people watching” on a central square devoid of cars and full of sauntering pedestrians! They are enamored of the slower pace of daily interaction in quaint old Europe – but within limits, of course. The grumpy waiter, the bureaucratic inefficiency, the secondhand smoke, and the arrogant sniff of cultural superiority all cast a slight pall over the museal atmosphere that is so appealing because it subconsciously awakens, perhaps, fond childhood memories of a fairytale or bedtime story. But in the end, no matter how much the fellow Americans I occasionally see at one of the recently opened Starbucks in downtown Berlin seem to enjoy the coffee they are drinking out of an earthenware mug whi-

le sitting at an outdoor table – upon their return home, they will undoubtedly revert to their customary practice of sipping out of a paper cup while on the go or seated inside the sterile, smoke-free, artificially lit, air conditioned environment of a Starbucks franchise located in a local strip mall. In the end, the love for American-style convenience apparently trumps the visceral affection for European-style quaintness.

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THE PALE CONTINENT India plays its cards in the globalised economy but European culture does not feature highly anymore, common historical roots are fading. To a certain degree the media are responsible because they show no profound interest in Europe. In addition, intercultural dialogue is hampered by language barriers and by complicated visa regulations.

By Rajendra K. Jain



The Indian encounter with Europe has been unprecedented in human history as no comparable rich and complex civilization had such a long period of direct European domination. European ideas and values profoundly influenced the English-educated elite and gave rise to various movements by Indian leaders from the nineteenth century onwards. Two broad strands were visible in the century after the second half of the nineteenth century: one sought to emulate the West, trying to adopt and adapt Western value systems and Western institutions to the Indian milieu; the second strand asserted the importance of basic Indian values, criticized the arrogance of the Western rulers, and passionately questioned Western analysis and assess-

ments regarding India's history, its intellectual heritage as well as its cultural and religious identity.

Independent India's Perceptions of European Culture

After independence, there has been a clear domination of Anglo-American imagery in the Indian media and popular culture. The Indian elite's perception of Europe's cultural face has been essentially conditioned by the Anglo-Saxon media. This has resulted in a rather fragmented and partial view of Europe and its culture since it tended to reinforce and sustain traditional stereotypical images and clichés. For instance, France continues to be the land of food, wine and fashion – an image which French cultural policy deliberately seeks to sustain. Switzerland has been immortalized by Bollywood as the ultimate paradise for romance and till today remains the first preference for honeymooning couples. For the great majority of Indians, however, most of Europe is a strange land, an exotic place for tourism, to which only a privileged layer of society had had access.

European nations have actively promoted the teaching of European languages in India (with French and German being the two most popular). Cultural institu-

tes like the Alliance Française, the Max Mueller Bhavan, the British Council, etc. have contributed greatly to providing the diverse facets of European culture to Indian audiences.

In the 1990s, in the wake of globalization, unbridled consumerism, the proliferation of satellite TV channels profuse with American soap operas and the onslaught of Western values, habits, dress codes, etc., some cultural purists feared that all this posed a grave danger to long-cherished values and were concerned that Indian cultural identity would be lost. Their critics, however, argued that an ancient civilisation like India need not be unduly apprehensive because it has been a culture of assimilation and should be able to withstand such intrusions on the basis of its inherent strengths. In recent years, most educated Indians have tended to feel that Europe confronts social and political difficulties in dealing with its diversity of cultures, that multiculturalism does not seem to be working in Europe, and that European societies have not been able to meaningfully integrate non-Western ethnic minorities, especially Muslims. For many in India, the admission of Turkey would be a real litmus test for the secular and pluralistic credentials of Europe.

There is a glaring lack of articles on the critical political, socio-economic and cultural challenges faced by contemporary Europe in the English language press. Most of the articles on Europe are informative and descriptive, rather than critical; they tend more to record the event than to analyze it. With over six million Indians traveling overseas, many newspapers and magazines, both in English and the vernacular, now carry regular features on various facets of European culture, places to visit, food, etc.

EU Cultural Policy and European Identity

For decades, European cultural policy has generally tended to ignore India

as some member states had traditionally prioritized in their former colonies. With the end of the East-West divide, there was a massive increase in financial allocations by most European countries as well as by the European Union for Central and Eastern Europe for teaching European languages, cultural diplomacy, mobility programmes, civil society dialogue, and cultivation of political elites. This led to cutbacks elsewhere, especially for Asian nations.

The foundations of the European Union's cultural policy rest on fostering the idea of 'Europe' and a European identity and its efforts to build a cultural identity for the Europe of the EU. The rejection of the draft European constitution by France and the Netherlands in 2005 is perceived as giving rise to competing visions of Europe – its borders and values. For most Indians, there is nothing like a European culture, but many cultures and identities. This is partly the result of the ambiguity of the discourse about EU cultural identity within the European Union itself, which has been seeking to foster a European identity and common European values, and partly the result of a fractured European demos.

The European Union suffers from weak visibility and low profile in India. The bias is evident in the importance given to Washington in the Indian media and in both intellectual and cultural ties with the United States. Despite a growing information and awareness about the European Union in India in recent years, there still persists a wide gap between peoples partly as a result of mutual indifference.

With English having become the lingua franca of intercultural dialogue and processes, the Internet offers many open-

ended possibilities for the wired-in middle class in India. This poses a major challenge for European channels like Deutsche Welle TV (which are hardly known or generally provided by cable operators), which offer standardized and undifferentiated cultural products which are unable to effectively compete with popular English channels like CNN and BBC.

Despite the inherent constraint (subsidiarity) of developing a more vibrant European foreign cultural policy and the reluctance of member states to more meaningfully contribute to EU cultural policy, there are increasing attempts to overcome the lack of strategic neglect of India for decades by the introduction of innovative programmes. These have included the EU-India Economic Cross Cultural Programme. The Joint Action Plan adopted as part of the EU-India Strategic Partnership (2005) builds on the EU-India Cultural Declaration (2004). The introduction of the India Window to the Erasmus Mundus programme has generated considerable interest amongst Indian students. There is a growing civil society dialogue, which for the most part is government-driven, but which needs to be broadened and sustained. Nevertheless, there is urgent need to supplement bilateral efforts by more meaningful multilateral initiatives in order to develop more effective synergies.

Cultural alienation?

As the largest democracies in the world, India and Europe have a multitude of cultural similarities – both are multilingual, multicultural, pluralist, secular and complex societies. They are natural partners sharing common values and beliefs, inclu-

ding a commitment to democracy, pluralism, human rights and the rule of law. Since culture is most often the window to a country or region, both India and Europe need to foster greater cultural dialogue and exchanges with one another in order to better comprehend our differences and how they can be used in achieving common goals.

With the declaration of 2008 as the “Year of Intercultural Dialogue” by the European Commission, the European Union must proactively promote dialogue with rising powers like India. Many of the historical and cultural bonds and terms of reference which traditionally linked India with Britain and, in turn, Europe have considerably withered away with time, including globalization and the growing influence of American television and Hollywood. A wired-in middle class is no longer greatly interested in European history, art or society. There is an imperative need to develop a more robust framework of educational exchanges and encourage Indian elites to study in Europe. A key goal should be to induce a greater number of students to study in Europe, which has so far been constrained because of the language barrier and because Europe does not provide a structure of post-doctoral fellowships and employment prospects that is available in the United States. This requires modification of visa restrictions and employment possibilities, at least part-time, during stu-

For most Indians, there is nothing like a European culture, but many cultures and identities.

dy periods, especially as India's new generation looks mostly towards the United States and hardly towards Europe. There is a need to persevere despite the perennial dilemma of being unable to answer the question if cultural diplomacy really leads to concrete results or not. There is a need to promote both "high culture" and "mass culture" and strengthen media relationships, academic and intellectual linkages and seek to promote tourism as well as foster greater intellectual and elite interaction.

India was established on the basis of "unity in diversity", which is the proclaimed objective of the European Union. Greater inter-cultural dialogue will enable both Europe and India to gain from each other's experiences. A dialogue on Islam with India – which has the second largest Muslim population in the world and with whom it has peacefully coexisted for centuries – may offer new insights into integrating Muslims in Europe. Similarly, there is much that India can learn from Europe about the virtues of interdependence and regional integration.

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FAREWELL TO EUROPE According to the author, there is no intercultural dialogue between Europe and Africa and cultural cooperations are mostly limited to school projects. People increasingly object to the cultural role model once forced on the African continent by colonial powers. *By Adjai Paulin Oloukpona-Yinnon*



Until very recently, the Europeans have left the deepest traces in Africa in the cultural sphere. European culture – in the form of education, fine art, music, literature, architecture, etc. – was the most obvious sign of a European presence in Africa. “Modern” Africans always distinguished themselves by adopting traits of European culture: the language, the clothes, and a certain attitude. Having learnt tiny bits of a European language, Africans believed to have climbed the heights of European culture and looked down on their fellow countrymen – now illiterates in their eyes – with conceit. This arrogant attitude has its organs during the times when the Africans were denied the right to their own culture – they had to adopt the cul-

ture of their white role models in order to be accepted as human beings. Writer and mastermind of colonisation Frantz Fanon aptly calls such “wannabe-Europeans” “peaux noires, masques blancs” – “black skin, white mask(s)”. However, that generation of Africans has long become obsolete and its times are over. Nowadays, the uncritical adoption of European culture is merely a side issue. Those who are still playing the game only do so for pragmatic political or business purposes. Otherwise, European culture has become a rarity in Africa. The presence of Europe in the life of Africans is more of a political than of a cultural nature. Many decisions of the African heads of state would not be made without European influence. As far as the economy is concerned, the American business and efficiency model is increasingly getting the upper hand.

Unlike for example in colonial times, Europeans living in Africa nowadays are from different European countries. Therefore, European culture in Africa is no longer as homogeneous as it still was in colonial times. The cultural institutions of European nations (“Goethe-Institut“, “Alliance Française“ and other similar institutions) are trying to organise more joint events to demonstrate European unity and diversity, yet the results are

generally a far cry from the intended objectives: European jazz concerts in Africa or African tours of well-known European theatre companies are only frequented by “insiders” these days. The majority of Africans does not even notice such events. The black continent, which was largely shaped and influenced by Europe in the past is slowly bidding farewell to the cultural role model previously imposed on Africa.

In actual fact, Africa has long said good-bye to the all-embracing “civilisation model” imposed on the entire continent, including Christian religion and ethics, European culture and art, fashion and lifestyle, etc. The Africans shape their own identities, following bequeathed African values and embracing contemporary global challenges: The explosion of population figures and poverty force Africans to invent new forms of life in order to be able to survive. An ever increasing amount of prophets found their own nondenominational churches here and there, because the established churches are preaching without considering the actual needs of the people. Informal trade and the recycling business provide help for the increasingly uncontrollable unemployment in African metropolises. Second-hand shops dictate fashion in many countries. There is absolutely no doubt that Western cultural models remain very attractive, yet with the daily fight for survival, the desire for European culture is increasingly utopian. Nowadays, Euro-

Nowadays, European culture is a luxury that only very few Africans can afford.

pean culture is a luxury that only very few Africans can afford.

It cannot be denied that more and more Africans drink Dutch beer or French wine, eat Italian pasta and drive German cars. However, this only applies to a small group of the African population and is only an expression of conformist behaviour or wealth. Culture plays a very marginal role in many Africans’ perception of Europe. It has no effect on the majority of the African population. Those Africans longing or striving for European culture generally only adopt a diluted version or a vague notion of this culture. Turning the back on European culture also – and above all – has an ideological reason: Contemporary Africans cannot identify in a straightforward and convincing manner with a culture which has denied them the right to their own identity over centuries.

The founders of the “Negritude“ for example – the former President of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor and the writer and politician Aimé Césaire – had to fight hard for this right. However, their efforts ultimately led to Africa rediscovering its past and slowly rescuing it. Thus, most Africans nowadays have gained a new self-confidence which allows them to form their own identity based on indisputable values.

Cultural values

The cultural historian Ulli Beier, one of the most knowledgeable experts of West Africa world-wide, once made the case that these cultural values have their origin in people’s minds, where they strike roots and establish themselves as “indisputable values” passed on from one

person to the next. He proves this theory using the cultures of West Africa as an example, which always adjust to the facts of time and space, continuously restructuring themselves: "The West African cultures do not use a script to preserve their history for their descendants. [...] Instead of a script, the Yoruba invented the "speaking drum". They were able to convert their history and their poetry, their wisdom and their humour into music using the language of the drums. [...] In order to make all these contents accessible for a larger audience, they constantly had to be revived by the drummers. It was the particular strength of the culture that the concepts changed in the process. It was never dogmatic and always remained flexible." A photo documentation with portraits of people who belong to the West African ethnic group of the Yoruba - among others the Nigerian Nobel Prize laureate Wole Soyinka - is another proof of this theory. The "undisputable values" of the Yoruba culture were reflected in the facial expression of these modern Nigerians.

Modern straw huts

Beier wants to prove a theory that also generally refers to both the Africans' cultural perception of Europe and the Europeans' cultural perception of Africa in a generalised fashion. While culture in Europe continuously develops, very often Europeans still see African cultures in the light of the old "tradition" of Africa, completely ignoring that Africans are also going through an adjustment process. Even European "cultural scientists" exploring these cultures and identifying their individual values mainly seem to content themselves with wanting to re-

scue "endangered minority cultures" or with the search for the "traditional", the "original" and the "authentic" in African cultures. Quite a few European cultural scientists would probably rather see Africans still living in straw huts to provide them with research material.

Seemingly, the dialogue of cultures can only take place if Africans introduce their ancient culture when Europeans offer "high-tech". The situation is similar for many Europeans who - for various different reasons - travel to Africa. During their holidays, all they want to see is the sun and a sandy beach lined with palm trees - far away from poverty and slums. But if they travel in the context of a town twinning programme, they want to experience Africa as it smells and oozes. The yearning for a "pure Africa" makes most Europeans blind and they forget what is essential: People and their minds as origins and environments of culture. Particularly for that reason, the "dialogue of cultures" is still impossible.

Dialogue of cultures?

The "dialogue of cultures" is a buzz phrase proclaiming the necessity of cultural cooperation between people and nations without actually implementing it. Reasons are given for the necessity of a "dialogue of cultures" and it is justi-

Quite a few European cultural scientists would probably rather see the Africans still living in straw huts to provide them with research material.

fied, but there is a great misunderstanding about the actual and potential nature of this dialogue. In the everyday lives of people from different cultures living together – whether in Africa or in Europe – “dialogue“ is simply reduced to mutual tolerance. Apart from some members of the European “avant-garde“, not many people attempt to understand the African people and to learn from this understanding. Hence, the “dialogue of cultures“ generally remains just a catch phrase for politicians to adorn their speeches to gain voters. It is also used in reports of non-governmental organisations in order to provide reasons for particular projects and to raise funds through donations. However, only very few people want to see the real value of a culture and the mutual beneficial aspects of two different cultures.

The fact that the Nigerian writer Wole Soyinka received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1986, seems to have been a mere political issue nowadays. It has certainly not led to a higher level of popularity for African literature in Europe. The fact that it was also a Nigerian – Okwui Enwezor – who managed the world-famous art exhibition Documenta 11 in Kassel, only generated little more attention for the black continent in the field of fine arts. Many hoped after the nomination of the Nigerian that he was going to break the crumbling dominance of the white West in the world of arts. And Enwezor actually tried precisely that – not only by representing multicultural positions from all continents, but also by radically rejecting the theory of autonomous art. According to Enwezor, the avant-garde had lost itself in formalisms too many times. Art only matters if it is socially, culturally and politically relevant and takes

a stand against racism, power structures and repression. With regard to the present, according to him this means the involvement of art in the fight against globalisation as a “mathematical logic“ of capital, working towards an anti-colonialist global community.“

Since the end of the Documenta 11, we are missing the positive outcomes of such an innovative concept of art. Particularly because initiatives of that kind and the related cultural changes in Africa are not appreciated enough in Europe, a “dialogue of cultures“ between Africa and Europe remains mere wishful thinking. And because the African artists feel ignored by the European cultural scene, they turn away from Europe and develop their talents in the self-contained scene of Africa.

The process of renunciation, which was initiated by African intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century, accelerated over the last three to four decades and the Europeans have been unable to stall it. Nowadays, Africans are increasingly dismissive of European culture. The so-called African intellectuals are the strongest critics of European cultures, even if they like to adopt certain aspects – gastronomy, fashion, freedom of thought, progress and general comfort for their lives.

Naturally, culture is still a very important aspect of institutional cooperation between Europe and Africa. Bilateral as well as multilateral development policies spend large sums of money for cultural cooperation, yet the results remain to be seen. The film festival “FESPACO“ in Burkina Faso – meanwhile well-established in Africa – could be one stepping stone for selling African films in

Europe. But how many cinema fans in Europe are interested in African films? The biennial Dak'Art was also supposed to pave the way for African artists into the European art market. Most of the time, cultural cooperation covers funding of school and university facilities. Rarely, a long-term project is introduced with the objective to build bridges and to establish a genuine “dialogue of cultures”.

It would be wonderful if one man who has not only preached, but lived and breathed the dialogue of cultures got more attention: The West African writer Amadou Hampâté Bâ, who has coined an impressive phrase for the cultures of Africa: “The rainbow owes its beauty to the diversity of colours”. Could there be a better way of equally describing European culture these days?

Translation: Angelika Welt

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It is impossible to play in an orchestra and to concentrate either exclusively on playing or listening. If you concentrate only on what you are doing, you may play very well but you might also play at such a high volume so loud that you're drowning the others out or alternatively at such a low volume that your own voice is drowned. And of course you cannot limit yourself to listening - the art of playing music is the art of simultaneous playing and listening: one enhances the other.





IDENTITY PITFALLS History has connected Europe and America – alien and familiar at the same time. However, Europe has not defined or distinguished itself yet. At least that is the perception of the Old Continent’s lacking sense of unity in Brazil and the whole of Latin America.

By Leopoldo Waizbort



Talking about cultural ties between Europe and America also means discussing the capitalist expansion process that led to the “discovery” of America and its colonisation. A large area of continental dimensions is considered to be the New World - yet it did not develop out of nothing. It is a child of Europe with European blood in its veins. Hence, Europe is not just the alien facing the familiar of Europeans past and present – it also represents the familiar itself. America is an extremely diverse version of Europe

– in varying dimensions, intensities and time formats.

In its relation to the ‘new Europe’, ‘old Europe’ has renewed itself – not only due to the exploitation and accumulation of gold and silver stolen from America and all the ensuing consequences. The active traffic did not just fill the royal treasure chests, but also those people’s thoughts who continued to see themselves in a different position - reflected by the alien.

The colonisation process realised by the Europeans continues to be the most formative and prevailing cultural aspect for the life of the American peoples - with lasting impacts until the present day. Hence – to phrase it quickly – the difference between America and Europe is mainly a strategy of self-perception and own identity, developed by the Europeans throughout their history, which has reproduced itself in the geographical and imaginary space of overseas Europe – in America.

This complex relationship between the identities is so deeply rooted that America is mostly perceived as a ‘non-Euro-

pe’, even if everything has become a lot clearer after centuries of emerging moments of dependence and independence in politics and economy. But the actual benchmarks ‘America’ and ‘Europe’ are as much a mere construct as the distinction between America and Europe. In the end, everything returns to the realm of history and only history can provide the appropriate criteria to explain this multifaceted identity process.

Europe – a search for identity

Yet how does the Brazilian public perceive Europe – primarily in terms of culture? The desire for a clearly defined identity implied by the concept of “Europe” does not seem to be very pronounced in Brazil. In spite of everything that is said about Europe and the European Union in this country, the notion of the nation states is still prevalent. We do not talk about Europe, but about France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, England and so forth. Supranational structures cannot really compete with deeply rooted, long-standing national realities. In spite of many differences, the Portuguese, English,

The difference between America and Europe is mainly a strategy of self-perception and own identity, developed by the Europeans throughout their history, which has reproduced itself in the geographical and imaginary space of overseas Europe – in America.

Spanish, German, French and Italian presence in Brazil has always been very strong – and continues in this position of strength – under the umbrella of national identity. The fact that international gastronomic specialists agree that it is possible to sample the same quality of Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, French and German cuisine in São Paulo as in the countries of origin themselves (mind you, not English cuisine – with the exception of cakes and tea) is a clear example of this – if food is considered an aspect of culture.

Cultural institutes from various European nations operate in São Paulo: Circolo Italiano, British Council, Goethe-Institut, Alliance Française and others organise a large variety of activities and try to establish the cultural presence of their individual countries in the cultural life of the city. However, with a few exceptions, they never cooperate.

Their activities focus on disseminating their respective cultures – always from the point of view of a national culture where the European concept always – or most of the time – comes second (if it is incorporated at all). This European concept is certainly not anchored as strongly in our view of Europe – seeing it mainly as a geographical area. The extraordinary wealth of cultural manifestations of this geographical area is defined and classified by national identities, as we talk about theatre, literature and ideas from France, Italy, Germany, and so forth.

There is still little evidence of a Europe merging its peripheral regions – for example Greece or Albania. It seems to me that there is no real concept of merging the individual nations, but merely one that identifies them one by one, positioning them within a larger geographical area called Europe.

We would have to overcome the common distinction between the familiar and the alien. Maybe a glimpse at the history books could help. But that would lead to questioning America and Europe and at the same time the search for identity. But for the time being, the concept of Europe above all seems to be limited to the European Union. This perception does not correspond with the political, economic or cultural forces shaping the life of the Europeans at present.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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PARADISE EUROPE In Russia, Europe is perceived as an attractive partner for culture and business. Due to a lack of resources and the laws of the journalistic trade, the media describe the European continent in a particularly clichéd and positive way. *By Sergej Sumlenny*



Globally, no other region and no other economic union or community of states is as popular with the Russians as Europe and the EU. This is not only due to the close historic ties or geographical closeness. In the schools of the former Soviet Union, European history was the most important part of the compulsory subject “world history“. Children had to learn at least one European language, and a “canon of European literature“ – from Homer to Ibsen and Dickens – was part of the school subject world literature. European literature also had a strong influence on Russian classic literature. Those who know the Russian romantic poets well automatically have a good knowledge of Schiller’s ballads, as their translations and adaptations were of

great importance for Russian literature.

What was mere abstraction and – like the knowledge of foreign languages – rarely applicable in the former Soviet Union has been part of everyday life for 15 years now. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the whole of Europe – from Finland to Portugal – has been the most favourite travel destination of the Russians. Cheap flight tickets, which make a trip from Moscow or Yekaterinburg to Paris or Berlin more attractive than travelling to Vladivostok in the far Eastern corner of their own country, complete the picture: “Europe is close and attractive, Europe has a good image, Europe is popular.“

Every second student in Moscow carries books by Erlend Loe or Michel Houellebecq in the original language. The new films by Pedro Almodóvar or Jean-Pierre Jeunet fill the cinemas. Probably the last bastion rejecting European culture is modern art. Only very few Russians (and I do not belong to this small group) appreciate modern paintings, sculptures and installations from Europe. From my own experience visiting the Neue Pinakothek in Munich in the company of Russians and Americans, I can say that 80 to 90 percent even of those Russians who generally value the culture and cultural history of Europe perceive contempora-

ry European art as a blind alley or even a degradation of the fine arts of the past. The general motto is: "Dürer and Rembrandt are a thousand times better than any modern painter".

Yet modern art is the only aspect of European culture which is normally not held in high esteem by the Russians. The Russians have a very positive attitude towards the European tradition of the constitutional state, measures to prevent corruption or successful examples of building preservation and nature conservation and are looking for opportunities to exchange experiences. The positive perception of European culture defines an important regularity: The better the economic situation in Russia, the more sympathetic the Russians are towards European culture - an understandable phenomenon: With an increasingly better economic situation, the Russians can be less self-conscious about adopting the experiences of other nations in their role as free and equal partners.

It is true to say that Europe has never been more popular in Russia - also thanks to our economic success, which does not only enable us to finally feel on an equal footing when exchanging ideas with Europe, but also stimulates us to cultivate economic cooperation with Europe. According to the most recent surveys of the leading Russian polling institute FOM, the large majority of Russians (80 percent) thinks that Russian policy should expand relations with the EU. According to 68 percent, an even closer cooperation with Europe would be necessary. And only one in ten Russians considers the relationship with Russia as too close. There has never been as much enthusiasm for the Russo-European relationship before: 39 percent

of all interviewees stated that they had improved over the last year and only 9 percent thought the opposite.

The media: The power of clichés

Nevertheless, the beautiful concept of integration, cooperation and mutual harmonisation also has its dark patches, particularly in areas where we least expect them - in the work of the media.

The image of Russia through the eyes of European journalists and vice versa is little more than a cliché or a rather crude distortion of reality, which is not the fault of malicious journalists (which would be easy to change), but has more objective reasons (which are much more difficult to change). Considering the increasingly shorter documentary programmes on TV, journalists are almost forced to repeat the stereotypes that have already settled in the minds of their audience instead of disseminating new information. News on television that appeal more strongly to the emotions of the viewer than to their rational thinking suffer most from this rather sad fact. Newspapers and magazines either have to follow certain clichés or prejudices - or lose their readers. In addition, Western and Russian journalists working as foreign correspondents also have further, very different problems preventing them from a comprehensive and cliché-free news presentation.

It is hard to believe, yet in spite of the billions generated with Russian oil that allow for a real start-up boom in the Russian media industry for the first time in years, the foreign studios of even the richest TV stations, for example the national "Rossija", remain the "orphans" of the economic boom.

Even the richest media normally only have one correspondent in Germany (additionally also in charge of Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands), one cameraman (who works as a sound assistant, driver, technician, etc. at the same time). The less wealthy TV stations such as the private business broadcasting station RBC-TV - founded two years ago - do not have their own correspondents in Europe, but work with stringers from the respective countries. Hence, due to time and economic restraints, reports are very often full of clichés. The station Euronews is probably still the only source for comprehensive, diverse and up-to-date information about everyday life in Europe. It is funded by European and Russian broadcasting stations, with journalists from the national station "Rossija" working in its Russian editorial department. The only problem of Euronews is its difficult position in the Russian media industry. Most Russians have no idea which sources Euronews uses and are also led astray by the name. Thus the station has the reputation of "propaganda TV of the European Union", which is of course completely wrong.

A distorted representation of Europe in Russia (even without malicious intent!) naturally leads to a distorted view in the minds of the spectators and the readers. At first sight, the situation seems to look very fortunate for Europe - Russia's perception of Europe is certainly better

Russia's perception of Europe is certainly better than real life in Europe, but like every distortion, it is not in touch with reality and hampers an objective perception of European politics. For the majority of Russians, Europe remains the role model for a successful political and economic system.

than real life in Europe, but like every distortion, it is not in touch with reality and hampers an objective perception of European politics. For the majority of Russians, Europe remains the role model for a successful political and economic system - a conviction which is obviously well founded.

Yet this conviction is obstructive for a realistic evaluation and understanding of the existing (and sometimes deeply-rooted) economic and social problems. The absolutely correct view that "Europe has been greatly successful over the last few decades" often develops into the incorrect statement: "Problems do not exist in Europe". And those pointing towards these problems are often labelled as "old-school Soviet propagandists" and "anti-democratic populists" - which is of course complete nonsense.

In June 2006, when I wrote an article for the leading Russian business magazine "Expert" about the conflict between German university hospital doctors and their employers which had already gone on for a good six months, I was criticised in the same way. "This could not happen in Germany", one reader wrote. "Why are you trying to convince us that the German medical system is in a crisis? Maybe you want to gloss over the crisis in the Russian medical system?" others wrote. The strongest reproach was that I "had been commissioned by the Kremlin to write propaganda". Maybe the only area of European domestic politics seen as wrong and unacceptable is its immigration policy. Seeing burning cars in Paris on TV (the camera teams of the major Russian TV stations were attacked by rioters during live broadcasts) and the protests of Muslims in Denmark and the UK after the

publication of the Mohammed caricatures have convinced the Russians that the European way of an immigrant-friendly society is very risky. But even this exception only confirms the otherwise deeply rooted belief that Europe is a “problem-free region”.

Ghetto of concepts

The big problem for German journalists in Russia is their lacking knowledge of the Russian language. It might sound surprising, but most German journalists coming to Russia do not actually have a command of the language. They are accompanied to interviews by Russian producers who interpret throughout the talk. The daily summaries of reports in the Russian media – a very important part of a journalist’s job – are also prepared by the producers. Even now, Russian journalists remember a correspondent of a German TV station. He worked in Moscow for 15 years and only spoke four sentences in Russian that he asked his interview partners every time: “How are you?“, “Was it better previously?“, “Is your President a good person?“ and “How is it all going to continue?“. This is certainly an extreme case, but not that far off from the average situation.

However, not real knowing the Russian language is certainly not the biggest problem of Western journalists in Russia. The biggest problem is that Western journalists often voluntarily and consciously lock themselves away in a “ghetto of concepts”. The circle of interview partners is very limited and mostly remains the same over the years.

Most people granting interviews to the German media on current affairs of Russian domestic and foreign policy have

not been part of the political scene in the country for a long time. For the Russians, they are marginal figures whose words receive as little attention as the statements published by the spokespersons of the NPD (extreme right) or the ‘Neue Linke’ (left-wing movement) in Germany. Only the German media court these people as “politicians“. And the worst aspect is that those people often receive money for the interview from the Germans because of their precarious income situation. Thus they come to depend on these interviews and constantly repeat what is expected of them – a vicious circle which is very hard to break.

Nevertheless, I am optimistic that these problems may not be solved completely, but will certainly diminish over time. The more Russian and European journalists disseminate a realistic picture of Europe in Russia through broadcasting stations similar to Euronews and the more journalists (also through cooperations between Russian and European magazines and TV stations) show a comprehensive picture of Russia in Europe, the easier it will become to continuously grow the flow of truthful information in both directions – and the fewer clichés and misunderstandings can settle in the minds of Russians and Europeans.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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The soul of Europe does not agree with the language of accountants and notaries, which is so widely spread in the institutions of the European Union.

We have to ask ourselves very simply questions: Why do we want to live together in Europe? How do we want to live together? These questions will lead us to the spirit of Europe.

Bronislaw Geremek, former Polish Foreign Minister, MEP





KEY ELEMENT OR ORNAMENT? Dear Jean Monnet did not actually say it - yet even official publications circulate his dictum on the new significance of culture in case he was to start European integration all over again. We do not seem to come close to the fulfilment of his wish anyway - if it ever existed. There is room for doubt whether cultural policy at a community level exists at all. *By Enrique Banús*



With these conclusions, this contribution could end very quickly. Yet as it is often the case with the delusions and confusions of the European Union, matters are not quite so simple. It is correct that the transfer of responsibilities for cultural affairs to the Community is relatively timid. Certainly, this is partly due to the fact that the main cultural responsibilities are with the individual countries or - since the start of rapid decentralisation in the eighties - sometimes with the regions - both being rather watchful custodians of traditional or new responsibilities. Their position also remains unchallenged, as it is the predominant and prevalent opinion that culture should develop in very close contact with the citizens.

The “Brusselsification“ of culture - excuse my daring neologism - would certainly not be met with great enthusiasm. Not even the basic documents can provide fundamental guidelines in this context. Although the Commission has been entrusted to look after the “joint cultural heritage“ in the Maastricht Treaty, it actually only comes second, with cultural diversity even mentioned twice in said Article (now Article no. 151). The emphasis is on preserving diversity and on highlighting the common heritage.

The common heritage is not in a very strong position, which is additionally weakened by the lack of a clear description - let alone the definition of this concept. Which might be just as well, though...

Nevertheless, the significance of culture and its consideration in Community policy has to be analysed on three levels: Firstly, we can examine the impact of the Directorate-General for Education and Culture in charge of the goals stated in Article 151, which secondly makes it easy to observe that other political areas (from the traditional Single European Market to financially strong regional policies) have an effect on culture. A third level is the increasingly growing importance of a cultural dimension in foreign policy over the last few years. And finally, culture

could also be considered in a wider, not very precise sense by linking it with the notion of a “European identity“.

Audiovisual culture

Cultural and educational policy have always been part of one Directorate-General within the Commission’s organisation chart. Sport also falls into this area of responsibility. A recent addition is language policy or rather: The concern about multilingualism, but also about young people and the civil society as a whole. “Audiovisual media“ no longer belong to this department. The new Commission with 25 member states incorporated it in the D-G “Information Society and Media“ (the website only seems to be available in English – not really in line with the multilingual approach of the neighbouring D-G... even if it only provides the site on multilingualism in 5 languages). None of this sounds particularly exciting – and in fact is not. Yet this separation of audiovisual media from culture is nevertheless noteworthy – as they were considered the favourite aspect of cultural policy for a while, receiving more funds than all other cultural segments together (which is still the case to the present day). The story goes that film and television contributed more to shaping (in this case European) awareness than literature or music. It is also obvious that this sector promises greater financial revenue. Hence here – between cultural and trade policy – independent activities have developed that are no longer placed under the overall organisational umbrella “culture“.

Indeed, the audiovisual segment was the sphere where most “political“ agitation took place. Mainly during the period

of François Mitterrand’s presidency, there was a strong push to support European films and to increase their market share, using the argument that European films communicated European values to counteract a growing Americanisation in the global film world. Not only did this trend lead to public film funding, but also to regulations that apply to television – with its most well-known aspect, the “European quota“. This has also led to a strict position adopted in some negotiations on international trade liberalisation – known as “cultural exception“: Liberalisation – yes please – but not for cultural objects. The state is not just a state sponsor, it also has demands – for example adherence to the applicable quota. Under the influence of these developments, the European attitude towards film has not changed significantly: The great successes in the European film market are still produced in the United States and around 70 % of the money generated in European cinemas can be allocated to US productions. At least some rather remarkable films have been produced in Europe with Community support. And quite a few film festival participants largely owe their existence to the MEDIA Programme.

France was on its own during those years (it was the official negotiation position of the European Union), but the other member states did not share the country’s enthusiasm. Since then, the situation has relaxed slightly. What remains are the MEDIA programmes that were initiated in 1991 – operating as MEDIA Plus and MEDIA Training until the end of 2006. The European Parliament and the Council of Europe gave the green light for the follow-up programme on 16th November 2006. The reasoning behind this decision was as

follows: “The European audiovisual sector has a key role to play in the emergence of European citizenship because it is one of the principal vectors for conveying the Union’s common and shared fundamental social and cultural values to Europeans and especially young people.”⁴¹

Further reasons for the envisaged project based on various documents follow. Is it only by accident that commercial aspects are also massively involved? The project is called the Lisbon Strategy and in that context it is also mentioned that the Council of Europe recorded that “information providers added value by utilising and networking cultural diversity in Europe”. In the world of culture, this “utilisation of cultural diversity is not always perceived with great enthusiasm (even less so if the term “exploitation“ is applied) – but it is no great surprise: Culture and commerce mix in a way here which some people may find ghastly (“utilisation of culture“), whereas for others it is most natural. The approach is certainly not liberal – it is in line with ordinary cultural policy practice in many countries that try to help with funds. Sales initiatives and festivals, but also the production process itself are sponsored – the latter generally with no more than 50,000 € for each film.

Hence MEDIA 2007 will last until the end of 2013 (the trend to adjust the duration of the programmes to the already agreed financial framework is obvious) and will have € 1,055 million at its disposal. A new activity will be added: “i2i Audiovisual“ to ease access to bank financing for film producers. But that’s not really the point here as all these issues – if they belong anywhere at all – are atypical aspects of cultural policy.

A second attempt to introduce the Directorate-General

Cultural policy as developed over the last 20 years by the Directorate-General in charge (in 1986, “Culture” is added to the name of the Directorate-General in charge of information policy), has experienced a process of clearance. Even before cultural responsibilities had been formally allocated to the Community, things had started to move. Commission activities – particularly in terms of listed buildings (it is common for cultural policy to start with the relatively uncontroversial “conservation of monuments and buildings”) have been anticipated – naturally with the permission of the member states. It was a time without a legal basis, hence resolutions were passed as resolutions of the “Council of Ministers”. This was followed by a time of frantic activity, including financial support for translator meetings to grants for the training of cultural managers or for exhibitions of young artists – a very colourful palette with very blurry outlines. After this period of searching for a definition of cultural policy (which was not allowed to be actual cultural policy, but only to feature as “activities in the cultural sector“), three fields emerged, leading to programmes with melodic names such as “Raphael“, “Ariane“ and “Kaleidoscope“ in 1993. The first programme is dedicated to the European cultural heritage, the second to books, reading and literature and the third remains open for a large variety of initiatives – always to be organised as collaborative projects involving different partners.

These programmes lasted until the beginning of the 21st century – to be re-

placed by “Culture 2000” with the aim to contribute to “the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”. It continues that this should be realised by “promoting cultural dialogue, the creation and dissemination of culture and the mobility of artists and their works, European cultural heritage, new forms of cultural expression and the socio-economic role of culture”. ‘Culture 2000’ supports “cooperation on subjects of common interest between cultural institutions and/or other operators

in the Member States and those in third countries”. Again, this is a broad, yet traditional support programme. The European Union does not get very involved, the main part of the budget (only 10 % are excluded and can be used for “miscellaneous expenditure”) delights the hearts of creative artists, facilitators and organisers in the cultural sector if they have the patience to comply with all the forms leading to the promised land (should the selection committee be in favour of an application).

Between 2000 and 2006, € 236.5 million were available “to provide support for specific and innovative measures”, particularly “encouraging the emergence and spread of new forms of expression, within and alongside traditional cultural

Fields, placing the main emphasis on facilitating access to culture and wider cultural participation by the people in Europe, in all their social, regional and cultural diversity, in particular young people and the most underprivileged and also

The transnational dimension is a result of linking several players covering all intercultural dialogues required to spend the money successfully.

promote the dissemination of live cultural events using the new technologies of the information society“. “Integrated actions covered by structured, multi-annual transnational cultural cooperation agreements“, “agreements that follow either a vertical (concerning one cultural field) or horizontal (associating several cultural fields) approach“ and finally, “special cultural events with a European and/or international dimension” are supported, if they “help to increase the Europeans sense of belonging to the same community“. All not terribly concrete and as always – the devil is in the details. The officials have always had an ample margin of discretion and now external experts are involved in the selection process, yet this continues to be a “broad field”.

Looking at the projects sponsored in 2005, a pattern emerges as the result of the European Commission’s “cultural policy“(or rather the grant policy in the cultural sector). The very varied participation of the different states - partly, but not only due to their individual size - is quite conspicuous. 25 projects from Germany, 35 from Italy (top of the list) and only 6 from Spain or Bulgaria (already part of the group of nations), the Netherlands and Slovenia have been sponsored. The country that sent the application is counted and organisations from other countries are then involved in the project). This is not the right place to analyse these data, yet they can certainly be revealing in terms of how different “cultures” apply EU funds (the examples mentioned above are meaningful enough for those occasionally involved in such issues).

The areas covered by the projects are more interesting, as they reveal the aspects of life perceived as “culture“: “Cul-

tural Heritage“, “Translation – Literature“, “Performing Arts“, “Translation – Science“, “Visual Arts“, “Literature Books & Reading“ – those are the categories – not very original indeed: They sort of match the department in a Ministry of Culture, marking an area where the particular emphasis on translations at most highlights what is specific (50 projects for literature, 20 for science). 63 out of 218 projects (almost one third) are dedicated to “Cultural Heritage”, which is also in line with conventional cultural policy. 56 projects are allocated to the “Performing Arts“ – again quite similar to national cultural policies. “Literature“ and “Visual Arts“ feature a lot less.

Often, the projects are about communicating cultural contents from one state to another and about a general promotion of cultural dialogue (in the category Literature, translations are often involved). They are about our cultural heritage and frequently transnational, yet sometimes only referring to a particular area with an allegedly “European“ heritage. They are about festivals and time and again about joint projects with partners from different countries – the transnational dimension is a result of linking several players covering all intercultural dialogues required to spend the money successfully (after all, a total of 1198 partners have been involved in the various authorised projects).

Throughout this analysis, we have actually fallen into the trap: How to quantify culture? How many projects, how many special areas and how many partners are involved? It would undoubtedly be more important to analyse the contents of the projects, but they form such a motley group - from “Canto della Pace“ to

“Industrial Mining Heritage“ – certainly representing diversity and hopefully also the common ownership of cultural heritage stated in the Treaty, which is much more difficult to verify. At least at first sight it seems that only a few projects actually target creative artists and performative outweighs creative.

It is difficult to identify a real focus of a dedicated cultural policy. With the allocation of the lion’s share of the budget to “patronage“ (an allocation of mercies), drawing up powerful outlines are difficult. The overall image emerges from the mosaic of applications from individual initiatives unconcerned about general priorities.

The millions allocated to other activities resulting from the Community’s direct initiative are not tied to specific applications, which could be considered a separate own policy. The vast majority of funds are allocated to the respective cultural capital – an initiative that has become quite popular – with a large number of cities as applicants for every round. The selection process initially takes place at a national level and afterwards at the community level (one example: it will only be Spain’s turn in 2016 – and 10 years before, there are as many as 7 definite candidates). Another project-independent activity supports financial organisations with a commitment to culture at a European level - for example the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages or the information- and documentation network Mercator – also working with these languages - or the concentration camps built by the National Socialists that have been

Throughout this analysis, we have actually fallen into the trap: How to quantify culture? How many projects, how many special areas and how many partners are involved?

turned into historic memorials: All these initiatives are mentioned separately and cannot be left empty-handed. This is followed by the list of “entities referred to Annex I, Article 3, Activity Area 2, Number 2)” (which would be suitable answer in a quiz) and which states that a public invitation to tender is normally required – with the exception of the years 2004 and 2005, when the selection was supposed to be made from a closed list with 39 privileged candidates, for example orchestras (youth, chamber and baroque orchestras of the European Union or the Philharmonic Orchestra of Nations), The Choral Federation (and other choral music institutions), the European Opera Centre in Manchester, some Jazz (“Swinging Europe”), The European Association of Conservatories, the European Theatre Convention and the Union of European Theatres (plus some other initiatives linked to the theatre), the European Writers’ Congress, the European Network of Cultural Organisations for Children and Young People, the Artists’ Villages, the training centre for cultural administration, the museum organisations, Euroballet and finally the European Association of Historic Shooting Clubs. The list is long – yet it was necessary to draw it up in order to identify how much lobbying was behind it and that the “principle of equal shares for all” is still very common: There is not much to give, but it is given to many. And yet one can assume that several of these institutions depend on EU grants and that their existence would be difficult or even impossible without it.

However, that was once upon a time. In 2006, a public tender took place and 34 organisations were selected: Many of the familiar organisations again – but no

Shooting Clubs or Euroballet this time. Among the new participants, I should mention the Mediterranean Youth Orchestra with its 91 musicians from 16 countries; also Ancient Music is considered – following the latest trend. Some aspects have shifted for choral music and other categories, yet the overall picture remains unchanged: The revolutionary sounding “Riot” Foundation from Poland is a film festival, “Bootlab” from Berlin stands for the sponsoring of independent media projects and the Italian “Fondazione Fabbrika (sometimes with a k, sometimes with a c) Europa per le Arti Contemporanee” follows very far-reaching goals – always somehow with an urban theme. The “principle of equal shares for all” continues: 5.5 million are earmarked for 34 organisations – leading to an average allocation of approximately 162,000 euros.

After all these comments that potentially provide too much detail, everybody may go out and find his or her answer as to whether a cultural policy exists or whether the European Union has turned into a patron with some key aspects emphasising its transnational character.

Culture everywhere

However, the Directorate-General for Culture is not so alone after all. Those aware of national cultural policies know that it is worth while looking at other ministries in France to see high level of state commitment for culture. Even the Ministry of Defence has a budget for culture. And within the European Community, it is almost mandatory to look for culture in other areas, because the Treaty states as follows: “The Community

shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.” It is not clear whether this refers to all clauses of the Treaty, but it seems very likely, which renders a nice utopian touch to it. The fact that only the so-called “First report on the consideration of cultural aspects in European Community action“ was published in 1996 – after the Article had already been valid for 13 years, seems to confirm the difficulty of ensuring the ubiquitousness of culture. Ten years later, we are still waiting for the second report.

Where can we find other EU activities with an impact on culture? Audiovisual media – now part of the information society are certainly an option, also including the Internet, with a cultural significance that can hardly be underestimated. Indeed, the Directorate-General knows a section on the Web with the title “Culture in the digital era“, dealing with audiovisual media, radio broadcasting and the Internet and in many places with technical aspects, for example the security of electronic communication, the new technical possibilities of radio broadcasting and similar aspects. The Internet is mostly used in areas such as health, business, learning, administration and also the inclusive society. In the strict sense of the word, this is not really related to culture, yet in a broader sense it has massive impacts on culture. Although there is little concrete information, it is evident that worries about those impacts of the Internet are considered – which is something. Programmes to digitalise museums, libraries and archives and opening them up for the Internet are

more direct. Projects digitalising historic films, music archives, historic maps, etc. are also sponsored.

Yet again, we are confronted with a subsidisation policy whose quality depends on the quality of the applications and those involved in the selection process.

We could certainly identify cultural aspects in other fields of activity: Analysing agriculture and rural development, health, consumer protection and employment, social aspects and equal opportunities, but also environmental issues (more than 10 % of projects sponsored by the LIFE programme are directly linked to culture) or development aid (also because of the topic “Tourism and Culture“) would certainly be productive – maybe even including trade in the analysis as the area dealing with intellectual property rights and the exciting topic of including audiovisual products in the global negotiations on trade liberalisation. Since the Uruguay Round, the topic mentioned earlier has disappeared from the limelight to a certain extent, but with regard to the ensuing talks of the stalled Doha Development Round taking place now, the website of the Directorate-General for Trade states: “...the EU is also committed to defending the right of WTO members to promote cultural diversity“.

In the EU’s Framework Programmes for Research, significant cultural projects are listed as part of the 5th and 6th Framework Programmes (approximately 115 projects) covering a very broad range, using melodic and sometimes astonishing acronyms, for example AMICI-TIA for “Asset Management Integration of Cultural Heritage In The Interexchange between Archives“ or MATAHARI “Mo-

The “principle of equal shares for all“ is still very common: There is not much to give, but it is given to many.

ble Access to Artefacts and Heritage at Remote Installations”. It seems that a large number of these projects are linked to the European cultural heritage.

Some years ago, it was already established that many of the sponsored projects have a cultural content – again mostly to do with the European cultural heritage. Projects dealt with the transformation of a disused mill into an ecological museum or about the development of an area for cultural tourism, etc. In this context, the EU Commission has been riding on a wave that has been relatively popular since the eighties of the last century: The view that culture could be very suitable to further economic growth, but also to revitalise regions in crisis.

Hence it is obvious that culture is not ubiquitous in the Community’s activities (and not even plays a dominant role or takes priority), but that it emerges in many places. The investigation of the role of culture at the core of the Community continues. Since the fifties, the goal was to create a Common Market, to abolish trade barriers and to create equal opportunities. The term “culture” is not mentioned in the Treaties of Rome. One could easily get the impression that culture only became relevant with the introduction of the already mentioned Article 128 (nowadays Article 151) of the Maastricht Treaty – or very shortly beforehand by silently anticipating this Article. However, that would be short-sighted: The Common Market does not exist in a vacuum – it is part of society, influenced by it and in turn influencing it – just like culture. And indeed it was stated soon that freedom of trade for goods also includes cultural “goods” and that labour mobility also covers creative artists. In

grant legislation, there are also cases affecting culture. A number of Directives explicitly state that they can be applied to cultural activities.

Yet a collision between freedom of movement – the basis for life in the Community – and the protection of culture explicitly allows for exceptions in terms of freedom of movement in order to “protect (...) the national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value“, as stated in the Treaty of Rome. The legislation of the European Court of Justice also refers to “Culture“, often not only, but increasingly dealing with questions of copyright, but also with questions of freedom in the context of cultural life (or the media). At times, states argue that a measure limiting freedom is justifiable to protect culture. However, the European Court of Justice frequently does not share this opinion.....

The importance of culture for the life of the European Community is often revealed in unexpected contexts. In 1997, the Commission sent a communication to the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (stating its decision) “about the sector of olives and olive oil (including economic, cultural, regional, social and environmental aspects)”. It is nice that a link between olive oil and cultural aspects is acknowledged (although it is unfortunately not specified further in the document). Regrettably, the famous verdict from 1987 on the German purity law for beer did not refer to the effects on culture, but only to the effects on health...

Culture and Cultures

By mentioning olive oil, we have almost reached another area where cultural

policy is becoming increasingly important. It developed in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Romano Prodi's hobbyhorse – and is intended to turn into an important pillar of the new neighbourhood policy, with the year 2008 being specifically dedicated to the idea of 'Intercultural Dialogue'. The Mediterranean that has always been an intersection of civilisations and an agora of manifold, not always positive encounters (glorification is not desirable in this context) – has again turned into the European Sea of Destiny. With immigration as one of the serious challenges over the next few years and with more than one neighbouring state struggling to find peace, with a number of misunderstandings and threats – the abundance of opportunities of this geographic and cultural area seem to degenerate and turn into evidence for the stupid proposition of the "clash" of civilisations. Whether it would be wise to see the development of the intercultural dialogue as an answer to this proposition remains to be seen. Prodi has certainly stimulated significant efforts in this area: Over the last three years, the Commission has organised at least three large-scale conferences on intercultural dialogue in Brussels. Romano Prodi himself has employed a group of consultants at the highest level. Their final document is not free of some obsessions, yet provides valuable hints about dialogue not just leading to more tolerance, but also to more respect. This document from 2003 states as follows: "On the one hand, new own reference points have to be sought in the dialogue with others and on the other hand, everybody needs to share the desire to create a common civilisation beyond the diversity of inherited cultures".

To support intercultural dialogue on a large scale – not limiting it to some organised forums – plus the relaxed combination of necessary openness and the conviction of the importance of fundamental values in a democratic society seem to be great challenges in this context, where many and very valuable concrete projects have to be presented. Some of them are effectively supported by the Euromed programme.

The focus on the Mediterranean region now merges into a new policy with the other neighbours. In its foundation documents, intercultural dialogue is rarely mentioned explicitly. However, the border is not described as a separation, but as a meeting space for culture, which is often transnational. The positive description of the melting-pot effect of the border region is indeed remarkable. There is also a request for intensified cultural collaboration and it is stated that the "exchange of human capital, ideas, knowledge and culture" should be supported: A different take on freedom! At some point, the dialogue between the cultures is identified as a "free exchange of ideas between cultures, religions and traditions" – not always easy, certainly not for the citizens of some neighbouring countries.

For 2008, the Year of Intercultural Dialogue, ten million euros have been budgeted – primarily for culture, education, young people, sports and EU citizenship. The Commission explains the introduc-

In principle, European integration has been a project of dialogue – and even if cultures in the member states share a common denominator, the differences are still very obvious. Therefore, the dialogue has always been intercultural to a certain extent.

tion of this themed year as follows: “To promote intercultural dialogue as an instrument to assist European citizens, and all those living in the European Union, in acquiring the knowledge and aptitudes to enable them to deal with a more open and more complex environment.“ Maybe the expectations towards this dialogue are raised too high by stating that it wants to contribute to “raising the awareness of European citizens, and all those living in the European Union, of the importance of developing active European citizenship which is open to the world, respectful of cultural diversity and based on common values – the protection of human dignity, freedom, equality, non-discrimination, solidarity, democracy and constitutional legality as well as respecting the rights of minority groups“ . Definitely worth a try. In principle, European integration has been a project of dialogue – and even if cultures in the member states share a common denominator, the differences are still very obvious. Therefore, the dialogue has always been intercultural to a certain extent.

In this context, culture is linked to the way the outside world perceives the European Union and its role for the future of the world, which enlarges the spectrum and moves culture away from just being a nice addition, putting it centre-stage instead when it comes to working on a peaceful, humane world rather than just nurturing the desire for it. Culture should not mainly be understood as an element of separation and conflict, but of bringing people together.

Within “Culture 2007“ – the follow-up programme of “Culture 2000“ of the Directorate-General Culture – the key element of “cultural policy” should it

exist – intercultural dialogue is one of the stars. The programme starts from the following assumption: “All Community activities are currently too fragmented.” This is followed by the suggestion to set three priorities: “Promoting transnational mobility of people working in the cultural sector, promoting international dissemination of artistic and cultural works and productions and support of intercultural dialogue“. The detailed analysis has to take place when the noble objectives can be compared with the practical implementation. It is certainly remarkable to what extent intercultural dialogue has now become a main goal of cultural policy.

Identity? No, thank you

Not so long ago, the question did not even arise whether a European identity existed, what it consisted of and whether it was to be supported. It featured in the Tindemans Report (1975) in the context of a new attempt to strengthen the Community. In 1973, it even triggered a declaration by the heads of state which did not really refer to aspects normally understood as culture, though. Democratic values are mentioned, even equating them with the identity of a Europe that is not only a reality, but also a goal and a project. “Cultural identity” has often been discussed in general terms since the eighties of the last century and hardly anyone has questioned that culture is a cohesive element. Yet does this approach not contribute to focusing on separating aspects of culture rather than its unifying aspects? Internally unifying, but externally differentiating? Thus the notion of the European identity can include or exclude – depen-

ding on the applied criteria. Wouldn't it be wiser to let culture be culture and to emphasise how much it thrives on the mix of influences and trends - particularly in Europe? And on the fashions on the "European marketplace"? Hence, "Europe" also becomes the antipode of nationalism which always evokes a monolithic "We" - but also of faceless globalisation with its "ketchup" levelling the diversity of flavours. The culture of Europe has a lot to offer, it is too varied and far too interesting to be exploited for processes of inclusion or exclusion.

In the meantime, we have also learnt from the theoretical debate about identity that it is not a monolithic concept. The rather hapless concept of "multiple identities" made us realise how multi-faceted identity is. Hence it would be childish to build up artificial identity conflicts between Europe and the specific national characters. European and national elements (in combination with regional and local characteristics) can be presented as additional aspects of our self-perception.

It seems important not to get caught in identity traps, but to support the closeness to European projects with other means: Activities geared towards the citizens - accompanied by a high-quality communication policy, which has been required for a long time - coupled with a greater presence of European contents in schools plus national governments avoiding the "Brussels effect", which implies using

"Brussels" as the scapegoat to justify not reaching goals in negotiations.

What comes next?

Culture is "in". From being the stepchild in politics and economy and adopting a merely cosmetic role, culture has moved centre stage in international politics - now apparently in charge of dealing with conflicts, which is a very ambiguous honour. Particularly within the European Union, the positive effect of culture on international social interaction and within a society needs to be demonstrated. The Community is fully aware of the fact that it does not develop a real cultural policy. The document introducing "Culture 2007" self-critically states that the citizens "are not aware of the extent of efforts required to maintain and develop their cultures and to integrate the cultural dimension of building Europe". To a large extent, the European Union contributes as a sponsor by awarding grants, which may not be altogether tragic. "Culture" is certainly very present in many areas. And at least we are spared the flood of inaugurations of cultural institutions shortly before elections.

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1 Decision No 1718/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 concerning the implementation of a programme of support for the European audiovisual sector (MEDIA 2007)

NEW TERRITORY IN SIGHT? The EU has long been aware of its deficiency to lack a real own identity. In 1992, Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, wanted to infuse “life and spirit“ with the Maastricht Treaty. The current President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, is even in search of a “paradigm shift“. He is convinced that the political unification process will remain a utopian concept if cultural unification fails. *By Olaf Schwencke*



The Treaties of Rome were ratified 50 years ago (1957) was the start of the success story of the European Economic Community (EEC), which later also became a monetary union. To create a European Community with a common culture and shared values was not intended with the foundation of the EEC. Hence, all articles of the Treaty had an economic focus, culture was not mentioned at all and education only featured in the context of professional training.

European cultural policy without contours?

It was a long way that finally led to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) of the European Union, formally including culture after

some earlier tentative attempts of promoting culture. 50 years ago, the six states unified in the European Economic Community did also not deem it necessary to include a cultural dimension because the Council of Europe was responsible for cultural policy.

Moreover, for a long time the EEC member states insisted on their exclusive responsibility for national, regional and local cultural policy. It was easy to reach an agreement with the Council of Europe, which was in charge of fundamental and overall issues, which were ultimately not really binding issues. With the agreement of all member states, it had ratified a European Cultural Convention (1954), stating cultural support and notably the “protection and support of the common heritage“ as well as the mutual assurance of general accessibility to this common heritage. This already featured in the Charter of the Council of Europe that had been agreed by ten (West) European nations in 1949. Together with the very significant Human Rights Convention (1950) of the Council of Europe, cultural policy could develop into its second pillar until the late seventies. Thus the Council of Europe turned into the main authority on cultural policy, soon followed by the UNESCO as a sub-organisation of the UNO, with the EEC still

a long way off. The UNESCO addressed the public with important declarations on “cultural policy in Europe“ (Helsinki 1972) and later with the “Declaration of the World Conference on Cultural Policy“ (Mexico 1982) and received quite a lot of attention.

Thus, on the eve of the first direct election to the European Parliament in 1979, noteworthy concepts on cultural policy for a “cultural democracy“ in Europe – also taking social change processes into account - already existed as early as 1979.

European cultural policy - march through the institutions

Direct EP elections were the starting point of a new phase in the development of the European Community (EC). Immediately after its formation in 1979, a cultural committee was founded and that was initially also in charge of education, sports and information. It became the most important body for cultural policy within the EC, using all its (still limited) possibilities to strengthen the cultural dimension of the Community in cooperation with the Commission and the respective (compliant) Council Presidency. The first cultural report (Fanti Report, 1983) was on the one hand geared towards economic objectives and corresponding key data, but on the other hand also confident enough to plan concrete objectives for the Council of Europe’s cultural policy – for example the budgeted margin of one percent for cultural expenses. In addition, the Heads of State and Government intended to issue a declaration (Stuttgart 1983) expressing their support for “complementary Community activities in the cultural sector“. This was the start of cultural poli-

cy, but the actual turning point came with the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992). The Maastricht Treaty (formally coming into force in 1993) was the first legal basis for a European cultural policy – and thus introduced a new dimension into European politics: Which role was allocated to cultural policy by legally anchoring it in Article 128? Which competencies did the Community receive in cultural policy and how did it use these competencies for a common cultural policy?

It needs to be added that besides some EP initiatives in the eighties, culture hardly mattered in the EC before Maastricht: Even the “Single European Act“ (SEA, 1986) did not contain a paragraph on the future development of culture in the EC, although pointing towards the general apparent lack of “identity“ as a deficit of the Community could have been useful at that time to identify how to involve the citizens of Europe in the process of Europeanisation. After all, attempts had been made at several summit meetings to rectify this deficiency of the Community – thus indirectly dealing with the topic of culture.

These discussions took place at the summit meeting in The Hague (1969), Paris (1972) and with the greatest intensity in Copenhagen (1973). Not least did the Tindemanns Report with its proposal for a European Cultural Foundation declare culture as a future element of EC policy (1976). Furthermore, an EC Council of Ministers of Culture had existed since 1984. Immediately after its establishment, a project was initiated following

the initiative of the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri which – although lacking the legal basis at the time – developed into the most successful cultural project in the EC (now the EU) so far: The programme of the “European cultural capitals“. This initiative is globally associated with glamour and prestige and is copied in Russia and in the USA. As early as 1990, it already shows indications of a new qualitative approach. Glasgow completely reinvented itself in its role as a cultural capital in the process of developing and realising its concepts, not just improving its outer appearance, but enhancing the quality of life for its inhabitants in a way that is a long-term justification for this new image. This experience with urban development influenced by culture can also be seen as a new original impulse for a European integration process consciously focusing

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on cultural aspects.

Based on German and Hungarian applicants for the title of 2010, international discussion contexts have emerged while developing, realising and evaluating cultural capital concepts - increasingly enabling culture to become a driving force and a valuable resource for social developments – with still unforeseeable positive effects for the enhancement of the integration process. (Budapest Declaration, 2005).

During the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, the member states decided that the EC should not limit its activities to economic cooperation, but also use its competencies in the political spheres of social, cultural, educational and research policies. The negotiations mainly focused on creating a European identity of diversity and the consideration of cultural aspects in all areas of the Community. Thus, the Community became a political union, going beyond economic boundaries, with culture as an intellectually developed entity rather than a loose conglomerate of national and regional units - merging the citizens of Europe more closely together, thus speeding up integration. Or in other words – the idea was to take the integration process initiated with the foundation of the EC one step further and to strengthen the solidarity between the people of the member states, respecting their history, their culture and their traditions.

Therefore, the qualitative change in the political concept of the Community also created a framework for cultural ac-

tivities. Culture became an EU objective. The principal guidelines of the EC Treaty (Article 3p; Amsterdam Treaty - Article 3q) state the following: “Community activity ... includes .. ‘contributing’ to ‘education and training of quality and ‘to the flowering of cultures of the member states.” The legal recognition of culture created a high level of intrinsic value for the member states.

Culture – attempt at a definition

What does culture mean in the context of the Maastricht Treaty? “Culture is not an abstract concept: Culture is the sum of numerous different customs and practices which find their expression in all areas of our daily lives. Our individual lifestyle, our traditions and our ideals are all reflected in culture. Our dialects and our songs are firmly rooted in our culture. It defines how we declare our love or bury our dead people. Hence culture is the most significant and strongest characteristic of the human community. Culture is closely linked to direct and indirect learning processes and human development as such. As a dynamic, continuously changing element, culture forms a link between the past and the present.”

This is how the advisory body of the European Commission – “Culture for Citizens in 2000“ defined culture. This interpretation is not elitist, it is about everyday cultures. As before in the Basic Papers of the Council of Europe (and above all the Paper by Arc et Senans, 1972), culture is understood in a broader sense here. This definition was not adopted verbatim in the Maastricht Treaty in order to avoid limiting the potential scope for action from the onset, but it is neverthe-

less valid. The dynamics of the concept of culture will play a role for all future spheres of activity, which helps to re-establish priorities in culture and in cultural policies.

Culture and Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty

Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty (Amsterdam Treaty Article 151) sets boundaries and states opportunities for European Union activities, describes the legal basis for cultural affairs and has thus infused the EU with “life and spirit”, as Jacques Delors put it. As these regulations have also been adopted by the text of the “Constitution for Europe” (CFE) without substantial changes, an extensive analysis is required, which will then form the basis for demonstrating the deficiencies.

- (1) The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

This paragraph stresses the dialectics of the concept of culture. National and regional diversity as well as the common cultural heritage are the main criteria of EU cultural policy. The antithetic constellation is supposed to maintain diversity on the one hand and to support culture with a strong common cultural heritage

on the other hand. If the focus was only on diversity, this would contradict the political concept of the European Union (“unified in diversity“). On the other hand, exclusively supporting the common elements could harm the plurality of European cultures and turn them into one European “monoculture” in the long run. There is a firm link between the common elements of these cultures and their diversity.

This first paragraph thus supports a balanced cultural policy of the EU through a dialectical combination of the diverse and the common elements of the different cultures, allowing national cultural interests priority over joint activities. This is also expressed by the plural form “Cultures” and the term “to contribute”, as the member states, not the Community, are primarily in charge of their own cultural policy.

- (2) Community action shall be aimed at encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas :

Improved knowledge and dissemination of culture and history of the European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of the cultural heritage of European sig-

nificance; non-commercial cultural exchanges; artistic and literary creation, including in the audio-visual sector.

This second paragraph defines an area of activity for cultural policy, stressing the “improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of culture and history of the European peoples“. Its objective is to contribute to developing a European awareness among European citizens further. Thus the Community commits itself to support the dissemination of the respective cultures of the individual member states through exchange, cooperation and information programmes. This field of activity is mainly geared at the material cultural heritage of European significance. However, this passage is also intended to protect the non-material heritage – for example dialects, languages and traditions. The European Community can also support individual member states in “safeguarding its national contribution to the common cultural heritage“ – as already defined by the Council of Europe in its Cultural Convention. Non-commercial cultural exchange consists of international cultural activities that do not generate any material profit. In case a project follows commercial objectives, the Community cannot support it. This is a significant aspect, as it does not encourage a market-orientation of cultural activities. Artistic and literary creation are the last area of Community activity, involving the European Community to support national and at the same time pan-European artistic creations, thus also including the sphere of high-quali-

Europe needs to operate beyond its borders in terms of cultural policy: Foreign cultural policy - provided for in the European Constitution - is a legitimate task of the Community.

ty art. The traditional areas – books and fine arts – are of particular relevance in this context. However, the audio-visual sector is also mentioned, which again emphasises a wider understanding of culture, also including the development potential for the New Media.

- (3) The Community and the Member States shall foster co-operation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.

This entitles the Community to an independent foreign cultural policy. In the sphere of cultural policy, it can cooperate with third-party countries and international organisations such as the UNESCO and notably the Council of Europe. This paragraph points out that the Community is not limited to internal cultural policy and can thus deal with issues of cultural policy as an international player. Cooperation with international organisations and third-party countries clearly emphasises that Europe needs to operate beyond its borders in terms of cultural policy: Foreign cultural policy - provided for in the European Constitution - is a legitimate task of the Community.

- (4) The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty – particularly to maintain and promote the diversity of cultures..

This lateral formula – the so-called “Culture Compatibility Clause” is very important because it shifts the focus from the general dominance of economic is-

ssues within the EU: In all Community areas of activity, a particular focus has to be on culture. In legal terms, the “Culture Compatibility Clause” legitimises and sanctions the inclusion of cultural aspects in the context of Community activities so far. It is an explicit commitment to allow for cultural aspects in all activity areas, thus enhancing their importance. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, culture had not been protected as a primary right. In spite of the fact that the European Court of Justice nevertheless has almost always decided in favour of culture, it was no overall protection. This situation of insecurity only changed with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the inherent explicit definition of the significance of culture in terms of Community legislation.

The Culture Compatibility Clause as a *proprium* reemphasises the significance of the Treaty in the development process of the European Union – moving from an economic to a political community. Furthermore, considerable scope of discretion is allocated to the Community in terms of the actual definition of culture. Culture is considered to be a specific value which cannot be reproduced or replaced by monetary values and is thus not to be subjected to the laws of the free market. Hence, exceptional regulations are created for culture, backed in line with the French “exception culturelle” – as implemented in the UNESCO “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” (2005).

This might present obstacles for the

free movement of goods if the goods are cultural goods. No cultural good should exclusively become an object of trade and this limitation should not be seen as discriminating. However, Article 92 (Amsterdam Treaty – Article 87) declares the promotion of culture as compatible with the market. This enables support for cultural projects of European significance, which is even more explicitly regulated by the “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression” – with the EU as a major factor for its successful realisation.

(5) In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council - acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the

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laws and regulations of the Member States.

This final paragraph stresses the “cultural autonomy“ of the member states. Agreements in the cultural sector have to be unanimous, which will only change after the ratification of the European Constitution.

European cultural policy put to the test

Roughly speaking, four essential aspects of EU cultural policy need to be evaluated: Firstly, the intensification of the dialogue with all stakeholders in the cultural sector; secondly, clear prioritising for cultural support initiatives; thirdly, reviewing cultural activities of the EU in terms of objectives and finally, the cooperation with third countries and the development of a common foreign cultural policy. Thus, European cultural policy cannot and does not aim at replacing national cultural policy, but adds an additional European dimension – also including aspects of foreign policy. However, individual authorities have been stated in such general terms in Article 128 (Amsterdam, Article 151) that there are practically no limits for the Community in terms of its potential cultural activities. Does the Community use this potential?

In terms of prospects, the Culture Compatibility Clause for an independent European cultural policy is the core of the Article on cultural policies - at the same time considerably expanded

and specified in the Amsterdam Treaty. If the Community is obliged to consider the specific nature of culture in all other policy areas nowadays, it cannot be emphasised enough that this reduces the predominance of economic aspects. One example is the accepted retention of the “national right“ to set a fixed price for books. At the same time, this Article lays the foundation for a single European cultural policy of sustainability. However, this policy has still not been achieved in certain areas – in terms of the realisation of the two programmes “Culture 2000“ and “Culture 2007“- on the contrary: Since the EU Directorate General (Culture and Education) has been fully committed to the Lisbon Process, the focus has been very much on the cultural sector and its achievements, which – as revealed by the recently published survey “Die Kulturwirtschaft in Europa (Cultural Creative Industries in Europe)“ (2006) – also has an enormous inherent growth potential.

It would be decisive to take the following four necessary steps now: Firstly, new priorities in terms of cultural policy would have to be set in order to deepen the key role that culture and art play in Europe. Secondly, the possibilities for dialogue would have to be widened – within Greater Europe (in cooperation with the Council of Europe) as well as in third-party countries. Thirdly, non-commercial cultural exchange would have to be strengthened and finally, models of common foreign cultural policy would have to be developed.

After all, the almost wanton disregard of the EU’s obligation to adequately fund culture as a Community task becomes very obvious when looking at the EU funding of the programme “Culture 2007“ which has started now. Every year, all 27 member states approximately receive funds equivalent to the average public funding of a state opera house – not really a very impressive amount.

Europe’s cultural future

However, there are indicators that the EU Commission is aware of its deficiencies – in terms of content and materially speaking – in the cultural sector. In Brussels, the necessity of a paradigm shift in cultural support policy is now discussed – for example very explicitly at the conference “Culture: a sound investment for the EU“ (December 2006), gathering cultural players from all over Europe to engage in a dialogue with the Commission. At this conference, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, stated in sufficiently clear words: Culture is not a luxury for the Community, but an existential necessity and Europe’s future depends on culture. Everybody seems to be convinced that the political Europeanisation process will not succeed if cultural Europeanisation fails.

Following the evaluation of interviews with European cultural organisations with the general tenor: Which role do culture and art play in the process of Europeanisation? What should and can the EU do in this context?, it had also become clear to the Commission: New tasks will have to be developed and new targets will have to be defined. If necessary, new

instruments and improved funding criteria will be introduced in order to fully exploit the cultural potential of Europe. In a “Communication on the Cultural Dimension of the EU“ envisaged for spring 2007, the Commission wants to present its thoughts on a “New cultural policy“ – in time before the German Presidency and before the 4th Federal Congress of the ‘Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft‘, which will take place under the motto “kultur.macht.europa – Europa macht Kultur (culture powers europe)” in Berlin in June 2007. A paradigm shift is necessary and possible.*

* *For more details on the significance of the Brussels Conference for cultural policy see: ‘Kulturpolitische Mitteilungen, Heft 115 (Dec. 2006)’; all quoted texts (in German): Olaf Schwencke, Das Europa der Kulturen – Kulturpolitik in Europa, Bonn/Essen 2006 .*

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STRUCTURE NURTURES CULTURE

Numerous surveys and reports highlight the importance of culture for regional development. Culture creates jobs, enhances the attractiveness of individual regions and boosts the economy. Which role will culture play for EU Structural Funds in the future? *By Christine Beckmann*



A lot of money is invested in EU structural policy: Around one third of the EU budget is allocated to EU cohesion policy¹ and almost one half to agricultural policy. The structural development of the member states and their regions is agreed within these political areas. The financial resources are raised by the Structural Funds – among others the Agricultural and the Cohesion Funds. With the means for structural development, the ministers of the EU member states primarily aim to strengthen the poorest regions of Europe. From this year, this will lead to reduced payments from the Structural Funds to Germany: Between 2000 and 2006, Germany received an average amount of €34 billion per year, whereas the country only re-

ceives €23.36 billion in 2007 (price index: 2004).

Funds for culture

The EU Enlargement in 2004 is one reason for the new orientation of cohesion policy. With the accession of poorer countries, the development gaps suddenly doubled, with the EU now facing particular challenges in terms of global competitiveness and internal cohesion. The objective of cohesion policy is to make a significant contribution to the environmental targets formulated in Gothenburg as well as to the so-called Lisbon Strategy, turning the EU into the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economic area in the world by 2010. In this context, sustainable development and environmental protection remain important. Structural policy is aimed at supporting regional development in Europe and strengthening economic and social cohesion by minimising the gap between the European regions and different social groups.

A legal legitimisation and at the same time a commitment towards common cultural grants have only existed since the introduction of Article 151 in the Maastricht Treaty. Since 1997, programmes have been dedicated to culture based on

these legal regulations. The budget of the central EU programme to support culture has a relatively small budget between 2007 and 2013: €400 million plus the contributions from associated states for cultural cooperation projects between 31 countries. Due to financial barriers of this EU cultural support programme and its restriction to cooperation projects, the structural grant programmes enabling the allocation of funds are vital for the cultural sector.

Structure finances culture

Cultural projects can be financed with means from the Structural Funds if they contribute to the objectives of structural and regional policies. Over the past 20 years, five to ten percent of the projects in Germany funded by the Structural Funds have had cultural aspects. Which projects in Germany have been funded by the Structural Funds Programmes so far?²

The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) mainly supports the development and structural adjustment of regions with development backlogs³ as well as the economic and social transformation of areas with structural problems⁴. The so-called OBJECTIVE 1 and OBJECTIVE 2 Programmes mainly support investments in cultural heritage developments as well as the maintenance, restoration and conversion of listed objects. They have a positive influence on the establishment and the development of commercial enterprises and promote cultural tourism. The programmes support projects with a supraregional impact as well as elements of regional activity programmes or national initiatives – for example so-called 'heritage routes', but

also the foundation of new companies in the cultural and media sector. As the ERDF is the largest Structural Fund, it is also the most significant for the cultural sector.

The Community Initiative INTERREG III was aimed at a balanced economic and social development within the EU by supporting cooperation between the regions. The main objective of INTERREGG – Strand A ("cross-border cooperation") was to support an integrated regional development between border regions in Europe. More than 50 INTEREGG Programmes – Strand A existed in Europe. One of the concerns was a more intensive identification of the citizens with their border region. Cross-border cooperation between public and private cultural organisations can be useful in this context, as it leads to the establishment of cultural exchange networks, the development and expansion of museums, tourism and cultural centres, joint marketing concepts and cross-border media.

Strand B ("transnational cooperation") supported the cooperation between national, regional and local authorities in the EU area as well as in neighbouring regions. Several administration units merged into 13 regions and developed transnational cooperation programmes. Cultural projects were mostly limited to the cultural heritage sector, including restorations, the establishment of networks, the development of conservation standards or the dissemination of best practices. Surveys, seminars, cataloguing of heritage buildings and sites as well the integration of cultural heritage into geographical information systems and new concepts for managing cultural heritage were also part of this grant programme.

Strand C (“interregional cooperation“) was aimed at networking and thus the exchange of information and experiences in the sphere of regional policy and its instruments between EU regions and neighbouring countries without joint borders. Culture only played a marginal role here. The exchange of experiences between regions as well as the establishment of networks – for example with regard to strategy development and project realisation methods in urban and regional development or cultural management – were supported.

Twelve German cities participated in the Community Initiative URBAN II. Even in this programme was specialised and hence less extensive than INTERREG III, for example, the cultural emphasis was nevertheless remarkable. Up to half of all the projects had a cultural aspect – for example the development of cultural infrastructures by converting and reusing historical buildings or the development of cultural and leisure centres for young people and migrants.

Social Fund Grants

It was and still is the aim of the European Social Fund (ESF) to support employment. Among others, ESF funds were used for projects establishing the cultural sector as a labour market and a location factor: This involved qualification measures for artists and other creative people, contributing to the development of profitable business areas for privately funded cultural organisations, new ways of professional training for art and heritage preservation, further professional cultural management training and the development of short-term and long-

term study courses in cultural subjects. At the same time, business start-ups and the qualification of unemployed people for cultural jobs received financial support.

The Community Initiative EQUAL supported new methods to fight discrimination and inequality in the job market through partnerships with players in the labour market – so-called development partnerships. Whether a project received financial support was dependent on its benefits in terms of labour market policy. This opportunity was hardly used – yet in theory, professional training measures on intercultural learning and cultural management, integration of migrants and the development of new areas of activity for artists in the service sector would have been funded.

Agricultural Fund Grants

Rural development programmes did not only aim at modernising and restructuring the agricultural sector. The focus was also on alternative ways of employment, a sustainable environmental policy and improved living and working conditions. The funds from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) were targeted towards the well-balanced development of rural areas within the European Community – for example by using measures such as village renewal and –development, projects to protect the cultural heritage as well as the development of tourism in rural areas.

The Community Initiative LEADER+ (with funds from the EAGGF) supported cooperations in rural areas to realise new, integrated strategies for a sustainable de-

velopment. Local people were included in the projects and the focus was on partnerships and networks to exchange experiences. In the cultural sector, funding was particularly geared towards small-scale infrastructure projects with an impact on tourism, such as the conservation of buildings typical for a particular region, the establishment of heritage routes and the artistic design of public spaces,

symposia and studies (for example on culture and tourism, culture and rural development), socio-cultural activities and cultural events to communicate the identity of a LEADER Region.

The most obvious change in the reform of the Structural Funds 2007 is the reduction to three lines of funding: The new OBJECTIVE 1 becomes the objective Convergence. As in the past, the objective

Overview: EU Structural Funds Grants - 2000-2006 and 2007-2013

2000-2006 (Total amount: €213 billion)			2007-2013 (Total amount: €308 billion+ €69.75 billion)			
Objectives	Priorities	Instruments	Objectives	Priorities	Instruments	Billion
Cohesion Funds (Member states with GDP < 90 percent of EU average)	Environment, transport	Cohesion Funds	Convergence (Regions with per capita GDP < 75 percent of EU average and those affected by statistical effects caused by EU Enlargement)	Innovation, environment/risk prevention, accessibility, infrastructures, human capital, administration ERDF	ESF	251,1
Objective 1 (Regions with per capita GDP < 75 % of EU average) Regions	with development backlogs	ERDF, ESF EAGGF, Guarantee and Guidance, FIFG		Traffic, environment, renewable energies	Cohesion Funds	
Objective 2 (Regions with structural problems)	Economic and social transformation	ERDF; ESF	Regional competitiveness and employment - regional level - national or regional level	Innovation, environment, risk prevention, accessibility, European employment strategy	ERDF ESF	49,1
Objective 3	Educational systems, employment	support ESF				
INTERREG III	Cooperation of regions	ERDF	European territorial cooperation	Innovation, environment/risk prevention,		7,7
URBAN	Urban development	ERDF		accessibility, culture, education		
EQUAL	Combating discrimination in labour market	ESF				
Leader+	Sustainable development in rural areas	EAGGF, Guidance	Development of rural areas (incl. LEADER) (Element of Common Agricultural Policy, CAP)	Restructuring of agricultural sector, protection of environment & landscape, quality of life	EAFRD	69,75

Quelle: European Commission – inforegio: Cohesion Policy at a Turning Point 2007, 2004, pp. 4 and 8 [modified by the author]

is to move the poorest regions closer towards the European economic average. The new OBJECTIVE 2 is Regional Competitiveness and Employment, hence the support of economic and social change for global competitiveness. The new OBJECTIVE 3 is to Support European Territorial Cooperation. This involves experiences with the Community Initiative INTERREG: There are still three support lines for cross-border (A) and transnational (B) cooperations between the regions as well as the interregional development of networks between areas without joint borders (C). The experiences from other Community Initiatives are incorporated in the new programmes but will not continue as separate support programmes.

Structural development support

From the point of view of economic, structural, social and employment policies, culture is only of secondary importance – at a European level as well as at a national, federal and regional level. The German ministries managing the EU Funds attach little value to cultural measures and projects, although de facto, significantly more funds are allocated to cultural projects than from the actual cultural support programme.

On the other hand, the European Commission explicitly endorses cultural grants from the Structural Funds. In the Council Regulation laying down the general provisions on the Structural Funds for 2000-2006, culture was included as a factor for development: “Whereas cultural development, the quality of the natural and the man-made environment, the qualitative and cultural dimension of life and the development of tourism contribute to making regions economically and socially more attractive

in so far as they encourage the creation of sustainable employment.”⁵ This leads to the development of an all-embracing concept of culture, which unfortunately has not been generally accepted in European regional development.

Culture as an industry?

The UK has a longer tradition in terms of publicly appreciating and supporting commercial culture than other European countries and the concept of Cultural Industries also has its origins there. In Germany, the concept of Cultural Industries has been somewhat infamous since Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno⁶ critically equated it with a levelling, senseless mass production of cultural goods towards the end of the sixties. In the UK, however, he appeared in a very different light - in the academic as well as in the cultural policy discourse.

On the basis of the current international discourse, Andreas J. Wiesand and Michael Söndermann suggest a definition of the cultural sector (=creative sector) in a study about the impetus of the creative sector on diversity, economic growth and employment in Europe.

This definition captures all professional activities in public and private organisations and institutions, including neighbouring disciplines such as design and cultural tourism.⁸ The cultural industry is included in this diagram, as the commercial aspect has a strong influence on the general development of culture and the media. On the other hand, privately funded art is important for the cultural industry and for public activities. Therefore, a participation of the public sector is frequent, but also very legitimate.

Social and economic driving force

Recent data support the legitimisation of the cultural industry as an independent economic sector: In 2003, the nine core sectors of the cultural industry⁹ genera-

ted a turnover of 73.7 billion Euros in Germany – thus taking the top position in Europe. In Germany, the commercial cultural sector contributed €35 billion to the gross value added (1.6 percent of the gross domestic product). This amount lies between the amount generated by the energy sector (€30 billion) and the amount generated by the chemical industry (€44 billion). Adding the public cultural sector leads to a gross value added of around €41 billion. In comparison, the automobile industry achieves 64 billion Euros.

Besides with some fundamental differences between the commercial cultural and media industry and the public arts and cultural sector, they have two aspects in common, which are very significant in terms of employment opportunities: Both cultural segments are labour-intensive. Particularly in Germany, culture with public support generates a large number of jobs. Between 1996 and 2001, the number of staff in the cultural sector increased by 20 percent. Whereas jobs have been cut in other sectors, the employment numbers (including entrepreneurs and free-lancers) stagnated in the cultural sector over the last years.¹⁰ Direct effects of the cultural industry are not the only trump card of public cultural funding at a national and a European level. Indirect social and economic side effects stimulated by a diverse cultural life in the cities and regions also demonstrate the significance of culture:

Cultural activities generate direct turnover and jobs in sectors such as accommodation, catering and transport. The cultural programme on offer in a particular region promotes investments, the establishment of companies and qualified staff.

A diverse, lively cultural environment in a city or a region enhances the inhabitants' identification with that particular area. Already existent infrastructures can be used in innovative ways for cultural purposes in the course of structural changes in agriculture and industry.

As early as 20 years ago, the world of politics and business showed an increased interest in culture. In the course of the eighties of the last century, this led to intensive support at all levels. At the same time, there was a growing fear of

The “Creative Sector“ - Arts, Media and Heritage in a European Perspective⁷




Fig.: Developed from models proposed at the Unesco Conference “The International Creative Sector” (Austin, 2003), in NRW Cultural Industries Reports (1992-2005) and in the 1st Austrian Creative Industries Report (2004).

being exploited for economic objectives or interests of regional policy – particularly among the arts and their institutions. Hence, the social scientist Dieter Kramer postulates: “[... It is not the right approach] to just exploit art and culture for other purposes, [...] only an autonomous arts and culture process following its own regulations [can make a real contribution] to the quality of our life and the sustainability of individuals and society.”¹¹ This is a major objective of EU cohesion policy. Therefore, in terms of cultural support, the cultural sector should be perceived in its entirety at a regional and a European level.

Breeding ground for creativity and innovation

One particular achievement of the cultural sector is to mobilise the personal abilities and the initiative of individuals, thus serving as a driving force for innovation. Time and again, the “aesthetic irritations” of artists and intellectuals have revealed their innovative character. Innovation needs creativity and “creativity not only thrives on cultural heritage, but also on a diverse, inspiring cultural environment.”¹²

Public support of culture at a local and a regional level has to create conditions beneficial for cultural life: On the one hand, it needs to provide spaces for cultural production and reception and on the other hand, it has to support encounters, exchange and cooperations to enable cultural players to engage in the social discourse about sustainable forms of life. In the context of cultural support programmes to create a common European cultural area, the EU wants to support the cultural po-

licies of its member states. Programmes promoting culture particularly focus on supporting international encounters, exchange and cooperations of creative people in the cultural sector plus the circulation of works of art and productions.

However, in the context of structural policy, culture is reduced to products – in particular for artistic and architectural creations. The programmes mainly focus on the traditional cultural heritage. “All sponsorship activities, all indirect profitability and all the perceptions of location advantages generated by culture can only work (for example for large exhibitions), because the cultural sector can draw from a vast cultural pool, which has developed over the centuries or even over the millennia. [...] Current cultural policy must not be limited to the utilisation of available treasures, but also enable the creation of a new pool.”¹³

The players in the cultural sector and their achievements are mutually dependent: Art that is not marketable yet requires public funding. The commercial cultural sector draws from this potential, publicly sponsored cultural activities and institutions need a financially strong audience and benefit from an environment shaped by the cultural industry.

Individuals at the receiving and the producing end need “inspiring environments”, which can either be funded publicly or by the market.

National versus European policy?

In the context of integrated strategies for urban and regional development incorporating cultural and economic-political approaches, the promotion of culture is supported at various levels: Together

with the measurable impacts on employment and economic value creation, it is certainly legitimate and reasonable to consider the “side effects” of cultural activities. However, it must not be forgotten that the participation in cultural life – whether as a producer or a recipient, in a management or other formative role – in essence has non-economic effects which in themselves are important for the development of society: Personal evolution and development of the individual are the basis for creativity, change and diversity in society.

At a European level, Article 151,4 of the Treaty Establishing The European Community defines that “the Community shall take the cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty”. On the one hand, it has to be examined for every political directive whether it does not run contrary to the cultural objectives of Article 151. On the other hand, this “compatibility clause for culture” also asks for support from programmes in other political areas for cultural projects. However, this requires coordination and the assessment of consequences by various committees and institutions in several political areas –not necessarily the best preconditions for a successful outcome.

Cultural affairs are the responsibility of the member states and in Germany, the federal states are in charge of culture. There is a wide range of differing views about the necessity of a European cultural policy. The discourse is made more difficult by the fact that there is no common

view as to how wide or narrow the term “culture” should be defined.

It is remarkable that all individual Structural Funds measures in their total have served the cultural sector as a whole – yet this is not envisaged by the programmes. It is not possible to introduce a strategy for economic development that applies to all the countries and regions – particularly as far as culture is concerned.¹⁴ Therefore, the EU follows the subsidiarity principle for its cultural support programmes, increasingly decentralising European structural development policies. Nevertheless, the Structural Funds Programmes with their specific opportunities can support the common objectives of promoting culture in the EU – objectives need to be defined and coordinated in this context.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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1 The Cohesion Fund finances transport and environment infrastructures in member states with a GDP < 90 percent of the EU's GDP.

2 Cf. Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft e.V. / Deutscher Kulturrat e.V. (Ed.): 2002, pp. 159.

3 Regions with a per capita GDP < 75 percent of the EU average. 4

Regions with a per capita GDP > this average.

5 European Commission: Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, Official Journal of the European Communities L 161 of 26.06.1999, p. 1.

6 Max Horkheimer / Theodor W. Adorno: Kulturindustrie, in: Dialektik der Aufklärung, Frankfurt am Main 1969 (first published in 1947).

7 Andreas Wiesand / Michael Söndermann: The 'Creative Sector' – An Engine for Diversity, Growth and Jobs in Europe, September 2005, p. 15 (author's note: The figure is a copy).

8 Ibid. (Translated from German text) Software and game industries, adverti-

sing markets, research and development are not covered.

9 Cf. Michael Söndermann, Arbeitskreis Kulturstatistik: Kulturwirtschaft. Statistische Eckdaten, published in November 2005,

(www.kulturmanagement.net/downloads/soendermann-kulturwirtschaft.pdf): Including the publishing industry, film and radio, creative people and artists from all sectors, cultural goods retailers, architects and the design industry.

10 Wiesand / Söndermann 2005, pp. 7

11 Dieter Kramer: Handlungsfeld Kultur, Zwanzig Jahre Nachdenken über Kulturpolitik, hrsg. v. Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft e.V., Essen 1996, p. 30.

12 Kramer 1996, p. 38.

13 Ibid., p. 37f.

14 Cf. David Throsby: Economics and Culture, Cambridge 2001.

NOT PROMOTION BUT PARTNERSHIP How are expectations of international cultural relations organisations in Europe changing, and how do these reflect changes in Europe itself? For the British Council they mean operating within the framework of the UK's international priorities and public diplomacy strategy. This paper describes a new strategy: from traditional cultural institute to cultural relations partner – a new approach for the 21st century. *By Michael Bird*



Europe is changing – and international cultural relations with it. An expanding European Union which now numbers 27 member states, mobility of populations and migration on a scale not seen since the fall of the Roman Empire, inter-community tensions post 9/11 and competition from China and India all make the safe and stable Europe predicted after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War look, with the benefit of hindsight, like wishful thinking. Far from coming to a full stop, history seems to be accelerating.

The UK's relationships in Europe have never been closer. We are part of an ever closer economic and political union, and there is a greater familiarity in the UK with other European cultures than ever

before in our history, fuelled by budget airlines, mass tourism, the single market and increasingly confident European approaches to education, science and culture.

Few problems now have a single country solution. At home, domestic and international agendas are increasingly inter-linked, and within the UK's multinational state and multi-cultural society the British Council finds itself engaging with multiple agendas as it seeks to represent the nations and communities of the UK, as well as the UK as a whole.

Changes in the macro-picture are driving changes at the micro-level of expectations of international cultural relations organisations such as the British Council. These include pressures to demonstrate “value-for-money”, “outcomes” and “deliverables”. These have generated debate about whether the job of cultural relations organisations within Europe is done, or whether, as I believe, they are needed more than ever.

The UK's international priorities

In a white paper entitled *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World*¹, published in March 2006 and updated in June 2006, the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office identified the trends that it expects to

shape the world over the next ten years, and set out the UK's role in the international system. The international priorities that it defined apply to UK government as a whole, and the British Council has agreed that they must guide its work too. They include:

- making the world safe from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
- reducing the harm to the UK from international crime, including drug trafficking, people smuggling and money laundering
- preventing and resolving conflict through a strong international system
- building an effective and globally competitive EU in a secure neighbourhood
- supporting the UK economy and business through an open and expanding global economy, science and innovation and secure energy supplies
- achieving climate security by promoting a faster transition to a sustainable, low carbon global economy
- promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction underpinned by human rights, democracy, good governance and protection of the environment
- managing migration and combating illegal immigration

The UK's international priorities stress partnerships and cooperation in Europe: "For the UK the changing international context underlines the importance of maintaining and extending our part-

nerships ...Our most important partnerships with other countries will be within the European Union and with the United States. The EU will remain the UK's single most important multilateral commitment ... We will continue to be a committed and leading member of the EU because only through a strong EU with effective institutions can we meet many of our international and domestic objectives".²

The UK is part of Europe. Its European neighbours are indispensable partners in facing and dealing with common social, political and economic challenges both within Europe and in the wider world. The new agenda is less about competitive diplomacy and much more about a new style of collaborative diplomacy. There is still a place for bi-lateral activities, but increasingly the UK's partners in European countries are working in a multi-lateral way.

Public diplomacy

There have been significant developments in the UK's understanding and definition of public diplomacy, notably a review of the UK's public diplomacy carried out by a team led by Lord Carter (the "Carter Review") which reported in December 2005³ and decisions taken by the UK's Public Diplomacy Board which brings together the major UK players in public diplomacy, including the British Council.

The Carter Review stated that as public diplomacy is funded by the UK tax payer (and UK government ministers account for it to the UK Parliament), it has to support UK government goals and objectives. Lord Carter defined public diplomacy as "work aiming to inform and engage individuals

and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals". At the same time the Carter Review acknowledged the operational independence of the British Council and the editorial independence of the BBC World Service. The Public Diplomacy Board has subsequently agreed that the purpose of UK public diplomacy should be to achieve the UK's international priorities.

British Council Strategy for 2010

Against the backdrop of these developments, the British Council is implementing an ambitious strategy for 2010. This is about being clear about what we do and why we do it. We exist to build mutually beneficial relationships between people in the UK and other countries and to increase appreciation of the UK's creative ideas and achievements. We contribute to the UK's international priorities by improving perceptions of the UK in other countries, which is a precondition for greater mutual understanding between the UK and other countries, which leads to stronger ties between the UK and other countries.

Fundamental to Strategy 2010 and to the culture and values of the British Council is the concept of mutuality.⁴ In the 21st century, building mutually beneficial relationships between people in the UK and other countries has to be founded on equality and trust. Trust is enhanced when, at the same time as increasing appreciation of the UK's ideas and achievements, we are open to those of other countries.

Mutuality is about engaging in dialogue with other countries and recognising that enhancing communication is about

more than delivering information. It is about creating opportunities for people both worldwide and in the UK to engage in dialogue and thereby to build trust. It is also about engaging people in the UK with international agendas and thereby creating opportunities for people in the UK to learn from, and to value, people in other countries. It is about seeking new and open ways of engaging with the worldwide community.

Mutuality gives us clarity about what we do because it recognises that connections we make between the UK and other countries are mutual transactions. It matches what we offer to what is required. It recognises the interdependence of our world, and is the basis of the respect and trust which characterises our work.

Mutuality helps us reach millions more people because it is about the way we address other people's agendas as well as our own. This applies to our customers and to our partners. It is our commitment to local partnerships and shared ownership of our work that ensures our global relevance in over 100 countries worldwide and also within the nations and communities of the UK.

Mutuality enables us to release the potential and creativity of our own people because our commitment to celebrating diversity, valuing difference and sharing ownership applies equally to our relationships with external partners and with each other.

The new agenda is less about competitive diplomacy and much more about a new style of collaborative diplomacy.

British Council Strategy for Europe

Between March and June 2006 the British Council carried out a strategic review⁵ of its purpose, priorities and delivery in Europe, in the process consulting over 250 key contacts about what they saw as the challenges and opportunities and what they wanted from the British Council in Europe. This has led to the formulation of a new Europe strategy.

The central argument is that the UK and its European partners face common issues, of which the four main ones are:

- Migration, mobility and employment
In 2005 34% of the world's 191 million migrants were in Europe⁶ and that percentage is set to grow. "Migration will present new economic opportunities and contribute to social and cultural dynamism. But it will also be a source of tension between states and communities."⁷
- Culture, identity and extremism
The challenges of migration, identities, Islam, and the rise of the far right: "The ideological tensions most likely to affect western democracies in the early twenty-first century will stem from religion and culture... Countering the extremists' message and encouraging dialogue will be a key task at home and overseas. We will need to work more closely with communities in the UK and Europe ..."⁸
- Global competitiveness
The need for new skills, education, training and innovation so that Europe / the UK can succeed in a globalising world: "As global competitiveness grows, we must develop further

our scientific and educational excellence ..."⁹

- Climate security
"Climate change is a serious threat to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the core of foreign policy."¹⁰

There was a strong plea from contacts in Europe for the UK's voice to be heard more in Europe and for the UK to share its thinking and experience with European partners. Our new strategy addresses these common issues, and the UK's international priorities, through four strategic themes. Everything we do in Europe will fit with these themes.

- Open Europe
We will champion open dialogue about citizenship, inter-community issues, tolerance, diversity and community cohesion in Europe.
- Competitive Europe
We will foster the development of Europe's education and skills base, in response to the challenges of global competition.
- Creative Europe
We will support the scientific and artistic creativity that is central to the future success of Europe.
- World Europe
We will address shared global challenges, such as climate security, together with European partners

Under our new strategy, the British Council's mission in Europe is creating partnerships and networks as part of a vision of working together to build next generation Europe. In order to respond to the UK government's desire to strengthen co-operation with European partners, the

British Council is expanding significantly its work in building European networks in which the UK is the key partner country. It is also involving larger networks of UK partners and participants in its work in Europe, in order to strengthen the interaction between the UK and other European countries and create a better mutual exchange of ideas and thinking between the leaders of next generation Europe. This is leading to a radically different strategy for the British Council's work in Europe, particularly in EU member states.

The British Council will no longer operate as a traditional cultural relations institute, providing a standard fare of arts, science and education and offering grants to support bilateral events and activities and become a cultural relations partner, offering access to global expertise and large-scale, region-wide initiatives which resonate across national borders. We will focus our work on bringing together Europe's next generation of leaders, and putting the UK centre-stage in international dialogue.

We will develop larger-scale, Europe-wide and global projects, planned and delivered through strategic partnerships and co-funding agreements. We will expand our English teaching and examinations services in Europe in order to support the acquisition of English as a core skill by every young European.

British Council in Germany

Berlin is the biggest city in Germany, a magnet for next generation Europeans and a key hub in the British Council Europe network, enabling us to identify emerging themes of relevance to the UK and the rest of Europe. In the context of

working together to build next generation Europe, Germany and the UK are natural partners in Europe. We see our mission as being to create networks of next generation Germans who look to the UK for partnership, and also to capitalise on Germany's pivotal position in Europe as a country that faces both east and west, and Berlin's as a city that attracts creative young people from all over the world.

The essence of our offer in Germany is our ability to connect people from both government and non-government sectors, and from both authority and successor generations, with their contemporaries and counterparts in virtually every country in Europe.

We aim to reach different people in different ways:

- With our UK government grant funding we will build partnerships and networks of influence and engagement with next generation young leaders to address common issues in Europe and shared agendas outside Europe
- Through our services which are funded by clients and customers we will reach younger audiences – creating opportunities to learn English, study at UK universities and gain UK qualifications – and also through the media, on-line services and the EU-funded education and mobility programmes which we manage.

This is a new direction for the British Council in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe. We are no longer seeking directly to influence perceptions of the UK in Germany. Budget airlines are doing that, day

in, day out, and the World Cup did more for perceptions of Germany in the UK in a single month than cultural relations organisations have achieved in many years. We are moving from our building in Berlin, conceived in the 1990s as a “showcase” for the contemporary UK, because budget airlines and the internet have made this model obsolete.

We no longer need the shop window and street access that we have at present. What we do need is a central location with excellent access to transport links within Germany and wide Europe and high-quality meeting space for interactions with next generation young leaders. We do not make impact through bricks and mortar, but through the quality of relationships we build, and the impact of the projects we deliver. We are already seeing more projects with regional scope and involvement, less use of our grant funding for reaching generic audiences such as young people in general, and more investment in networking opportunities for young leaders.

The British Council in Germany and Europe is redefining the idea of a “Kulturinstitut”. While maintaining our expertise and authority in the international dimensions of education and the arts, we are becoming a facilitator of debate, a networking organisation, and a creator of Europe-wide partnerships.

The shift from bi-lateral to multi-lateral working described above also involves closer partnership with European national analogues and European umbrella organisations. The British Council’s partnership with the Goethe-Institut is a strong example of the former.

An example of the latter is the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), a partnership of 19 European cultural institutes that was established in 2005 with the aim of increasing co-operative working both within and outside Europe. The British Council was instrumental in founding the partnership. EUNIC has a close working relationship with the European Commission (DG Education and Culture) and is currently working on three major pan-European projects – Inter-Cultural Dialogue, Migration, and the EU’s new Cultural Policy 2007-13. It operates at country level through national clusters of EUNIC member institutes. EUNIC is well placed to contribute to the EU’s emerging thinking on the cultural dimensions of an EU foreign policy.

The British Council is also working in partnership with other European organisations to manage EU-funded education and mobility programmes such as Comenius, Erasmus and Youth Action. Although “partnership” is in some ways a predictable concept, we believe that our commitment to partnerships reflects a real mingling of objectives and aspirations, and that working in partnership is a touchstone of mutuality because it commits us to being relevant to others’ agendas.

Conclusion

The British Council in Germany and Europe is redefining the idea of a “Kul-

turinstitut". While maintaining our expertise and authority in the international dimensions of education and the arts, we are becoming a facilitator of debate, a networking organisation, and a creator of Europe-wide partnerships. We aim to put the UK at the heart of European relationships and to help the UK mobilise European partners to address shared European and global agendas. Indirectly, we believe that our new approach will do far more to enhance perceptions of the UK, as a serious partner in Europe, than our traditional approach.

Our old job in Europe may be done, but there is a new one needing to be done, and to do it we see the British Council as a new kind of cultural relations organisation for the 21st century. In some ways this is a radical departure; at the same time this can be seen as the British Council, founded in 1934 to foster open dialogue in the face of threats to tolerance and stability in Europe, returning to its roots.

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1 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World, FCO Crown Copyright, 2006.

2 Ibid.

3 Review of Public Diplomacy, FCO, 2005.

4 Mutuality, Trust and Cultural Relations, Counterpoint, 2004.

5 Options for Change, British Council, 2006.

6 International migration and development, Report of the Secretary-General, UN, 2006.

7 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World, FCO Crown Copyright, 2006.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Speech by Margaret Beckett, UK Foreign Secretary, Berlin, 24 October 2006.

ESCAPE FROM HUNTINGTON'S SCENARIO A

tough political and economic approach has been required in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since the beginning of the Barcelona Process 12 years ago. Only the shock about the caricature controversy steered the attention towards softer topics. Are the cultural relations between the EU and the South Mediterranean countries more than just a rhetoric conjuration of dialogue? *By Traugott Schöftbaler*



The Barcelona Declaration is a copy of the Helsinki Charter of 1975. The Declaration - ratified in November 1995 by then fifteen EU member states and their twelve Mediterranean partners (Malta and Cyprus have changed sides in the meantime) - is a forward-looking document, whilst deliberately modelling itself on its predecessor: Chapter 1 defines the principles for a partnership in terms of political goals and security. Chapter 2 sets the goals for free trade and economic development and Chapter 3 deals with the so-called "soft topics" in the context of an enhanced concept of culture. For education, cultural heritage and creativity, science, the media, youth, women and human rights, the focus is on exchange and mutual understanding.

The European generation that is no longer very young still remembers the dynamics caused by the so-called Helsinki Basket 3 in 1975, until finally the walls and national borders came down 14 years later. I still vividly remember the demonstrations in the GDR under the motto "Thank you, Erich". No GDR citizen had to fear a prison sentence only because he or she displayed posters with quotes of the Helsinki Charter in public. The Helsinki Charter did not tear down the wall, but it legitimised the pressure for human rights and cultural exchange in a way that was difficult to fight. The greatest obstacle for success was the short-windedness of many Western Europeans who sniggered at the Helsinki-Citizens' Committees, thought they were naive and simply did not believe in the option of ending the Cold War. In 1985, our neighbours in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary saved the Helsinki Process: Had it not been for their insistence, the West would probably have abandoned Helsinki after ten years.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established with the Barcelona Declaration now joins 27 EU member states and ten neighbouring countries in the South - from Morocco to Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria to Turkey. Globally, it is the only political constellation granting full

member status to Palestine (as “Palestinian Autonomous Territories”) instead of just allowing them to watch the group as an outsider. Mauritania’s application for admission was ratified in November 2006, Libya is still playing hard to get and South-Eastern Europe is missing. In principle, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has agreed an application for admission, but EU-Europe has a big problem with its “European Neighbourhood Policy”, which was revised in 2007: The EU wants to deal separately with the group of candidates for accession (including South-Eastern Europe). Neighbourhood Policy is in charge of states which are unlikely to get the opportunity to join. The bilateral relationship with the EU is regulated in Association Agreements. Hence, our Turkish partners feel particularly bad if they are included in the group of countries on the “other side” in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. When the Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between the Cultures – the latest joint initiative of the Barcelona Process founded in 2005 – started an Internet dialogue for young people between 18 and 25 in February 2006, the tendering document promoting North-South Partnerships and differentiating between the EU and Partners had to be changed. The problem was resolved by alphabetic sorting and an additional note to state requests for a dialogue across the Mediterranean.

Other problems are not as easy to resolve. First and foremost, there is the conflict in the Middle East – with a peaceful end seemingly close in 1995. Yet nowadays, the Anna Lindh Foundation remains the only institution organising some form of cultural exchange between Israel and all Arab nations, although the Arab League

boycotts these cultural relations. If everybody is invited to get together at one table, they all follow this invitation – whether it is for a joint teacher training event, cultural festivals, university cooperations or regional networks. This is as far as the comparison with Helsinki works under current conditions. However, boycotts and cancellations have almost become the rule for smaller projects. Five Israeli partners participate in the first series of 28 funded projects developed according to the formula 2+2 (at least two European partners and two partners from the South) that started in 2006, whereas the only Arab partners willing to engage in these five projects are Palestine and Jordan. On the whole, the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” still mainly remains within the realms of rhetoric.

The political conflicts and the aggravated crisis in the cultural relations with the Arab world – with angry protests against the Mohammed caricatures at the beginning of 2006 only being a symptom – are not the only reason for this situation. The question is rather whether EU-Europe is really willing to engage in an equal partnership with its neighbours in the South as it was originally agreed in Barcelona in 1995.

The Helsinki Charter did not tear down the wall, but it legitimised the pressure for human rights and cultural exchange in a way that was difficult to fight. The greatest obstacle for success was the short-windedness of many Western Europeans who sniggered at the Helsinki-Citizens’ Committees, thought they were naive and simply did not believe in the option of ending the Cold War.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership makes progress

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has effectively become an instrument of EU foreign policy – shaped by the European Commission and with a rotating EU Presidency. Nearly all budget decisions take place within EU structures, following the administrative and financial regulations of the Commission. Everything is considered a “project” and is largely left to its own devices. The ban on “double funding” prevents synergies between EU-funded projects and programmes. This leaves little scope for coherent strategies and hardly any scope for a joint decision-making process between North and South. The language of development aid divides the partners into donors and recipients.

It is therefore not very helpful to measure current EMP results against the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration. It would be more appropriate to talk about an EU-Mediterranean policy and to use certain political EU objectives as a benchmark. One of the most important outcomes is the creation of a political body with regular meetings – approximately every six weeks – that consists of senior civil servants and ambassadors as representatives of the foreign ministries (EuroMed Committee). All partners including Israel, Palestine and Syria are regular participants. Once a year, the foreign ministers meet and recurring meetings of other ministers also take place. In 2006, five meetings were held on environmental issues, information, equal rights for men and women, industry and transport. In 2007, the Ministers of Culture will have their first meeting (in Greece) and the Minis-

ters of Higher Education in Egypt. After policy, security, trade and economic development dominated cooperation during the first decade, the so called “soft topics” from Basket 3 will now be negotiated at ministerial level as well. The caricature controversy caused a deep shock, which is mixed with efforts to incorporate the means of cultural cooperation in the defence against terrorism. The Ministers of Higher Education will discuss the enlargement the higher education and research area, including the Mediterranean partners. The European Commission will introduce a new scholarship programme for students and young scientists, the European Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development will be opened to the countries in the South. The Ministers of Culture will discuss joint steps for the ratification and implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, establishing the future prospects for the Anna Lindh Foundation in terms of cultural dialogue in this context.

It is also part of the success record that the EU has signed bilateral Association Agreements with all Mediterranean partners, with particular impacts for trade and economy. Over the last ten years, the trade volume of all Mediterranean countries with the EU has exceeded the level of 50 percent by far. The EU has become the main foreign investor in all Mediterranean neighbouring countries – particularly using the European Investment Bank funding instrument for the Mediterranean. Current prospects for the ambitious objective of creating a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade zone by 2010 are good.

Crisis prevention in the Arab world?

In the debate about the value of the EMP, critics regularly comment that the Barcelona Process has not contributed to the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East. This might be correct, however, the EMP is not equipped for this task. The Israeli-Arab conflict is not the only one where the EU is only one player within a “quartet“. The EMP does not even have enough political authority to resolve the comparatively small Cyprus conflict.

The true spirit of the Barcelona Declaration lies in the third Chapter on education, science, culture and the media – so far the poor relative of political and economic cooperation. The most important keywords in the third Chapter are “culture“ and “civil society“. First of all, everybody had to understand that the cultural relations between Europe and its Arab neighbours in particular had deteriorated dramatically and that more deeply rooted distrust does not jeopardise trade, but political relations, before culture was shifted to the fore of EU-Mediterranean policy for the first time. Until 2005, the EuroMed-Cultural Heritage Programme was almost the only regional culture project, apart from a programme on further professional training for youth team leaders, limited project funds for university cooperation programmes (TEMPUS/MEDA) and some fixed-term projects in the media sector. In 2005, a programme for journalists and the Anna Lindh Foundation came along, followed by policy declarations on the necessity of commitment for the education sector, including a number of bilateral funding agreements for building schools. At their annual conference on 28th November 2006 in Tampere, almost all 35

EMP foreign ministers demanded a boost for cultural relations and renewed efforts to support the cultural dialogue.

Europe begins to understand that the traditional forums of cultural exchange and cultural dialogue have largely failed in the relationship with the Arab world. The first EU forum on cultural dialogue with the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the spring of 2002 ended without substantial results. Two years later, the cancellation of the subsequent meeting even led to a serious *éclat*. As the Islamic states in Europe did not receive any attention for their claim to issue a joint declaration against Islamophobia and discrimination, they presented their proposal at the UN Human Rights Committee, followed by an identical proposal to the UNO General Assembly one year later. Both times voting was necessary. The proposal was agreed with two thirds of the majority. All EU member states were in the minority voting against the proposal. In 2005, the West was not yet prepared to acknowledge the feelings of discrimination of the Muslims, but insisted that Islamophobia also has to be seen in the context of Christianophobia and Anti-Semitism. In the meantime, this situation has changed. The EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in Vienna has published an impressive study on Islamophobia in Europe. However, bitterness prevails – particularly among Europe’s Arab neighbours.

The EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, demands no less than the creation of early warning systems and mechanisms for crisis management to prevent the resurgence of problems of cultural non-understanding

On the whole, the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership“ still mainly remains within the realms of rhetoric.

similar to the caricature controversy. It is planned to have these mechanisms in place by 2008, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue.

Thousands of dialogue events over the last two decades have brought “representatives” from different religions or “cultures” together. They generally ended with less than substantial declarations about common values and were unable to find a common language for cultural and religious difference – the breaking points of cultural problems between North and South, but also of controversies between cultural or religious communities in almost all EMP countries. Only now the insight is spreading that cultural dialogue has to escape from Huntington’s Scenario in order to move things forward. Culture cannot be reduced to cultural heritage. Following the definition of quality of life in the UNDP Report, it also has to be understood in terms of human development – namely as a formative space for every citizen with his/her diverse cultural affiliations and preferences. Hence, it is important that the focus of the first EuroMed Conference of Ministers of Culture in 2007 is on the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

The Anna Lindb Foundation as a cultural intermediary

So far, the Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between the Cultures in Alexandria (Egypt) is the only EMP institution co-financed by all partners and established in the South of the region. It has been commissioned to develop ideas for a substantial cultural dialogue, to create opportu-

nities to put the dialogue to the test and particularly to teach young people the necessary skills for this cultural dialogue. In August 2005, the foundation started its work as a pool of 35 national networks, linking around 1200 institutions and organisations from education, culture, the media, women and youth.

The first joint product was a study with practical examples from the entire region on the roles of education, culture and the media in changing perceptions and behavioural patterns between men and women. Most recommendations were incorporated in an action plan for the following years by the first EuroMed Ministerial Conference on Women in October 2006. Together with the Council of Europe and the Arab League Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ALECSO), the foundation started a Euro-Mediterranean teacher training programme in May 2006, jointly training teachers from the North and the South to teach cultural diversity and interreligious tolerance. The textbooks do not provide much material on these topics. In October 2007, one thousand young artists from the region are expected for the BJCEM Art Biennial in Alexandria, which will take place outside of Europe for the first time. The motto is “Our Creative Diversity” – homage to the report on “Culture and Development” that was published by the World Commission ten years ago and created the basis for the current international agreements on the protection, maintenance and respect of cultural diversity.

The Barcelona Declaration continues to be important – particularly with its political commitment of all EMP partners to ensure that cultural diversity and religious pluralism are respected in the

entire region – which has not been implemented in concrete programmes yet. If understood in the right way, the later declarations and agreements on cultural diversity by the Council of Europe, the Arab League, ALECSO and OIC including its cultural organisation (ISESCO) and, above all of course the declaration of the UNESCO have the potential to heal the contaminated cultural relations between Europe and its Southern neighbours.

The Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between the Cultures is a typical top-down creation of governments. However, together with three other EuroMed networks – the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes (FEMISE) and the Euro-Mediterranean NRO platform – it has already developed mechanisms to operate within the civil society. In cooperation with the respective youth organisations, a parallel network has been developed. The foundation is involved in setting up a permanent inter-university platform for the EuroMed region to support the expansion of the European area of higher education and research towards the South and to boost the direct cooperation between universities across the Mediterranean. The founding conference is planned to take place in Alexandria in June 2007. In cooperation with the DAAD and the British Council, the foundation is particularly involved in the democratisation of access to information about Arab mobility at Arab universities. In 2007, a training programme for staff working in newly founded academic exchange services starts in Alexandria in 2007.

The foundation has contributed to the UN Commission report on the “Alliance

of Civilizations“. The most important element is fighting the abuse of cultural or religious arguments for political purposes. In a serious dialogue with its Southern neighbours, Europe has the opportunity to achieve a more realistic perception of its own cultural diversity. It is essential for cultural relations in the Mediterranean to enhance the knowledge about the cultural complexity of partners in Europe. If Europe barricades itself in crisis situations, evoking “European values“, which happened during the caricature controversy, this creates unnecessary new fences. The values of the European Convention of Human Rights (1953) have been fully established since 1966 – thanks to the UN Convention of Human Rights, the so-called economic and social pact on civil rights and thanks to political, social, economic and cultural rights.

The continuous repetition of the two concepts “Europe“ and “Islam“ is a dichotomy excluding historic and contemporary Islamic elements from European cultural diversity. The step towards abuse for the political objective to keep Turkey out of the EU is not far off. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a suitable platform to develop cultural relations on an equal footing.

Translation: Angelika Welt

Dr. Traugott Schöfthaler has been the founding director of the Anna Lindh Foundation in Alexandria since November 2004.

EU-PHORIA IN CROATIA Culture and identity are most closely intertwined. So how shall we feel European in a diverse Europe? A first step would be to recognise that there should not only be political and economic questions but also cultural and ethical values on the agenda for Europe. Which route does Croatia follow to win over the public to the idea of joining the EU?

By Marija Pejčinović Burić



Opening the first conference A Soul for Europe in the year which bears particular significance in the history of the European Union, i.e. in 2004, the president of the Commission José Manuel Barroso made a statement: 'The EU has reached a stage of its history where its cultural dimension can no longer be ignored'. Indeed, with the recent enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, we have witnessed the growth of this dimension to an even larger scope, richness, variety of expressions and cultural traditions. However, considering that the notion of culture has more often than not almost inextricably been interwoven with the notion of identity, one cannot but revisit, always inviting and thus frequently addressed the phenomenon of European

identity. More so since both concepts, culture and identity, have been contemplated by scholars, philosophers and learned individuals from various fields of expertise, and from many standpoints, attempting to define these immensely important, yet elusive notions. It is probably safe to say that all-encompassing definitions are yet, if ever, to be offered. Nonetheless, even if eluding confinements of abstract thought, both culture and identity are firmly rooted in reality of everyday lives of all humanity. What is then the 'European way' in this respect?

Searching for Europe's soul

Culture has been recognized as a major factor in the development of knowledge, understanding and values, and together with democracy and respect for human rights, a necessary precondition for a fulfilling life. It helps every citizen of every European state to shape a sense of belonging and to share it with others. Thus it is enshrined in the Treaty on European Union whose Preamble states the desire of Member States 'to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions'. This is accompanied by the introduction of the 'citizenship of the Union' which would supplement, but not replace,

national citizenships, and by the resolution to ‘reinforce European identity and its independence to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world’. The Preamble and the Common Provisions of the Treaty therefore strongly suggest the interlocking, and interdependence, of the three: culture, identity, and the Union’s role as a keeper and promoter of peace.

The idea of European citizenship reflects the existence of shared fundamental values which are at the same time the cornerstones of the whole integration process. No less important, although occasionally, and entirely undeservedly, sidelined, is the European Union’s role as the keeper and promoter of peace. Although it is to an extent understandable that for the great many living Europeans the horrors of the Second World War are but a distant element of collective memory, it appears that the peace-keeping mission of the EU can hardly be overemphasised. The importance of this aspect is particularly visible from Croatia’s point of view, with its recent experience of war and ensuing destruction. Probably it is even more visible from, unfortunately still numerous, places in the world, torn by conflict and tragedy, for which Europe shines as a beacon of stability, peace, and decent human life.

As far as the identity is concerned, it is a well-established fact that the Union, both in practice and in its fundamental documents, fosters respect for individual identities of its Member States parallel to its developing the European identity, this development of the European identity by no means endangering or thwarting the national ones. Thus the statement in the first Article of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before

the Constitution as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’.

Hence, the importance of symbols. Symbols, both visual and literary, although the immediacy of reception perhaps lends a certain advantage to the former, act as glue which holds together the whole, and ensures the transmission of memory. One of them, the motto of the European Union United in diversity aptly comprises the cultural variety and richness of contemporary European Union. The first official mention of this motto in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe invites us to look both to the future and the past. In an interesting way, the ‘formalizing’ of the motto in the Treaty reflects an old tradition of many European legal systems – inclusion in a legal document of an entity that had already been put to practice. In a similar manner, the United in diversity had been in use for several years before its inclusion into the Treaty. The look into the future, however, is less characterized by past certainties, and provoked more by the need to rethink our future after the unsuccessful referenda in France and Netherlands, and also by the debate on future enlargements.

Culture as icing on the cake?

Although there are strong indicators, and indeed actual figures, showing that the great enlargement of 2004 was both political and economic success, we are faced with a kind of fatigue, even downright refusal of the notion of further integration. One of the reasons might be that the EU made a strong point on economic, institutional and administrative integration whereas insufficient emphasis has been placed on the affirmation of its cultural and ethical values. Hence, the importance of both promotion of culture and its usage as a vehicle for fostering common identity. It might be that the Union actually needs to go back to the common European values and our common European heritage

to reaffirm the trust of its citizens in the future of integrated Europe.

Moreover, the economic aspects of culture are positive contributing factors. As shown by a recent study commissioned by the Commission, the culture sector contributed to no less than 2.6% of EU GDP in 2003 and nearly 6 million people worked in this sector in 2004, all this apart from cultural activities' indirect and non quantifiable contribution to the development in general. The concurrence is immediately obvious of such economic indicators with the goals set in the Lisbon Agenda, in particular concerning growth and jobs.

All in all, it appears that employing the power of culture to bridge the emotional gap between Europeans and the European development process, which is the idea behind A Soul for Europe initiative, cannot be but a win-win situation.

What is Croatia, as a candidate country currently involved in the advanced stage of accession negotiations, doing in this respect? The EU-Croatia partnership further intensified after the beginning of the accession negotiations in October 2005. The candidate status in itself and even more so the advanced stage of our negotiations clearly mandate the intensification of communication activities, which are in many ways not unlike those conducted by the Commission in communicating with the citizens of the EU Member States.

Since public support to the integration process is one of the central issues for a candidate negotiating its accession to the EU, it is of primary importance to develop a strategic plan as a basis of all activities. Therefore, at the end of 2005 the Croa-

Employing the power of culture to bridge the emotional gap between Europeans and the European development process cannot be but a win-win situation.

tian Government and early in 2006 the Croatian Parliament, adopted the Communication Strategy Aimed at Informing the Croatian Public about the EU and Preparations for EU Membership. The goal of the strategy is both to provide easily accessible and understandable information to the citizens and to ensure the two-way communication with the public, by means of media coverage, regular public debates, publishing, info telephone and various special projects such as the celebration of Europe Day. Particular attention is being paid to the young as well as to all specific target groups in Croatian society and the organizations of civil society. Also, decentralized approach to communication is being employed by means of activities carried out at regional and local levels. One prominent project is the National Forum on the Accession to the EU whose regular sessions ensure the continuous public debate about various aspects of the integration process in Croatia. The Forum is an opportunity for communication between the policymakers, the media, stakeholders and members of public in different regions of Croatia on subjects as various as consumer protection, youth mobility, small and medium enterprises or intellectual property rights.

Nonetheless, we are aware that it is not only the economic and political aspects of Croatia's accession to the EU which need to be communicated to our citizens, but also the cultural and ethical values of the enlarged Union. Moreover, focusing on cultural bonds has been shown to be one of the most appropriate ways to approach susceptibility to stereotypes and such sensitive issues as the apprehension of a loss of a part of the national sovereignty. Accordingly, cultural cooperation, in various forms, is of utmost importance.

A good example of Croatia's both traditional participation in the common European heritage and involvement in contemporary cultural exchange is a project called Roland's European Paths, recently conducted by a civil society organisation,

the Europe House Dubrovnik. This project resulted in the publication of a splendid monograph and a multimedia presentation documenting the tradition observed in many European cities, Dubrovnik among them, of erecting in public places the column-held statues of the knightly Carolingian protector of law and justice Roland (Orlando). The book, written by contributors from several European countries was published in five languages (Croatian, German, Italian, French and English). Returning briefly to the earlier observation about the importance of symbols, it may be said that Roland's statues, which can be found in the cities as diverse and as far apart as Bremen, Dubrovnik and Riga, bear witness to both Europe's common past and its contemporary shared values. As an allegory, we may add that the Croatian Roland in Dubrovnik, although at the moment the only one among its contemporaries which is still standing outside the Union, determinedly follows his path towards joining in near future his company of knights in the European Union.

Visions for the future

Another cultural project well worth mentioning is Europe 2020, the pan-European competition in poster design depicting artists' visions of the future of Europe, organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and Croatian Designers' Society. The first Europe 2020 competition was organized in 2002, and its success encouraged us to organize the second one in 2005 called Europe 2020 – Today for Tomorrow. In both competitions more than 200 works by designers from more than twenty European countries were received, showing a large diver-

sity of both the visions of European future and the visual imagery. This multitude of ideas and expressions includes diverse cultural references as well as the elements of national traditions, blending both in its own kind of unity in diversity. Since 2002 exhibitions resulting from Europe 2020 competitions have been shown in no less than 17 European cities, from Copenhagen to Sofia, from Bucharest to Brussels. Europe 2020 exhibitions offer many thought provoking views of what concerns us all – our common European future. It also reinforces our belief that we can successfully discuss Europe and its identity in a way that transcends languages and borders, by using the medium of art.

These two projects are among Croatia's contributions to communicating the soul of Europe not only to Croatian citizens but also to the other Europeans. They are a part of our belief that envisaging, and helping create, the future Europe is not only about prosperity, important as it is, but also about preserving, promoting and further developing common values growing from our diversity. Culture is undoubtedly one of those values, and so is the achievement and maintenance of peace, the precondition for any flourishing culture. Thus it appears appropriate to conclude on a thought by Johan Huizinga, the Dutch historian who so aptly described the later Middle Ages, the 'homeland' of our doubly symbolic – artistic and order-maintaining – Rolands: 'We know it only too well: if we are to preserve culture we must continue to create it'.

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BREAD AND GAMES (PANEM ET CIRCENSES) The elites in Hungary and Eastern Europe have always embraced Christian Europe and its cultural traditions, but suffered under the Communist regime and the Cold War for a long time. Nowadays, they feel threatened by changed values and the loss of culture in the course of globalisation. A renewal of our European identity can only be initiated by focusing on our cultural heritage. *By Gyula Kurucz*



As a former middle-sized power, Hungary lost two thirds of its historic territories and more than one third of its population in the course of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, which - among other events - led to the deposition of the Habsburg Regime in 1921. All organic developments over thousand years of history were suddenly idle - from the railway and road networks to the Hungarian regional counties. Millions of disrupted families stayed behind and politicians were helpless in the face of general rancour and distress.

The country's creative artists made attempts of recreation in spite of adverse conditions. Many escaped to a shrunken Hungary, as they were only able to image their creativity within the cultural struc-

ture and under the protection of the "mother country". A strong intellectual motivation faced the geopolitical dilemma. Since the 10th and 11th centuries, nomad Hungarians have very consciously (and not without bloodshed) adopted Christianity and European culture. They have handled Romanesque, Gothic and Baroque periods with as much commitment as the Renaissance and the schools of thought following the Enlightenment.

Since the 1920s, members of the Hungarian intellectual elite have been looking for a potent remedy against the phantom pains by creating their own cultural golden age. This resulted in top achievements in music and literature, in the visual arts and in science and also led to an advanced Hungarian school and university system. The Hungarians wanted to liberate themselves from the political and military plight through world-class cultural achievements. They wanted to renew European tradition with a distinctive Hungarian accent - desperate plea for acceptance and forgiveness - in the firm belief that a Hungarian patriot is always a dedicated European and a global citizen and that all top achievements have their roots within the European cultural heritage as well as the Hungarian tradition - and that differences and similarities can only exist together.

Until the period of Enlightenment, Christianity was the creative framework for intellectual creativity on the European continent. As the standard and the role model, it has always left scope for uniqueness. Those who have eliminated the concept of Christianity that has formed traditions from the European Constitution and the common European cultural heritage, have contributed to the castration of our culture.

Culture – in spite of Communism

Nazism also spilled over into Hungary, although the country resisted for a long time (Thomas Mann still published here in 1942). The most dazzling figures escaped to the West or to America, where they were instrumental in the development of the atomic bomb, Hollywood and the American orchestra culture. In the 20th century, the first waves of destruction were National Socialism with the Holocaust and the Communist regime with its missionary ambitions and its strife for power. Yet the Cold War with its divided world order was also perilous for culture.

Before World War II, the borders were permeable and all European cultural movements in Paris, Rome, Berlin or Munich attracted the best artists in Europe. These achievements enriched the cultural life in Europe and in the entire world. During the Cold War, people were forced to think in opposing positions and value judgements depended on pathologically overrated politics. All intellectual achievements were evaluated in terms of their ideological affiliations and their usefulness. The mouthpieces of political power were stronger than cultural and artistic treasures.

Nevertheless, the merciless Communist dictatorship created something beautiful in the Eastern half of Europe. It was demonstrated that terror cannot eliminate the traditions of values – particularly not among the cultivated classes and creative artists. The opponent – the Communist dictatorship – seemed so strange, so un-European and of minor value that it "forced" sophisticated people to resist. Poets, musicians and visual artists did not want and could not create in line with "socialist realism". Naturally, they were discriminated and chased into the underground. Yet the "products" of the followers were so weak and wrong that even laypersons were put off by them. In many countries, oppression and the convincing quality of "good art" led to uprisings. The bloody Hungarian Revolution in 1956 forced the rulers into a certain liberalisation. The Prague Uprising in 1968 led to a brutal reaction, yet also set an example. The Polish resistance movement was not primarily a product of intellectuals. It had its origins in the Catholic Church, which strengthened the Czech underground movement as much as the Hungarian cultural opposition that was becoming increasingly legal.

And that was the happy conclusion: Nobody can suffocate the traditional values of the people. Dictatorship and the ridiculous "cultural programme" of the red ideology were in direct competition with first-rate works of the opposition and censored top achievements in Western culture. In an "unfree" world, only "con-

Those who have eliminated the concept of Christianity that has formed traditions from the European Constitution and the common European cultural heritage, have contributed to the castration of our culture.

sumption” of the noble works of writers, musicians and other artists was possible. An uncanny amount of art was “consumed”, enhanced by the heroic aura of artists opposing the system. They became heroes of the people and - particularly in Hungary and Poland - were instrumental in the downfall of Communism.

Democracy and globalisation

This was followed by the great turnaround, which has often been idealised. Yet what came from the West was not the intellectual impetus that had been missed for decades, but the fight for material goods. And initially, not Europe, but third-class America arrived. Soon, the debate about values was no longer in the hands of an enquiring free press, but tied to several vested interests. Adding value soon focused on very few places and Eastern and Central Europe was quickly as much at a loss with its value judgements and as disoriented as the West.

The second source of danger is globalisation. The initially American, yet unidentifiably “international” power of the multinationals has a fundamental interest in the global loss of culture throughout the world’s population.

People with taste and their own value judgements are difficult to manipulate. They have clear ideas of what they like and what they want to buy. They see through the temptations of mass culture and are not content with superficial fashions and promises of happiness. The globalised market pressure and the pressures to consume contradict a traditional cultural value judgement. In its own interest, it inevitably weakens individual convictions and does not produce

a deeply rooted culture. The globalised world needs money-oriented masses with a weak cultural taste to be at the mercy of every consumer campaign. It does not tolerate the resistance of refined individuals - whether they are creative artists or sophisticated cultural connoisseurs.

However, the capital of globalisation also supports culture in two ways - on the one hand by sponsoring the “ultra-modern” commercial art trends in the sense of a “throw-away civilisation” and by serving accelerated consumption. On the other hand, it supports traditional, valuable culture, as the international elite will hold it in long-lasting high esteem.

Thus, globalisation generates a new model of a two-tier society - a new variation of the Roman Empire, where the masses are sedated with “panem et circenses” and ludicrous profits are generated at the same time. This is supplemented by the ideology of (mass)individualism, with “self-realisation” by using certain perfume brands, etc. Everything becomes ephemeral and relative. This wheel of futility turns at an enormous speed, every new trend is immediately consumed and then forgotten again. And as a by-product, our environment is killed by mindless absorption: As the car is “the” consumer object of the world and every fifth employee works in this industry (and affiliated service industries), even the most intelligent government in the world cannot do anything to oppose this industry if it does not want to face enormous unemployment rates. Over the last few decades, we have experienced a frightening retreat of culture into an elitist corner. At the same time, culture loses its “population” and its appeal to the masses.

A global value judgement is required

I took part in a EU cultural conference and was indignant to hear that Western representatives thought that solidarity and social market economy were the actual common European goods. How could one possibly forget the Greek and Roman Antique periods, the Romanesque and the Gothic periods, the Renaissance, the Baroque period, the Enlightenment and the artistic values that shaped the world in the 19th and 20th century in a specifically European way?

A strong culture of international standing would not surrender so easily. Europe is unthinkable without its common cultural tradition and a modest value judgement. While we are resting on the wealth of our cultural heritage, it is inexplicable how easily we surrender our treasures. The citizens see the grim fight for economic power, financial means and goods in Europe. What Monnet said (or did not say) is more valid than ever: The creation of Europe has to start with culture. Yet the Bologna Process dealing with education is a capitulation to the global dictate. With the overall shift to a Bachelor degree education, we abandon the profound knowledge in a special subject as well as teaching the corresponding "world view" and we release thousands of (culturally) half-educated "specialists".

Europe would need a common reassurance about the requirements to maintain and nurture our joint cultural identity: Initially the development of a value-oriented synthesis of the specifically European cultural heritage, which should not be loaded with details, but describe the entire cultural heritage in a way that is easy to understand and attractive at the same

time. It ought to show and strengthen the development of a common identity and a sense of belonging. In addition, we would urgently need a European history book and a cultural guide as compulsory textbooks in all European schools. Informal, interesting and exciting.

Without a stronger value judgement of the European states with regard to their traditional artistic and cultural standards, the future looks bleak. Modernisation of culture is only conceivable with an awareness of our own cultural past. Amongst a disoriented pragmatism and the predominance of confusing trends, minimum value and knowledge standards are required to be able to separate lasting values from fleeting fashion trends. We do not want to devalue or discriminate anything but open the gateway for independent modernisation by providing the opportunity for a continuous return to European roots. The gateway to a profound, cultivated freedom with a zest for life.

Translation: Angelika Welt

Gyula Kurucz studied German Studies and Literature at the University of Debrecen. From 1968, he worked as a journalist, dramatic adviser and teacher in Budapest. From 1980 to 1989, he was editor-in-chief of *Periodika Books from Hungary/Hungarian Book Review/Le Livre Hongoris*. In 1987, he co-founded the first opposition party UDF. In 1988/89, he lived in Berlin as a DAAD artist-in-residence. In 1990, he was one of the first non-Communist diplomats in Berlin. Until 1995, he was the director of the Hungarian Cultural Centre in Berlin (Haus Ungarn), then president of Hungary's largest civilian organisation until 2000. Until 2006, he was the director of the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Stuttgart.

We always have to keep body and soul together. It does not make any sense to talk about culture on Sundays and about economy, politics and military affairs from Monday to Friday. Ideas are important. They need media. And as their medium, they need the Citizens' Europe.

Georg Boomgarden, State Secretary, German Federal Foreign Office





CULTURE IN EUROPE –

EUROPE IN CULTURE





THE CONTINENT OF NO COMMUNICATION

The media have not identified the means to cope with the diversity of languages in Europe yet. Instead, politicians and journalists are in combat.
By Peter Preston



I begin – as, in fact, it all began for me – with a personal anecdote. Thirty years ago I was the new, young editor of a British national paper getting my first invitation to speak at an international press seminar. Its fine, challenging subject was freedom, democracy and the printed word, and it drew senior journalists from all over Europe to Rome – where our Italian hosts made speeches full of abstractions and principles, before introducing Italian politicians, who pavilioned their beautiful language in even more beautiful prose. After tea on the first day, I noticed that people chose different places to sit. The Italians, the Spanish and some of the French and Greeks sat now on the front two rows. Meanwhile, I'd moved to the

back row, alongside the Swedes, Danes and Dutch, where we muttered and fretted about empty rhetoric devoid of practical content. Europe, you see, had divided itself naturally: between the pontificators and the pragmatists.

Our journalism didn't have a single style or a common history. We had scant means of talking to each other, let alone to readers beyond our national borders.

Europe with a soul?

Have things changed over those three decades? A little, perhaps. In freedom from Franco, the Spanish have produced some notable papers of wide reach and repute. Air travel has developed hugely and puts Europe's top papers on sale on the morning of publication from Ljubljana to Liverpool.

Some television channels like Euro News make their influence felt. German, Italian, Spanish and French news agencies have grown in influence (whilst American agencies have withered) and Reuters is still the proudest name in the agency world. But let's not get carried

away, either. The information hole in Europe's heart is as dire and as threatening as ever.

We have a tapestry of countries and tongues woven into a great – indeed, amazing – network of trade and politics inside a union that aims to carry on amazing the world. Yet, apart from grey meetings in Brussels, that union seems to have no easy means of involving its major protagonists or informing the millions of citizens on whom its future depends. This isn't a burgeoning federation, a United States of Europe to rival the US of A. This is an agglomeration amiably arranged – but lacking any wish or ability for deeper conversation. Only very rarely, in vestigial ways, do you sense something that could be called “European public opinion”. But without that, the real tools of union lie broken and bent. Without that, you can't move ever closer; or, in fact, in any direction at all. Without that, the project is becalmed. Who'll argue a new case for the constitutional treaty? Nobody who can make his voice heard across a continent, for there is no voice that travels such distances.

Press relies on regional loyalty

To understand what is wrong, you must first understand what is different:

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and even newspapermen themselves, let alone Brussels civil servants, are slow to such understanding. A newspaper is a newspaper, isn't it? By no means, when you look deeper. Context matters.

Most of the big European countries have a regional press – and not, in the narrowest sense, a national one. Germany boasts great papers of national importance in Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin and Munich; but, intrinsically, they are still distinguished papers serving their regions first, and opting for a monopoly of influence in those regions. Italy, in just the same way, finds its great papers in Rome, Turin and Milan. Once the TGV begins to lose speed a few hundred kilometres outside Paris, then France's huge regional monopoly papers – *Midi Libre*, *Sud-Ouest* and the rest – take over. *Le Monde* stops turning at Lyon.

All of this has produced, over time, a lack of direct competition and thus of direct argument. Though the influential papers of Germany or Italy have different views and allegiances, they also relate to their home regions first. They are, in that sense, akin to the big city newspapers of Los Angeles, Atlanta and Chicago. They rely on local loyalty and reflect a consensus of local interests.

That means many things, but one of them is a certain residual elitism, a belief that if you can reach the most important people in your area, the movers and shakers of power, then there is no need to chase thousands more readers of smaller consequence, little people without

power. So, in turn, circulations are more constricted - and the mass habit of reading a newspaper is feebly established. Newspapers have low readership by international standards, and low penetration of political consciousness.

Demography, geography and society have defined their role and their appeal.

But take other countries with other factors at work. They may be so small that 'local' papers have national clout as well: go to Copenhagen or Amsterdam to see self-definition by editorial politics and debate, not consensus, as the dominant trend. Come to Britain to find almost 30 million readers picking up a paper during an average week and defining themselves - in belief, status, job, sex and ambition - by the paper they choose. The entire structure of the industry is different. So are the various newspapers it produces - by design and in the interests of their own survival.

And this is only one difference amongst many. Beyond that lie the differences of language and of a press that is not merely unavailable to many Europeans, but literally unreadable, too. Films and television series can be dubbed. Magazines can turn *Hola!* into *Hello!* and export formulas that operate successfully in many lands, featuring an international cast of celebrity film stars, matadors, royals and playboys. But newspapers haven't found a way to develop such formulas yet. They are language specific, audience specific and community specific. When German papers (for instance)

have tried to export their formats and personnel to other countries within the EU, they have often come a terrible cropper. Remember how swiftly *El Sol* set in Madrid! Rupert Murdoch, from Australia by way of New York, may own four of the most influential papers in Britain, but he leaves the shaping and staffing of those papers to his managers on the ground in London's docklands. He can make movies and television shows to export round the world. He can buy giant internet enterprises like MySpace. But where his newspapers are concerned, he safeguards their difference.

More differences? We've done history, geography, audience, language, staffing and style - and failed to find much common ground. Now add a cold bath of resource incapacity. Some countries are big, with large, rich newspapers to match. They can afford to have correspondents in Paris, Berlin, Madrid and London, as well as in Washington and Moscow. They can open many windows on the world. But what if you're an editor somewhere much smaller, say a Baltic state or a sliver from the old Yugoslavia? Then the population that sustains you is smaller and more impecunious, too: then even affording a reporter in Brussels is a stretch. So the news of what's happening in 24 other European Union countries - or to the cluster of aspirant members paying their neighbourhood status dues - is thin, confined to news agencies in languages you can afford. Thus even basic information comes thin on the ground. The United States can

be united, most of the time, by national television, national wire services and national bloggers. Europe has none of these resources.

Lack of communication channels

What does Bratislava know of Helsinki, or Athens of Riga? It's not just the politicians who don't trouble to communicate: the basic news of day-to-day existence goes missing, too. There are no reporters on the spot. There is no easy channels open. We're all in the dark, doomed to glimpse reality only through the prism of Brussels. We don't share a common information base; and therefore we can't join in the arguments that help define democracy.

Almost two decades ago now, Helmut Schmidt had an idea and summoned European editors to sit by a lake in Hamburg and discuss it. He wanted to found a magazine that, variously translated, could debate the issues of Europe in every EU country – to, if you like, give Europe a means of talking to itself. But who would mastermind such a project? And who would pay for it? The audience, nodding sagely, thanked the former German Chancellor for his vision and let it potter away into research studies that never reported back. There was not, in

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short, a will to proceed. But I – leaving that audience – still thought that something might be done; so, with a great deal of effort, we began Guardian Europe, a thick weekly insert of opinion articles from sister papers all over the continent that they, in turn, could pick up and use for themselves. It was practical, interesting and well-received: but it was also fiendishly expensive. Advertising agencies geared to national markets didn't know how to cross frontiers. (And still don't in large measure). Translation costs were heavier than budget. Britain plunged into a recession and cherished projects had to be scrapped. That was the end of Guardian Europe. It lived again under another name in the late nineties as part of a daily survey of the world's press, but that, too, failed to survive a further round of economies. And meanwhile the essential dilemma became clearer and clearer. How does one part of Europe join debate with another – or even register its concerns? How on earth do we grow ever closer if we haven't an idea what's going on?

I exaggerate a little, of course. Euro News cable is still in business. The Herald Tribune and Financial Times serve selected readers at breakfast tables in all the major capitals. Several scholarly magazines of small distribution pick up and carry forward key arguments. The internet is already an immense potential force for cross-fertilisation.

But none of this, to be frank, adds up to much as yet. None of it has begun to create a Europe-wide public opinion – without

which, in turn, there can be no Europe-wide democracy. And we delude ourselves if we think such a public opinion can be created at the snap of a finger.

Go to Brussels itself, sit in the press room, and see one aspect of the problem. Most of the reporters around you work for those regional papers, those monopoly reflectors of consensual opinion, I outlined earlier. What are they interested in? The level of CAP prices set for the crops grown in that region, the possibility of building new bridges or roads, levels of cost and local remuneration. All of this is understandable enough. It is what the readers of their papers want to be informed about. It makes the feeding of news from the Commission a bilateral affair, a close, blinkered relationship between EU officialdom and practical publicists for the good works of the union. But it does not spread the word. It assumes that Europe is a mesh of special deals, special requirements and special interests.

None of that routine works in other countries with other sorts of media coverage. Take Britain as a good and bad example. We have almost unwittingly developed a hybrid of a federal state: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own parliaments and their own opportunities for direct contact with Brussels. Nor are they shy about the use European money is put to. When Europe helps build a bridge in Scotland, a sign on the road tells you where that beneficence came from. But that does not happen very often in England. Here

Europe is a kind of dirty secret. Here it is the union's frailties and stagnation that consume column inches. Here a fiercely combative press does not look to the small change of Brussels operation, but constructs bigger, more over-arching threats to national sovereignty.

There is nothing benevolent here. The impulsions are quite, quite different; and they reflect, as well as condition, national debate. Ask a British editor why that is so, moreover, and he'll probably begin talking about the forces of competition and the need for his paper to say something distinctive, not something the same as the rest. Structures, again: and a bias against consensus.

Is it possible to hope, in time, for better things? A diagnosis of present ills, however gloomy, at least suggests ways forward. And some examples of present news concerns, however gloomy, too, show what may begin to develop.

The future of communication in Europe

Consider the flows of immigrants into Western Europe from Eastern EU

When you look at what happened in the Dutch and French referendums, and at what might have happened elsewhere if voting had ever been relevant, you see something far beyond a temporary setback. You see continuing stasis and bewilderment.

Europe and beyond. Consider, in particular, the question of Turkish membership. Immediately we're talking – and Europe is talking – about jobs, culture, religion, fear, hope and reconciliation in a way that sweeps over borders. Public opinion counts. Consider Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and Afghanistan, with so many troops from Europe in action in so many foreign fields. Again, European opinion counts. Maybe, with only slight malignance, you could say that George W Bush is the new father of European togetherness. And then, crucially, there is the constitution....

When you look at what happened in the Dutch and French referendums, and at what might have happened elsewhere if voting had ever been relevant, you see something far beyond a temporary setback. You see continuing stasis and bewilderment. Of course Europe can jog along for a while, welcoming Sofia and Bucharest, parking Zagreb and Ankara until further notice – but when it jogs in this way, its also loses salience and significance. It becomes inert, a source of blame but seldom a repository of praise. It loses any sense of momentum or inevitability.

This, for the union's fathers, was always a twilight zone of despair. If things weren't coming ever closer at a rate of knots, then they were going nowhere. But now, perhaps too late, we can all see the problem of public opinion deficit. The easy charge against the EU after referendum defeat was that it had lost touch with the people of Europe – and

everything we see now confirms that. Indeed, getting in touch sometimes appears a task beyond comprehension inside the cumbersome machine rooms of Commission bureaucracy.

What's to be done? The danger, as ever, is hunting for simple answers to a fiendishly complex problem. But there are some steps that would help.

One, of course, is making the Commission itself (and the Strasbourg Parliament) more open for reporting business – especially, TV business. At the moment it is viewer repellent, and thus unable to generate second-phase print coverage, either.

Another – a suitable case for proper subsidy – are translation services that don't spend endless hours translating Finnish into Slovakian, but provide a swift daily translation of the most important articles of argument and opinion appearing in major EU newspapers. If they went on the web each morning, with blogging space attached, then the first hurdles of debate might be crossed.

Yet another is having the self-confidence (and drive) to take the attack to the great enemy, apathy. Most heavyweight British newspapers, for instance, seem to employ as many – or almost as many – correspondents in the US as they do throughout Europe. Does that make sense? Would their readers think so if they were drawn into the count? There is an extremely serious question here. Why report in such depth on a society that is not our society, when the society to which we belong goes so unreported? Why, in

countries like Britain, have magazines of political opinion that neglect European dimensions almost wilfully? Why let the union slide down and off the agenda? Why confirm in practice what research already shows to be the case: a European reliance on American films, American television, American assumptions that sets us apart from any other continent in the world except Australasia?

The biggest danger, though, lies in a game of pass-the-parcel of blame. Brussels can and does blame journalists for these frailties and omissions. Editors blame Brussels. Politicians blame any convenient target. But very little changes.

It could, I think, if there was a will to understand the problems that bar the way. It could if Europe's politicians genuinely wanted to create a European public opinion. And it could if newspapermen and broadcasters felt a keener impulsion to cooperate because their audiences demanded it. See? A circle of responsibility, turning slowly, and perhaps going nowhere. But if we glimpse the wider dilemma, we may also glimpse ways of tackling it. There will be no true road forward unless we do.

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EUROPE ON SCREEN The author can not see a European identity as such, and the development of a European media systems or even a European public sphere seems not be on the horizon. So far, national borders indicate the limits of media power. The real European public sphere does exist in the Brussels environment: among politicians, EU civil servants, lobbyists, correspondents. *By Deirdre Kevin*



Within discussions on the future of Europe there has been an ever increasing expectation that the “media” could or should somehow positively contribute to the process of integration. A logical expectation is that the media should carry out the role of informing the public of European affairs, providing a forum for discussion on European affairs and doing this according to journalistic ethics of accuracy and fairness. Another frequent expectation is that the media should actively promote or support the process of European integration. One does not necessarily exclude the other: in informing citizens of European affairs, the media automatically supports the development of European citizenship, whether or not this results in support for

policies. Real support for the project can only be attained through the use of the media by the European institutions or national governments, influencing the perceptions of citizens as to the purpose of integration. But what exactly should the people support and what messages do they receive from EU and national leaders via the media? Garvey (2005) makes a nice distinction with regard to support for the EU between the “hearts” (values) and the “minds” (economics) of the citizens. The question arises as to which aspect has been more the focus of the communication process.

The role of the media in Europe

The communication of the work (and purpose) of the European Union is often seen as a way in which to increase public support and understanding. As the European Union has grown, become “wider and deeper”, discussion and initiatives have increased that focus on three issues: the “democratic deficit” of the European Union, the “communication deficit” of the European Union, and the “role of the media” (broadly speaking) in communicating Europe. Concerning democracy and governance at the EU level, of relevance is the communication between the EU and citizens, European journa-

lism and media coverage of EU affairs, the communication within the European policy community, and the EU's interactions with European media. The media can also provide political and cultural information concerning other European countries and cultures and cultural exchange through films and programming. Also crucial is the shape of European communication systems: the political economy of the media, the ways in which different publics use these media systems, and the political and democratic cultures in which they exist. Drawing out the various elements above should hopefully provide the reader with a more concrete idea of the various roles that media can play in the process of European integration.

Top-down or two way communication?

The so-called "democratic deficit" concerning the actual practice of governance at the European level has largely been addressed through constitutional change. Until the Single European Act of 1986 (introducing the cooperation procedure) and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (introducing the co-decision procedure placing the EP on equal footing with the Council), the role of the European Parliament was purely consultative, and before 1979 the parliament was not even directly elected.

At the same time, there has been a strong interest in the public's (the citizens') awareness, understanding of, and attitudes towards, Europe, the European Union and the project of integration, since the development of Eurobarometer surveys in the 1970s. Eurobarometer surveys continue to show the importance of mass

media, particularly television as a source of information on the EU.¹ Despite the leap in use of the Internet, for the general population, television followed by the press, is still the most important medium. Of course the citizens have, since 1979, had a stronger way in which to express their opinions on European integration, through voting for the European Parliament. The main "message", however, generally taken from this process, is the level of interest and participation: turn-outs in elections are used as indicators of support for the entire project, while election campaigns and results seem to reveal little concerning public support for EU policies. Additionally, there have been a total of 29 referenda in the member states of the European Union concerning enlargement, membership, and deeper integration (treaties and the constitution). Low turn-outs in elections and frequent rejection of integration through referenda tend to periodically increase the panic that there is no consensus on Europe, that the citizens are being "left behind", and ultimately that more information or different ways of communication are required.

The EU institutions have attempted to deal with the "communication deficit" in several ways: the policy of "openness and transparency" concerning the access to information and documents: information campaigns have been carried out over the years on various aspects of integration (citizens' rights, the single market, the euro, and enlargement): the Audiovisual Service of the European Commission provides video, sound, and photographic coverage of EU news to journalists via the Internet and via Europe by Satellite: and the Europa server, was launched by the Commission in 1995. Further political developments led to changes in the approach to the mass media. In 1999, after the collective resignation of the Commission, a major review of press and communication relations was carried out in order to improve and strengthen the press

and communication services. The work of Meyer, for example, (1999) revealed the important role of investigative journalism and cooperation between foreign journalists in Brussels during this crisis. Since then the work of the Spokespersons of the European Commission has become more professional and news management practices, similar to that of national governments, have been employed (see AIM, 2007). Between 2004 and 2006 policies were developed concerning information and communication strategy, culminating in the recent White Paper on a European Communication Policy which among other ideas proposes initiatives such as “going local” i.e. working more with regional and local media, and making better use of ICT to communicate with citizens.

Other projects provide funding for programming concerning EU affairs: currently the European Parliament has funding available for the co-financing of: “informative and awareness-raising television programmes”.² It is difficult to assess, and there is little research available to enable an assessment of, the overall impact of information campaigns, and communication strategies, on citizen knowledge and attitudes, or support for integration. The analysis of news coverage in the mass media of the member states has been the main investigative tool to date, which at least allows an assessment of the information available to citizens.

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Information on the EU and Europe in the media

Extensive research³ has been carried out concerning the role of news media in informing European citizens on EU issues, particularly with the increasing of EU policy for national policy (see for example Blumler et al, 1983; Siune, 1993; De Vreese, 2003; Kevin, 2003; Trenz, 2003). Much of this research focuses on the role of the media in a democratic society: providing information to the citizens regarding policies and economics and providing a forum for discussion of these issues (contributing to the public sphere); and providing a watchdog function on the operation of democracy and political and economic actors. Many studies have also examined journalism at the EU level and the production of news (Morgan, 1995; Slaata, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Baisnée 2002; AIM, 2007). Another central question for research is the issue of European identity formation, the extent to which European media could replicate the process of supporting national identity formation at the national level. It has been argued that such a process would require a European level media system common to all citizens, which thus far has not emerged, largely due to the obstacle of language. Aside from news, music and sports channels, the news and information channels with European or international audiences such as Euronews, BBC World, CNN and publications such as the Economist, the Financial Times, the International Herald Tribune are essentially targeted towards business and political elites (Schlesinger and Kevin, 2000), while also being essential sources for EU correspondents (AIM, 2007). Such elites make up the EU

policy community, a place with plenty of communication between Europeans. Alongside the political community over 1000 EU correspondents are present and also more than 2000 lobby groups. According to a report issued by the European Parliament (2003) over 70% of lobbyists in Brussels work for corporate interests, and just 20% represent NGOs (including trade unions, public health organisations, environmental groups, etc.).

Results of comparative studies on European news, programming and information in national systems tell us several things: the types of media that tend to provide more information on Europe (quality press, public service broadcasters); the countries that tend to have most comprehensive coverage (frequently Germany, France, Nordic states); the particular obstacles that exist in reporting European news or dealing with the Europe Union as a theme in the media (complex topics, lack of interest of editors and audience, long legislative process); and where the European Union generally fits best in the media outlets (in the context of economic and political news).

Despite wide-ranging national differences and trends (journalism cultures, topics of relevance, media landscapes), the normal influencing factors on news remain: news outlets serve the citizen or they serve the consumer and while the framework for carrying out the first service may lie in public service or editorial values, the factors that shape the second are based on assumptions of interest or perhaps results of surveys. Broadly speaking, all studies reveal that news that interests an individual must be information of relevance to their lives: the closer the more relevant, whether geographi-

cally, financially or emotionally. Hence, in terms of political news, the national governance structure and developments that affect this are more easily related to important issues of personal finance, employment, health and education.

This surely must limit our expectations of what role news media can play aside from the normal requirements of accuracy, and from those who present themselves as such, quality (analysis, comment and background) and perhaps most importantly of all in relation to any political and economic system, an independent and impartial watchdog on political affairs. What is most difficult to assess in the process is the way in which people process the information available to them. Eurobarometer studies are helpful but limited in terms of the data collected.⁴

Perceptions of Europe and the European Union

If the media largely operates on the basis of producing news information and programming for audience needs, then one can assume that national and individual attitudes to Europe will influence this, or create a framework within which such information is processed. The concept of European integration has for different nationalities always had different meanings. For the original six members, the European Communities were a post-

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war solution intended to prevent war between these states and to bind them economically with joint control of the coal and steel industries (the engines of war). For later members, there were frequently economic rather than value-based reasons for joining this trade block. These historical logics for support of the European Union still influence the various national debates and voting patterns. In a 1998 study on elite discourse on the single currency (Risse, Engelmann, Knopf and Roscher, 1998) researchers found that for the British elites, Europe represented the “other” and a threat to British sovereignty. For the German elites Europe was the positive alternative to the “other”, German nationalism. The long-standing British scepticism and strategic distancing from Europe remains despite the engagement with Europe of the current government, and this is perpetuated by the UK tabloid and much of the mid-market press. Two British researchers (Anderson & Weymouth 1999) have questioned whether these sections of the press are simply “insulting the public?” In a range of interviews carried out with EC Representation offices in the member states, it is only the British office that describes dealing with “Euromyths” in the media as being a large part of their work (AIM 2007).

Although the 2004 enlargement was preceded by referenda showing massive support for joining the EU, subsequent surveys show a reduction in satisfaction and support in the new member states. Could one assume that the message for voters in these countries stressed the economic benefits over any other motive for cooperation? During the Nice Treaty campaign, where the Irish electorate voted “No” to further integration for the first time, there were some interesting campaign slogans from both sides of the debate. The “Yes” campaign had posters with the slogan: We’re better off in Europe. The “No” campaign suggested: You will lose jobs, money, and power. One

group in the “No” campaign did address an issue of value, that of Irish neutrality with the message: Goodbye UN, hello NATO.

Here we can clearly see some distinctions between winning the “hearts” and the “minds” of the citizens. Too often the focus is on the potential economic prosperity of integration, sometimes leading to disappointment. If “Europe” and reasons for integration within the European Union have different meanings for the publics, and generate different expectations and fears it is difficult to expect too much commonality in opinions, debates and attitudes. While these perceptions may be perpetuated by the media, they are strongly influenced by political elites and their agendas. It is not just the media that filter the information that guides our understanding of Europe but also the political actors.

European media guiding the way?

Due to the lack of a pan-European media system that would address a mass audience, a European public sphere operates through national spaces, national media systems. European media systems have undergone major changes in recent years, particularly regarding choice available to audiences. In the 1970s, most countries had merely two television channels and those tended to be public service (or state) television. This situation has changed due to technological development, the deregulation of markets and the globalisation of markets. To take just one example, in Ireland in 1975 there existed one public service channel until a second PSB channel was introduced in the late 1970s and a commercial channel in 1998. To-

day however, particularly given the lack of a free to air digital terrestrial television (DTT) service, 25% of Irish households are now (2006 figures) subscribed to Sky digital television receiving up to 206 channels. In one generation a massive change has taken place. In the light of this explosion of choice for national publics in the EU, the question is raised as to how the traditional role of the media in identity formation (whether national or European), or in the democratic lives of citizens might be reduced or limited. One generally expects the media types that most often and most comprehensively deal with political and economic affairs, the places where citizens turn to for information would be the Public Service Broadcasters (PSB) (due to specific remits and obligations) and the press (in particular the “quality press”). This is also

apparent from the studies looking at European news content.

PSB systems remain strong in many EU countries, particularly in Nordic and Northern European states. In several states public service broadcasting is very weak as regards audience share: for example in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. For many of these the transformation from state broadcaster to public service broadcaster has been problematic and as privatisation moved forward (often with foreign capital invested in the private channels), the PSB channels have failed to develop into a solid service. For others financing has been coming from advertising or the state budget rather than a license fee, compromising both political and financial independence (Spain, Portugal) (see Kevin et al 2004).

Levels of newspaper readership also vary throughout the EU, with the strongest tradition of readership, by and large in Nordic, and Northern European countries. In these countries both the readership of the press and the audience figures for PSB channels are high. Not surprisingly, it is in these countries that more

Table 1: The position of Public Service Broadcasting in the EU markets

Combined audience share	of Public Service Channels in EU Countries	of top 2 Commercial Channels in EU Countries*
Very High 60-75%	Denmark 72%	Czech Republic 65%, Hungary 61%
High 50-60%	Poland 54%, Austria 52%	Portugal 57%, Lithuania 55%, Finland 52% Medium -High
40-50% Italy 49%, Finland 44%	France 43%, Belgium Flanders 41%, Germany 41%, Ireland 40%, Sweden 40%	Netherlands 47%, Estonia 44%, France 44%, Germany 43%, Slovenia 42%, Italy 41%, Latvia 40%
Medium 35-40%	Netherlands 38%, United Kingdom 38%, Slovenia 35%	Greece 37%, Malta 37.5%** , Belgium Flanders 36%, Poland 36%, Sweden 35%, United Kingdom 34%***
Low- Medium 25-35%	Malta 33%, Czech Republic 31%, Spain 30%, Portugal 28%	Belgium Walloon 30%
Low 10-20%	Belgium Walloon 19%, Latvia 19%, Estonia 18%, Hungary 18%, Cyprus 17%, Greece 15%, Lithuania 12%	Austria 10%, Denmark 15%, Ireland 13%
*In the case of Italy and Ireland, the share is just one channel. / ** In Austria, German channels have a 37% share; In Ireland, UK channels have over 40% share; In Malta, Italian channels a 19% share; in Belgium Walloon, French channels a 30% share; in Estonia, 40% of the Russian community watch Russian channels. / *** Including ITV network, which is considered to have certain PSB obligations Figures from 2004 (AT, BE, CY, DA, FIN; GR; IT); from 2003 (CZ, EE, FR, DE, IE, LT, SI, SE); from 2002 (LV, NL)		

Source Kevin et al (2004)

information is provided in the media on European affairs, although this does not automatically imply support for integration, or the development of a strong European identity.

Additionally, the EU media systems of the member states are widely varied in terms of size (from serving a population of over 80m in Germany, to that of 0.38m in Malta) and also concerning language culture and use. A further important issue is ownership and control of the media: whether political (Italy, Malta); religious (Malta, Slovenia, and Greece); business and industry (Italy, France, and Greece); foreign companies (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Denmark, Lithuania, and Czech Republic); or multi-media moguls (Italy, UK, Portugal, Greece, and Spain). These factors influence the spaces where the citizens receive political and cultural information about the EU and their European neighbours, but also the way in which media contributes to national democracy (see Kevin et al, 2004).

The EU's media policy has focused mainly on achieving a strong European media industry in opposition to the US.

the reception of French, Dutch and German television in Belgium; of German television in Austria; British television and press in Ireland; Russian media in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia; Greek media in Cyprus, and Italian media in Malta. This is often seen as a problem, however, as these market shares impact on the advertising revenues, and also cause worries concerning cultural domination. The exchange of programming in Europe has remained limited and looking at schedules of private channels reveals more commonality in the presence of US television programmes. While competition generally provides greater choice for the consumer there is an ongoing concern that competing with commercial media causes a reduction in quality (less information, documentaries, quality drama) and more cheap entertainment.

The same applies to cinema, with the

Table 2: Breakdown of cinema admissions in the European Union (EU 25)
according to the origin of films

Origin	USA	USA/Eur.	France	UK	Germany	Italy	Spain	Other EU
% of total admissions	59,7	11	9,5	6,1	4,5	2,2	2,1	2,1

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory (2004). Provisional figures for 2004.

It has also provided funding for film, and introduced regulations to support independent and European television production. However, it is only very recently that the EU has begun to show concern regarding the state of political and cultural pluralism in the national media systems.

Regarding cultural exchange, cultural and linguistic links exist between several small EU states and their larger neighbours allowing a certain level of reception of trans-frontier television and the purchase of programming. This includes

dominant provider of cinema entertainment being the US. Even where certain countries have stronger film industries such as France, Germany, the UK or Italy, the production is mainly enjoyed by the home audience.

Conclusion

The prospects for a European public sphere or an area of debate at the European level, addressing all citizens are slim for the near future although the Internet

as an important medium of communication is growing (but still less important than television). The real European public sphere exists in the policy community of Brussels: the politicians, EU officials, lobbyists and EU correspondents. How this is communicated via national systems is the central way in which the media can support European citizenship. Attitudes to the European Union, European integration, and also European identification are more complicated, and related to perceptions, to how elites, particularly national elites communicate. They are also strongly influenced by personal experience, and that includes cultural experience of others and other places. The context of the media in European countries is central to the type of information people receive, and this involves cultural, political and economic factors. Keeping national media strong as regards their public interest role is an important first step to ensuring that democracy and cultural diversity at both national and European levels are maintained. This would surely be the best foundation for a European public space supporting citizenship and identification with Europe.

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1 In 2004 television as a primary source for respondents was 73% (EU 15) and 79% for the New Member States (NMS). The daily press is a primary source for 54% (EU 15) and for 51% of NMS respondents. Radio was mentioned by 35% (EU15) but by 51% of respondents in the NMS. The use of the Internet as a source is 16% (EU15), and higher in the NMS 18%. Source: Eurobarometer 61.
2 See under: http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_paper/doc/white_paper_en.pdf

3 As this piece was requested as an essay, it is not possible to fully reference or provide an overview of the vast amount of research and thought in this area. A useful place to search for references is the following database: www.aim-project.net/doku/

4 According to Eurobarometer methodology, each survey consists in approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State (except Germany: 2000, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom 1300 including 300 in Northern Ireland).

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RECONCILIATION IN LIEU OF DIVISION Europeans do not only talk about themselves, but also with each other – at least that’s true for players in the film industry. The European film industry has not only gained ground as the antithesis to Hollywood – it is also increasingly influential as an economic driver. *By Michael Schmid-Ospach*



Johannes Rau – a strict advocate of Europe – said once: “In my view, Europe can only succeed if we do not use the divisive ‘your culture, our culture’, but the conciliatory ‘your and our culture’ as its basis and if we do not perceive diversity as a threat, but as the foundation for its unity.”¹

The situation on the world map of film is definitely changing: Particularly in the recent past, the predominance of Hollywood has been put into perspective here in Europe. The United States – still one of the biggest markets – continues to be fastidious: The masses disapprove of synchronised film versions. Non-English productions from Europe are still not really marketable in Hollywood. Those European projects liked by the United

States are even filmed again, for example the film “Bella Martha“, launched in the USA with the title “No Reservations“ – with Catherine Zeta Jones instead of Martina Gedeck as the leading part. Michael Haneke’s “Caché“ is also retaken – in this case even transferring the plot from Paris to the USA.

Film on a world tour

However, the Berlinale showed that things are moving: The USA does not only put out feelers for film ideas from Europe. Many European actors and other creative people populate the international stage now. Martina Gedeck features in “The Good Shepherd“, Moritz Bleibtreu in “The Walker“ and in „La Masseria dello allodole“, Daniel Brühl in “2 Days in Paris“, Julia Jentsch in „Obsluhoval jsem anglického krále“, André Hennicke in “In Memoria di me“, Jasmin Tabatabai and Sibel Kekilli appear in “Fay Grim“, Christian Oliver in “The Good German“ and Benno Fürmann in “Kruisocht Spijkerbroek“. Film teams are increasingly international and in terms of selecting locations for filming, a high level of networking has taken place for years – not only within Europe but between all film nations.

Generally, the network for films is in-

creasingly consolidated. For a European provider, this means presenting regional and national options in the first place – and on the other hand – in terms of demand – to exploit the opportunities provided by the European film market. In close cooperation with “German Films“, the distribution support programme for German films abroad, we are represented at all international festivals and cooperate with various different filmmakers, also way beyond European borders.

Success factor Europe

Numerous cinema productions with financial support from the Filmstiftung are successful at European festivals and in European cinemas, among them Tom Tykwer’s “Perfume“, Sven Taddicken’s „Emma’s Bliss“, Andreas Dresen’s “Summer in Berlin“, Philip Gröning’s “Into Great Silence“ or international co-productions such as the winner at Cannes, Ken Loach’s “The Wind that shakes the Barley“, the Israeli-German co-production “Sweet Mud“ by Dror Shaul, which received several awards, Maria Speth’s drama „Madonnas“ or the tragicomedy “Armin“ by the Croatian director Ognjen Svilicic.

During the “Indian Summer of Film” in Germany, five German titles were in the Top Ten on German cinema screens. On international markets, German TV event movies almost sold “like hotcakes“. To quote the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau: “As Hollywood’s global success is almost exclusively linked to the production of television series, so-called ‘disaster movies’ from Germany are almost without competition.”² If we take a look at the box office success of

domestic productions as contenders in Europe, it becomes apparent that German fiction has turned into one of the strongest products in the meantime. The cinema production “Downfall“ was sold to 145 countries, the two sequels of the TV event movie “Dresden“ to 68 countries and “Stauffenberg“, also a TV event movie and like “Dresden” subsidised in North Rhine-Westphalia, was sold to 82 countries.

With two examples from our daily practice, I would like to outline the unifying effect of film work in Europe and the success of European cooperation. The following cinematic highlights are a hundred percent “Made in Europe“ and have created a furore in Europe and beyond Europe’s borders in many different ways.

One is a real blockbuster and the most expensive German cinema production ever – the film named after the novel “The Perfume” by Patrick Süßkind, which years before had already been translated into over fifty languages. Over one million people saw the Constantin-Eichinger production “Perfume“, directed by Tom Tykwer, on the first weekend of its release in German cinemas, which means around 1500 visitors per copy. In the meantime, the film has received a Platinum Bogey for five million visitors within 50 days. Steven Spielberg’s film distribution company Dreamworks shows the film in US cinemas and it is released in Japan in 2007. A great success for the production company and the most recent example that a film can be both – a blockbuster entertaining the masses and a cultural event. But it is also an example that the film world is becoming increasingly international and that international cooperations in this

industry are increasingly the rule rather than the exception.

For cost reasons and in spite of the funds that initially enabled the making of the film, it was shot in several countries. In Barcelona, the mayor authorised very generous roadblocks. In France – the actual location of the film, only the lavender fields were filmed because according to the producer, the country is “too expensive in terms of production technology”. 1400 costumes were made in Romania, the models were built in the Czech Republic and the digital effects were also produced there. In Germany, 15 days of shooting took place in the Bavaria film studios in Munich and the substantial post-production “with 80 people working on it for more than 12 months” equally took place in Munich. And I should also mention that the producer, Bernd Eichinger, comes from Bavaria and the director, Tom Tykwer, from North Rhine-Westphalia. The actors have also been cast internationally and the British leading actor’s performance is consistent with the international cast, without any perceptible boundaries.

Tom Tykwer also composed the music (together with two partners) set to music and recorded by the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra with their British conductor Simon Rattle. The CD with the soundtrack was available in the shops when the film was released in the cinemas. The film was also a highly sought-after candidate as the opening film for Venice, but the producer declined the offer. The film premiere was planned to take place in Germany – yet another novelty. In the end, “Perfume” had already been sold to many countries before its official release in the cinemas. After its success in the German cinemas,

in Austria and in Switzerland, it shot to number 1 of the Russian cinema charts on its first weekend.

The second cinematic event featuring in my excursus seems to be the exact opposite of the first example. Nevertheless, European and international audiences have received it with equally great enthusiasm in the course of half a year. I am referring Philip Gröning’s documentary “Into Great Silence” subsidised by the Filmstiftung, which received numerous awards at European and international festivals, including the Grand Jury’s World Cinema Documentary Award at the Sundance Film Festival and the European Film Award – Prix Arte 2006 – as the best documentary. This documentary talks about life in a French Carthusian monastery. The topic is so “kindling” and transnational because it talks with so much love and dedication about a life which is very different from the life of the people in the audience. Both in terms of content and form, the film shows that it is not the only way forward what successful Hollywood occasionally wants us to believe. Individual and good storytelling, which turned Hollywood into the exclusive home of the stars, has found a new adopted home in Europe.

Funding pool Europe

However, a simple glance beyond national borders is not enough. For some years now, there have been increased activities to intensify the relatively young connections between the film nation France and the film nation Germany. One half of “Amelie of Montmartre” was filmed in Germany and the production “Good-bye Lenin!” sponsored by the

Filmstiftung (Film Foundation) delighted millions of cinemagoers in France in 2003 – and during the same year, the first “Les Rendez-Vous Franco-Allemand du Cinema“ was organised in Lyon. Since then, the “Rendez-Vous“ has taken place every year in either of the two countries – receiving increasing amounts of credit. Chaired by the French president and film producer Margaret Menegoz, it always attracts several hundreds of people from the film industry to the respective country. The French-Austrian-German co-production “Caché“ by this producer (director: Michael Haneke) was the Best European Film at the European Film Awards in 2005 and received the award for the Best Director in Cannes. It was also widely discussed at the Franco-German Film Meetings.

Film as an art form

Meanwhile, a kind of premiere league at the Franco-German Film Academy in Ludwigsburg and at the Film Academy La fémis in Paris was founded. The tutors of these academies are also planning a Franco-German film meeting.

The German Minister of State for Culture, Bernd Neumann, officially opened a workgroup on “Cultural diversity in Europe“ in the autumn of 2006. Among

A film can be both – a blockbuster entertaining the masses and a cultural event. In the film world, international cooperation is more than ever the rule rather than the exception.

other topics, German and French delegates discuss the dimensions of the “Influence of the new media on cultural diversity“ and how the “Support mechanisms for European film productions“ can be improved.

Prior to these events that were all very relevant for the film industry, two agreements had been signed between Germany and France in 2001: One of these agreements is a film treaty which regulates Franco-German cooperation in general in 15 articles plus annexes. It covers co-productions, cooperation for training and further training and aspects of cultural heritage. The second agreement is a supplementary treaty – the so-called “Mini-Traité“ – about film subsidies and the conditions for funding. A Franco-German commission with equal representation from both countries decides about the allocation of funds for Franco-German co-productions.

Another example showing that Europeans talk to each other more than they talk “about each other“ nowadays was provided at the International Film Festival in Rome, which took place for the first time this year. The Italian, French, Spanish and German twin towns of the CRC Network (Capital Regions for Cinema) signed a joint contract to prepare joint funding initiatives for European co-productions.

France and Italy are currently planning a film production agreement following the Franco-German example for a better evaluation of productions from the partner country.

It is a fact that Europe is no longer ill-reputed as “Europudding“. ³ Economic and artistic synergy effects are increasingly appreciated. To a large extent,

this is due to the continuous, structuring work of European Film funding boards, whose dedicated work over the last few years has become increasingly noticeable. The important work of the extensive MEDIA programmes also needs to be mentioned in this context. Often, it is more of an issue how something is “sold” or perceived. Cultural and national diversity need time in order to merge into a resilient and genuine European unity – and until this fact will have been generally understood.

Global (film)village

Through the Internet and digitalisation, films can be sent from one place to another in seconds. This is one of the accelerating factors in order to create a global- or in our case initially European “village“, which has already been mentioned earlier, where film can be everything – whether it is a documentary, fiction or in-between genres and cinematic worlds – and at best is a critical, educational work.

Above all, this means that German and European films are not only gaining ground. Film is rapidly becoming an increasingly significant art form, a cultural event and gradually also an important economic asset.

This will require additional competencies of all parties involved – be it at the level of film production or of film reception. It also requires a sharper observation of media power and extensive monitoring to prevent the repetition of events in Italy, with Berlusconi as the most powerful politician in the country controlling the media. A “global village“ cannot avert such developments because of the sove-

reignty of the individual states, but it can certainly generate differentiated opinions and support critical perception. Yet one aspect must not be overlooked: No matter whether we’re talking about Hollywood or Bollywood or Wooden Europe – cinematic quality is claim that must not be abandoned. Film as a pure economic asset is stripped of its function as an art form and as a cultural event.

To protect the genre of film as a cultural asset – whether at a European, national or global level – is the main task and at the same time the responsibility of the global “village community”.

Translation: Angelika Welt

Since 1992, **Michael Schmid-Ospach** has been the ARTE delegate of the German broadcasting corporation WDR and the chairman of the supervisory board of the Film Foundation NRW in Düsseldorf. Since 2001, he has also been the Film Foundation’s managing director. The author studied Theatre Studies, German Studies and Psychology in Cologne. Between 1977 and 1990, he was the head of Press and PR at the WDR. Afterwards, he became the deputy director for television and worked in “Central Assignments“ for the next two years. Schmid-Ospach is also the head of the section ‘Culture and Science FS’ at the WDR and a member of a number of media and cultural institutions.

1 On 11 June 2001 in Aachen at the opening of the exhibition “Krönungen. Könige in Aachen (Coronations: Kings in Aachen)”

2 Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 November 2006

3 Westdeutsche Zeitung, 6 September 2006

CURTAIN FOR NICHE CINEMA Progress not least due to technological advance has changed our behaviour as consumers of culture. Even in the most distant places we are globally connected, and cultural goods such as books and films are available online – with the exception of European niche films. However, blockbusters from Hollywood now face serious competition from niche products. *By Dina Iordanova*



It was not a long time ago that Manuel Castells, the Internet visionary, insisted that the media world is “in the midst of an extraordinary transformation, going glocal (globalizing and narrowcasting at the same time), and finding economies of scale and synergy between different modes of expression” (Castells, p. 191). It only took about five years for his view to become commonly accepted truth. Those engaged in the creative industries today already know that the age of blockbuster is over, that nowadays “it is possible to make a major commercial success out of a niche interest” as long as the range of media on offer is properly understood and utilized, that globalizing indeed comes hand-in-hand with narrowcasting and niche marketing, and

that “we are not moving to a more homogenous world but one where the individual consumer wants to make individual choices” (Gubbins, p. 2).

In this age of new technologies and triumph of niche markets liberated from the ‘tyranny of geography’ amazing new possibilities can turn into wonderful new routines. Because of the inflexible nature of distribution channels that favoured broadcasting and suffocated narrowcasting European cinema’s contact with its potential audiences were suppressed for many years. Today, however, there are unprecedented opportunities to reach out. But do we see these prospects burgeon in Europe? Not really. There isn’t much to suggest that Europe’s cultural policies are taking up the opportunities offered by the dramatic change in distribution channels to radically transform the public space within Europe and beyond and reach out to those who want to know about Europe’s diversity and culture.

Today Europe has got the technology that permits for niche consumption and catering to varied interests and that allows to overcome the blockbuster domi-

nation and to tap into the rich and the diverse. What is not in place, however, are the policies and the strategies to let us really take advantage of the 'extraordinary transformation' that Castells spoke about. European cinema's outreach is hampered by muddled distribution strategies and knotty public policies.

What my daily life looks today seemed a nice fantasy even ten years ago, though it had first been outlined in media theory terms by Marshall McLuhan in the early 1960s. I live in a small village on Scotland's East coast, 45 miles from Edinburgh, in the centre of a beautiful golf country, overlooking the sea from my office window. My home has broadband connection and I can do my research and most of my work as I sit here and enjoy the striking view.

In the morning I go for a walk on the breezy seaside. Within minutes after my return home I access Screen Daily (the daily arm of Screen International, featuring the latest news from the film world) and check if yesterday's press release about my recent project on Indian cinema has been picked up by newspapers in Mumbai. I then do an hour of writing or other work, respond to the e-mails that have come meanwhile, or talk in real time on Skype with friends in Hong Kong and Paris. I then take a break from writing and walk to the centre of the village to buy eggs, fresh salmon, and oatcakes. In the post office I chat to the local bookstore owner who is here shipping books to international clients that he got via his eBay and Amazon storefronts: he is conscious that his business would barely thrive if it was to rely solely on the occasional passers by in the village.

On the way back, I enjoy watching the seabirds and observe the tide; sometimes I even see seals. On my return, the mail has come. With it there are two square envelopes marked Lovefilm, containing the DVDs I was told in an e-mail message from the company the previous day, had been shipped my way. In the evening I will watch the films on my large plasma screen television; the next day I will make some notes about the films, then put them back in the reusable envelopes and drop in the mailbox at the corner. The next shipment of DVD's from the personal viewing queue I have created on Lovefilm's web-site will arrive in another two days.

Later in the day, I handle most of my administration by sending more e-mails and prepare my lecture, read student work and send feedback electronically, engage in discussions with the IT officer regarding clip digitisation for teaching, and then mount the lecture notes for tomorrow's teaching session on to the virtual learning environment my University uses, WebCT. After the day is over, I can check the stock market's latest movements, both on the computer or on the respective satellite television channels, and can do my shopping online (it will be delivered tomorrow from a large supermarket which is 30 minutes drive down the coast).

I can do all this from home, enjoying the beautiful peaceful surrounding of the village, with its clean air and proximity to nature, while at the same time being fully engaged with my contacts,

nationally and internationally. I can sit in my Scottish rural setting and be as connected to the world and as active in my exchanges as I would be in the centre of London, without all its stress. My fantasy from a decade ago is now my daily reality.

There is no video shop in my village; all over the place video rental businesses of the corner shop-type are going down. The two local grocery stores used to carry DVDs for rent (exclusively recent Hollywood releases) but these rentals are now discontinued: people now either order video on demand via their satellite service or have become subscribers to various on-line DVD rental clubs that offer so much more variety, and are cheaper at that. The video shop that was carrying all the Hollywood stuff in the nearby University town of St. Andrews saw its business decline and had to close. The only surviving video shop is the one specialised in art house films: a process clearly contradicting what we are told is the trend of big Hollywood chains taking over small independent businesses committed to alternative film.

Even though I am a Film Studies Professor and watch at least one film

The only surviving video shop is the one specialised in art house films: a process clearly contradicting what we are told is the trend of big Hollywood chains taking over small independent businesses committed to alternative film.

every day, I no longer go to the cinema very much. The nearest cinema in St. Andrews is still blanket-booking Hollywood films, and I only occasionally want to see these. The nearest art house cinema is in Dundee, and to get to there I would need to drive 45 minutes; quite often I decide it is not worth it as I can see the same film two months later at home from a DVD. Then, not far from here, Edinburgh has the most important film festival in the UK. But it happens in August, precisely when the long sunny days on the seaside are much more enjoyable, so staying home often takes precedence over spending the day in stuffy dark screening rooms. So I only go for the opening and only a few screenings. I still go to international festivals (Rotterdam, Berlin, and so on), but this is mostly to see films that will never be available otherwise.

It may be true that my village is not the average one. About a third of its 1,500 inhabitants work at Scotland's oldest University in St. Andrews; another third are retired intellectuals – writers, artists or musicians; only about a third are engaged in agriculture, fishing and the local service businesses. But this is precisely what makes my village such a suitable example: the majority of those who live here are potential niche consumers of European cinema; they are more likely to prefer seeing serious European films rather than Hollywood blockbusters, and most of them have the technology to do it. But European cinema is simply not available to them.

We have achieved the dream of living in the countryside and enjoying all privileges of life near nature, while at the same time taking advantage of the wonders of globalisation, allowing us to have exposure to art and culture that earlier one could only get to amidst the dust and the noise of big cities. Distance does not seem to matter any more, as the remote village is as adequately supplied with cultural goods as Europe's most central locations. We are witnessing the end of the blockbuster and mass distribution era, entering another age where our specialised niche interests can be catered for equally successfully, no matter where we are. Because, as Castells put it, the Internet provides, "a horizontal, non-controlled, relatively cheap, channel of communication, from one-to-one as well as from one-to-many" (Castells, p. 157)

Life in the Long Tail

Welcome to life in the Long Tail! Welcome to the world of abundance! The Long Tail, of which Wire editor Chris Anderson began talking a few years ago describes the mode of cultural consumption in the electronic age. For our viewing needs we are no longer confined to the local cinema to the three television channels, but have access to a range 100-odd channels and to the Internet, where on YouTube one can find almost anything that has not made it to television for some reason, and where one can download or order almost any film (legally the films that are picked up for distribution and clandestinely all those that have not been selected for mass marketing). Welcome to the time of niche marketing, thriving and pro-

spering alongside the mass consumption and progressively taking a bigger share of the market. Million dollar ads for new Hollywood blockbusters on television now face serious competition from free word-of-mouth recommendations in Yahoo groups or other chat rooms, because in the Long Tail word-of-mouth is as powerful as advertising. Businesses like Lovefilm and Amazon no longer need to maintain massive stocks and to carry simultaneously as much as possible of what the drop-in client may be interested in, they can simply list almost any item and resource it on demand. In addition, they can provide their websites as a forum for exchanges, like E-Bay where scores of small vendors have grown their businesses by tapping into a global market of clients.

New technologies profoundly change the manner of cultural consumption, allowing for a much wider scope of narrowcasting alongside the broadcasting. In Anderson's Long Tail universe, the world of broadcasting is seen as 'world of scarcity' (yesterday's limited choices) and juxtaposed to 'the world of abundance' (today's world of niche marketing). In the Long Tail 'the vast majority of products are NOT available at a store near you' but can always be requested and obtained from companies like Lovefilm, Amazon, eBay which operates 'on demand' inventories and have 'not only expanded existing markets' but have also discovered entirely new niches that are intensely growing. For the first time in history blockbusters and

niches are on equal economic footing, equally worthy developing from distribution point of view, because the very big number of niche products multiplied by even a relatively small number of sales still results in a viable and powerful economic figure. “Suddenly, popularity no longer has a monopoly on profitability,” Anderson remarks (p. 24). “Bringing niches within reach reveals latent demand for non-commercial content. Then, as demand shifts toward the niches, the economics of providing them improve further, and so on, creating a positive feedback loop that will transform entire industries – and the culture – for the decades to come.” (Anderson, 2006, p. 26)

Drawing borders

European film, however, is not as easy to stumble upon in the world of abundance. Very little of European cinema is available in the Long Tail, still restricted by distribution deals that are nowhere near stretching across Europe and are still limited to specific countries. For specialists like me, working in East European cinema but based in the UK, it is a frustrating and time consuming to keep up to date with new film developments in the countries in which I have special interest, and I still rely more on personal networks and contacts with the filmmakers as no mechanisms exist that would bring the output of these cinemas

to my doorstep, like the DVD rental service does.

Having been engaged in growing an ambitious University DVD library collection for my programme over the last two years, I know all about the frustrations and the limitations one encounters when trying to source European films. Even for an experienced specialist like me, familiar with all existing channels, it is a laborious and time consuming effort to acquire many of the films of leading European cineastes as they are simply unavailable. Take Tony Gatlif, for example. Only a single film of his, *Exils*, is in UK distribution and thus readily available for me to purchase. The French Amazon site only carries a fraction of his films on DVD (mostly not subtitled, whereas the Hollywood DVD releases come with subtitles in more than a dozen European languages, from Finnish to Bulgarian). Only two of Volker Schlöndorff's films are currently in UK distribution; to get a copy of his *Homo Faber* (co-produced by four European countries, including the UK), one can only rely on second-hand traders. More than 30% of all British made films never make it to any sort of distribution and therefore one cannot grow a proper collection of British cinema. The only way to obtain copies from other key European cinematic texts is via illegally downloading them from the Internet. If I indeed download some of these films and use it in teaching, my colleagues in IT and Media Services refuse to help by claiming I am committing a piracy crime.

**For the first time in history
blockbusters and niches are on
equal economic footing.**

I clearly remember witnessing a few years ago how the DAAD-funded German language 'Lektorin' at a British University who was planning to teach a German film course could not get any of the early Wim Wenders films through the usual channels she had access to and had to resort to placing eBay bids in order to acquire *Alice in the Cities*. In the breaks between lessons she was running to her office to check on-line how the bidding was going. Alas, her funds were limited and she was outbid. Today none of Wenders's early films are part of this University's collection; this is the picture at most other UK University collections as well. Accidentally, Wenders has been the president of the European Film Academy for ten years now. One can only speculate what is the availability of the work of cineastes that are not as publicly visible as he is.

Get out of the corner

European cultural funding bodies spend significant amounts on supporting networks of traditional cinemas and on festivals, both types of exhibition with a limited urban reach. The reality of the need to distribute in the Long Tail, however, remains ignored. Funding bodies privilege the financing of projects that target metropolitan audiences and ignore the technological developments

that allow reaching out to niche audiences in pocket locations. The distribution is still by national territories (as opposed to pan-European, one that could indeed be 'sans frontières'). It is essential to understand, however, that Europeans' access to cinema is not via the cinemas and the festival network. More and more of us live in the Long Tail, and it is about time for European cinema to arrive here and takes its place, alongside Bollywood and Japanese animation.

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4 Der Begriff des "Long Tail" geht auf Chris Anderson zurück. Er beschreibt die meist auf Mausclick verfügbaren Nischenprodukte, die im Einzelhandel nicht unbedingt erhältlich sind, und die dennoch lukrativer sein können als Massenware.

5 Anderson, S.24.

58 Anderson 2006, S.26.

THE POWER OF IMAGES Time and again, Hollywood films such as “Pretty Woman“ or “The Pursuit of Happiness“ reiterate the American Dream. By now, the whole world dreams that dream summing up the credo of US-American society: Life can be improved through will-power and hard work. Who dreams the European Dream, where is the European cinema? Is Europe abandoning the battlefield of images to others?

By Wim Wenders



“What is Europe?“and “What is Europe like?“ We could think that Europe is destroyed, fucked, foutue. Just think about the disaster with the European Constitution, its actual political power, the lack of enthusiasm of European citizens for “the European cause“ in the recent past. “The Europeans“ are sick and tired of Europe... On the other hand, Europe turns into heaven on earth and the Promised Land if observed from outside. Over the last two months, I have seen Europe from Chicago and New York, from Tokyo, Rio, Australia, from the Congo in the heart of Africa or last week from Moscow.

Europe always appears in a different light, but always as a paradise, a dream of humanity, a haven of peace, wealth

and civilisation.

Those who have lived in Europe for a long time seem to be weary of it. Those who are not here yet and live elsewhere want to come here or get in at any cost.

What is it that some have, but don't want any more and others are longing for so much? Or, to speak for myself: Why is Europe so “sacred“ to me the moment I see it from afar and why so profane, ordinary, almost boring as soon as I am back here?

When I was a boy, I dreamt of a Europe without borders. Now I am travelling across Europe - virtually and in reality - without showing my passport. I even pay with one currency, but where is my emotion? Here in Berlin, I am wholeheartedly German by now. Yet as soon as you are in the United States, you no longer say that you are from Germany, France or wherever. You are from “Europe“ or returning to Europe. For Americans, Europe is the epitome of culture, history, style, “savoir vivre“. The only reason for them to suffer from an inferiority complex. All the time. From Asia or other parts of the world, Eu-

rope also seems to be a bastion of the history of humankind, of dignity and – yes, that word again – of culture.

Europe has a soul – oh yes, no need to invent a soul for our continent – it has got one already, which has nothing to do with its politics or its economy, but mainly with its culture. I am preaching to the converted. Two years ago, in this same place, the President of the European Commission made a very clear statement. I only quote the end of his speech:

“Europe is not only about markets, it is also about values and culture. And allow me a personal remark: in the hierarchy of values, the cultural ones range above the economic ones. If the economy is a necessity for our lives, culture is really what makes our life worth living.”

I could quote other parts from this remarkable speech or even his entire words, because he speaks my mind. Yet outwardly, in the interaction with its citizens, Europe still acts like a power with primarily economic interests, using political and financial arguments – never mentioning cultural aspects. Europe does not argue with emotions! Yet who loves his or her country because of its politics or its economy? Nobody! Directly next door is the “showroom“ of the European Union, which you can find in every capital city. What is on display? Maps, brochures, economic information, material on the history of the European Union. All dead boring, nothing going on! Who would

feel represented and who would such an environment appeal to?!

We live in the age of the image. No other cultural aspect is as influential as the image. Books, newspaper, the theatre ...nothing comes even remotely close to the power of moving images, the cinema and television. Why is going to the cinema in the entire world – not just in Europe – synonymous with ‘going to see an American film’?! Because a long time ago, the Americans have understood what moved people and inspired dreams and have implemented this radically. The whole “American Dream” is an invention of the cinema – with the entire world dreaming it in the meantime.

I don’t want to discredit this fact, yet would like to ask the following question: Who is dreaming the European Dream? A recent concrete example comes to my mind in this context: Over the next two months or so, 20, 30 or even 50 million Europeans are going to watch exactly the same film. Every programme, every news channel – and I zapped through the whole of Europe – reported about a film premiere in London. The film in question was, as you might guess, James Bond – that noble British gentleman, a fighter for right and wrong, who has saved the world from its downfall for 40 years now. Do you remember the wonderful Scotsman who once played this European hero – Sir Sean Connery? Or the highly elegant and sophisticated Irishman Pierce

The whole “American Dream” is an invention of the cinema – with the entire world dreaming it in the meantime.

Brosnan? Over Christmas, exactly at the same time, millions of Europeans are now going to see some kind of little Gangster who – forgive my comparison – looks like the Russian President Vladimir Putin. This new Bond is apparently rather brutal and ruthless. So what does this tell us? What does this American production communicate? I know that this is exaggerated, but the core message is still rather true: We no longer have ownership of our own myths. Nothing shapes today's fantasies as strikingly, emphatically and with such long-lasting effect as the cinema. But it is beyond our reach, we do not own it any more. Our very own invention is out of our control.

In European cinema, which nevertheless still exists! – and is produced in around 50 European states, our own European stories do not have an important position any longer!

These European cinematic images could reflect a whole new generation of Europeans. Europe could define itself in an emotional, strong and sustainable way. European thoughts could be carried into the world, we could communicate our most important good – our CULTURE – in an infectious way, the “Open Society”, the culture of dialogue and peace and humanity – but we allowed that the weapon was taken from our hands. I deliberately use the word weapon, as images are the most powerful weapons of our 21st century. There won't be a European

awareness - no emotions related to this continent, no future European identity, no connection – without us being able to look at our own myths, our own history, our own ideas and feelings!

No other ambassador of Spain is more powerful than Pedro Almodóvar. The UK has Ken Loach and Poland is represented by Andrej Wajda or Polanski. Although dead for 13 years now, Federico Fellini still defines the Italian soul. Which is exactly what the European cinema does: It forms and shapes our self-awareness and our awareness of others! It creates a European idea, a European way – in fact the European soul that I am talking about. But look at the position we grant our treasure. Look at the role it plays in European cultural life, the low level of attention political Europe continues to allocate to European cinema and culture as a whole. Yet this is the cement, the glue, the cohesion of European feelings!

All these countries longing for Europe – including new and future accession countries from the East – on the one hand can imagine to tell us about themselves and to win us over, to be welcomed by the European cause and the European soul on the other hand, if only we would invigorate our mutual ambassadors, if we in Europe would believe in the power of images. However, a serious error is committed in this context. Politics and economics rather than emotions are used as arguments. Next door, the showroom fea-

tures the most boring maps in the world, whereas the global superpower of images – the USA – captivates people, including the Europeans, with the most important embassy spaces in the world – in the cinemas and through television. This generation that is currently de-tached from Europe, will turn this into a serious reproach towards European policies one day: Why did you allow that we became bored by Europe?! Why did you babble on about politics instead of recommending and showing our wonderful home continent to us?! Europe HAS a cultural history, HAS today's lifestyle, HAS its own political culture.

George Soros calls it “The Open Society“. Particularly because America has failed so often to describe its moral and political values in the recent past, Europe is even more significant in our present-day world and more than ever functions as a role model.

But: This role model is powerless if it does not trust the force of its own images! The Open Society is not going to sweep anybody along, carry people away and

enthral them as long it remains an abstract idea. It has to be filled with emotions. These European emotions are right in front of us and the Europeans are longing for them, but instead we leave them to one side and leave the sphere of images to others. I hope that we in Europe won't recognise too late which battlefield we are clearing without any real resistance...

Translation: Angelika Welt

The author introduced this text at the Berlin Conference “Europa eine Seele geben (A Soul for Europe)“ in November 2006.

Wim Wenders is a film director, photographer and professor at the Academy of Fine Arts in Hamburg.

Because of the two world wars, the recent history of Europe is probably the great landmark that defines our planetary reality. In spite of its exemplary reconstruction, conflicts are still smouldering. All this considered - how can the European Community set its own example and contribute to a culture of peace in the world?

Danilo Santos de Mirando, Director of Serviço Social do Comercio São Paulo (SESC-SP)





Inge Feltrinelli

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THE END OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION FORTRESS

Public authorities and educational communities have become aware of the European dimensions of challenges facing schools and universities, students, teachers and families as well as countries and regions. National and regional policies and practices in education, training, research and innovation are increasingly implemented and evaluated in a European framework. *By Guy Haug*



Until about 1985, education was nearly completely absent from the EU's agendas and educational policies were set and implemented exclusively in their national context, usually without any attention to issues and policies in neighbouring countries. The first generation of mobility programmes of the European Union (Erasmus, Comett, Lingua, and somewhat later also Tempus) marked a first wave of change in this traditional landscape: by generating intra-European mobility on a (comparatively) large scale, they have contributed to taking educational systems out of their isolation behind their national borders (first in higher education and then, with Socrates, also in school education), but without ever daring to suggest that this

mobility would be immensely easier if the various national educational structures and systems were less incompatible with each other.

This taboo was broken for the first time in the landmark Declarations of the Sorbonne (1998) and Bologna (1999) which called for a high level of convergence (not uniformity) in the degree structure in higher education. The ensuing "Bologna Process", with its currently 45 participating countries from all over Europe, has thus succeeded in opening a new door. A few years later, this door could be enlarged to all other levels and types of education/training, thanks to the "Education & Training 2010" work programme which foresees (for all EU and related countries) their convergence towards shared European objectives (rather than "structures").

This work programme was made possible thanks to the European Summit (meeting of heads of states and governments) of Lisbon, in March 2000, which marked a major step in the construction of the Europe of the future: it announced the European Union's ambition to become the world's most advanced knowledge-based economy and society, capable of creating more and better jobs and fostering social inclusion while at the same time respecting sound environmental

principles. At the same time the European Council acknowledged that the EU's "Lisbon Strategy" was hinging on major changes in the social systems (in particular in employment and education) and on a major effort to strengthen research and innovation. This set in motion a process that within less than two years led to the adoption of two policy-oriented action plans by the Barcelona European Council in spring 2002: *on the one hand, the first EU work programme on the objectives of education and training systems, now known as "Education & Training 2010" (E&T 2010); on the other hand, an agreement about the need to raise the level of investment in research and innovation from the then 1.9% of GDP to 3% by 2010.*

"Education and training 2010": three strategic guidelines

The Education & Training 2010 work programme as a long term policy document for the EU and its Member States remains amazingly little known in the education/training communities throughout Europe. Yet, it is of strategic importance, mainly because it introduces three major innovations:

First, the work programme defines a series of shared European objectives towards which the national policies and educational practice should converge. This is a major new event, which does not change the basic principle of subsidiarity (according to which Member States

The European Summit in Lisbon in 2000 announced the EU's ambition to become the world's most advanced knowledge-based economy and society, capable of creating more jobs and fostering social inclusion while also respecting sound environmental principles.

are sole responsible for their educational policies and structures) but adds to it a new and ever thicker layer of cooperation in the interest of each country and of the European Union as a whole. The action programme concerns all levels of education and training and all types of learning (including outside the formal education/training systems) in a lifelong learning perspective. The 13 concrete objectives to be achieved by 2010 were arranged around 3 strategic goals (quality, access, openness) and each objective was broken down into specific action lines and accompanied by an indicative list of indicators for the assessment of progress (See Table 1)

Education & Training 2010

1. Increase quality and efficiency of education/training systems; improve the training of teachers and trainers; develop skills needed in the knowledge society; guarantee access of all to information/communication technologies; increase the enrollment in science/technology disciplines; make best use of resources
2. Facilitate access of all to the education/training systems; create an open learning environment; make learning more attractive; promote active citizenship and social cohesion
3. Open the education and training systems to the world around; strengthen links with the world of work, research and society; develop the spirit of enterprise; improve the learning of languages; increase mobility and exchanges; strengthen European cooperation (both within Europe and with the whole world)

Secondly, the Ministers wanted not only to respond to the European Council's "invitation" to cooperate more closely: they were keen to add to it at their own initiative, by raising the level of their shared ambition "in the interest of citizens and of Europe as a whole". This means not just improving quality, but becoming "a reference of quality and relevance" in the world. They also underlined that Europe, who had lost to the USA the privilege of being internationally mobile students' most-wanted destination, should again become by 2010 the "preferred destination of students, scholars and researchers of other world regions". These statements signal a new political will and mood in education and training in Europe and have encouraged policy makers to take better into account the European and international dimension of the cultural, social and educational challenges underpinning the work programme.

For the benefit of citizens and the EU as a whole

The E&T 2010 work programme should make it possible to achieve:

- The highest level of quality in education and training, allowing Europe to be seen as a world reference for the quality and relevance of its education/training systems and institutions
- A sufficient level of compatibility between education/training systems in Europe, to allow citizens to move around and choose, taking advantage of their diversity instead of being hindered by it
- Real possibilities for those who have

acquired a qualification or competencies anywhere in the EU to use them effectively throughout the Union for the purpose of work or further learning

- Access of all Europeans to lifelong learning opportunities throughout Europe
- A Europe open to cooperation with all other world regions which should by 2010 be the preferred destination of mobile students, scholars and researchers of the world

Thirdly, for the first time in the history of the EU, member states accepted to fix European targets in education and training and to report on their own performance in these areas. Five quantitative targets (called benchmarks) were defined for the EU as a whole. They highlight improvements to be achieved until 2010 thanks to coordinated efforts aimed at reducing early dropouts, filling deficiencies in basic skills, counteracting the disaffection for scientific/technological studies, increasing the completion rate of upper secondary education or the participation rate in continuing education/training. It has however been impossible to find an agreement on the minimal level of investment in education/training, for example in terms of a percentage of GDP.

European reference points («benchmarks»)

- Early school leaving: in 2010 the percentage of young Europeans dropping out prematurely of the ed-

For the first time in the history of the EU, member states accepted to fix European targets in education and training and to report on their own performance in these areas.

ucation/training system should be reduced to no more than 10%

- Maths, science and technology: the total number of graduates in MST in the EU should increase by at least 15% until 2010, and the imbalance between men and women should be reduced
- Completion of secondary education: in 2010, at least 85% of 22-year old EU citizens should reach the level of upper secondary education
- Basic skills: by 2010, the percentage of 15-year old with insufficient reading skills should diminish at least one fifth in the EU, in comparison with the year 2000
- Lifelong learning: in 2010, the average level of participation in continuing education/training activities should be of at least 12.5% of the working age population (age class 25-64 years) in the EU

These reference points (or “benchmark”) allow each EU country – as well as the EU as a whole – to compare itself with the European average and with the highest performers in Europe and in the world (in a way similar to the OECD’s PISA project which compares reading and computing skills of learners in different countries). The distance to the agreed targets and the itinerary for their achievement are different for each country. But the “benchmarks” are not just technical instruments underpinning change/reforms: they have also a clear political meaning, since improving the performance of the EU as a whole depends on the efforts of all countries and actors, i.e. on some kind of solidarity between all countries – something definitely new in areas such as education and training.

School education and training

The list of agreed European “benchmarks” shows that the main thrust of the E&T 2010 work programme con-

cerns school education and training; it encompasses also the efforts to improve the quality and attractiveness of vocational education and training (as part of the so-called “Copenhagen process”). Several working groups have brought together experts and decision makers to identify the main shortfalls in school education and the main levers for action in key areas (e.g. teacher training, the identification of the core basic skills for the knowledge society, the best use of new information/communication technologies, the promotion of Maths/Science/Technology, the upgrading of guidance and counselling, the setting up of a coherent framework of qualifications, the optimal level of autonomy of schools, etc). The main purpose of the whole exercise is that interested countries can learn from each other in “peer learning” groups where key issues and possible policies addressing them (“best practices”) are evaluated and compared.

This could be illustrated by what appears to be the cornerstone of all education/training systems: the definition of the role of teachers/trainers and their initial and continuing education/training, which has been the main theme of one of the working groups set in place for the implementation of E&T 2010. In the light of the new challenges facing teachers/trainers (whether in pre-primary, primary or secondary education, including general, technical, vocational or professional education), the dialogue between EU countries and actors on the training of teachers/trainers has resulted in a new vision for the coming decades, based on a new, European profile of the profession and a list of key competencies in tune with a new age. The teaching/training

profession should: require a qualification acquired in higher education, define its role in a lifelong learning perspective; include a period of mobility abroad and base itself mainly on the activation of partnerships. Among the key competencies which all teachers/trainers should acquire, three are seen as particularly crucial: the aptitude to manage knowledge, information and technologies; the capacity to manage human relations (with learners, colleagues and external partners); and the ability to work with and within society, at the local, regional, national, European et global level. These principles are only meant as tools for forward-looking dialogues and reform proposals in each country and each institution, by providing stakeholders and decision makers with a revisited, open, dynamic and European framework of reference.

Universities: higher education and research/innovation

At the level of universities, in their related missions in higher education, research and innovation, the most important observation is that henceforward the EU's agenda for the modernisation of universities defined as part of the Lisbon Strategy coincides substantially with the agenda of structural change of the Bologna Process and thus reinforces and complements it.

The objectives underpinning the Bologna Process (employability, efficiency of learning process, mobility, attractiveness) are also core priorities of the European Union. Bologna makes use of various instruments that were developed as part of EU programmes, such as the ECTS credits or the ENQA network of quality as-

surance agencies. In return, several EU activities provide specific or indirect support to Bologna priorities, either through new or renewed programmes like Erasmus Mundus or Marie-Curie, or by means of the E&T 2010 work programme, e.g. through the network of "Bologna promoters" in all countries, the cross-border comparison of curricula and key competencies in various disciplines (Tuning programme) or the new Recommendation on strengthening the cooperation between quality assurance agencies.

This demonstrates that beyond the structural reforms coinciding with the priorities of the Bologna process, the EU is designing a broader and deeper process for the modernisation of higher education and research. This also adds a new policy dimension to the EU's traditional role in higher education (i.e. the cooperation and mobility programmes) and in research/innovation (i.e. the series of „Framework programmes“). The EU's agenda for the modernisation of universities could only be developed within the framework of E&T 2010. It was set out in two important Communications of the European Commission:

- In 2005, "Mobilising the brainpower of Europe" acknowledged that European universities were lagging behind (in terms of access, relevance and image), identified the main reasons for this (e.g. fragmentation, under-funding and over-regulation) and outlined an agenda aimed at "allowing universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy". It focuses on policies favour-

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ring; the renovation of curricula and research programmes at universities; a greater differentiation between institutions and hence the quest for excellence; better governance models for systems and institutions; and higher education and research funding mechanisms adapted to the highly competitive and rapidly changing context of the knowledge economy and society. This Communication was supported by the European Council who at its Hampton Court meeting in October of 2005 encouraged further initiatives for the strengthening and modernisation of higher education and research.

- In 2006, in response to the European Council's request, the Commission published another Communication, "Delivering on the modernisation agenda of European universities". After repeating that European universities' enormous potential goes largely untapped because of various rigidities and hindrances, the Communication reaffirms that freeing up this substantial reservoir of knowledge, talent and energy requires immediate, in-depth and coordinated change ranging from the way in which systems are regulated and managed to the ways in which universities are governed. Each institution should find the balance of education, research and innovation which is best suited to its role in its region or country. This will necessarily mean a differentiated approach. The aim is to create a framework within which universities can become stronger players in the global knowledge society and economy and excellence in teaching and research can emerge and flourish. The Communication also identifies a short list of core measures that should be introduced everywhere. They include: greater autonomy and accountability for

universities; focusing funding systems for universities on outputs and giving universities more responsibility for their own long-term financial sustainability; reviewing national student fee and support schemes to increase access and success rates for all qualified students irrespective of their background; etc.

These changes in school education, higher education and research mean that Europe has entered a new phase. Most importantly, since the adoption of the E&T 2010 work programme, education and training – together with research and innovation – have gradually moved from marginal areas to core priorities on the European agenda. While policies in these areas remain clearly in the hands of national authorities (subsidiarity principle), they are henceforward articulated with each other within a new type of cooperation geared towards the achievement of shared European goals.

Guy Haug is an independent European/international expert in education policies with a special emphasis on university policies. He was centrally involved in designing and launching the Bologna Process and worked for the European Commission for the shaping of the university agenda of the EU's Lisbon Strategy.

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LEARNING OVER TIME A time-travelling teacher from the fifties of the last century would not lose orientation in 2007, whereas a surgeon would be completely lost facing new technologies. Does the school system lag behind the model of a future-oriented society? While Asia is catching up in the OECD comparison of education systems, European schools only gradually realise that beyond teaching knowledge social skills and ways to exploit potentials are needed. *By Andreas Schleicher*



Within living memory, education has always played an important role. Yet why is education adopting a key role for the European states right now – and not only for the benefit of the individual, but also in terms of the wealth and competitiveness of entire nations? It is evident that work and living conditions have changed fundamentally. The markets in the industrial society – up until the second half of the 20th century – were stable, competition took place at a national level and organisational structures were hierarchical. In the knowledge society, markets are dynamic, competition is at a global level and organisational structures are networked. In the industrial society, growth impulses were based on mechanisation and

competitive advantages were achieved by “economies of scale“. Nowadays, growth impulses are a result of digitalisation and miniaturisation and competitive advantages are achieved by innovation and real-time delivery. In the industrial society, the corporate model was the individual company, whereas it is a flexible alliance of competitors nowadays. In the industrial society, full employment was the political objective, whereas it is “employability“ nowadays – which means enabling people to broaden their horizons in a continually changing society. In the industrial society, professional profiles provided a clear identity within a job-specific context and formal qualifications were the key to success. Nowadays, convergence, transformation and life-long learning have become the key success factors.

New technologies have had a decisive influence on these developments, as Thomas Friedmann illustrates in his book “The world is flat“. A lot of reflections from this book are also represented in this article: Since the eighties and the nineties of the 20th century, people have been able to produce their work in

digital format on a PC. The World Wide Web began to organise and arrange information that had been distributed on individual computers so far and above all made it globally accessible. And finally, products such as Word, Excel or PayPal set standards for networked working. At the same time, the deregulation of the telecommunication industry led to the “dot-com bubble“: Investors paid billions to telecommunication firms which hoped for high profits from investments in communication technology and glass-fibre cables to network states and continents. As a consequence, the costs for telephony and the use of the Internet sank so drastically that many of the technology companies providing this global communication network went bankrupt in the process. Yet the networked world, low communication costs and the distribution of new technologies enabled new forms of global cooperation.

Contrary to general opinion, the subsequent stock market crash in the technology industry did not dampen globalisation processes – it rather accelerated them. Companies started to save and tried to produce products more cheaply. A technologically networked world offered a large number of opportunities to outsource simple production or service activities to countries like China or India. Suddenly, the European states were competing with states offering basic qualifications at significantly lower costs. In Europe, unemployment figures for people with a low qualification profile began to rise. Other economic sectors disappeared completely as they were made redundant by information technology. Naturally, the European states also benefited from globalisation, particularly because large new markets

were opened up for them. However, this mainly led to a growing demand for people with a high or average level of qualification, as the jobs involving simple tasks remained in the buying countries.

Needless to say, technological innovations alone do not create any productivity advances. However, their implementation creates new work structures and new behaviours. As a result, a global platform was created around the turn of the millennium, enabling users all over the world to exchange knowledge, to communicate with other people and to work or compete with each other. People, companies or states around the globe were able to cooperate within complex contexts and to participate in global competition. As a result of this development, the best and most efficient provider anywhere in the world can carry out every job and offer every service that can somehow be divided and digitalised. One great challenge for the European societies is the fact that three billion people in countries like China, India, Russia, Brazil or in Eastern European countries - due to their hierarchical and vertical political and economic structures excluded from the global community until a short while ago – can now actively engage with the networked world. The collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s turning away from a self-contained, self-sufficient economy and China’s economic opening have enlarged the global society and economy to six trillion people over night.

Certainly, China currently only dominates the production sector, but the

competition caused by low production costs is only a transition phase for the country. China's longer-term strategy is to win the contest against the Western industrialised nations - certainly not at the lower end of the performance scale. For that reason, China consistently invests in education.

Hong Kong's PISA results - not exceeded by any nation in the Western world - already give us an impression of China's future potential in the case of a further political opening of the country. Initial pilot studies even in poorer regions in West China show a PISA performance level that keeps up with Europe - at least in mathematics. These changes towards a global knowledge society have a decisive influence on the educational landscape. I will provide a short outline of these consequences in order to show fields of activity and the resulting challenges.

Europe - missing the boat in education policy?

There are many ways to evaluate the existing knowledge and skills portfolio of a population. However, in most cases the respective highest educational qualification of the adult population is measured. This benchmark only considers formal qualifications, which per se have a restricted significance for the quality of education and moreover only serve for international comparisons to a limited extent. With such quantitative benchmarks, changes in the final degree quotas clearly reveal over time how education systems in the industrialised world expanded over the last decades: In the sixties, Germany maintained a strong position among the middle-ranking countries of OECD coun-

tries in terms of its university degree quota. However, in the seventies, many states caught up and in the eighties, the dynamic expansion and changes in the tertiary education systems continued, with some states again accelerating in the nineties. Looking at Korea as a country which generated the gross domestic product of Afghanistan in the sixties, it has advanced from occupying one of the last positions in the OECD comparison to the group of international top performers. Germany has fallen back to the 23rd position among 30 OECD member states - not because the participation of universities in Germany has decreased, but because participation in the academic and non-academic tertiary education sectors has increased in so many states at much greater speed during that period of time.

In this context, it is also significant that the European states are no longer competing with threshold countries that offer lower qualifications at lower costs, but with countries like China or India, which increasingly aim for top qualifications. In the past, the educational systems in Europe were able to focus on themselves. However, in a globalised world, a global perception needs to be added to the national perception and it has to be clear that insufficient investments in education lead to a deteriorating quality of life - for the individual as well as for entire states failing the transition to the knowledge society. The OECD indicators reveal that the job market situation is significantly better for graduates of the tertiary education sector and the risk of unemploy-

ment is significantly lower than for those without a tertiary degree – particularly in the later years of life. Likewise, in all OECD countries, at least one half of the per capita GNP increase in the nineties was due to an increase in work productivity and thus mainly the result of a higher level of education.

There are also no indicators that the dynamic global expansion of the tertiary educational system leads to an “inflation” of qualifications. On the contrary – among the states where the share of 25- to 64-year-old people with tertiary degrees have increased by more than five percent since 1995 – Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Korea, Spain or England – most nations show decreasing rates of unemployment and increasing income advantages among the tertiary graduates. Between 1998 and 2003, the income advantage gained by a tertiary education increased from 30 to 53 percent in Germany – another important indicator that demand for top qualifications has accelerated at a noticeably higher rate than supply.

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Assuming a zero-sum game, it would be completely wrong to deduce a decreased demand for higher qualifications in Europe from the increasing numbers of staff with top qualifications from China or India: An employee creating a knowledge-based product – for example a book or a consultancy service, sells more of this product in a bigger market. However, those who sell their manual labour or tangible products with no real value increase generated by a growing market do not benefit from these developments, as each product and manual labour can only be sold once. Therefore, the opportunities for those with a good education will grow further, whereas people with an inadequate education will suffer greater risks.

Learning for life

It is also undisputed that strategic objectives for educational reforms should no longer be limited to the quantitative expansion of educational systems – following the motto “more of the same”. It would be equally myopic to align educational systems with the present need for manpower, thus looking at the past. Nowadays, many successful educational systems follow a traditional model with the goal to meet the current qualification demand in the job market and invest strategically in further education for young people – the only way to teach them to broaden their horizons continuously and to become actively involved in the economic and social changes of society.

It is the main challenge for education to prepare people for an active and autonomous role in society, shaping it by recognising and applying different dimensions – cognitive, moral and social – of their own actions. The OECD has identified three categories of future-oriented key competencies, which require a broad spectrum of classroom contents, with social or musical competencies at a similar level as cognitive competencies: First of all, people engage with the world by using cognitive, sociocultural and physical media. This type of interaction determines how they interpret the world and acquire competencies. By itself, this is no guarantee for the young people's success. Nowadays, globalisation is no longer primarily an issue of interaction between states – as it was the case in past centuries – or an issue of interaction between multinational companies – as it was the case over the last decades. The question of a constructive involvement of the individual in the knowledge society is becoming increasingly important. For that purpose, people need competencies enabling them to reposition themselves continuously and to act independently and responsibly in a permanently changing world. Competencies empowering them to get actively involved in different areas of life and to shape them, to recognise rights, interests, boundaries and needs and to deal with them with a strong sense of responsibility. And they need competencies that enable them to place their individual plans and projects within a larger reference framework. Thirdly, people have to be able

to build sustainable relationships, to cooperate and to work in teams, to deal with conflicts and to operate constructively in multicultural and pluralistic societies. The increasing heterogeneity is not a problem, but rather a positive potential of the knowledge society.

Obviously, the real-life implications of such normative regulations have to be measured. If – as initially described – we assume that every category of work that can be digitalised is available in a globally networked world – which at actual wage levels often means outside of Europe – we need to ask which fields of activity will remain for Europe's future: Which types of works cannot simply be digitalised, automated or outsourced? Which competencies are required for these jobs and how are they evaluated?

Within the first of the three competency categories mentioned above, schools have traditionally placed a strong emphasis on analytical abilities to dissect specific problems and then solve them. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly obvious that great breakthroughs and paradigm changes nowadays mainly occur if different aspects or spheres of knowledge with no obvious relation to each other are synthesised. Examples are social workers in schools or the computer expert systematising the human genome, using his findings for the introduction of new drugs in cooperation with pharma-

The ability to synthesise different areas will increase in importance, as this process is not easy to digitalise or automate.

ceptical companies. The ability to synthesise different areas will increase in importance, as this process is not easy to digitalise or automate.

With an increasingly complex world of work and an increasingly complex codified knowledge base, people who understand complexity and have the ability to translate it into the language of other fields of expertise - thus making it accessible for people from other fields - often in a local context - will become more and more important. Quintessentially, this also involves the ability to filter information in a meaningful way, to distinguish between relevant and less relevant information, etc.

In terms of the second competency category, it can be observed that neither the generalists nor the specialists will play the decisive role in our society but the people acting as intermediaries between these two groups.

Of course, generalists with a large knowledge radius and a transversal scope for manoeuvre will still play an important role. Specialists will still be recognised within their own profession. However, a complex changing world increasingly relies on the ability to acquire in-depth specialist knowledge in new contexts and life-long learning, on the adoption of new roles and continuous repositioning. With that in mind, the success of German professional training also has to be re-evaluated: The dual professional training system as an alternative to academic education is internationally recognised as an efficient form of integrating young people

into the job market. Yet the success of the dual system at the beginning of a working life is countered by a growing risk of becoming unemployed in later years of life. Apparently, said young people are less capable to adjust to the fast-changing requirements of the world of work - for obvious reasons: Every salary at the same time reflects transversal and job-specific competencies. If one job is lost because its specific profile is no longer required - for example because technologies replace this profile - people with this job-specific profile face difficulties. Even if they find a new job with a different range of duties, the new employer will only remunerate the transversal competencies, whereas specialist competencies not required in the new position will no longer be reflected in the salary.

In the third competency category, increasingly complex economic relationships and supply chains require the efficient orchestration of complex processes within specific areas of work and other areas of work in cooperation with other people and other teams. Interpersonal competencies personalising global processes, products or services within the respective local context are also becoming increasingly important.

No matter how efficient China or India will be in the future - people who are well-trained in line with these requirements will also have good and growing job prospects within Europe.

The road to success

Successful educational systems suggest that a systemically anchored, far-reaching improvement of the quality of education is no longer based on guidelines, but on effective incentives enabling teachers and schools to learn from and

with each other, offering development opportunities.

The response to diversity is not institutional fragmentation in this context, but a constructive approach to different skills, interests and social contexts. In the light of the growing complexity of modern educational systems, one individual Minister of Education cannot solve the problems of thousands of pupils and teachers. Yet thousands of pupils and teachers can solve the problems of one educational system if they form a network and the educational system provides the necessary networking and support structures.

Therefore, jobs in schools have to be converted into knowledge-based professions, with knowledge not only being imparted from top to bottom, but with the parties involved actively contributing to shaping the educational institutions themselves – always aware of the consequences of their activities. What do parents really know about what and how our children learn? In what way can a teacher benefit from the teacher's experiences in the adjacent classroom? Can a school learn from the interaction with the neighbouring school that faces similar problems? Where could Germany be today if competencies were efficiently networked within the educational system? Often, the school is a "black box" for the parents and frequently teachers are facing problems in the classroom as lone fighters. Curricula, feedback and support systems are often only insufficiently linked.

Modern educational systems have to ask how they go beyond imparting knowledge and act as a driving force for development and innovation. Hardly any organisation has as many highly qualified

employees as the educational system. However, nowadays this potential is often only used to teach prefabricated curricula rather than as a formative force in the educational system. Imagine a surgeon and a teacher from the sixties, travelling through time into the year 2006. The surgeon who was successful as an individual at the time by using the knowledge acquired in his studies and his bag with instruments, is embedded in a dynamic profession nowadays. His workplace is equipped with highly sophisticated technology and can only be mastered by him as part of a complex team. The surgeon will quickly realise that a time leap across half a century is impossible, whereas the teacher from the sixties will presumably still find his way as the work environment school with its incentive and support systems has not changed that much.

It is possible to implement short-term changes in the school work environment by setting education standards and changing mechanisms of responsibility. However, long-lasting changes can only take place through a stronger professionalisation of educational institutions. The standard of the initial professional teacher training in Germany is generally high, only to leave teachers to their own devices in the classroom later on without providing the necessary ongoing professional support. Countries like France mainly focused on the centralisation of educational processes, which is ultimately limited to rule execution. This might be a useful step into the direction of minimum standards and more

coherent education portfolios, yet it does not involve the individual stakeholders enough to achieve real progress. England was quite successful in creating a knowledge-based work environment with the introduction of creative instruments. Education standards, support and feedback systems were closely linked to the work of the teachers. However, the long-term goal and characteristic feature of the currently most successful educational systems is to link professionalisation and a knowledge-based work environment, thus creating a good learning environment and an attractive work environment for future teachers. This approach distinguishes Finland, Japan or Canada. Their educational systems achieved good results in the PISA Study and provide a balanced distribution of education opportunities. These countries could provide an orientation framework for future efforts in this sector. The challenges are enormous:

Traditionally, German learners study under the guidance of curricula with a detailed description of educational contents. The benchmark for success is the accumulation of specialist knowledge rather

With the increasing amount of people taking responsibility for planning their career, protecting themselves against economic losses and social descent, schools cannot limit themselves to teaching the necessary specialist knowledge. They also have to strengthen the ability to change.

than anchoring contextual knowledge and teaching effective learning strategies, which is precisely what is reflected in the PISA results. However, with the increasing amount of people taking responsibility for planning their career, protecting themselves against economic losses and social descent, schools cannot limit themselves to teaching the necessary specialist knowledge. They also have to strengthen the ability to change and equip young people in a way that enables them to actively use and expand their knowledge.

For that purpose we need schools which are less focused on specialist curricula, with strategic educational objectives as guidelines. We also need teachers that implement these objectives with commitment, creativity and individuality by customising the learning process and by supporting learners in their independent and cooperative way of thinking and learning. Only those with clear expectations convertible into strategic educational objectives that can be communicated to decision makers and other parties involved – schools, teachers, learners and parents – can motivate and achieve good results. Germany's schools mainly use tests and marks for control purposes, for example to certify achievements and to allot access to further education. Yet the future needs modern evaluation and motivating performance feedback systems creating trust in learning results, enabling the development, individualisation and monitoring of learning paths.

The German education system relies on

early selection within its three-tier school system and the related monotonous teaching in groups with homogeneous performance. Pupils with special needs – for example from a migrant background – are often pushed into school formats with lower requirements, where the state prepares young people without prospects for unemployment. On the other hand, successful educational systems are based on a constructive and individual approach to deal with differences in performance and talent – with the goal to open up prospects for the learners showing them how to shape their own future with very individual support. Different interests and skills have to be perceived as a great potential of the knowledge society. Ultimately, teachers and learners in Germany are frequently just the final executing instance of a complex administration apparatus. In the future, the relevance and efficiency of this administration system – whether at a local, federal or national level – will have to be measured in terms of the achievements of individual schools with regard to agreed education objectives and in terms of the quality of support to achieve these objectives. It is also interesting to evaluate the added value with regard to the schools' potential achievements as independent and pedagogically responsible units. The much discussed issue of dividing responsibilities between the state and the federal states is irrelevant in this context. We need an attractive, high-profile work environment for teachers that is not based on its civil servant status, but on creativity, innovation and more responsibility – a work environ-

ment distinguishing itself with enhanced differentiation, better career prospects, stronger links to other professional areas, more responsibility for learning outcomes and better support systems.

In Germany, the argument that this approach is not viable with today's teachers is often used and first of all teacher training would have to be changed before the schools could change. A comparison with the business sector reveals the absurdity of this reasoning: In the seventies of the 20th century, the mobile telephone company Nokia from PISA winner Finland still produced car tyres. Where would Nokia be nowadays if the company had been told at the time that it would be nice to work with highly sophisticated technology, yet the engineers were unable to do that? Therefore they would have to wait until the engineers' retirement to train new engineers, which would enable the company to create new products. The current educational system follows exactly that pattern, whereas other states have recreated schools as learning organisations – with a professional management characterised by internal cooperation and communication, for example in

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strategic planning, quality management, self-evaluation and further professional training, also introducing an external dialogue with different stakeholders and in particular with the parents.

Modern schools certainly face a lot of challenges and inconsistencies. They are expected to be innovative and flexible and receive a growing amount of freedom to shape their learning environments. On the other hand, they are also expected to produce reliable results and to minimise risks. Some approaches try to individualise learning with new forms of teaching and more diverse education formats. On the other hand, modern education institutions have to develop as networked learning organisations and ensure equal opportunities. The role of interpersonal competencies is increasingly emphasised, yet what is mostly certified are individual learner achievements.

The results of educational processes are increasingly evaluated in terms of cognitive performance, whereas today's parents have growing expectations towards schools that go far beyond cognitive learning. However, the experiences of many states – but also of many successful German schools – show that high-quality education coupled with a balanced allocation of education opportunities can certainly be achieved in manageable time frames.

China and India will continue to increase their efforts in education. They have the decisive advantage that they can use the experiences of the Western world as a benchmark. For these countries, the future is relatively clear. In some years, they will do the things and use many of the competencies characterising today's life in Germany and Europe. However,


for the European countries that have remained at the top of educational policy developments for centuries, the future remains uncertain. They will only continue to hold their ground if they successfully define the future with all its uncertainties. For that reason, it is necessary to create strategic prospects for educational reforms that go beyond mere optimisation of the current educational system and to reflect on the transformation of the school and systemic factors Germany's educational system is based upon. In spite of many reforms, the discourse in educational policy in Germany, but also in many other European states, is still far from this stage in the process.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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HIGHER EDUCATION WITHOUT FRONTIERS?

Transnational higher education has been nothing more than a great vision up to now. The Bologna Declaration and the Lisbon Process were the first milestones for a transparent and comparative European higher education landscape. Nevertheless, the state of student mobility is still far from perfect. *By Franziska Muche*



2010 is the magic number – almost the mantra in Brussels circles: The plan is to complete the Bologna reforms by 2010 and to turn Europe into the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, with European education as a “global quality benchmark”. Over time, the superlative has been abandoned in secret – to be replaced by the objectives of transforming Europe into a dynamic and competitive knowledge-based society, at the same time stating that it is actually too late to achieve these objectives in time.

Even if their literal implementation seems unlikely: Mantras are sometimes necessary and important – even more so in a sector where European institutions only have very limited authority and

many diplomatic efforts are necessary to move things along. Mantras are extremely “practical” to provide an introduction and the rationale for tenders, project proposals, programmes, etc. Hence, they are useful – even if everybody knows that the authors may have been slightly overambitious (on purpose) in terms of the concrete objectives. For the other European agenda – the Lisbon Process – education is only one aspect. It is driven by labour market requirements and economic reasons plus Europe’s general position in the world. In order to improve its position, education has to make its own contribution by achieving a higher level of quality and effectiveness, enhancing its general accessibility and global appeal. What is actually happening in Euroland? To what extent has integration been achieved in higher education and how does this effect mobility structures? In general, two developments can be observed:

Firstly, the European higher education landscape has undergone significant changes since the ratification of the Bologna Declaration in 1999. A growing mentality change is as remarkable as the objective changes – moving away from a

mere “exchange mentality” towards the “Bologna mentality” of joint structures.

And secondly, the main focus of the Bologna and Lisbon Processes has largely shifted towards structural reform, whereas the emphasis had been on promoting mobility when the Europeanisation of higher education started.

The way to Bologna

The Bologna Process is often described as a European integration process of higher education and is thus linked to the European institutions – in general collectively referred to as “Brussels“. However, this often leads to several misunderstandings:

For a long time now, Bologna has long gone beyond EU borders. 29 undersigning states have increased to 45 – among others Russia, Georgia and the Vatican – with the latter including – in the strict sense – all Catholic universities in the world into the Bologna Process.

Strictly speaking, the European institutions have nothing to do with the Bologna Process: In the educational sector, the member states have almost all the authority. Bologna is an intergovernmental process – from the Brussels point of view a “bottom-up process“, even if the higher education institutions often perceive it as “top-down“, as it was initiated at government level.

Bologna is only a framework - without regulations for the introduction of three-year bachelor’s degree programmes and two-year master’s degree programmes. Individual member states can – but are not obliged to – introduce binding regulations.

Everything started with the signing

of two declarations - 1998 at the Sorbonne and 1999 in Bologna. Due to a clearly structured time framework (until 2010) and regular follow-up conferences (in Prague, Berlin, Bergen and 2007 in London), “Bologna“ turned into a process with clear objectives and constituent parts. Bologna pursues an internal and an external agenda: On the one hand, it is about integration of the higher education sector and a better preparation of graduates for the European job market. On the other hand, globally enhancing the appeal of European higher education is also on the agenda.

A number of constituent parts have been introduced to achieve these objectives: Probably best-known are the harmonisation of higher education degrees with the introduction of bachelor’s and master’s degrees as well as doctorates, the introduction of the “European Credit Transfer System (ECTS)“, the diploma supplement as well as the improvement of the mutual recognition of student qualifications, the promotion of quality assurance and accreditation at various levels. The purpose of the interaction between all these components is to create more transparent higher education systems and achieve quality and mutual trust. Particularly after the last Conference of European Ministers in Bergen, the great objective has been the introduction of a Framework for Qualifications of the European Higher Education Area, defining reference standards for every educational level from all these constituent parts, based on learning outcomes.

What is the position of the individual European countries and higher education institutions in the Bologna Process? The biannual Trends-Report monitors the developments. The latest data are from spring 2005. The Trends-Report and other studies on the Bologna Process show the following trends:

- Almost all countries have at least started with the introduction of a bachelor's and master's degree system. The progress of the introductory process can vary significantly. The process has already been completed in the Netherlands or in Norway, whereas it has only just started in Spain or in France;
- Most higher education institutions are using ECTS and issue a diploma supplement;
- European quality standards, a register of quality agencies and a European quality label are currently planned;
- 36 of 45 undersigning states have ratified the Lisbon Declaration on the recognition of European higher education qualifications;
- Higher education institutions have adopted the reform: Compared to earlier studies, Bologna is no longer perceived as "top-down";
- Although in many cases, the reforms were used to solve existing problems, there is a lot of unused potential (for example by renaming terms);
- In many cases, a lack in autonomy and financial resources of higher education institutions prevent the realisation of the reforms.

All in all, an increasing focus on the reform agenda can be observed: Brussels

circles talk less and less about Bologna and increasingly about the "Education and Training 2010" Agenda, the part of the Lisbon Process referring to education, or of higher education reforms.

Now what about mobility? In principle, promoting mobility is one of the objectives and "action lines" of the Bologna Process. Some of the structural reforms are intended to enhance mobility between different European countries and higher education institutions as well as mobility to Europe. Some examples: comparable degrees, transferable study qualifications through ECTS, improved recognition of qualifications and the diploma supplement.

However, the objective of promoting mobility contravenes the fear often voiced in this context, with short-term mobility potentially suffering from more tightly organised study courses. The following paragraphs will take a closer look at student mobility in the EU and the influence of the Bologna process on mobility.

Study locations in Europe

In the EU, student mobility can already look back at a long history: First initiatives go back to various agreements on the recognition of study qualifications and degrees in the fifties of the last century. The introduction of the Erasmus Programme in 1987 was a milestone and the promotion of student mobility regained momentum. The original goal of Erasmus was to encourage ten percent of all students in Europe to spend a li-

mitted period of time studying abroad, in another European country. The Erasmus Programme is often labelled as “system provocation“: Only the necessity to deal with the integration of students from the various European countries as well as the recognition and transferability of study achievements paved the way for the later structural reforms in the context of the Bologna Process. Parallel to the European initiatives, several players also promoted student mobility at a national and sometimes even a regional level with scholarship and exchange programmes, higher education marketing, etc.

So how many “international“ students are in Europe? What is the current situation of mobility within Europe and how many non-Europeans choose the European continent for their studies? These questions are all highly relevant, yet the answers have been insufficient up to now.

First of all, different types of mobility need to be considered:

- Mobility within Europe and between third countries and Europe: The former is interesting in the context of European integration in the educational sector and the latter in terms of the appeal of the study location Europe as a whole.
- “Free movers” and organised mobility: The former refers to individual, mobile students and the latter to mobility in the context of exchange and scholarship programmes, bi- and multilateral agreements, double diploma agreements, etc.
- Vertical and horizontal mobility: The former refers to mobility for entire study courses with the goal to obtain a degree, whereas the latter

refers to fixed-term mobility without obtaining a formal degree abroad.

Which data are available on student mobility in Europe? What can be said about the individual “mobility categories“? In 2004/05, the Academic Cooperation Association (ACA) carried out a study on student mobility in 32 European countries in cooperation with the International Centre for Higher Education Research (INCHER) Kassel.² The study, Eurodata, is a first attempt to bundle European mobility data and to provide a comprehensive overview. This is only possible to a limited extent, as the available data are sometimes not really comparable.

Individual EU member states define and measure their share of international, foreign or mobile students in different ways. Sometimes they differentiate whether the student is really mobile (the country where the previous qualification was obtained is the determining factor in this context). Sometimes nationality is the key factor; sometimes mobility is quantified in the context of organised programmes and sometimes not. In parts, differences can be considerable: The percentage of foreign students already living in the country where they take up their studies (international students treated as native students for educational purposes) can be up to 40 percent. Students with a domestic passport that lived abroad before taking up their studies also need to be considered as mobile – their numbers can also be large at times. In most cases, separate data for bachelor’s and master’s

degree students are not available as they fall into the same category in terms of their “level of study”. It is also very likely that many short-term mobile students are never entered into the statistics.

An ACA study³ provided an overview over existing data by Eurostat, OECD and UNESCO. It analyses a number of countries with a relatively complete data set, showing the above-mentioned problems in identifying European mobility statistics. So far, pan-European information has only been available on the number of international students and thus those with a foreign passport (only ten out of the 32 analysed countries collect data on student mobility in the narrower sense).

The following trends are emerging:

- Globally, there are over two million international students;
- with around 1.1 million studying in the 32 European countries under analysis, of which 54 percent are non-Europeans.
- France, Germany and the UK are the target countries for 60 percent of all international students.
- A total of 575 000 students from the 32 analysed European countries study abroad (three percent). 80 percent of these students study in another European country and a further 13 percent in the USA. Target countries of most European students (around 40 percent) are Germany and the UK. The main countries of origin are Germany, France, Turkey and Greece.
- The largest groups of Europeans studying in another European country are from Greece and Germany (with over 4 percent in each group) and from France (4 percent).

- The largest group of non-European foreigners is from Asia (with as much as 6 percent from China) and the second largest group is from Africa. The largest groups of international students in individual European countries are Chinese and Greek students in the UK and Turkish and Chinese students in Germany.
- 13 European countries accept more international students than they “send abroad”: The large countries (Germany, France, Spain and the UK) as well as Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. The UK has the lowest share in mobile national and international students: Out of ten students in the UK, one is a British student abroad.

These figures are good news for the objective of European integration. Europe seems to be an attractive study location for Europeans. With regard to the global appeal of Europe, it also sounds good to be able to say: Europe as common higher education area is even slightly more attractive as a target area for students than the USA. However, on closer observation, things are looking less rosy: The part of Europe with the actual appeal consists of three countries. Hence, balanced mobility flows within Europe and into Europe are not actually taking place.

Generally speaking, it can be assumed that programme mobility is only a fraction of the total: Most mobile students are “Free movers“. Over the past years,

there have been a lot of speculations as to how the introduction of the new higher education degrees will influence student mobility – what kinds of mobility will be supported and what kinds might be made more difficult? The following chapter will deal with these issues.

Higher education creates mobility

In the autumn of 2001, an anniversary was celebrated extensively in the corridors of the European Commission: The one-millionth Erasmus students took up his / her studies abroad. Decentralised data processing made him or her impossible to trace – much to the disappointment of those who were celebrating. During the anniversary celebrations, the next ambitious objective was agreed – three million Erasmus students by 2010. In view of a number of budget cuts, this target seems to be a very distant prospect – not only for budget reasons. There is a lot of speculation in European higher education institutions, at conferences and seminars: Time and again, the question is raised whether the shortened and tightened study times do not make it more difficult to study abroad for a certain period of time. Various models are considered to counteract a

However, on closer observation, things are looking less rosy: The part of Europe with the actual appeal consists of three countries. Hence, balanced mobility flows within Europe and into Europe are not actually taking place.

possible decrease in numbers – integrated study periods abroad and double diploma degrees are some examples.

At the same time, the European players want to support vertical mobility more or less openly: An increasing amount of students ought to obtain their bachelor's degrees at one university and their master's degrees at another – preferably at a university abroad. This should support mobility within Europe and also make access to a higher academic level easier for non-European students.

Yet this development is not necessarily in line with the objectives of the higher education institutions and the academic staff: According to a study by Alesi, Bürger, Kehm and Teichler, higher education institutions expect that two thirds up to 90 percent of all students with a bachelor's degree obtain their master's degree at the same institution. First of all, this reveals that the bachelor's degree as a professional qualification is still not widely appreciated; secondly good master students (and potentially future doctoral candidates) are naturally in demand. According to the higher education institutions and the academic staff should not necessarily go their own ways.

The importance allocated to the length of the study courses is another issue: For higher education institutions inside and outside of Europe (example for the latter: USA), it is not always a matter of course that three-year bachelor's degrees are recognised. In theory, the introduction of the Bologna reforms has led to a greater permeability between universities and

universities of applied sciences in many countries. Yet in practice, this is complicated by tightened standards in terms of content, which are very closely linked to the bachelor's degree profile of a specific higher education institution. This might reassure the guardians of quality standards – but it does not boost mobility. In many cases – for example in the discussion of US-American higher education institutions about accepting three-year bachelor's degrees – a stronger emphasis on contents and results instead of the length of study can be observed. However, Europe still has a long way to go.

In principle, a slow mentality change can be observed: Whereas ten years ago, internationalisation meant Erasmus (and still does in some countries / higher education institutions), other topics are increasingly taking over. Bologna is one and the enhancement of quality and international appeal is another. Increasingly, internationalisation is perceived as a structural process and is integrated into the overall profile of higher education institutions. Mobility – the ultimate objective of internationalisation in the past – is becoming a sub-discipline and a tool of the overall internationalisation process.

These are all speculations and discussions. Are there any concrete observations in terms of the influence of Bologna on student mobility? The answer is “yes and no”: In 2005, the DAAD commissioned a study to analyse “transnational mobility” in bachelor's and master courses in eleven European countries. However,

due to a lack of time series and the insufficient availability of data explained earlier, again this study can only analyse trends and assumptions rather than concrete results.

The results of this study suggest that fears of a negative influence of the new higher education structures on mobility numbers are unfounded. Only in Germany and Hungary, half of the interviewees share these concerns. The most important measures to ensure and support mobility mentioned in the survey were a greater emphasis on periods abroad and an improved mutual recognition of study qualifications. In contrast to speculations and wishful thinking in Brussels, two thirds of all interviewees are not expecting an increase in vertical mobility (bachelor's degree at home, master's degree abroad).

Does this mean that everything will be different from what is expected, speculated or feared? It is still too early to give a final answer to this question. Time will tell – provided that the data collection mechanisms are improved by the following measures suggested in the Eurodata study:

- Capturing of mobility data in the narrower sense, not only recording the students' nationality (in other words, a differentiation between students considered domestic (Bildungs-

A lack of motivation and opportunities, insufficient information and numerous administrative obstacles still block effective labour mobility.

inländer) and students considered foreign (Bildungsausländer) for educational purposes).

- Complete recording of limited study periods abroad (at least one semester)
- Differentiation of bachelor's and master's degree students
- Improved data collection for doctoral candidates and other postgraduate students.

With these measures, it would be possible to go beyond mere speculation about European mobility trends and the influence of the Bologna reforms – yet there is still a long way to go.

A vast area, a long way to go?

Particularly within the European institutions, the Bologna Process is increasingly seen as a tool to achieve other, less abstract, result-oriented objectives, for example the Lisbon Agenda, which is linked to education and was initiated to support the European labour market. 2006 was nominated the “European Year of Worker’s Mobility“, which is still perceived as insufficient. Only 1.5 percent of EU citizens lives and works in another EU member country – a figure which has hardly changed over the last thirty years according to Eurostat.⁴

A lack of motivation and opportunities, insufficient information and numerous administrative obstacles still block effective labour mobility.

The situation is growing even more acute in terms of mobility of non-EU citi-

zens within the European labour market. The opportunity to gain work experience is highly relevant for non-European students, though, as only practical experience makes a European degree really valuable in their native countries.⁵

In short – there is still much to do on the building site that is the European education area. Nonetheless, there is a lot happening and a lot has already changed. Old structures are broken up. Over the last few years and months, another step has evolved.

Theory and practice

Since the Bologna Declaration in 1999, the appeal of European higher education and its global position has been an important topic. However, in concrete terms, nothing happened for a long time as the European countries were too busy implementing the reforms internally. The EU programmes – with the exception of some mostly bilateral programmes with other countries and regions – mainly focused on European themes. However, in most recent times, Europe’s position in the world has increasingly moved into the limelight. Evidence of this new orientation is the establishment of a workgroup to develop a concrete strategy supporting the external dimension of the Bologna Process. The Erasmus Mundus Programme – a well-funded scholarship programme opening up the master’s degree programmes of at least two European higher education institutions for non-European students. The open objective of the programme is to improve the profile and the position of higher education in Europe at a global scale. Additional activities are European education fairs, jointly organised by seven-

ral EU countries and sponsored by the EU Commission, an EU invitation to tender for the development of a European higher education marketing concept as well as a number of different activities at a national and an institutional level.

Bologna itself reaches far beyond the EU and has sparked interest in a lot of places all over the world. Here are a few examples:

- The projects Tuning Latin America and 6x4 use the Bologna example to promote the structural reforms at South American higher education institutions;
- The Australian government has issued a consultation paper stressing the importance for Australian higher education institutions not to miss the boat with regard to developments in the European education area;
- Twelve Mediterranean neighbouring countries have signed the so-called Catania Declaration with the objective to create a Euro-Mediterranean Area of Higher Education;
- The introduction of three-year bachelor's degree in many European countries led to extensive recognition debates in the USA
- The introduction of the three-year bachelor's degree in a large number of European states has led to intensive recognition debates.

What is the future of Bologna? One big question is whether this is the story of the external dimension of Bologna or rather an eternal expansion, a continuous

expansion of the process as a “translation tool” and a framework for mobility, recognition of study qualifications and the comparability of higher education systems. So far, participation in the Bologna Process has been limited to the Council of Europe member states. It is likely that the process will eventually reach its limits – geographically and in terms of content. However, Bologna has already crossed many boundaries and realised many aspects that still seemed impossible not very long ago. In fact, until recently it was almost suicidal to talk about a “harmonisation of higher education in Europe” in the context of the Bologna Process, which thankfully is no longer the case.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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1 [www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/](http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/PRESIDENCY_CONCLUSIONS_Lissabon.pdf)

PRESIDENCY_CONCLUSIONS_Lissabon.pdf

2 The 32 analysed countries are 27 EU member states, the four EFTA member states, one accession candidate (Turkey) and Switzerland. See Kelo, Teichler and Wächter: EURODATA – Student mobility in European higher education, Bonn: Lemmens 2006.

3 ACA is a European umbrella organisation for 24 national academic intermediary organisations, see www.aca-secretariat.be

4 See website http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/workersmobility_2006/

5 Perceptions of European higher education in third countries, EU-Commission, 2006, http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/programmes/mandus/index_en.html



Lea Linsler



DO YOU SPEAK EUROPEAN? EU language policy has to find a balance for the complex and chaotic mix of national and regional official and working languages – also including the languages of migrants and minorities – to support rather than jeopardise cohesion within the European Community. *By Ulrich Ammon*



Was multilingualism the ultimate downfall of the Ottoman or the Habsburg Empires? And did this lead to perceiving cultural and religious differences as ethnic and thus as irreconcilable during the Age of Nationalism? Finding definite answers is difficult, yet there is no doubt that language differences can deepen the rifts in a society. This does not necessarily lead to a complete break. Contemporary Belgium or Spain - or the much-lauded harmonious cooperation and coexistence in Switzerland are good examples of the more conciliatory form of cultural and linguistic autonomy.

Successful reconciliations require a cautious and level-headed language policy, which is of particular importance

for a community like the EU with its multitude of states and languages. Contrary to widespread criticism, EU politicians are likely to be aware of this. Before looking at this language policy in more detail, I would like to introduce the main features of the language situation within the EU.

In 2006, the EU had around 457 million inhabitants and 25 member states, with two more joining in 2007. Of these 27 member states, only 23 have one national official language, whereas three (Belgium, Finland, Ireland) have two national official languages and one member state (Luxembourg) even has three national official languages. At the same time, some national official languages are used in several member states: German, English, French, Dutch and Swedish. Each national official language in the EU is very intertwined with its society. It is the predominant means of recognition and communication for national administration, politics and schools. It is also the native language (sometimes as a dialect) of the majority of the population plus a symbol of national identity, which is revealed in naturalisation tests including language exams serving more than just a practical purpose. Occasionally – in countries with several national official languages – national identity is very clo-

sely linked with one of these languages, the real “national language”, as it is the case in Luxembourg with ‘Letzeburgisch’ (Luxembourgian) or in Ireland with Gaelic. It is evident that EU language policy has to show the greatest consideration for the national official languages.

National and regional official languages

Regional official languages that are not the national official language for an entire country, but official and school languages in a culturally and linguistically autonomous region, have a similar status to national official languages. In many cases, regional official languages are also transnational, with their status varying frequently. German is the regional official language in South Tyrol, the national official language in Austria and a minority language without official status in France. The connection between several countries through the same language contributes to the already complex linguistic situation in the EU.

However, many languages are also limited to one single state, for example Finnish, Latvian or Czech. Migrants and their languages are not considered in this context. Some languages are even limited to one particular part of a state, for example regional official languages such as Galician in Spain. Most of the time, they are minority languages without an official status. Examples in Germany are Sorbian or Low German. Both languages are only used in Germany. Further minority languages in Germany are Danish, Frisian and Romani (nowadays the term “gypsy language“ is no longer politically correct). All these languages are spoken

in at least one other EU member state. Frisian is often divided into three different languages: West Frisian, Saterland Frisian and North Frisian - with the latter two currently only spoken in Germany. Moreover, the example of Low German reveals that it is not always easy to distinguish between an (independent) language and a language that is «only» a dialect. Many Germans see Low German as a dialect of the German language, whereas it is an independent language officially recognised by the EU and Germany. Hence it does not really belong to the German language any more.

The languages of migrants and immigrants

A large number of newcomers join the traditional indigenous (autochthonous) languages. Varying numbers of migrants and immigrants live in all parts of the EU, with many of them speaking their imported language at home and among themselves. Scientists roughly agree about the number of autochthonous languages in the EU. Various official counts converge at a final result of around 70 languages. However, for the allochthonous languages (of migrants and immigrants), the numbers are like a lottery, varying widely depending on the estimated minimum of speakers or regularity and domains of language use. Depending on the criteria for a language census, the numbers reach several hundreds. However, the numbers are higher for individual languages and they are more widely spoken. This particularly applies to Turkish. It goes without saying that the EU must not ignore these allochthonous languages in its language policy, particularly as speakers of those

languages can frequently feel underprivileged. The EU grants fewer rights to these languages than to autochthonous languages, though – on the general basis that migrants and immigrants voluntarily moved to their places of residence and had to expect at least partial linguistic adjustment from the outset.

EU language policy has to balance a complex and chaotic mix of diverging interests without jeopardising Community cohesion – at the same time ensuring that the cooperation between EU institutions and their member states remains efficient and that language barriers are no significant obstruction for the legally guaranteed transnational mobility of the citizens and the development of a pan-European political public.

At first sight, these goals seem to be so irreconcilable that the overused image of “squaring the circle” suggests itself, which is wrong in this context, as the task at hand may be gigantic, but not unsolvable. I shall outline some focal points of this policy – sometimes resembling dilemmas – in the following.

Many countries, many languages

In most language policy bulletins, the EU emphasises the value of preserving multilingualism. The European Year of Languages – a joint EU and Council of Europe initiative in 2001 – was also introduced to raise awareness for this particular value. The focus was on autochthonous languages again, although many allochthonous languages are much more endangered, with minority languages facing the greatest threat. However, it may be even more important for cohesion within the EU that there is commitment to

multilingualism in terms of majority languages and official languages. Ironically, speakers of some of the majority languages fear elimination most.

France and Germany are the two most prominent examples in this context. Both countries fear that their respective own national language is pushed back by political and economic developments, but also by EU language policies. This fear is not about the imminent «extinction» of French or German – at least not among realistic people – yet there is growing concern about a status loss of these languages – with lasting negative consequences for the individual countries.

Fear of status loss

For as long as one century, France has perceived the English language as a threat for the global position of the French language. Now the country fears for the position of the nation’s language within Europe – particularly since the UK and Ireland joined the EU (accessions in 1973). Previously, the supremacy of the French language in EU institutions had remained unchallenged. Language fears might have motivated France to veto the accession of the UK twice. In any case, it is an open

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secret among EU civil servants that the French President Pompidou at the time wrestled the promise from the British Prime Minister Edward Heath that British EU civil servants would always need a certain knowledge of French. Nonetheless, English quickly became the established working language of the EU institutions. The accession of the Scandinavian countries, but also of the Central Eastern European countries has strengthened the position of English to an extent that makes France worry about its own language.

The «Joint Franco-German Language Directive» - a type of language alliance agreed between France and Germany in June 2000, stated the two countries' mutual commitment to support their respective national language in the EU institutions. More specifically, it is «about interpreting difficulties» at «informal meetings», where the ministers of both countries should aim for a mutually «satisfactory solution». The joint veto of the French and German foreign ministers Védrine and Fischer brought down the proposal by the vice president of the European Commission, Neil Kinnock, to submit working papers for briefings exclusively in English in the future.

(Under the Swedish presidency of the Council of Europe in spring 2000), the Common Language Directive was preceded by the proposal that informal expert discussions should no longer be interpreted into German. Germany agreed under the condition that such meetings should be limited to a single working language, which was accepted by the majority. English - as was to be expected - was chosen as this working language.

Germany's line of action was basically a manoeuvre in an ongoing debate about the position of the German language within the EU institutions. It started with the efforts of the Christian-Liberal coalition government under Kohl (from 1982) to enhance this position, after the previous German governments had wil-

lingly accepted the supremacy of French and later also of English. The German unification (1990) and later the accession of Austria (1995) were perceived as the basis for a stronger position of the German language. In 1993, German was declared the third internal working language of the commission, together with French and English. However, this status did not lead to the corresponding role of the language: In practice, German as a working language of the European Commission has remained on the periphery. The efforts of the German government - sometimes joined by the Austrian government - to enhance the importance of the German language within the EU institutions were also not very successful otherwise. Even individual demonstrations of strength, with Germany and Austria boycotting informal ministerial meetings when Finland provided no interpreters for German at the beginning of its EU Presidency in the autumn of 1999, did not lead to significant changes. Interpreting was subsequently enforced, but other improvements of the position of the German language failed to materialise.

For EU institutions, the Council Regulation No. 1 from 1958 determines the language issue. When new countries accede to the EU, new languages are added to the Regulation. Ultimately, every nation can decide whether its official languages should simultaneously function as EU «official and working languages».

The «Universally Valid Regulations and Documents» and the Official Journal of the EU are published and interpreted in the formal debates and meetings of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe in these languages. Otherwise, Article 6 of the Regulation No. 1

provides for the individual institutions of the Community to «stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases», thus forming the basis for the differentiation between the (actual) working languages and the (mere) official languages not used in the briefings. This differentiation and the assignment to the group of working languages has long been a focus of the language debate in the EU.

Italy and Spain and sometimes the Netherlands have also claimed working language status for their respective languages. The former succeeded at the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) in Alicante – which now uses five working languages. In addition, Italy and Spain repeatedly caused the breakdown of efforts from German-speaking countries by simultaneously making claims for their own languages. To fulfil these claims would have brought effective working practice to a standstill. The interpreting and translating apparatus of the EU is the largest and most expensive in the entire world anyway (with around 1650 permanently employed translators, a large number of freelance translators and 500 permanently employed interpreters plus 2700 freelance interpreters in 2006).

Working language or foreign language?

What are the reasons for the great interest in acquiring working language status for a national language? Presumably, it originates in the not entirely unfounded assumption that the EU working languages will become the future languages of a government in a coalescing Euro-

pe, with their importance by far outgrowing the governmental context. This is combined with practical communication advantages for native speakers. But it is equally a question of prestige – probably with far-reaching consequences. In the future, decisions of other countries about foreign language school curricula or the learners' selection of foreign languages might depend on this. The languages of government in the EU or any other format of a united Europe have very good prospects to be globally studied as foreign languages. And it is a great advantage for a country if its national language is widely studied as a foreign language. The German-speaking countries network with their contacts abroad – also in business terms – to a large extent through people who have studied German as a foreign language. The number of those people could diminish if Germany ceased to play a prominent role in Europe in the future – particularly as German – in the same way as Italian – only plays a minor role as a national official language outside of Europe, which is in marked contrast to English, French or Spanish. Hence, there is a lot at stake for the German-speaking countries in terms of the position of German as a working language within the EU.

English as the lingua franca?

So far, a solution of the conflict is not in sight – even less so as the smaller member states without any prospects to achieve working language status for their own languages are in favour of a single working language (English), which would be the easiest solution for them. At present, a clear-cut decision is formally impos-

sible, as Regulation No. 1 determining the use of languages can only be changed unanimously by the Council of Europe. Presumably, it would also be the crucial test for the EU. Putting oil on troubled waters by constantly pledging the preservation of multilingualism, at the same time surrendering a comprehensive and clear regulation of the issue of working languages might be the only feasible language policy option for the EU. Hence, not even criticism can dissuade the EU from this approach. In terms of language policy, the EU has hardly any direct influence on the development of an overall lingua franca for the entire EU. It is uncertain whether other languages besides English will play a noteworthy role as a EU working language in the long run or whether they will retain a transnational role as a lingua franca.

With their individual education policy approaches, all member states have paved the way for the supremacy of English in Europe, as English is either the first foreign language or can at least be selected as the first foreign language – a very popular choice among learners. An even more widely spread future knowledge of the English language will not only strengthen its role as a lingua franca, but presumably also have an effect on

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EU working languages.

There are no similar conflicts in the context of the (mere) official languages within the EU. At most, occasional disapproval is expressed behind the scenes – for example, when Malta claimed this status for Maltese and later on Ireland for Irish, although both states can communicate in English without any effort. The status was granted – in spite of the interpreting and translation costs – hoping that Luxembourg would not propose ‘Letzeburgisch’ (Luxembourgian) next.

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

Conflicts about the status of a national official language are an internal matter of the individual member states. Nevertheless, they occasionally have an effect on the EU – as in the case of Catalan which is more widely spread than some other official EU languages due to the large numbers of its speakers and has received certain privileges at EU level. The EU is also not directly responsible for conflicts between national official languages in multilingual member states, for example in Belgium between the Dutch-speaking Flemings and the French-speaking Walloons.

Only at the lower end of the status hierarchy – when minority languages are concerned – the EU gets involved again by calling on the member states for the protection of these languages. The importance of maintaining multilingualism is often revealed most impressively when looking at these languages, which are often not very widely used. The most important regulating measure is the European Charter for Regional or Minority

Languages, jointly passed by the EU and the Council of Europe (agreed in 1992, implemented in 1998). It includes a comprehensive list of 39 language rights, such as integration in schools and in the media or at court, with the member states required to guarantee a certain minimum of rights. However, in 2006 the Charter had only been ratified by 8 member states, among them Germany. France reacted to the Charter with a change of the constitution, declaring French as the Language of the Republic, thus rendering the Charter irreconcilable with the French Constitution (which was also stated in the declaration of the Conseil Constitutionnel on 15. 6. 1999). Nevertheless, under the impression of the Charter, France has granted more rights to its language minorities than before – particularly with the introduction of bilingual schools. After all, the EU and the Council of Europe have also lobbied for the allochthonous minority languages, requesting respect and consideration from the member states. These measures raised awareness for the minority languages, strengthening the rights of those who speak them. Yet the prospects of maintaining or even expanding their use remain uncertain.

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Translation: Angelika Welt

FORTUNATE BABEL Europe likes to believe that Switzerland is a nation of flourishing multilingualism and that all its inhabitants can speak every Swiss national language. And maybe Europe perceives Switzerland as a role model to learn from. Is not the Swiss citizens' ability to overcome internal language barriers the Confederation's secret of cohesion? And is not exactly that required of the citizens of Europe if they want to develop a real sense of togetherness? *By Etienne Barilier*



Yet there are a few aspects about Helvetian multilingualism that require further clarification. It is correct that four languages are spoken in Switzerland, but the individual Swiss often only uses one of them – at times not even particularly well. This is not due to a lack in competence to learn and speak foreign languages. The block is emotional and ignorance a free choice: The people from West Switzerland refuse to speak the language of the Swiss-German area – the idiom of the majority and therefore potentially threatening, whereas the Swiss Germans are in principle willing to speak French, yet only very reluctantly phrases an answer in standard German to the Romand, who believes to please his conversational partner

with three stammered words in Goethe's language. Speaking to a Swiss German in standard German is similar to talking to him or her without making eye contact.

In some ways, the voluntary ignorance and its resulting communication problems are important cornerstones of Switzerland. We must not forget that the Swiss Confederation has its origins in the unification of independent groups, which only merged to ensure their previous status. In other words, the Swiss Confederation is a pact guaranteeing each contractual partner the right and the privilege to differ from others; the right and the privilege of not having to adapt and of not having to understand and not to be understood by the other partners. The Swiss are united by their common right to turn their back on each other. Nonetheless, the Swiss state exists – and to a certain extent that is due to the mutual deafness of the different population groups. This does not only apply to the state, but also to the nation. Ultimately, the Swiss do not completely lack a sense of national belonging and patriotism, which the Football World Cup revealed

a short while ago. Patriotism goes beyond words and language. It also becomes manifest in singings or jubilant cheers. Depending on the point of view, patriotism is prelinguistic or translinguistic. Naturally, Swiss patriotism is moderate and reserved – like all Swiss emotions. But it does exist.

Wrapped in haze

Propos reserve: There is probably a subtle link between this Swiss virtue and the Swiss shying away from other national languages. This conscious ignorance of others – and I mean this – has a positive effect on the policy of pragmatic compromise – an art the Swiss expertly command. The debates of the parliamentarians in Bern are generally wrapped in a slight haze. People become more cautious and polite when using a foreign language and only have a very general understanding of what is being said. They protest less emphatically and agree with less conviction. In the end, they adopt a halfway house position – halfway between the fear to lose an advantage and the fear to overlook it and reach a tacit (in the true sense) agreement with their respective counterparts. To some extent, Swiss parliamentarians are like the protagonists of the famous «prisoner's dilemma» frequently quoted in economic theory: As none of the prisoners knows the other prisoner's next step, cooperation is the lesser evil for both parties involved.

Comparing parliamentary debates in

Switzerland with those of the French National Assembly, the advantage of being Swiss immediately becomes clear. The French members of parliaments can communicate effortlessly – with terrible consequences: They attack each other with open visors, always fully aware that all their votes are understood in all their stylistic nuances and down to the finest details – with their combatants agreeing vociferously and their opponents strongly rejecting them. Their positions are clear, completely unambiguous and thus irreconcilable. The French parliament is condemned to eternal dispute and the Swiss parliament to an eternal struggle for mutual understanding. Even in their native language, Swiss speakers are generally less skilful and specific than the French, German or Italian speakers – seemingly knowing that specifications make no sense as they do not reach the foreign-language listeners anyway, that linguistic nuances do not contribute to amicable agreements and pragmatic solutions and that it is better not to understand one another too well at the linguistic level in order to get on well. «We understand each other well because we don't understand each other» the Swiss often state humorously. However, there is more than a fragment of truth in that statement.

In the end, you adopt a halfway house position – halfway between the fear to lose an advantage and the fear to overlook it and reach a tacit (in the true sense) agreement with your respective counterparts.

The reader of this text is free to interpret it as a humorous squib. I do believe, though, that the example of Switzerland clearly demonstrates that a state and also a nation can be multilingual without all citizens necessarily being plurilingual. If the quality of linguistic communication between the citizens is not a mandatory requirement for the existence of states or even nations, we could conclude that it is even less significant for an entity like Europe. After all, Europe – whatever that may be – has never seen itself as a «nation» and restricts itself to «constitutional patriotism». To what extent should active plurilingualism be necessary for a sense of togetherness and the wellbeing of a political Europe? Maybe the European Parliament – with its members always wrapped in a slight linguistic haze like their counterparts in Bern – might gain the same advantages as its Helvetian equivalent. A general disposedness to compromise that smoothes everything is also spreading in Europe...

Europe as a concept

But wait a minute: It is certainly true that a multilingual state or a multilingual nation can also exist if the citizens hardly leave their own little shells. Yet it is equally true that Europe cannot really exist – at least in my view – if the different European countries do not have a certain knowledge of their neighbouring countries' languages (often simultaneously neglecting their own language). In

short: If a citizen is content with «Basic English» as a means of communication, Europe has lost its *raison d'être* – and I do not only mean cultural Europe in this context, but Europe as a whole. Why? Because that is precisely what Europe is not – a nation or a state. A certain disregard towards languages that do not pose a threat to other nations or states can have devastating effects at a European level.

Europe cannot rest its cohesion on the collective awareness that cements a nation. I would like to reemphasise that Europe is not a nation and will never become a nation. Europe is more than an amalgam of individual interests. Europe is a concept – its strength and its weakness at the same time. Neither the Articles of a European Constitution nor patriotic singings fill and will continue to fill the European concept with energy. Only sharing a common vision (I should and would rather like to say, a common love) for the human being, for freedom, dignity and the capacity for refinement can achieve that.

But to what extent does this joint vision or love require Europeans to be aware of their plurilingualism and to possess the necessary skills? For the benefit of people and their freedom, for dignity and the capacity for refinement, skills inseparable from linguistic culture and the love for language need to be nurtured: Creativity and an understanding of nuances, diversity and quality. What I mean by «language» is obviously not the more or less technical, prosaic and standardised form of communication used in the context of business relationships. I am referring to language as an intimate treasure, a multifaceted reflection of hu-

man experiences, as an active preserver of our culture; a secret place where old mixes with new, heritage with creation, what has been preserved with what is provided and knowledge with love.

Money and language

Many languages, one currency. It is remarkable and very significant that the process of the European standardisation started off with money – and also immediately ended there. Money, per se the instrument of material exchange, was easily standardised. We could even call it the only real aspect in the life of the people and nations of Europe that has really benefited from this process. Money – like language – is a means of exchange, but at the same time also the complete opposite of language, at least of inspiring and emotional language. Money represents the purely quantitative, unambiguously defined exchange, whereas human values transported, shaped and constantly recreated by language are of a purely qualitative nature: The richer the language, the less quantifiable. Language – every language – is the refuge of meaning and thus ambiguity, of irony, hints, distancing, obfuscation and the twinkle in the eye. A sentence is always more than a simple combination of words. Every sentence of every language contains an entire world, with all its bright and dark sides, its inspirations, confessions and secrets. Language is a melting pot of the senses: With every new sentence, it challenges the world's

wealth of experience, questioning it and creating new contexts. It communicates and creates; it is expression and appeal; it states and gives hope – all at the same time. Every sentence expressed by a human being is a wish, a possibility and an order at the same time. It contains a description of what exists – but also the dream or hope of what does not exist.

Hence it should be clear what we should think about the ignorance of other European languages, but also of the neglect of our own language and the terrible disposedness of Europe (and – even more terrible) of Switzerland, to accept the use of «Basic English», a sublanguage which is nothing more than a linguistic single currency, facilitating transactions as if we were at a cashier's desk. Artificial «communication languages» (a wrong expression, as they do not really serve communication, but the exchange of verbal goods) are anti-languages as their poverty and their desperate strife for unambiguosity –

Money – like language – is a means of exchange, but at the same time also the complete opposite of language, at least of inspiring and emotional language. Money represents the purely quantitative, unambiguously defined exchange, whereas human values transported, shaped and constantly recreated by language are of a purely qualitative nature: The richer the language, the less quantifiable.

at the same time wanted and accepted as a necessary evil – deprives them of any possibility to create something new that has never existed before – which is precisely the nature of natural and cultivated languages.

Building the Tower of Babel

Has anybody noticed the enormous contradiction in the biblical story of building the Tower of Babel? If people in the entire world had really only spoken one single language, they would have never started to build such a tower! A monolingual humanity would have been blocked and paralysed and without desires or plans – content with the world as it was, without aiming for the sky in order to be at the same level as God and without wanting to change and improve, scrutinise and reinvent the world. This monolingual humanity would not have perceived itself as the humanity of possibilities; it would have never thought of escaping from its situation – in short, it would have never dreamt of building the Tower of Babel. In order to have the drive for such a venture, the later curse would have had to reach them beforehand ...

Language diversity – a curse? Certainly not – on the contrary. The diversity of languages is the mandatory requirement to prevent our future from turning into an exact copy of the present. Languages in their diversity open up opportunities to speak about subjects that are not yet reality and turn us into creators and designers. And it is the es-

sence of the human being to nurture this opportunity – and Europe's opportunity in particular, where human beings have always strived for further development and perfection.

But how does «nurturing the diversity of languages» look like in practice? It would be utopian to ask Europeans to start learning every European language from an early age. Breeding language geniuses is not the point. The objective should be that all European nations clearly reject the use of «Basic English» and instead focus more on lovingly nurturing their own language without forgetting to throw a comparative glance at the other languages of Europe. There is no contradiction in this approach, because I would like to reemphasise that people are more susceptible to the secrets and riches of another language, the more they love and know their own languages.

A comparative view

When I talk about «all European nations», I naturally also include Switzerland. And if I am forced to acknowledge that a country can also exist without nurturing its languages, it still makes me sad that Switzerland does not nurture and love its languages enough and thus is not particularly European in the sense that I have attempted to outline. Our country would be a bad example for the future of Europe if it had not provided the Continent with some great language facilitators and translators such as Jakob Burckhardt, Johann Jakob Bachofen, Guy de Pourtalès, Denis de Rougemont...

If the previously mentioned «comparative glance» at other languages sounds terribly abstract to you, let me reassure you: I am talking about school teachers that could start as early as possible with reading the most beautiful stories from different European languages – introducing them with their translation and following-up with explanations, if required. Thus French, German and Swiss children can listen to lines like the following at an early age: «O noche que guiaste, O noche amable más que la alborada, O noche que juntaste Amado con amada, Amada en el amado transformada.» Or: «I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?»

True English – worthy of the real Europe! Those who have listened to these words do not automatically turn into confident Europeans. Yet I am sure that confident Europeans have listened to these and other words at one point in their lives and to them they are worth more than the single currency, their state and even their nation; these words are Europe – they are what Europe can become and what it can give – to itself and to the entire world.

Translation: Angelika Welt

The writer and essayist **Etienne Barilier**, born in 1947, has written around forty novels («Le chien Tristan», «La créature», «Le dixième ciel», «L'énigme» ...) and essays. Two of his essays are dedicated to musical themes («Alban Berg» and «B-A-C-H»). Others deal with literature, philosophy or politics and particularly with Europe – the latter also the topic of «Contre le nouvel obscurantisme» (European Essay Award 1995), which was also published in the German translation («Gegen den neuen Obskurantismus», Suhrkamp 1999). «Nous autres civilisations ...» (2004) and «La Chute dans le Bien» (2006) also deal with the fortune of cultural Europe.

Globalisation is happening!
And the EU has to go on
the offensive in order to
help shaping it. The EU
is not the Trojan horse of
globalisation but our
answer to it ...

Europe is as much
Erasmus' deeply-rooted
humanism as it is Voltaire's
sharp irony. It is the love of
freedom in Schiller's Don
Carlos and Beethoven's
Fidelio as well as the tole-
rance in Lessing's Nathan
der Weise.





THE SOUND OF EUROPE MP3, Internet, mobile phones and home movies have conquered the music business. In order to master future challenges in the world of music, initiatives like the EU Culture Programme 2007-2013 are a step towards a better distribution of titles and artists, more exchange and cooperations. In order to achieve a sustainable European music policy, non-multimedia industries have to be integrated more effectively. *By Jean-François Michel*



Culture touches us all in many ways, but music above all touches our heart. It unites and proves to be a universal language, especially for the young generations. Music is the first form of art created by man: music is present everywhere, as it reflects human culture and its legacy on all continents. Music has always been essential to culture in Europe, and is nowadays the form of art privileged by young generations in order to express their creativity and share their national culture. More than ever, music is the best form of art used to develop intercultural dialogue. Those millions, who travel to foreign festivals, buy foreign records or simply play foreign music show that music goes beyond national borders and ultimately that music is building Eu-

rope. Music has also proven to be a preponderant element of social integration for minorities in Europe.

Music promoting Europe's cultural diversity

The music industry employs over 600,000 people across the European Union and represents a global market of more than 40 billion. All works of art need to be published and distributed to allow access to artists who will become their interpreters, and to reach different types audiences. Cultural industries are essential to establish, distribute and promote works of art. Publishers and record companies have to take their role of promoting creations as seriously as the different stakeholders in the music sector. They are all involved in the process of helping the work reach its audience. These different stakeholders operate within the framework of a specific economy, the cultural economy, with an industrial dimension specific to each sector of activity. Hence, industrial reproduction of a cultural product helps circulate and sustain the cultural

vitality and diversity of Europe. The EU music sector is as important for economic development as it is for true cultural pluralism. The cultural industries fully belong to European culture, with a very limited number of multinational firms (4 in the case of music), and a very large number of SMEs and even smaller entities, which produce, publish and distribute artists' records, meanwhile others produce concerts and organise tours, etc. - with the objective of giving audiences the opportunity to discover new artists and new cultures.

The European Music Office: the voice of music professionals in Europe

The European Music Office is an international non-profit networking association for international and national professional organisations, associations and federations from the music sector within Europe. Together with its members, other trade organisations and national institutions, the association promotes the diversity of European music and represents its interests at a European and a global level. The activities carried out by EMO in Europe favour the realisation of the European Union's objectives in the field of culture: EMO aims at facilitating the circulation of works, artists, creators and productions. It fosters exchanges, cooperation and the mobility of music professionals, easing public access to new artists and cultures from all over Europe and encouraging the development of professional networks and organisations in the European music sector.

With the European Music Platform, EMO also manages European projects

co-financed by the EU supporting information exchange, live music and the international development of European music professionals. EMO's projects are in line with the objectives of the EU and the Common Market. With regard to the transnational mobility of people working in the cultural sector, projects like the European Talent Exchange Programme and the European Tour Support aim at facilitating the mobility of professionals and artists in Europe. In terms of the transnational circulation of works of art, artistic and cultural products, ETEP and ETS¹ also aim at facilitating the circulation of art works by supporting tours abroad. The project Exchange of Information aims at providing professionals and artists with the most useful information to enhance their mobility in Europe. Projects such as the development of an office in New York and China are also good examples of international mobility and intercultural dialogue.

EMO is also lobbying on behalf of European institutions and national governments. In the context of new EU Culture programme 2007-2013, EMO's focus is on projects supporting initiatives promoting the cultural industries and their programmes.

A European programme for music: a necessity for the development of European music

EMO's core objective is the development and implementation of a coordinated music policy for the European Union

and its member states – a very specific and necessary support for the European music sector in order to realise EU objectives in this field.

In the coming months, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe will establish a new generation of cultural and audio-visual programmes. The introduction of these programmes between 2007 and 2013 will be essential for the further development of the European cultural scene, enhanced mobility of cultural goods and services, creators, artists and culture professionals. European cultural industries not active in the multimedia sector so far and – often confined by regional boundaries – will also benefit from this new generation of cultural and audio-visual programmes, both in the European and the global market.

In addition, a true European strategy promoting musical creation in particular and the music industry in general also has to rely on initiatives that enforce intellectual property rights on the one hand and master the problem of piracy on the other hand.

However, it is obvious that the 2007-2013 Programme in its current format will not produce successful results, since the pilot projects have proven that non-multimedia industries need more support and flexible funding. For that reason, EMO is in favour of creating a specific programme for the culture industries, following the example of the Media+ Programme.

Musical Europe: Who listens to what and to what extent?

France

According to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), France was the 4th largest market world-wide in 2003 (after the USA, Japan and the UK) with retail sales of almost two billion USD – representing 6.4% of global sales.

With a 21.4% drop, France recorded its strongest slump in sales in the major record markets between January and March 2004. The market decline in 2004 eliminated the previous positive trend with an average annual growth of 3% that had lasted for six years.

In terms of music genre, domestic pop had the highest market share with 37.6%. Since 1999, France has been the European country with the highest emphasis on local repertoires – thus overtaking the UK.

In 2003, the SNEP (National Union of Phonographic Publications) noted a continuous growth in this market segment – with an absolute value of 60% compared to a total of 35.5% allocated to international repertoires and 4.5% to classical music.

European cultural industries not active in the multimedia sector so far and – often confined by regional boundaries – will also benefit from this new generation of cultural and audio-visual programmes, both in the European and the global market.

Germany

For the past six years, the percentage of music purchasers in the German population has been in continuous decline. 52.6 % in 1997 sank to 40.1% in 2003. While Germany had the largest market share in Europe until a few years ago, the dramatic slump in sales has caused Germany to fall back to the 3rd position (globally: number 5).

Since 1996, the IFPI has awarded the Platinum Europe Award for many German albums selling more than a million copies within Europe. However, the majority of these sales took place in German-speaking countries. Other distribution formats for popular music are still in their infancy in Germany; this is in stark contrast to the promotion of classical music, where Germany has an outstanding position for economic reasons as well as for reasons of cultural and educational policy.

Spain

Spain represents 1.7% of the world music market, ranking on the 9th position after the USA, Japan, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, Canada and Italy.

Spain's per capita purchasing power is well below that of other European Union countries: \$22,403 (compared to \$26,345 per capita in France and \$26,751 per capita in Italy). Per capita expenditure on music is still one of the lowest in Western Europe with an all time low of €10.50 in 2004.²

Mobile phones (GSM and 3G), MP3, Internet, DVDs and home cinemas are rapidly gaining in popularity, although Spain still lags behind in comparison with other European countries (for Internet connections, Spain is number 20 in Europe – lagging behind several of the Union's latest members such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia).³

UK

9.3% of global music sales take place in the UK and the market share in the global music market is around 15%.⁴ In 2000, the UK music industry's worth was estimated at £3.624 billion with around 5,000 singles and 20,000 albums released each year and around 130,000 jobs. As a great source of repertoire, the UK is only outplayed by the USA nowadays. The UK industry is dominated by a number of large multinationals - Warner's, EMI, Universal, BMG and Sony - but 90% of the music business can be classified as micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The industry's success is founded on the quality and diversity of talent in the UK.

According to the IFPI, the UK is one of the only music markets in the world where sales increased in 2003 (+0.1%) and amounted to US\$3.216 billion, equalling approximately £1.632. Retail expenditure on recorded music amounts to £2.1 billion and per capita expenditure for music is only exceeded by Norway.

The record industry in the UK demonstrated a strong overall performance in 2003, although the total industry profits were down slightly with £1.177 billion. In spite of increasing competition in the entertainment industry, the entire music business recorded a growth of 4%

in 2003, with a profit increase from album sales of 3.7% and - for the first time in five years – the volume CD single sales up by 15.4% at a value of 8.1%.⁵ The issue of declining single sales was addressed by the record industry – in particular by lowering CD prices, to give just one example. Simultaneously, the market for music DVDs has doubled its share in the UK: As early as 2003, their market share was at 4% of the UK music market. In the following year, sales of downloads reached 2 million units.

Although the international repertoire has constantly increased in the UK market over the last years, British music still remains very present in its own country and around the world. In 2003, British artists accounted for 47% of single sales (excluding classical music and compilations). UK artists account for 47.2% of singles, and 42.3% of albums, followed by American artists with 34.6% and 45.4% respectively.⁶ This is the first year that US artists have overtaken UK artists in album sales in the UK. On the other hand, a “new British invasion” of overseas markets has been observed, particularly in the US with the success of artists such as Franz Ferdinand, Joss Stone and The Darkness in 2003.

Edited by Angelika Welt

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1 Under the management of the European Music Office (EMO), the European Music Platform has initiated the European Tour Support Programme – with the help of the European Commission – as an incentive for European artists to tour through Europe.

2 Anuario SGAE de las Artes Escénicas, Musicales y Audiovisuales 2005.

3 Internet World Statistics, 2004 & 2005.

4 Figures from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), Creative Industries, 2004.

5 BPI Quarterly Market Review – 23 August 2004.

6 IFPI 2004.

FEELING THE BLUES? What are the conditions and processes influencing today's music business in Europe? With the globalisation of music, researchers in Europe increasingly focus on social changes triggered by music and its role identity development. What are the effects of technological developments on traditional record companies and music consumers? And will the predominance of English pop music prevail in the global music landscape? *By Jonas Bjälesjö*



Who will be the winner of the next Eurovision Song Contest? Will other countries voice reproaches again stating that the Baltic States were voting in favour of each other? Whereas it has been difficult to identify a European core in pop and rock music since the fifties of the last century, the Eurovision Song Contest is a classic example of the claim to represent European diversity in its various national forms.

Since 1956, the Eurovision Song Contest has been organised every year in cooperation with TV channels within the European Broadcasting Union. The range of countries that have won the contest since 2000 is truly remarkable: Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey,

Ukraine, Greece and Finland – all those countries that normally play a less significant role in European pop music. In each country, the music contest enjoys a different status and receives varying levels of attention. At least almost all European countries participate, thus putting the Anglo-Saxon predominance in its place. The songs are mostly in English, but many countries use this platform to present national characteristics and special features of their respective cultures. The Grand Prix Eurovision de la Chanson has paved the way to the European stages for the new Eastern European EU member states.

Even if transnational European productions are rare, a large number of funding programmes promote the exploitation and amalgamation diverse musical potentials. “Muzone“ for example is a music training programme in cooperation with the EU action programme of professional and academic education, Leonardo. Its objective is to promote collaboration in the fields of professional training and higher education policy at a European level. The festival organiser “Yourope“ promotes music exchange.

The European music business also gets together on a regular basis at industry fairs such as the “Midem” in Cannes and the “Popkomm” in Berlin.

A common popular music for Europe?

All European networks nurture their domestic music traditions. Popular music was - and still is in certain countries - an important means of expression to develop locally, regionally or nationally anchored identities. Certain types of popular folk music - with Irish music as one example - also experienced a certain degree of success in the rest of Europe. Yet popular folk music has always been and still is mainly significant at a national level. The enlargement of the European Union has hardly had any influence on the use and meaning of national folk music. It has only gained some influence in specific regions, countries or cities. The Professor of Ethnology, Jonas Frykman, believes that popular folk music can contribute to a European identity: “We have opted for the ‘European regions’, where local and European traditions are currently merging. Since the beginning of the millennium, place, home and roots are playing an increasingly bigger role”.

Some popular music in European is leading the market due to its particular sound, genre, style and image within national borders. In spite of its potential to achieve global popularity and the lack of a clear geographical connection, this type pop music is rarely played beyond national borders. Not without reason: Markets

and audiences are mainly within national boundaries, as the lyrics are often in a country’s native language and mainly refer to domestic problems.

European pop musicians are certainly globally competitive. However, their contents are often specific to the individual nation.

Music with roots outside of Europe can also be globally successful - with hip hop music being only one example. Even if its roots are Afro-American, it is widely spread among young people and often among immigrants in Europe. Hip hop speaks many languages - not just at a pan-European level, but also in different places within European countries.

The relationship between music, ethics, nationalism, social background, age, gender and place play an important role for the development of Europe. These factors are points of orientation for individuals, social groups and regions. A sense of belonging that has grown through music challenges the norms and values of a society, creating alternative, cultural forms of expression and styles. Social communities are often important forums of expression for minority groups and can create resistance against uniform trends within the cultural industry - an important prerequisite for local colour. Particularly among adolescents, there are a

Markets and audiences and mainly within national boundaries, as the lyrics are often in a country’s native language and mainly refer to domestic problems.

numerous other examples of communities creating networks and exchanging information, characterised by a specific taste in music and by their own lifestyle. These translocal networks are kept up through personal contacts and visits, concerts, festivals, fanzines, mailing lists, websites, clubs, etc. What are the prerequisites and processes influencing the world of music in Europe - now and in the future?

Pop and youth culture in Europe

Youth cultures are globally characterised by openness in terms of location, a mix of local, global and cultural patterns as well as social influencing factors. The myth, the story and the history of pop music thrive on relating to festivals, events, moments, people and places creating music and life styles. At the same time, youth culture in general and pop music in particular are examples of a post-modern condition, where time, space and location are continuously interwoven into complex patterns, to be disentangled again after a while.

The sociologists Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash summarise as follows: "Nowadays, cultures create their own internal boundaries. Externally, they are incorporated into networks of other cultures, which makes it more difficult to define the boundaries." Media scientist James Lull defines the local transformation of global views and products as "cultural re-territorialisation".

With the triumph of globalisation - also in pop music - scientists are also in-

creasingly interested in the connection between changes in society and pop music. They also analyse the importance of self-projection and identity development for individuals. Discussions about pop music are often about the ways global processes can be noticed at a local level. How do people react if local conditions and their own experiences are intertwined with a certain type of music? To what extent do these processes influence identity development processes? A location can be perceived as one aspect of global trends and views - not as their antithesis, which results in a local and a global - and thus a glocal - process. Developments in pop music are "translocal", as they are simultaneously influenced by global and cultural influences, trends to homogenise plus local variations and diversity.

Cultural behavioural patterns of young people in Europe create an open environment of interaction and social relationships. They try to keep this particular space separate from their environment. For many young people, organising an environment for their own existence is closely linked to establishing their own identity. It is an important factor for developing their own social identity - which goes hand in hand with their identification with a particular location. People are not just "festival visitors", "punks" or "hip hoppers". They adopt these roles at all times and wherever they are. Particularly in popular music, young people and their ways of expressing themselves find a strong potential for a global life without boundaries on the one hand and

for the adjustment to local characteristics on the other hand.

“Anglophone” domination

The domination of English-speaking, Anglo-American countries in pop music can hardly be overlooked – as much in terms of their presence in the media as in terms of sales figures and audience numbers at concerts. A large number of TV music channels focus on American and British music – with regional variations depending on where they broadcast – as pop and rock music have their historic roots in the USA and the UK. Looking at programmes of European music festivals with their diversified line-up, which is not limited to one particular genre, presenting a wide range of pop music, we can often observe that the majority of main acts and well-known artists are from the USA and the UK.¹

Changing listener preferences

“New digital communication channels catapult music consumption to a high quality level. More than ever, consumers want a number of different forms of access to music.”² Technical and digital developments are also changing music production and distribution in Europe, forcing the industry to develop new business models and to restructure its way of working. Parallel to changes in the music business, listener and consumer preferences are also changing. Nowadays, developments are not just led by record

companies – several IT, telecommunications and media companies have taken the reins. This has led to a shift in power structures and a more democratic relationship between music companies, producers and consumers. It has become much easier and simpler to produce and market music, which leads to new distribution prospects for new, unknown artists. The difference between music production and music consumption continues to shrink, as current technology enables own productions as well as new forms of music consumption through new digital formats with music files and digital distribution technologies – mobile phones, MP3 players, iPods, etc. are becoming increasingly influential. According to John Kennedy, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry IFPI, “the music industry increasingly changes into a digitally literate industry nowadays. [...] The digital music business continues to grow. In 2006, the income from sales doubled to around two billion dollars – around ten percent of our overall sales. By 2010, we expect at least one quarter of all global music sales to be in digital format.”


New forms of distribution and consumption patterns also change the social function of music. Socially networked websites are booming. They allow people to portray themselves, their musical creations or their interests in music. The explosion of websites such as YouTube, LastFM and above all MySpace with over 60 million registered users in September 2006³ have created a vast contact network for artists as well as listeners and record

companies. These websites operate like communities for fans and music enthusiasts. MySpace made the Arctic Monkeys and Lilly Allen popular. "Some bands have even started to offer exclusively "virtual" gigs. In October 2006, Ben Folds organised a virtual mega release party in the virtual 3D world "Second Life" for his album 'supersunnyspeedgraphic, the LP!'. Damon Albarn's latest project, "The Good, The Bad and The Queen" featured with an exclusive live performance on MySpace in December 2006".⁴

Digitalisation provides fans with faster updates and enhanced forums for exchanges – for example about career news or ordinary stories from their idol's daily life. On MySpace, news and stories about the favourite artist can be published. Record companies in Europe use social networking websites to establish contacts between fans and their admired artists, thus at the same time generating an interest for other musical styles. The Website Last FM launched a so-called 'Taste-o-meter' operating like a dating service focusing on musical preferences.

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Downloads of individual songs are gaining ground. According to IFPI, their percentage has increased by 89 percent between 2005 and 2006. Together with downloads of individual songs and master tones, downloads of ringtones, digital albums and music videos are becoming increasingly popular. The number of MP3 players – above all the Apple iPod – increased by 43 percent in 2003. Mobile phones are also increasingly turning into central music media players. In October 2006, Nokia introduced its music brand Xpress Music, enabling people to download up to 1,500 songs on mobile phones. In addition to its phone market, Nokia is also going to launch a music store. According to Ed Averdieck, Managing Director at Nokia Music Service, multifunctionality is the future. Mobility is the keyword for producers and consumers. Jean-Francois Cecillon, chairman and CEO at EMI Music Continental Europe, states: "An increasing number of consumers are using their phones to listen to music or they use music to add a personal touch to their mobile phones. Music has become a key topic for mobile telephony [...]." However, the biggest discussions continue to be about overall access and illegal downloading of music through P2P file sharing. Illegal piracy is perceived as the main threat for the music industry and artists as it undermines copyright. Yet it can be assumed that even the major record companies will soon allow the purchase of digital files without restrictions. Most independent labels already sell their music in MP3 formats that can be downloaded and copied



Market share global music market - Nielsen Sound Scan 2005

without copy protection.

This would be a small revolution, with an impact on the entire European and global music market. The monopoly status of the major record companies – currently dominating around 80 percent of the global music market – would belong to the past.

The future of music

In Europe, pop music is part of a global industry, with the four large major companies EMI, Sony BMG, Universal and Warner dominating the world market. However, many small and not always commercial labels influence the music industry.⁶ The majority of the companies belong to a conglomerate in the cultural industry, characterised by a complex pattern of alliances, cooperations, partnerships, participations, joint ventures, etc. Yet music is more – it strengthens identity, provides a sense of life and leads to appropriate social behaviour. Pop music

is a cultural and a mass product with aesthetic and economic relevance. It has cultural significance and is suitable as a media product for the masses. "Music is a complex system of social practice and different meanings: It has rituals and rules, hierarchies and systems to create credibility. Music can be an active form of art and a passive consumer experience [...]. Furthermore, the "popular" part is not just about the market success of cultural products like CDs, music videos and concerts. It is about trends, social contexts of the fans, their attachment to a certain music style and about human relationships. A formal definition of popular music does not exist."⁷

Translation: Angelika Welt

Jonas Bjälesjö studied History, Politics and Sociology at the University of Linköping. He is the chairman of the Swedish Rock Archive, the Swedish partner of the European Leonardo Project Muzone and a member of the IAS-PM North (International Association for the Study of Popular Music). He has worked on a number of research projects and publications on young people and music in the European Union. In his empirical doctoral thesis about the Hultsfred rock festival, he analysed the impact of music on cultural processes at a local, national and international level.

1 This comparison refers to festivals not featuring on the website of the European Festival Association, Yourope (www.yourope.org).

2 IFPI: 07 Digital music report p. 4.

3 Fiveeight Music, September 2006, no. 58.

4 IFPI: 07 Digital music report p. 12.

5 EMI Press release 23 November 2006, www.emigroup.com/Press/2006/press73.htm

6 In Sweden for example, 99.4% of all companies in the music industry have up to 19 employees. (Nielsen 2006:17).

7 Connell & Gibson 2003: pp. 3.

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EUROPE READS European literature is well-known and loved all over the world. Yet it cannot be said that the literary world in Europe is characterised by interpenetration. Lacking financial support and high translation costs prevent a holistic literary exchange with our neighbours. It is doubtful whether the book series of a number of newspaper publishers can change this situation or create a European canon of literature. *By Albrecht Lempp*



In the overheated networking culture of our times that allows us to witness everything in real time or at least relatively close to the actual event wherever it may occur, we are no doubt losing the general overview, but also our sense for the linearity of events. Traditional novel reading is diagonally opposite to this development – not to mention the act of writing a novel. And yet the book remains an immensely important part of our lives, our culture, our economy and sometimes even our politics.

Hence, it is even more surprising that books only leave fragmented traces in the statistics, which forces us to live with the following conclusion: “Not even remotely reliable, independent and generally accepted statistics exist - neither on the

core subject ‘book’ itself nor on markets for new and second-hand books, translations, culture and market or innovation.”

And further: “Ironically the book – traditionally the most important historic medium – has no (institutional) memory in Europe.”¹ This still leaves room for polemic argument. However, since the UNESCO has stopped counting new and newly released titles and since the IPA (International Publishers Association) took over in 2001, the German Publishers and Booksellers Association has reported that the published data are up-to-date – yet they are nowhere near as exhaustive as before.² Looking at the IPA statistics brings tears to one’s eyes.

However, it is not the lack of statistically backed-up material which suggests a limitation of selected topics to me, but the large number of topics that would deserve detailed discussions, yet can only be mentioned in a negative list in this context. The popularity of a writer such as Dan Brown or the Harry Potter books would provide material for a horizontal illustration in this report. The effect of such extraordinary successes in book markets – with the statistically recorded average customer might buy 0.8 books a year – can be as devastating for the distribution of national literature as a potato beetle plague would be for the next harvest.

Bookshelves stacked with mangas young readers unquestioningly read from back to front are one of the new phenomena which are slowly changing the book markets. Already, they are extremely noticeable and determining factors in the larger markets - increasingly also influencing the smaller markets. The not so young reader is rubbing his or her eyes, hardly able to make the connection from Japanese comics to China and South Korea, the countries buying the largest number of book licenses from German publishing houses every year.

Literature and state support

Let's leave Asia and Dan Brown to one side and focus on two home-made phenomena instead. Both contribute to the availability of European literature to households of reading citizens. For both phenomena, the question arises whether intention and effect are interrelated in an intelligible way.

The first question could be: "What does the state do for the dissemination of its own literature in terms of getting it translated?", or else: "What effects does it have on the market and the circulation of national literature if governments use books as popular 'ambassadors' in their external advertising?"

And the second question could be: "Which part and how much of the respective national canon of literature is available to other readers in the European Union that have no knowledge of foreign languages - or at least do not actively use them", or else: "Is there a trend towards a uniform (European) canon of literature, with authors from Eastern and Western Europe represented in

equal measure - or will the book market remain a domain of motley diversity?"

However, one thing is immediately clear: Those who believe that we are able to read translations of all important publications by our European fellow citizens if we have no knowledge of their languages are on the wrong track. Translations made available to us are fragments of fractions. A quick glance at the unreliable tables of titles produced in some EU countries and the percentage of translated titles reveals that we are not talking about mass but niche production (admittedly including mass phenomena such as the ones mentioned above that can potentially snowball with great impact): British publishing houses release some 160,000 titles (2004) every year. Germany - second-largest producer of new books - publishes approximately half of that amount: a total of nearly 80,000 new publications or nearly 90,000 book titles (2005). In the bottom midfield is Poland with a good 20,000 titles (of which 12,000 are new publications), Denmark with around 15,000 and Portugal with around 12,000. As already mentioned: Roughly speaking, statistics about title production distinguish between first-time publications, new editions, reprints, etc. In all cases, the proportion of fiction and youth literature among these titles is high - on average between 10 and 20 percent.

It is not only enlightening to compare these impressive numbers with the number of translations - it is also sobering: Around 50 percent of all translations into another foreign language are from English or from American English. Insiders using rather convincing background material even mention up to 70 percent. One

look at Polish figures seems to confirm this: According to statistics of the National Library, the number of translations from English (or American English) was the respectable amount of 3,180 or 60 percent of all translations in 2004. Almost half of these titles were fiction books (1,602). Translations from German formed the second largest group with 577 titles (11 percent). One quarter of this group were fiction books (116 titles).

The rest is allocated to other languages and 15 or 20 of them (and not even the official 21 languages, including Irish Gaelic forming the group of official EU languages from 2007), but at least theoretically almost 100. Of course we can leave out Manx, the Gagausian or the Asturian languages in our literature comparison and even the number of translations into Rhaeto-Romanic, Catalan or East Sorbian does not have to be the measure of all things in European translation practice. Yet even disregarding those language leaves 30 to 40 percent of translations allocated to more than 30 languages. If we accept that the “strong” representatives of the second league are among those remaining languages - with German having the strongest representation of native speakers, followed by Spanish, French and Italian - we quickly lose faith in wanting to work with percentages. And it is no consolation to point out that Albania, for example, is represented well enough with the large number of translated books by Ismail Kadare, and secondly that Albania does not belong to the EU and that the country’s language and literature do not have to be counted in...

The proportion of translations in book production varies enormously and - not

really surprisingly - is relative high in comparatively small markets such as the Dutch or the Hungarian market (20 to 60 percent), whereas it is rather small in larger markets (UK: less than 2 percent). Mainly Germany, but also Spain with their large output in book publications and a surprisingly high proportion of translations (in Germany, over 12 percent in 2003, currently around 7 percent) adopt an exceptional position, making it attractive for authors and translators from functionally secondary languages.

It is only too apparent: We are far from a real interpenetration of literary worlds and from a situation where all EU readers have similar access to creative people’s thinking in the European cultural sector.

Maybe that is not really a problem and all alarmists are right in saying: “The book is no longer a medium for a linguistic and transnational exchange of thoughts.”⁴³

In any case, it seems to be worth mentioning.

Promoting literature in Europe

And yet, books are still important products in the commodity basket of foreign cultural policy. Sometimes more, some-

It is only too apparent: We are far away from a real interpenetration of literary worlds and from a situation where all EU readers have similar access to creative people’s thinking in the European cultural sector.

times less, books are used as friendly ambassadors abroad by various governments. Even the European Union contributes to this with corresponding EU support programmes – albeit still reluctantly and rather symbolically.

In the context of the EU programme “Culture 2000”, the commission spent a total of 8,576,671 Euros for 338 translation projects over a period of 6 years. According to an analysis of the Budapest Observatory, 187 publishers from 19 EU countries have benefited from these projects. Only Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Belgium and Portugal did not receive any funds.⁴ No detailed information is required to see that overall expenditure for translation is so low that it hardly carries any weight. A little over 4,000 Euros per year and project were available. Statistically speaking, according to an analysis of the heaven-sent Budapest Observatory, every citizen would have received just enough money to translate one single word with six letters between 2000 and 2005. Thankfully, it wasn’t a four-letter word.

Without any hidden agenda, the people from Budapest also noted the costs of really complying with the necessities of Europe’s multilingual diversity beyond the belles lettres: While Culture 2000 issued the amount of €2 million to publishers for translations in 2003, providing interpreting and translation capacities in the EU institutions Council of Europe, EU Commission and EU Parliament that were not actually used cost a total of €10 million.⁵ The costs of Eurocracy are a constant topic of discussion – but that is not why I use these examples. I would like to highlight that time and again, the cost factor ‘translation’ disrupts the book

market and is a potential barrier for the circulation of literature in Europe. Only a short while ago, the Munich author and publisher Michael Krüger exploded in the light of the claims of literary translators for better remuneration. With great irritation, he demonstrated his calculation methods in public. This led to speculations of the German Publishers and Booksellers Association that the decrease in the licensed business in 2005 could potentially be seen in the context of this debate and similar discussions.⁶

Is book promotion worthwhile?

If the contribution from Brussels is hardly enough to alleviate the reproach that translation costs are driving publishers into the poorhouse, national support programmes can certainly relieve the financial burden. Individual expenditure varies a lot from country to country. There are no adjusted statistics as a basis for reasonable comparison. If the focus is mainly on the new member states and particularly on the MOE Countries, the data accumulated by Alexandra Büchler in the context of the programme ‘Literature Across Frontiers’ at the Mercator Centre of the University of Wales can be a useful source of information.

According to these data, Poland provides the highest amount by far – €273,890 in 2005 – while the Baltic States are operating with sums around €20,000 to €30,000. In Hungary, the foundation in charge at the Ministry of Education and Culture still had €120,000 at its disposal in 2003, whereas it had to work with just over €80,000 in 2005.⁷

Statistically speaking, in terms of

book production (without translations from a foreign language), this financial support means €5 to €18 per title. With an assumed funding of €1,000 to €10,000 for translation fees and/or licence charges per book, this is not a very fortunate situation. However, if we consider that the translation of two book titles between two smaller markets can mean an increase of 50 percent of the annual translations from a particular language, sensible financial support in such dimensions certainly seems realistic.

Additionally, considering the cultural product book as an integral part of foreign cultural policy, it can also be attractive for the individual cultural institutes representing their countries abroad to appear as a player and thus a financial sponsor. The entrance costs are low: €500 to €1,000 are often enough. This frequently generates external funds from various sources, which actually take over the entire translation charges and the licensing fee – and occasionally even printing costs. Twelve sponsoring institutions from ten countries is not the rule, but it does happen.

At the end of the nineties, a distinct professionalisation of institutions and programmes promoting books and their translations became apparent – in particular in the new EU member states in the East. The incentive provided by the German Publishers and Booksellers Association with its Guest Country Programme at the Frankfurt Book Fair should not be underestimated in the context of developing and expanding these programmes: The Translators' Funds of Latvia, Poland or Hungary were all founded in the context of this Guest Country Programme and have developed in mu-

tual alignment, at the same time competing with each other. They also had a joint presence at international book fairs. In June 2006, in the context of its invitation as a Guest Country for 2008, Turkey announced that the Turkish Ministry of Culture planned to stock up its translation fund – which proves the direct link to the programme.

Together with mere translation support, the national book or literature centres generally also work on other aspects of promoting books, literature and reading as well as documentation, which makes them an important, if not the prime source of information for foreign journalists, publishers and organisers of literature programmes.

However, it is not uncommon that requirements do not match reality and that the amount of time required for the input and maintenance of data is underestimated. Not all websites and databases are universally available in one foreign language (mostly English). According to Alexandra Büchler⁸, only the Polish and the Estonian databases allow for a full-text search of available translations of domestic works. Naturally, these services are not a speciality of the MOE states, but over the last ten years, it was particularly impressive to observe in these countries how authors and their works went under the auspices of foreign cultural policy and to what extent the individual states attempted to balance the “location disadvantage” of their own literature in foreign language markets. The old and older EU member states have already done the preparatory work. In an analysis of national support programmes and institutions, it becomes evident that something similar to a norm has been

accepted, which historically has probably been very strongly influenced by the Scandinavian programmes and the Norwegian NORLA in particular.⁹

Yet in spite of all the enthusiasm about a successful implementation of the Scandinavian model of translation and book promotion in book and literature centres, a nation's own limitations remain obvious. Let's use an analogy from sports: The entrance of the participants in the Olympic Games into the stadium is sponsored. Whether there will be medals and the achievements will be remembered, is a completely different story. Or – to put it differently: The participation in the so-called European discourse called for by intellectual or lettered elites is not simply guaranteed by providing a translation.

Books from newspapers

The statements on cultural diversity in basket 3 at the OSCE Conference in 1975 were often used to support the claim to translate important books into all major and minor European languages. Time and again, the idea of a national canon of literature to provide all European citizens with access to the intellectual wealth of their many neighbours – in high-quality translations and bound in luxurious covers – keeps coming up in the debates on cultural di-

This initiative has nothing to do with the European discourse about worlds of ideas. Illustrated books prevail.

versity in Europe.

While some of these schemes ended up in the cellar of the ordering party and quite a lot of money went towards well-meaning prestige projects far removed from the realities of the market, one glimpse into the bookshops or the virtual catalogues of the publishing houses is enough to see how the market itself interprets the task from basket 3 and has implemented it with profit.

It seemed as if the key to mass distribution of translated books had been found, when the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* started to “piggyback” books with newspapers in 2002. No state subsidy programmes, but the sheer mass made the books cheap – with direct access to the newspaper readers. Twenty million books were sold under the overall title of the series “20th century library”, generating a revenue of 112 million Euros.

Naturally, this initiative has nothing to do with the European discourse about worlds of ideas. Illustrated books prevail: Encyclopaedias, guidebooks through virtual or real galleries, fauna, informative, colourful or artistic contents, criminal fiction and adventure novels – but quality literature and books for young people are also part of the programme.

The concept has caught on. It seems as if the secondary school teachers of this world have begun to define the minimum of our set reading and to feed it to us with our morning papers. Throughout Europe – yet (still) with varying success: Whereas the number of series created in this format remains small, the market of book supplements is booming in Poland, in Portugal and in Belgium. Whereas British people receive DVDs

when buying their newspapers, a number of different series are competing in Spain and in Germany.

Together with many encyclopaedic and historic publications, a series with the title '19th century classics' or '20th century classics' is published in many cases, introducing the most important works of fiction from all over the world. The unofficial version of a canon of literature - without making such a claim and without the authority from the world of literature supporting the selection.

Although or particularly because these series are in a way anonymous and yet have been selected with great care - also with the local market in mind - it is very interesting to analyse where they are similar and where they differ from country to country. Is Graham Greene as much part of the Estonian selection as of the series in Portugal or Ireland? Is *Catch22* a title read by (almost) everyone? Are the books mainly by authors who won the Nobel Prize? Do very important, yet difficult books stand a chance with the newspaper readers?

My curiosity was initially very private and limited to comparing the first series of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* SZ in Munich and the *Gazeta Wyborcza* in Warsaw, because I had noticed that only three titles among the 40 titles of the Polish edition and the 50 titles of the German edition were identical in both series: "The Name of the Rose" by Umberto Eco, "Tortilla Flat" by John Steinbeck and "Swann's Way" by Marcel Proust. It may sound naïve - but I had expected a much larger proportion of "matching" titles.

A further comparison of the titles revealed that eight authors were represented in both series - with different titles:

The SZ series represented Günter Grass with "Cat and Mouse", whereas the Polish readers were able to enjoy "The Tin Drum". Hermann Hesse's "Beneath the Wheel" was chosen for the German readers, whereas "Steppenwolf" belonged to the Polish edition, Franz Kafka's "America" is part of the German series, whereas "The Trial" was chosen for the Polish series. Graham Greene's "The Third Man" is the German of choice, whereas it is "The Heart of the Matter" in Polish, Milan Kundera is published with "The Unbearable Lightness of Being", whereas "The Joke" is part of the Polish edition, "Heart of Darkness" by Joseph Conrad is the book of choice for the German edition and "The Secret Agent" in Poland and finally Julio Cortázar with "The Pursuer" in Germany and with "Hopscotch" in Poland.

It goes without saying that there are more Polish writers on the Polish list than in Germany (Gombrowicz, Iwaszkiewicz, Kapu ci ski, Konwicki, Lem, Miłosz). Yet the only Polish writer on the German list is Andrzej Szczypiorski,

In many cases, a series with the title '19th century classics' or '20th century classics' is published, introducing the most important works of fiction from all over the world. The unofficial variety of a canon of literature - without making such a claim and without an authority from the world of literature supporting the selection.

who is missing in the Polish edition.

Naturally, such a list can be scrutinised under various aspects, always fully aware that other elements beyond a conscious selection also play a role (for example the availability of printing rights, because the publishers are certainly angry about such “cheap offers”, with prices between four and five Euros). And yet: It is an interesting aspect if Vladimir Nabokov (with “Lolita“ of course) and George Orwell with “1984“ made it into the Polish list, but not into the German series.

Looking a bit further, Orwell is also represented in Slovakia, Italy and Spain – however, the titles vary – “Homage to Catalonia“ in Spain, released by the newspaper ‘El País’ and “Animal Farm” released by the Italian newspaper ‘Repubblica’. The social alternative represented by the novel “Brave New World“ by Aldous Huxley only appears in the Spanish series of El País. Joseph Conrad features in every series – yet with varying titles; often Heinrich Böll is part of the edition (with equally varying titles). Michail Bulgakov’s “The Master and Margarita“ is popular (Poland, Spain, Italy, Slovakia) – as well as the books that have risen to fame through the cinema: “The Great Gatsby“ by Scott Fitzgerald and “The English Patient“ by the Canadian writer Michael Ondaatje.

With the success of these series, new titles in new combinations are added all the time, which has not led to many discoveries of new foreign-language titles yet. The series generally stick to “safe“ classics. The Hungarian daily newspaper Népszabadság launched a series of ‘Classics of the 19th Century’.

But except for Dostoevsky, Turgenyev,

Sienkiewicz, Tolstoy and Chekhov, Western literature still plays the dominant role. Even translations of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky as part of a selection of 50 novels into Catalan only demonstrate what everybody knows already – that some Russian authors’ works are world literature of the 19th century. But that’s it: No 20th century author from the “East” is part of the original series in Italy, “Master and Margarita’ is published in the standard classics series in Spain together with Nabokov and Solzhenitsyn features from time to time.

So far, there is no indication that the “Western canon of literature” will open up to 20th century authors from the new member states and become a “West-Eastern canon of literature”. A letter by the reader Mr Mahr from Switzerland to the German magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ sounds almost reassuring: “At the Berlin School for Booksellers (1953 – 1956), we compared a History of World Literature from 1928 with the titles from 1955. The striking title of the History of Literature by Eduard Engel was: “Was bleibt? Die Weltliteratur. (What will survive? World Literature.)“. “In 27 years, not even five percent survived.”¹⁰ Where so much is variable over the years, ignorance remains tolerable.

And whether the call for book series with a better mix, contributing to the formations of new “canons of literature“ and providing a broader horizon for the literary awareness of the European readers is of any value leaves room for cautious doubt. The responsible market strategists state quite frankly that these projects are not primarily about reading. “The incentive to collect 10 to 35 books on a particular subject is not related to

the buyer's wish to read these books.“ The success of a series much rather depends on good advertising, efficient sales activities, the concept and a convincing price-quality ratio.¹¹

Nevertheless, it might not do any harm to try. But maybe we impose too much on books and on literature if we turn them into the packhorse of cultural diversity and intercultural discourse on our way to Europe.

Whether with state promotion or commercially arranged in series - maybe it would be beneficial to examine reading habits instead of book production. In the next Europa- Report (quarterly publication on policies, economy, research and culture).

Translation: Angelika Welt

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1 Wischenbart, Rüdiger: "Das Spielfeld ist zerrissen: Der globalisierte Buchmarkt." Article from 9 May 2006 in perlen-taucher.de (English translation from the German original quotation).

2 Buch und Buchhandel in Zahlen 2005. Published by the German Publishers and Booksellers Association. Frankfurt/Main 2005, p. 72.

3 Wischenbart, cf. Note 1.

4 MemoSep 2006, "Culture 2000 under Eastern Eyes", p. 24ff. www.budobs.org

5 *Ibid.*, p. 25 and accompanying letter for MemoSep "Eurotranslation".

6 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 January 2006, p. 31 and 'Buch und Buchhandel in Zahlen 2006', p. 69.

7 Presented at a conference of the Next Page Foundation and Kulturkontakt Austria on the subject of "Promoting translations - ideas, practices, innovations" on 23/24 June 2006 in Vienna.

8 "Promoting translations...", cf. note 7.

9 Norwegian literature abroad, fiction & specialist literature

10 Letter to the editor in 'Der Spiegel' 43/2006, reacting to an article on the book market in 'Der Spiegel' 41/2006.

11 Profile of the Paperview Group from Belgium on its website www.paperviewgroup.com

A HOUSE (OF LITERATURE) FOR THE CONTINENT

Houses of Literature are the future model of literature facilitation. In Germany, it has become obvious that all municipal sectors rather than just the group of people interested in culture benefit from these venues and that it is important to tap the full potential of a transnational network.

By Florian Höllerer



Over the last twenty years, there has been a real boom in opening new Houses of Literature in Germany, Austria and in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. With Berlin as the starting point, the growing enthusiasm for Houses of Literature has not been limited to the large cities. Over the years, an increasing number of mid-size cities such as Kiel, Darmstadt, Magdeburg, Wiesbaden, Rostock or Nuremberg have followed the trend. One could say that Houses of Literature have become a natural element of the urban cultural landscape – at the same level as theatres, museums, concert halls or cinemas.

Irrespective of this development, new Houses of Literature are founded everywhere in Europe. If we look at Poland,

there are large municipal institutions such as the »Nadbałtyckie Centrum Kultury« (»Baltic Cultural Centre«) in Gdansk and non-governmental venues such as the »Pogranicze« (»Border Country«) in Sejny, which are organised as foundations. As it is the tradition in all Eastern European countries, the houses of the Writers Associations are also major event venues. It is the same throughout Europe, with very diverse venues such as the »Villa Gillet« in Lyon, the »Maison de la Poésie« in Paris, the »Casa delle letterature« in Rome, the »International House of Literature« in Brussels (founded in 2004 under the name of »Passa Porta«), the SLAA in Amsterdam that joined forces with the cultural centre »De Balie«, the first Danish »House of Literature« that opened in Copenhagen in 2005 following the example of the German language Houses of Literature and finally the House of Literature in Oslo that will open soon.

All these Houses of Literature follow very unique cultural, economic and social traditions: The French book and reading landscape is strongly influenced by independent booksellers that have always been very influential. This situation is very different in Italy, where newsagents – among others – are increasingly participating in the book market. It is mainly the successful literature festival in Mantova setting

standards in this country. The traditional formats of literature events also vary significantly: An author's reading of an hour's length or longer is a very normal format in German-speaking countries and takes place in municipal libraries, bookshops or trendy cafés, whereas it is more the exception than the rule for a Spanish, French or Portuguese audience.

Already, an inkling of numerous idiosyncrasies prevents us from offhandedly deducing the unknown from what is known to us – for example by wanting to transfer the format of German Houses of Literature to an English or a Hungarian environment. Particularly the differences and the non-transferable aspects create the spark that introduces a twist to a newly developed venue. I would like to report about idiosyncrasies and perspectives focusing on three different aspects, with the House of Literature revolution as the starting point:

Citizens on the move

Located in representative buildings in the city centre, Houses of Literature are normally an ensemble of event and exhibition spaces, a restaurant, a café and a bookshop. With this mix, they have become urban meeting points – communication spaces where different groups of society exchange information and where citizens' initiatives and ideas for cooperation have their origin.

The prerequisite is an intact balance between the programme and the gastronomy – evoking the feeling that the House of Literature starts when entering the café/restaurant (and the bookshop) – and not only when entering the function room. Yet this is what makes this entire concept

vulnerable: Over time, many houses had to fight quite a lot to find restaurateurs combining strength of character and a sensible approach to the idea of the House of Literature with profitability. If this delicate arrangement works, Houses of Literature can also play an important role in urban planning and contribute to the resuscitation of old and derelict parts of town or new areas with a tendency to become sterile.

Anchoring Houses of Literature in urban life to a large extent also depends on the history of their foundation and their organisational forms. Houses of Literature are often associations and less frequently foundations and thus operate autonomously. They normally have hundreds, if not thousands of members and are also supported by friends. They are normally founded and supported by the public authorities (the cities and sometimes the federal state) – particularly by providing the property. However, the initial stimulus mostly came from the private sector: From people actively involved in the cultural sector, from publishers and citizens interested in literature. They started the process of founding the House of Literature, supported by politically influ-

If the idea of the House of Literature is realised in a profitable way, Houses of Literature can also play an important role in urban planning and contribute to the resuscitation of old and derelict parts of town or new areas with a tendency to become sterile.

ential citizens providing legal or business advice. Charity programmes supported by well-known writers and other cultural institutions sympathetic to the project often developed into inventive fundraising campaigns. A growing media interest and start-up funding by foundations and companies inspired socially influential citizens' initiatives with a high level of financial and non-material commitment to the cause of the House of Literature. This commitment lasted beyond the successful foundation of these Houses.

Ownership of the premises, rent reduction or the rent-free use of the building can be crucial in order to fund the day-to-day running of the institution. Revenues from leasing the restaurant and from the bookshop are normally directly allocated to the House of Literature budget. The function rooms are also rented out to external event organisers – cultural (associations, foundations, reading groups, etc.) and non-cultural (symposia, weddings, etc.). Foundation grants, donations and sponsoring contribute as well as annual subscription fees of the club members and the friends. Fourthly, revenue is generated from entrance fees. If we take the House of Literature in Stuttgart as an example, its total revenue covers at least two thirds of the overall budget. The remainder comes from public sources, with a major contribution from the fixed annual municipal grant and project funds granted by the federal state. Even if the relationship between public and private financing varies significantly from one city to another, this kind of mixed calculation is part of the fundamental principles of the House of Literature concept. The material responsibility is widely distributed throughout society.

Programme with a long-term effect

Over the last ten years, there has been a trend in cultural policy to reduce basic funding of cultural institutions and to replace it by project-based funding and funding of big one-off events to gain more flexibility and room for manoeuvre. Customary rights are abolished and budgets previously blocked by continuous funding have become more dynamic. Particularly in the field of literature, this tendency also has major disadvantages. Sustainability and the continuity of the work are in danger. Values based on long-term trust and faithful audiences demand to develop topics further and not just to kick them off. It also involves looking at themes and debates over a longer period of time, maintaining the dialogue with authors and following their development over the years. Literature on boats, in airports, zoological or botanical gardens or shopping arcades can be a breath of fresh air, yet it is tiring and counterproductive if overdosed.

In terms of sustainable long-term effects, the Houses of Literature are in a very good position: In the same way as theatres, opera houses and concert halls or museums, they believe in a highly specialised management principle, aiming for a personal profile inclined towards experiments – very much the opposite of the sluggishness and half-heartedness of board decisions. Generally, the aim is to develop programmes independently and to take risks rather than reacting passively to the reading tours organised by the publishing houses: Themed months, commissioned original contributions, and unusual constellations for panel discussions or extensive event series about one particular author, a genre or a theme over a few

months. In all houses, the hub of the programme repertoire is still the traditional reading, followed by a talk, moderated by well-known critics or other writers. What is offered might be the presentation of a young local writer of crime fiction, a Ukrainian poetry night or events with crowd pullers such as Imre Kertész, Jonathan Franzen, Michel Houellebecq or Orhan Pamuk, where the Houses of Literature (with roughly 200 seats) have to move into theatres or concert halls that offer five times their capacity. The times are over when people went to literature events out of noble mindedness or a sense of duty, of course without paying an entrance fee. In lengthy processes – mainly through word-of-mouth – audiences have gained the confidence to experience scintillating and unique evenings - by no means inferior to a visit to the cinema or the theatre. And engaging with the audience does not lead to complacency and to smoothing literature's anarchic hook. 'Sophisticated' is not the opposite of 'popular'. – In the long run, a sustainable positive attitude of audiences cannot be achieved without challenging exactly those audiences.

During the day, Houses of Literature also have a presence and mainly follow two paths, offering exhibitions and creative writing workshops. The exhibition programme ranges from comic strip presentations in the function room to large-scale, especially curated touring exhibitions, with themes such as 'Hannah Arendt' or 'Die Kinder der Manns' (The Children of the Mann Family), presented in separate gallery spaces, accompanied by supporting programmes and being acknowledged/meeting responses beyond a particular region. They are also attractive for school groups, thus bring-

ing tomorrow's visitors into the House of Literature at an early stage. This also applies to the creative writing workshops, mostly aimed at young people, but also at adults. In this context, a lot of big projects have developed over the last years – often funded by foundations – cooperating with schools, producing publications, looking for supranational contacts and thus including authors from a particular city over longer periods of time as lecturers of the venue .

In search of cooperation

The most important term for the work of any House of Literature is cooperation. Only a small minority of evenings take place without a cooperation partner. This could be a foreign cultural institute, a publisher, a university institute or a foundation. It could also be radio stations broadcasting series of talks from the House of Literature, newspapers commissioning essays together with the venues, a big museum commissioning writers to describe their favourite work of art, a theatre co-organising a reading by Michael Frayn when his play »Copenhagen« is part of its repertoire, an opera house participating in a Hölderlin evening in the context of the premiere of Bruno Madernas' »Hyperion Project«, law firms sponsoring a panel discussion on the ban of Maxim Billers' novel »Esra«, a film producer as the partner for a poetry film festival, etc.

However, this does not turn Houses of Literature into cultural supermarkets, constantly going beyond their own expertise by organising everything and nothing.

Particularly a high-profile partner enables the houses to focus on their own core

profile, even if the individual evening exceeds the boundaries of literature towards music, architecture, religion, education or politics. The fact that the audiences of two institutions and two interest groups meet and join forces in the mutual promotion of a joint evening is particularly beneficial for the perception of the House of Literature as the intellectual hub of the city.

A search for synergies also takes place beyond the microcosm of the individual city. Or to speak in chemical terms, Houses of Literature are molecules with free, unsaturated compounds. Due to the continuous absorption of impulses from other cities and other countries, the initiators and providers of ideas play a stimulating role in common talk. Houses of Literature such as the »Literarische Colloquium« in Berlin, which also offers a scholarship programme or the »Literaturwerkstatt« have nurtured relationships to foreign and particularly European institutions over many years, which contribute to their wealth of experience.

Those eight big Houses of Literature in the German-speaking cities of Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Salzburg, Munich, Cologne, Stuttgart and Leipzig that have created the »literaturhaeuser.net« network also have a wide range of experiences with cooperations. In Munich, an office financed with equal representation

However, this does not turn Houses of Literature into cultural supermarkets, constantly going beyond their own expertise by organising everything and nothing.

was opened to coordinate the activities of the houses and to service the Internet presence »www.literaturhaeuser.net«. The first joint activity of all houses - »Poesie in die Stadt! (Poetry in the City!)«, which will now be repeated every summer with a changed theme and changing sponsors consisted of distributing more than 3000 gigantic posters with modern poetry in the whole of Germany. Over the years, diverse forms of cooperation have taken place: Reading tours with important authors not yet discovered by the wider public (some years ago Richard Powers or Kiran Nagarkar) or the project »Transnationale«, where all houses deliberately organised different events at the same time and on the same subject (transnational literature). Every year at the Leipzig Book Fair, the network awards the »Preis der Literaturhäuser« to authors for particularly successful literature events.

It is an advantage that other opportunities to source funds come up as a result of the cooperation. This particularly applies to the large public and private foundations. They are happy to work with one central contact and enjoy being able to finance local projects in different parts of the country with one single grant. Hence, an increasing amount of funds goes into cities which would have been out of reach without the House of Literature – quite an important argument for municipal politics. Joint projects also simplify the PR work for the different houses – particularly when dealing with national newspapers and radio stations. A number of years ago, »literaturhaeuser.net« also signed the contract for the media partnership with the TV channel »Arte«.

In terms of European and general international networking, this potential has

not really been fully exploited yet. The community of Houses of Literature faces great challenges in this context. One step into the right direction is the ambitious writer-in-residence project that »literaturhaeuser.net« has organised together with the »Goethe-Institut«, »Arte«, the »Frankfurt Book Fair« and institutions of the individual partner countries: Last year, in cooperation with Houses of Literature, seven German cities sent one author to an Indian city for one month to keep a diary. Every day, these diaries were published on the Internet in two languages. In exchange, seven Indian authors came to the German cities as writers-in-residence. This project generated texts characterised by the unguarded immediacy of daily writing on the one hand and by the shifts in perception caused by the duration of the stay on the other hand. Two years before, the same project took place in cooperation with seven Arab cities and the candidate for the exchange in 2008 is Turkey.

All in all, these are three important reasons why the House of Literature model is the future. One aspect becomes very evident in this context: Literature is not the week little plantlet that has to be protected by the cities as a dying species. On the contrary. Firm roots anchor literature in

society, ensuring its sustainable and long-term cohesion. The main beneficiaries of the foundations of Houses of Literature are the cities themselves. They receive a multiple return on their investment.

Translation: Angelika Welt

Since 2000, **Florian Höllerer** has been the director of the House of Literature in Stuttgart. He did German and Romance Studies, worked as an Assistant Instructor at Princeton University for two years and received the honorary award of the Académie des Sciences, Belles Lettres et Arts in Lyon. In his latest post, he was involved in the Culture and City Programme (Brussels 2000) at the Goethe-Institut Brussels.

With the prospect of becoming a member of the EU, many nations have moved towards an open society. [...]

Wherever Europe follows a common political course - for example in the case of Iran - it was able to persuade others - even the USA - to abandon their inflexible positions. However, it is far too seldom that Europe taps its full potential.

George Soros, Investor and Philanthropist





A STAGE FOR EUROPEAN THEATRE Europe is the home of theatre. Festivals as open events provide an ideal platform for cultural exchange: Artists present their various disciplines, creating interest for their works. The audience can choose from an extraordinary cultural programme and last, but not least, festivals are also a driving force for the regional economy. *By Bernard Faivre d'Arcier*



Although the word festival is sometimes associated with the remote past (taking the examples of Bayreuth or Orange), the concept is relatively young. It goes hand in hand with civilisation and leisure activities, summer outings and the expansion of the media. In the case of Avignon, the oldest and most famous of European festivals, its founder, the actor and director Jean Vilar, would never have been able to imagine its success and above all the expansion of the festival phenomenon in 1947. In his opinion, the festival was only one of various means to gather a young audience and to communicate particular aesthetic and moral values to these people. Yet it turned out that immediately after World War II, several festivals started in various

countries at the same time. Only one year after Avignon, the Poetry Festival in Aix-en-Provence came into being, with the festivals of Edinburgh and Recklinghausen also starting at that time. Therefore, it is a social and historic phenomenon at the same time, which was completely in line with the *Zeitgeist* and has been closely linked to our leisure and media society to the present day.

Since that time, a myriad of theatre festivals has evolved. Most recent statistics mention more than 3000 festivals in Western Europe, classifying them according to a variety of categories: The size of the festival, its dates, the type of festival, etc. Of course they are always labelled as incredibly beneficial for tourism and the local economy. Hungary for example has consciously identified 1000 cultural activities which the local authorities happily call "festival". Is the festival idea diluted by objectives of the tourist industry? And are there not too many festivals anyway? And is it not true to say that audiences are already tired of the concept? Meanwhile, we seem to feel increasingly sated with something that has become a formula rather than an attitude, as Europe is flaunting an incredible amount of different statements!

In actual fact, the festival concept should be reserved for cultural events

promoting creativity and international innovation, as it is the true role of a festival to allow artists to initiate projects and activities that would not be performed in the context of ordinary institutions. However, the magic label cannot be allocated exclusively to the diminishing number of truly creative festivals. It is also important to acknowledge that festivals continue to play a major role for the distribution of artistic works.

It is common knowledge that a growing amount of events everywhere in Europe increasingly face marketing problems – particularly in public theatres and very specifically in countries with predominantly small groups working from one project to the next. This is different from Europe or Central European countries with their repertoire theatres, where actors on the payroll have the security to play for the entire season. Yet in France, there is a strong economic imbalance between production and distribution. Strong increases in supply and thus overproduction have generated a clogging up of communication and distribution channels and a certain exhaustion among the audiences.

Festivals are a breath of fresh air for such events and some of them were simply created for that purpose. They increase the number of visitors or, to use Brecht's words, enlarge the "circle of initiates".

Strong increases in supply and thus overproduction have generated a clogging up of communication and distribution channels and a certain exhaustion among the audiences.

However, in other European countries, a saturation of the market cannot be lamented yet. The whole of Eastern Europe has turned towards the festival formula for quite some time now, yet the opportunities to circulate works from another country are particularly limited in the East.

Nevertheless, we can also witness a duplication of festivals in that part of Europe – from the Baltic States to Bulgaria and from Romania to Poland. Does the festival format still serve a purpose? A festival distinguishes itself by being exceptional. "Festival rime avec carnaval et estival." (Festival rhymes with carnival and estival.) The secret of the success and longevity (60 years!) of a festival like Avignon is: A meeting that lasts for three to four weeks in the summer in an ancient town, where all theatre aficionados constantly bump into each other.

This is the public view of a festival and also the reason why the large European metropolises find it difficult to define the identity of their festivals, as there are so many activities on offer throughout the year. There is not one European metropolis that does not have its own festival. Some – from Brussels to Zagreb – deliberately occupy the entire calendar and distribute the festival over every month of the year.

The festivals as places of carefree celebration have often been compared to the "permanent institutions" – the main suppliers of cultural education, faithful adaptations and rigour of cultural activities. Luckily, this distinction is no longer unequivocal as the festivals on the one hand have adopted the role of initiating and educating their audiences, ultimately ensuring a lot of visibility to the permanent spaces, and on the other hand artistic production and distribution centres

increasingly include festival elements in their annual programmes in order to rekindle the spark of the audience yet the opportunities to circulate works from another country are particularly limited in the East.

Nevertheless, in the eyes of one part of the cultural public, festivals seem to be more lightweight, frivolous events - too concerned with their media image and ultimately too numerous to do serious sustainable work.

Who benefits from the festivals nowadays and what are their actual benefits? According to local politicians, there are many good reasons to organise a festival in their respective cities.

1) Firstly, to provide a new opportunity for the democratisation of culture. The festival seems to offer an easier access to citizens and audiences than cultural institutions that people pass every day without ever going in (for various reasons: lack of information, high entrance fees, cultural barriers and the fear of “not belonging to that world”). Audiences take greater risks for a festival - and particularly for open-air festivals enabling people to make good use of their weekends and the holiday season, to find new friends and to get together in groups. The events seem to be more accessible and it is easier to get in touch with singers or actors. Every local member of parliament who wants as many citizens and the electorate to enjoy cultural activities is pleased with successful festival series. Immediately, the costs of an event that lasts over several days are compared with the annual budget of a cultu-

ral institution by dividing it by the number of users inspired by the cultural muse. This is the reason for the success of street theatre and circus. Without them, there would be no festival nowadays. For local politicians, easy access to the event seems to be a condition, if not a guarantee for the democratisation of culture.

2) A festival creates the impression or the illusion that it strengthens local identity. A festival is like a balm soothing social tensions, providing the opportunity for new neighbourly bonds and allowing for new social mixes - even if they only last for a short while. It could also be an expression of the identity of a particular district or a professional environment. Furthermore, it is well-known that some members of parliament like to see artists showing a stronger social commitment, which is inevitably linked to less inequality in culture and education.

3) The latest and without a doubt most effective argument is that a festival provides good opportunities for the business sector. For fifteen years now, more or less vague studies have convinced the members of parliament, but also the retailers and local businesses that a festival first and foremost means good business. This applies less to the sectors threatened by decline, but to the service sector: from hotels to parking spaces, from cafés to cleaning services, from souvenir shops to travel agents. Adding everything up, the rule of thumb says that every Euro invested in the festival generates at least three, if not up to ten Euros: Expenses for ac-

commodation, the events themselves, travel costs, the derived salaries as well as leases for flats and materials. The local authorities are fully aware of the fact that a festival is often a labour exchange – if only for one season. Although the job opportunities are precarious and generally do not require a high level of qualification (workers, technicians, waiters, drivers, doormen), they provide an opportunity that needs to be ceased for the benefit of young people – whether they are students or people at the beginning of their professional career.

- 4) Together with the economic benefits, the festival also enables the community hosting it to create a particular image it could not achieve otherwise. Often, the festival is such a central element of tourism policy that its impact goes beyond its actual dates. Thus, a city can build up a certain prestige which it would only achieve with large expenses for advertising and PR – if at all. A high-profile festival attracts greater and broader interest in the media than any advertising campaign. For that reason, festival venues are fighting a tough battle to be able to offer festival dates not only suitable for their audience, but also for the media.
- 5) The final *raison d'être* of the festivals is of course the most important

A high-profile festival attracts greater and broader interest in the media than any advertising campaign.

(but is not always presented in the right place): A festival has a first-rate significance in artistic and cultural terms. Artistic in the sense that the festival – if it is commissioned and possess the means of a creative activity – ought to allow the artists to produce works and experiments beyond their usual habits and locations, which in turn enables them to innovate and to escape from their routine. During a festival, a performance can last for half an hour or for the entire night. It can be in Korean or in Turkish and it can invigorate an extraordinary place it would see for an ordinary performance. A festival has to be a place to take risks. It is of mutual cultural interest if the festivals provide opportunities to discover, to learn and to discuss among equals – also from the point of view of the audiences. During festivals, formal and informal discussions take place, words, rumours and reputations circulate. As most festivals are internationally open meeting events showing different aesthetics and mixing various disciplines, they are privileged moments – for the artists to rediscover their audiences and for the critics to be criticised themselves. The audiences have to find their luck on roads often less travelled and the events have to continue finding their audience every night.

Hence, there are a number of reasons for continuing to create new festivals. The currently existent festivals could be categorised as follows:

- Minority festivals for women, homo-

- sexuals, senior citizens, etc.
- Identity festivals for a local group or a regional (ethnic) culture
- Festivals for tourists
- Original festivals which first and foremost aim to be different, want to occupy a niche or represent a single artistic aspect – for example debut films, fairy tales or photo journalism. In order to become a talking point, a festival could also take place on a boat, in a hot-air balloon or in the woods.

But at the same time, festivals would have to maintain their ambition to present a coherent programme, which should turn them into generalists rather than specialists. We have to be aware that there is apparently no longer one predominant school of thought at the theatre (as it was the case with previous masters such as Grotowski, Barba, Vilar, Mnouchkine, Brook or Heiner Müller) and still is the case in music, dance or in the visual arts. There is no longer an ideological guideline providing a festival with a standardised doctrine. The festivals of encounters present many artistic directions – and they either mix or – in the worst case – fall apart. Therefore, internally a festival always must have the ambition to accompany its audiences, if it doesn't want to force them into incessant "zapping". This is not about a gathering of brothers with the same faith, but about helping everybody to explore the various tendencies in contemporary art.

From the elite to the masses

The festival is certainly a joint adventure shared with the artists, but it does

not only exist for the pros. In the true sense, its only *raison d'être* is a faithful relationship to its audience. Or rather audiences in the plural to be precise, because we have known for a long time that the audience is actually a conglomerate of individuals, with their varying histories, references and educations.

And that is the actual difficulty of a "creative festival" – to address audiences with a diverse attitude to art. Therefore, a contradictory mission is required of the festival: to consider local cultural life and at the same time open up to the international dimension; to surprise the old hands among the critics without closing the door on the young critics; to form a bond with the audience and at the same time renew it; to develop a coherent and strict programme and at the same time promote festivity and conviviality – and thus pleasure.

Some regret this major expansion of mass culture so much that the attachment to artistic values is seemingly only relevant for a minority these days. A minority or rather an elite? This question is relevant at a political level, as being in a minority is often confused with being part of an elite. Yet the festival audiences are not an elite as defined at the time of the class struggles. The festival audiences do not necessarily have their origins in the richest and very well-to-do groups. Naturally, money will always remain a

The greatest barrier to access culture, however, is less of a financial, but rather of a cultural nature.

problem. It can objectively avoid practical uses and consumption of culture. The greatest barrier to access culture, however, is less of a financial, but rather of a cultural nature.

The relationship to art and its values (sensitivity, emotions, fantasies as well as knowledge or pure intellect) decide about the interest in cultural aspects. De facto, appreciating art requires education, constant interest and acceptance of its rituals, regardless of the actual artistic categories and typologies. Modern pop music and the so-called alternative theatre are equally constituent for certain individual groups and specific audiences as the opera or classical dance. All the better - as art sometimes clashes with unanimity and consensus. Looking at the various aspects, this explosion of formats and audiences no longer seems to be a factor of social cohesion, but a sign of cultural diversity, which is often promoted nowadays.

Festivals and regional identity

Cities and regions (French départements, Italian provinces or German Länder alike) are spellbound by the festival formula. Those locally selected are at the forefront: They are the first promoters and without a doubt the first beneficiaries of these festivals. The formula seems so seductive that they sometimes forget all the other cultural work throughout the year. Sometimes they confuse festival with fete and develop a tendency towards the event character, which puts them in the limelight of the media and ensures the recognition by their audiences and the electorate - starting with local businesses. A festival has a stronger impact on local

cultural life than we might believe:

- It has a strong mobilising function, as it is an event format that can be exploited by the media. For the media, it is a godsend: It spells everything out to the press and the television, accumulates slogans and logos and presents a critical mass which is easier to identify than an isolated event or an annual programme carefully distributed over an entire season.
- A festival supports local cultural life and local artists. Rivalry at some festivals between external "imported" artists and local artists has been mentioned frequently. On the one hand, some festivals do actually integrate certain local artists. If that is not the case, spontaneously developing parallel events can often be observed, "seizing" or complementing the so-called official festival. Other artists also join the festival to make themselves known and to benefit from the gathering of audiences, journalists and pros. Avignon is a good example in that context: The troupe of actors in the cities invented the "off"-activities and primarily presented them during the time of the festival. In Edinburgh, the "Fringe" with its abundance of events even surpasses the original festival.
- A festival is also an incentive for the local scene to compare and measure itself with artists from outside, but at the same time also to work with them. Artists are encouraged to develop further and the festivals cooperate with local structures at different levels of intensity (from renting out

the location to coproducing the festival).

- Ultimately, a festival allows local or external audiences to rediscover a city and its hinterland and to adopt common spaces in a different way than in daily life. A film festival can help promoting a local venue, a theatre festival to modernise historic buildings. And an audience can rediscover unusual places, unknown buildings and forgotten paths.

It is therefore not necessary to convince politicians of the usefulness of festivals. However, they should receive support in specifying their project and in maintaining their course in terms of artistic aspirations and education of audiences. A city cannot just launch something and a festival cannot just establish itself anywhere. Hence, it is necessary that the region communicates with creative artists and facilitators. We have learned from experience that an artistic director often becomes obsolete as soon as a festival understands how to address artistic claims and cultural activities in equal measure. It is the responsibility of the artistic director to cultivate the relationship with the artists on the one hand and on the other hand to inform the audiences and

bring them together. The artistic director has to counterbalance his/her competency with independence. He/She should be assured about the length of his/her contract, cannot behave like a local employee and should not be perceived as one.

In Europe - home of the theatre - and inhabited by a cultural consumer society with the media having gained such a high level of importance, the future of festivals certainly looks bright.

Translation: Angelika Welt

After studying Microeconomics, **Bernard Faivre d'Arcier** was initially in charge of theatre, film and audiovisual media at the French Ministry of Culture. For 16 years - with two interruptions - he was the director of the Festival d'Avignon, cultural adviser of the French Prime Minister and head of department in the Ministry of Culture. He initiated the French branch of today's Franco-German culture channel ARTE and currently works as an adviser for a number of cities and regions.

VISIONARY OPERA Opera not just provides more social prestige as an end in itself – it has discovered its transnational potential. International co-productions and festivals have turned the opera into a promising platform for a debate on social, economic, political and environmental topics at a European and a global level. *By Xavier Zuber*



The title of this cultural report investigating the role of culture in Europe is “Progress Europe“. I would like to link this significant and at the same time abstract topic with opera - first and foremost a place of internal and external communication. Its interaction with people represents an advanced Occidental civilisation. Yet opera also belong to the performing arts – with its roots going back 400 years and with obvious European influences: Opera represents a precious cultural memory of our “old”, yet very diverse Europe. As an institution, it still reveals aristocratic and courtly structures as well as democratic and bourgeois aspects – starting with the structure of the apparatus defining artistic everyday

life – from the hierarchical top with the artistic director, followed by the musical director, the singers, musicians and the technical staff. Not only does this hierarchy enable poetry, music and the visual arts to work under one roof, but also to join forces in order to realise the concept for one particular work of art. In the course of the artistic process, this concept turns into a vision expressed in artistic terms, with the objective to provide a counterpoint to our current bourgeois concept of humankind.

In practice, the “entente“ between the individual art forms seems like trying to square the circle. Artists gathering under the roof of opera often represent differing artistic opinions and views. But opera would not be opera if this “cohabitation“ of the arts would not lead to a productive argument, with the focus always on the singing individual. Interpretations of operas such as “La Traviata“ or “Carmen“ are processes of our times. Modern music theatre as we understand it in Stuttgart, for example, attempts to find works from the traditional repertoire or to lift a new piece from the darkness of its origins

and prepare it for the present.

In the 20th century, the opera plunged into a legitimisation crisis. In the past, it mainly had to represent the respective ruling form of society and was only able to question it to a limited extent, whereas the theatre could afford a critical and independent position due to the social events of democratisation and a smaller, more flexible apparatus. This found an artistic expression in the reform movements of the

20th century German National Socialism marked a distinctive break in the aesthetic reform of opera (and the theatre in general). The abuse of the German repertoire was radically investigated by taking a close look at the works. The examination of his grandfather's creations by stage and festival director Wieland Wagner (Stuttgart) are one example in this context. And we also need to consider the rapid development of modern technologies in the past 40 years, influencing today's aesthetic work and interpretation efforts.

Hence today's music theatre provides an opportunity to discuss the development of our (intellectual) history and its inherent role for the people. Opera as an institution provides the necessary space and freedom for that purpose. It is the temple of intellectual debate between the composer, the author and the stage director. The Stuttgarter Musiktheater and its artistic work is a good example for this approach.

Yet which are the themes in question? Which of them will be worked on and

make it to the stage? And which aspects connect and separate people in Europe nowadays? These questions also determine the work of a modern music theatre in terms of contents and dramaturgy, at times of European partnerships and co-productions of opera houses and international festivals. Nowadays, music and theatre productions not only serve the national prestige as an end in itself. They are rather pillars of modern forums presenting contemporary events with subsequent discussions.

Thus global problems also influence these works. In this context, I would like to give one example of a well-known opera from the repertoire.

In June 2006, the opera *Wozzeck* by Alban Berg had its premiere in Hanover and was shown in Barcelona afterwards. With this opera, the stage direction team (including myself as the dramatic advisor) around the Catalan director Calixto Bieito wanted to point towards the catastrophic situation of the environment and nature. The exploitation of the individual – in this case Fall *Wozzeck's* – is symbolically declared

And which aspects connect and separate people in Europe nowadays? These questions also determine the work of a modern music theatre in terms of contents and dramaturgy, at times of European partnerships and co-productions of opera houses and international festivals.

as a sign of our times. The opera asks the following question (freely adapted from Büchner and Berg): What is the relationship of humankind to nature? The opera was produced as an apocalyptic vision of nature wasting away. An ecological dimension developed for the opera houses in Barcelona, Hanover and Madrid was added to the story. Such works in opera literature provide us with highly relevant contemporary topics.

For some time now, the Staatsoper Stuttgart has covered trends in new forms of music theatre. The Forum für Neues – so the official name of the venue on the Römerkastell in Stuttgart since the beginning of this season – brings international teams together to develop and perform new works in music theatre. It was formerly known as the Forum Neues Musiktheater and was initiated by Klaus Zehelein (opera director at the time) three years ago. Here, in the forum – also called “opera laboratory” – the focus is on the composer who develops his work in cooperation with authors, stage directors and stage designers. The works deal with stories “from the street”, which means they are relevant for our contemporary times. One work was the “zeitoper” Carcrash by the composers Willi Daum and Ralf R. Ollertz, with the car providing the central content for the production. The composition stages an imaginary drive at night, representing the unconscious of the driver, with microsleep triggering internal activity. The threat of an

accident is suddenly so real that the course of events leading up to this accident becomes an endlessly repetitive story set to music. The extreme situation of the driver – and thus the audience – in this “zeitoper” makes this night drive impressive music theatre on the subject of man and mobility.

The question of the report at hand also can and has to be passed back: Which role do opera and music theatre play for the political institutions of the EU? Or more poignantly: To what extent does the EU administration support opera as an artistic genre with its role as an intermediary for new ideas and visions? Would it not be an opportunity for Europe to distinguish itself if the identities of our states not only consisted of economic and national factors, but also of cultural interests? Would it not be possible to identify opera houses as European venues for forums of debate and exchange – to be supported accordingly? And aren't the already existing museums, theatres and opera houses in Europe predestined for this role?

Some European opera houses – for example Hanover and Barcelona – are already working towards this objective. They summarise their programmes with a theme that works as a leitmotif for their concept, also thematically incorporating social topics and discussions of the respective cities and countries. The opera house in Stuttgart currently cooperates with the Institut Français and other institutional partners, developing a thematic focus on “French culture in Germany. Isn't it exciting to discuss the French view of history and its reception in Germany within the large repertoire of French opera, for example

in the context of Hector Berlioz' "Les Troyens" or Claude Debussy's "Pelléas et Mélisande"?

Which concepts of mankind are these operas based upon? What is their cultural background? Which musical forms are used? French? Or German? The opera can present this argument and debate about European idiosyncrasies in a very exciting way. The singing individual moves in a world of ideas and utopian thoughts, with all of them questioning our relationship to the present. The primacy of music provides opera and modern music theatre, which has developed from opera, with an emotional dimension asserting an alternative concept with great relish, helping to shape our future in a visionary way.

Translation: Angelika Welt

Since September 2006, **Xavier Zuber** has been the chief dramatic adviser at the Staatsoper Stuttgart. From 2001 to 2006, he was involved in "Schwerpunkt Oper" and "zeitoper" in his role as artistic adviser at the Staatsoper in Hanover. From 1998 to 2000, he worked as the artistic adviser for opera and dance theatre at the Theater Basel and from 1996 to 2005, he worked as a lecturer in the Department of Scenography at the State Academy for Design in Karlsruhe.





EUROPE – WORK OF ART “European art“ does not exist. Culture is a distinguishing feature of different peoples – not least visible in national pavilions at international events such as the Venice Biennial. What is the role of governmental and non-governmental players for the well-organised arts exchanges of “old“ EU member states? Is the potential of art as an image factor fully exploited? How do the “new“ EU member states attempt to get access to the EU market? *By Ursula Zeller*



“Europe does not only consist of markets, but also of values and culture“, so the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso at the Berlin Conference “A Soul for Europe” in November 2004. The question of the role of culture within the EU and for the EU has been asked openly again in the recent past. At different internal and external levels of the EU administration, an intense discussion of European cultural values is taking place – in particular as they are considered to be the basis for a European foreign policy shaped by the EU. The questions are also topical in terms of the interaction with the Islamic world and the internal European debate about Islam. Yet Europe struggles to define specifically European values. The

smallest common denominator would be allowing for contradictions and diverse views, respect for regional cultures and the development of a canon of values – with democracy and freedom firmly anchored as core values.

As difficult as it may be to establish common cultural values for Europe, we also note that Europe has merged very closely together in cultural terms. Approximately one million European tourists in- and outside of Europe spend a fortune on exhibitions, visits to the opera, the concert hall, the theatre or the cinema. They travel widely – from one event or one festival to the next – in order to experience the cultural events that mean something to them. Private collectors make large-scale purchases for their art collections. But it is not only premium art that finds its clientele. In popular culture, big events from all over Europe merge in a cultural festival which is globally competitive. This remarkable appreciation of art and culture creates a renaissance for European cities and attracts large numbers of tourists. This development is almost independent of influences from Brussels, as the EU’s cultural budget is modest and can only support culture on a small scale. This renaissance of art and culture reveals a certain common understanding of art and culture in Europe. Yet it is still a

long way to a real common perception of European culture.

European art versus art in Europe

By definition, culture is a distinguishing concept. Hence, the culture of one nation differs from the culture of another nation. The same ought to apply for art as one aspect of culture. So does European art exist? For the period from the Middle Ages to the 19th century, we talk about European art: Architecture across several countries is the most visible expression of the common European cultural area. Art history – the retrospective classification and allocation of the development of art – knows cross-national styles, but also regional schools and local idiosyncrasies in Europe up until the 20th century. After that, the approach of retrospective analysis no longer works as there are too many parallel new developments in global art. Hence, the closer we get to the present, the more the perception of European art has become diluted in the international discourse on art.

This can be clarified further by an

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example from history: American artists detaching themselves from Europe dismissed the centralised perspective which was perceived as decidedly European and developed Abstract Expressionism in the forties and fifties. At the same time, “Art Informel“ developed in France and Germany. At first sight, the two schools seemed to be similar. However, on closer observation their prerequisites, contents and objectives are quite different, which is also the case for the French and the German styles. The differences in the national characteristics of art can be explained with a different place of origin, different traditions, mentalities, languages and ways of thinking. These dissimilarities may not always be very significant, which is why we are increasingly discussing the antagonism between Western and non-Western art and less so between European and American art, for example. Nevertheless, differences in terms of so-called national idioms in the global language of art exist, with the national idioms of Europe more closely affiliated with each other due to a common European cultural area than with American or even Asian idioms.

Yet we do not particularly focus on the differences in the national arts scenes within Europe. One reason could be that attempts of a definition readily fall back on national stereotypes. An external observer would probably be in the best position to describe the common grounds and the differences in contemporary European art.

The best example for the differences in the national arts scenes can be found at the Venice Biennial, where the contest of nations in fine arts and architecture takes place every two years. Founded in

1895, initially only the core countries of Europe - England, France, Germany and Italy - took part. At the beginning of the 20th century, they built their own pavilions in the Giardini to show their contributions. Soon, other European countries, but also the USA, some Latin American countries and others joined in. Nowadays, almost every nation wants to be represented with its own pavilion in Venice. As there is not enough space in the Giardini, the national pavilions find locations in palaces and churches all over the city. Over the past years, mainly countries from the former Soviet Union and Asian countries pressed forward and wanted to participate in the Biennial to show their growing confidence in the arts and because Europe still plays an important role in contemporary fine arts. For the young states in Central and Eastern Europe, the participation in the Biennial is an important step into the European art market. Even if the contest is no longer taken as seriously as in the beginnings of the Biennial, each country still aims to send the best artists to compete for the Golden Lion awarded to the best national presentation. The differences in artistic idioms manifest themselves in these presentations.

EU cultural policy and art

If national differences in art exist, they should be nurtured and supported, which is the task of the individual states. It is the role of the EU to promote the exchange between the national cultural scenes, as its motto is to support unity in diversity. So what does the EU do to support cultural exchange?

The EU started its work in the cultural

sector at the end of the eighties with the Commission granting financial support for selected activities. Thus, its involvement in culture started comparatively late because of the subsidiarity principle that applies to all EU activities: The EU is not allowed to engage in areas of responsibility of individual nations or rather its own constituents. As culture falls into the sphere of responsibility of individual nations, EU cultural programmes are exclusively dedicated to areas beyond national spheres of influence, for example to international multilateral exchange or the protection of historical monuments. In 1995, the regulations in the Article on cultural policy of the Maastricht Treaty increased the areas of EU activity in the cultural sector with the programmes supporting sectoral cooperation: Ariane supported the book sector, Raphaël the cultural heritage and Kaléidoscope the performing arts. In the beginning, the focus of EU funding was on a large number of small-scale, short-term activities relating to a broad range of cultural areas and objectives. The framework programme CULTURE 2000 (2000 to 2006) was introduced to end this scattering of funds by establishing one standard instrument. However, the initiative has only achieved its objective to a limited extent. One reason is the necessary unanimous decision-making process, which leads to compromises and prevents prioritising. On the other hand, there is no real European cultural community which could

Differences in terms of so-called national idioms in the global language of art exist.

provide the framework for focused activities. At least, the programme fills the cultural activities with meaningful contents. In December 2006, the Council of Ministers of Culture agreed the follow-up framework programme CULTURE (2007 – 2013).

The programmes CULTURE 2000 and CULTURE (2007 – 2013) can also fund art projects. For the period between 1996 and 2000, approximately 2000 cultural projects were funded by the EU in the context of the Community programmes. Over the same period, more than 8000 project partners were involved, with an average of five participants from various countries. At that time, the total funding amount was approximately €130 million. In 2005, the EU budget for culture was at 0.12 percent of the entire EU budget - not much considering that France spent one percent of its gross domestic product on culture in the same year. Consequently, the promotion of culture is only of little significance in all sectors of the EU. Even if the funding amounts have increased slightly over the last few years, up to now this has not changed the situation fundamentally. Therefore, many applications are not even sent to the programme CULTURE 2000, but to the EU education programme. This leads to very low expectations of the artists and cultural institutions towards the EU. Additionally, the barriers for the projects subsidised by the EU are relatively high: for one-year projects, institutions from at least three countries have to cooperate and for projects over several years, institutions from at least five countries need to team up. The new programme CULTURE (2007 – 2013) even increased the number of participants for coopera-

tion projects over several years to at least six. Managing such complex projects is simply stretching many organisations too much. Requested funding has to be at least €50,000 per year, but only account for a maximum of 50 or 60 percent of the overall budget. For one-year projects, the individual institutions have to fund at least €16,000 on their own. This is a particular high barrier for institutions from the new EU countries. Funding of art projects from this programme is additionally complicated because most art projects are planned with shorter preparation periods and more flexibility in terms of planning and realisation phases. Thus, these programmes rather support the realisation of projects planned by larger institutions in Europe.

The conclusions of the Ruffolo Report from 2001 about cultural cooperation are still valid today: The development of cultural activities can only be achieved by including the member states. At the same time, the author comments that the tendency towards cooperation at a European level was very weak and was not really linked to the individual member states' transnational activities. This means that the EU cultural programmes do not have the desired effect. The increase in the budget over the next few years will also remain comparatively low and cultural policy will still only have little influence on the development of art and art exchange activities in Europe in the future.

Circulation of contemporary art

Although Europeans have no specific and readily available concept of contemporary European art, transnational or

multilateral exchange and cooperation work particularly well at a European level in the fine arts segment.

This does not only apply to “state”-organised and -subsidised artist exchange programmes, but also to the private art exhibition scene and the art market.

A number of governmental and non-governmental players work in the sphere of art exchange. At the municipal level, museums and exhibition sites are funded by the public sector, private sponsors or private public partnerships (for example with banks). In almost all EU countries, additional off-spaces – initiatives with little money, a high level of commitment and self-exploitation – organise privately sponsored exhibition projects within a non-institutional context. – Although funds from governments and sponsors only trickle in, they have a fantastic network and are very active and productive.

Publicly funded institutions with supra-regional tasks exist at the federal level with its provinces, cantons or counties. They are generally in charge of correspondingly large-scale exhibition projects. However, their programmes are less focused on contemporary art, but rather on traditional modern art or the art of the Old Masters. They work on the basis of bilateral agreements, facilitating temporary loans of works of art and manpower. They increasingly participate in transnational cooperations in order to source the necessary funds for exhibitions. The same applies to national museums and galleries directly funded by the governments.

At the national level, the ministries of culture and the foreign ministries, private and public foundations as well as several networks also play a role. Said

ministries do not organise exhibitions or art events themselves, but use specialist organisations. However, the role of art exchange activities organised by the state through intermediary organisations and national cultural institutions in the individual states is rather marginal in the former EU member states. These players mainly fill the gaps in cultural exchange, with targeted support for stalled exchange activities. Furthermore, they work in cultural policy, setting up the appropriate framework conditions, influencing politicians and their decisions in national cultural policy. This is aimed at reducing obstacles – for example an inconsistent taxation of artist fees, exhibition fees, etc. in order to keep cultural exchange going. On the other hand, the intermediary organisations – including in the “old” EU countries – are mostly interested in the dissemination of their own national culture. More transnational cooperations exist outside of the EU, with the exception of CICEB (Consolatio Institutiorum Culturalium Europaeorum inter Belgas), a not-for-profit association of European cultural institutes in Brussels, which was founded in 1999 to support bilateral activities and has developed its cooperative dynamics in Brussels and beyond.

In the new EU countries, the intermediary organisations – national cultural institutes, but also specialist institutions promoting contemporary art – are responsible for a large part of transnational art exchange. Organising their country’s presence at the Venice Biennial is part of their most important task – to tap the European market and the European arts scene for their own artists. For that reason, they organise exhibitions in

other EU countries to give an overview of their art. However, a bilateral national exchange is not enough for a successful introduction of a country's own artists in the European arts scene. In addition, they have to invite curators to their country who realise major exhibition projects in Europe, organise studio visits and suggest artists. Other support instruments are workshops, funding of exhibitions and scholarships for artists-in-residence. The large national, state-funded museums and galleries in the new EU countries have not made a significant contribution to arts exchange yet. Most of them have just started to modernise their structures in terms of staffing, financing and space. However, smaller, alternative institutions receive hardly any state funding, which generally prevents them from participating in transnational activities.

Networks

Nowadays, networks are the most efficient form of cooperation. For that reason, a large number of different networks of varying sizes and budgets have developed over the last 15 years, actively driving and supporting cultural exchange. Networks are not only established by museums or

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cultural institutions – artists, critics, freelance curators and even intermediaries join forces.

In the past, national cultural institutions and organisations largely promoting the fine arts focused on supporting their artists in- and outside of Europe. Therefore, cooperations were not really an issue in this context. Only over the last few years, networks also developed in this sector. The largest network is EUNIC (European National Institutes of Culture), established in November 2006 from CICEB, which was founded in 1999 and had 12 European cultural institutes in Brussels as its members in the end. Not only does EUNIC realise common multicultural culture projects in Brussels, it also aims at supporting local networks of cultural institutions within Europe, but also outside of the EU.

In 2006, leading arts exchange organisations from all over Europe merged in the new network VOLTAGE (Voice of leading transnational art exchange groups in Europe). The objectives of this network are enhanced communication and cross-border cooperation in arts exchange plus a stronger voice for the arts in the bureaucratic jungle in Brussels. In addition, more transparent national support structures within Europe will be created with the publication of all programmes offered by the individual organisations.

Particularly the non-governmental sector has established a large number of networks. It is noteworthy in this context that they are all operating across several nations within Europe and in the entire world, generally without a particular European awareness. One of these organisations is AICA (International Association of Art Critics). This non-governmental or-

ganisation was founded in 1948/49 under the patronage of the UNESCO, globally promoting art criticism. Its offices are in Paris. AICA has 4200 members in 64 national sections.

The most important network of all governmental and non-governmental museums and museum experts across all fields of expertise is ICOM (International Council of Museums), with over 21,000 members in 140 countries. 113 national committees and 30 international expert committees as well as numerous regional and affiliated organisations are part of ICOM. Its offices are in Paris. Traditionally, the European sections of the organisation work with great commitment. However, they (still) operate without a specifically European agenda.

On the other hand, ICT (International Association of Curators of Contemporary Art), which was founded in the sixties of the 20th century, is a mainly Eastern and Western European network of curators with more than 500 members - some of them resident in Japan, Australia and America. Through this network, museum directors, cultural managers and freelance curators can exchange programme concepts and share experiences - with the ultimate objective to foster the debate in terms of the planning process and the realisation of art exhibitions. Every three years, the organisation's offices move to a different European country.

Not only curators, museums and cultural institutions have established networks - artists have also developed supranational organisations. The IAA (International Association of Art) is the largest non-governmental organisation of visual artists with over 70 national committees worldwide. The organisation has advisory sta-

tus at the UNESCO in Paris. It aims at improving the professional, legal and social conditions for visual artists. In order to allow for the globally varying conditions, the work of the IAA was regionalised as early as the beginning of the eighties of the 20th century. The IAA continuously expanded this regional approach with the foundation of IAA Europe. Currently, it works on customs and visa regulations as well as models of support for art in public spaces.

In addition to the IAA, the ECA (European Council of Artists) was established in 1995, mainly to influence political institutions in Europe - for example the EU, the Council of Europe, the UNESCO and other relevant organisations. It represents the interests of professional artists in Europe in terms of social, legal and economic issues across all the different sectors. The organisation's representatives from currently 24 countries in Eastern and Western Europe are artists who actively represent the umbrella organisations of their countries. ECA's offices are in Copenhagen.

The EFAH (European Forum for the Arts and Heritage) - founded in Belgium in 1994 - is the largest cross-sectoral asso-

The greatest gaps are between the art markets in the old and the new EU member states. In the new member states, the art market is currently developing and buyer groups for contemporary artworks are slowly emerging. In most cases, the state sector is still the sole buyer.

ciation of cultural networks, organisations and experts in the sectors arts and cultural heritage in Europe, currently with 75 member organisations from twenty Western and Eastern European states. The forum's offices are in Brussels. It operates as an intermediary in the field of European policy and administration, representing artists and other creative people in the cultural sector. In addition, EFAH also defines itself as a lobbyist of the European cultural sector, dealing with decision makers at all political levels.

In 2001, visual artists merged under a joint European umbrella organisation - EVAN (European Visual Artists' Network). Current members are artist organisations from eleven countries (Denmark, Finland, UK, Ireland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Iceland and Germany). EVAN's objective is to influence political decision-making processes at a national and a European level, representing the specific interests of visual artists by raising awareness of the living and working conditions of this professional group in Europe, by supporting the information exchange about social and legal issues as well as promoting cooperation between artists and their organisations. The aim is to integrate the organisations of visual artists - preferably from all EU member states - in this network.

Another network strongly anchored in Europe is Res Artis, the largest association of artist-residencies and residential art centres world-wide. It represents over 200 centres and organisations in 40 countries, providing artists with the opportunity to live and work there for a certain period of time. Res Artis was founded in 1993 as a voluntary association and rep-

resents and supports the affiliated centres with the exchange of information and experiences. The organisation promotes a higher level of understanding for the important role these residential art centres play globally in terms of developing all types of contemporary art.

Arts in education

Art exchange programmes are not as successful in the education of artists, where most nations only use their own professors for this purpose. This tendency is very strong in academies in Italy and France and much less so in Holland, Germany or the UK. And there are more barriers. A memorandum on European cultural cooperation issued by the French government in January 2004 demands - among other aspects - "to support the mobility of cultural representatives and works of art in Europe", for example by converging the social and tax status of artists and by mutually recognising the academic degrees awarded by the individual member states. These are rather issues of universities and education, yet they have a massive impact on the arts scene and the mobility of artists in the individual countries.

Art market

The art market generally works as well as art exchange programmes. We can only talk about a market if artists are available in one country, if galleries exist to nurture their works of art and act as intermediaries for them plus a group of private and public collectors are in a position to buy these contemporary productions. The greatest gaps are between

the art markets in the old and the new EU member states. In the new member states, the art market is currently developing and buyer groups for contemporary artworks are slowly emerging. In most cases, the state sector is still the sole buyer as hardly any galleries or private collectors of contemporary art exist who could support the young artists.

The situation in the old EU member states is different, which stimulates the new EU member states to gain access to those markets for their artists – already with a certain amount of success. The increasing number of galleries from the new EU member states at art fairs in Europe also shows an upward trend - with Poland as the model student.

Several art markets have developed in the old EU member states, with Basel as the most important, followed by London, Paris, Madrid, Berlin, Cologne and Bologna. Since the breakdown of the art market in the eighties of the 20th century, these markets have reported increasing amounts of visitors and higher sales figures. Transnational regulations define who can be represented at the art markets: Only galleries with a regular exhibition programme, a regular group of artists represented by them and general opening hours for the public receive permission. A certain distortion of competition is caused by some European countries sponsoring their commercial galleries' participation in art fairs. A pan-European regulation does not exist in this context, as the funding takes place in the disguise of cultural, not economic support.

There are certainly barriers in the art market that have to be removed. A memorandum on European cultural cooperation issued by the French govern-

ment in January 2004 for example aims to enhance the attractiveness of the European art market. The memorandum states (pp.15/16): "...Vitality and competitiveness of the European art market are impaired by a tax system which – particularly in comparison with Switzerland or the United States – is not particularly beneficial. Several measures ratified in the course of the nineties have led to even worse mismatches – in particular the directives on import VAT and the harmonisation of the droit de suite system. Several national reports have shown that the removal of VAT on imports would have a very favourable impact on the dynamics of the European art market, ...The implementation of the Directive 2001/84/EG of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe ...in terms of the droit de suite would have to be subjected to an evaluation and joint considerations of all the member states. The expert representatives of the art market are of the opinion that the wording impairs competitiveness in the European market."

In addition to VAT regulations and the droit de suite, another development also threatens the art market: The increasing amount of private dealers who cannot and do not want to be represented at art fairs with their own stands. They have lower costs than the gallery owners, as they do not have to offer an annual exhibition programme or to support their artists. They jostle into the relationship between galleries and collectors by selling works of art directly from the artist, thus monopolising the secondary market.

Copyright

The EU does not have a harmonised

copyright law and national legislations regulate intellectual property rights. However, these national legislations are increasingly permeated by European regulations. Copyright harmonisation processes reflecting the lobby work from the collecting societies of individual countries are particularly intense. One regulation states that copyright owners must receive adequate remuneration and that adhesion contracts forcing them to sell their works beneath their actual value are not binding. The period of copyright protection was also harmonised to 70 years after the artist's death. So far, different guidelines have existed where a harmonisation of copyright legislation would be desirable. The fundamentally different approach of the legal systems in continental Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries is the greatest obstacle in this context. In Anglo-Saxon legislation, copyright is part of property law, whereas continental European legislation protects the creator's commercial and personal rights ("droit moral"). Then again, it has been discussed for some time now whether copyright protection in its current form is not too strict - preventing social developments with monopolisation, sometimes also by-passing technical realities. The best example in this context is the debate about copy protection, where completely new mechanisms have to be invented for Digital Rights Management Systems. In

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this context, it should be asked whether music might need completely different regulations than visual arts or literature. Currently, many EU regulations are generally applicable rather than specified by individual sector.

Biennials and other large arts events

"What our village needs now is a biennial" - so the title of a comic strip by Olav Westphalen that he wrote in 2000. It shows the television interview with a run-down city councillor with his city going up in flames as the backdrop. The biennial as a lifesaver - almost believable considering the boom of this exhibition format. Originally, the biennial was a Western European project that developed into an export hit. Biennials have spread across the entire world - particularly since the nineties of the last century. Some biennials - for example *manifesta* or *Ars Baltica* - are location-independent and take place in varying EU member states. In addition, almost every EU member country has its own international biennial - and sometimes even several biennials. Apparently, the label "biennial" turns out to be particularly useful in order to attract the attention of local authorities as well as local and supraregional sponsors - the ideal basis for funding large international exhibition projects. The label "biennial" generates money for the presentation of contemporary art and creates a workshop-like meeting space for artists from all over the world.

On the other hand, large exhibition events with great public appeal also take place in almost every country, organised by festivals and large exhibition venues. These blockbuster exhibitions are also

interesting for sponsors, thus achieving a high level of funding.

Smaller exhibition venues also realising important exhibition projects in the past are now facing great problems due to shrinking public budgets. Due to their lower public appeal, it is not easy for these venues to win sponsors for their projects. One way out might actually be funding through European and non-European co-operations. However, this is only viable if financially strong sponsoring agents get involved or EU can be obtained. Financially speaking, it is not “lucrative” to cooperate with countries outside of Europe that do not have such financiers behind them. If that is the case, the individual cooperation partners have to use their own means to create maximum synergy effects, which works equally well with partners inside the EU and outside of the Community.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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FASHION SHAPES EUROPE Fashion thrives on multicultural grounds. It visualises that it is not necessary for European cultural dynamics to give up or adjust national identities to form a unit. Two experts – *Ingrid Loscbek and Sibylle Klose* – talk online about the role of fashion in Europe and its impact as a cultural image factor.



Klose: *Do you think a European designer fashion exists and if so, is it influenced by national aspects?*

Loscbek: More than ever, fashion design is shaped by an international creative scene nowadays. In the established Paris fashion houses, the creative team always has been and still is international. Famous examples are the initiators of Parisian haute couture: The Englishman Charles Frederick Worth, the Italian Elsa Schiaparelli or Cristóbal Balenciaga – originally Spanish – all of them responsible for the fame of Paris fashion. And this remains unchanged: The Englishman John Galliano is Dior’s creative director, the Italian Riccardo Tisci has the same role at Hubert de Givenchy and the Belgian

Theyskens at the fashion house Nina Ricci. The American Marc Jacobs designs for the luxury label Louis Vuitton, the Italian Stefano Pilati designs prêt-à-porter for Yves Saint Laurent, etc. The Englishman Alexander McQueen is also an integral part of the fashion shows in Paris, financed by the Italian Gucci Group. As early as the eighties, Japanese avant-garde designers such as Issey Miyake, Rei Kawakubo and Yohji Yamamoto quite naturally showed their creations in Paris. Valentino – icon of the former Roman ‘Alta Moda’ – has shown his haute couture as well as his prêt-à-porter at the fashion shows in Paris for a number of years. Prada presents its second label Miu Miu and Hussein Chalayan and Vivienne Westwood – both English – are also represented on the catwalk. Giorgio Armani shows his ‘Alta Moda’ as a guest of the haute couture in Paris. The intellectual fashion designers from Antwerp officially take part in the fashion shows in Paris although they are resident in Belgium. This is equally the case for young German designers such as Bernhard Wilhelm, John Ribbe or newcomers such as C. Neeon. Jil Sander has already shown fashion created by its eponymous designer and Strenesse Gabriele Strehle was represented at the fashion shows in Milan.

On the one hand, the selection takes place through the fashion houses in Paris and luxury brand groups and on the other hand through the *Fédération Française de la Couture, du Prêt-à-porter des Couturiers et des Créateurs de Mode*. Neither London nor Mi-

lan and not even the New York Fashion Week have a similarly diverse presence of fashion designers from so many different national backgrounds. Particularly the strong international presence of designers in Paris is not so much the result of multicultural ambition. It much rather originates in the claim towards designers to produce highly creative, innovative fashion – regardless of their background.

Klose: *Do these multinational designers cause the similar look of designer fashion in all European countries?*

Loschek: This international cooperation in the design process does not mean at all that fashion styles are the same in big European cities and in all countries of Europe – quite the opposite. Designers and designer companies present their fashion where they feel that their design philosophy and their style are most successful or where they fit in best. Milan, Florence, Rome are still considered as places of wearable, progressive elegance (“only“ the Italians can master this contradiction), Paris is the place of everlasting avant-garde, Antwerp has a reputation for highly intellectual fashion design and London is still a wacky, unconventional source of ideas.

Due to its numerous medium-sized cities, Germany offers a differentiated fashion spectrum. Whereas the South is characterised by conservative chic, the Berlin scene is known for maverick and newcomer designs and Düsseldorf is very commercial, which is due to the cpd – the world’s largest fashion fair. European fashion in particular represents the much cited “Di-

versity in Unity” – not as an empty phrase, but as a very tangible reality.

Klose: *Are there still noticeable tendencies of fashion confined by cultural, socio-ethnological boundaries – certain regional characteristics, as it were?*

Loschek: Yes, I think so. Vivienne Westwood keeps referring to England and Scotland – whether she draws her inspiration from British painters or Scottish tartans or works with the Scottish fabric producer Harris Tweed. The Japanese are masters of drapery. The German designer Bernhard Wilhelm, who graduated in Antwerp and shows his fashion in Paris, likes to pick up on landscape motifs and sagas from his South German home in his embroideries. Eva Gronbach – also from Germany – made a name for herself by using the German national colours and the German eagle for ornamental purposes for her logo.

Klose: *How strong is the influence of designers and design companies in a very commercial fashion industry?*

Loschek: Clothes and accessories are products realised in a design process. Which products are accepted and become “fashionable” is exclusively determined by “society” or a group of society, a social circle. Hence the semiotic specification of “fashion” is subject to a social process that is negotiated in communication. This process varies from region to region. As fashion reaches far beyond the objective character of clothes as a product, it is so diverse – particularly with all the individual ways of mixing fashion items. Or to put it differently: Clothes are a product, fashion is a construct. Fashion renders a ‘social purpose’ to clothes that goes beyond function and aesthetics. Appearance and illusion are added to the clothes defined as ‘added value’ or ‘additional benefits’ – or in short: as fashion.

Klose: *Critics talk about a mass phenomenon. To what*

European fashion in particular represents the much cited “Diversity in Unity” – not as an empty phrase, but as a very tangible reality.

extent do we see fashion for the masses in European cities nowadays?

Loschek: Thinking of functional clothes such as jeans and t-shirts that go across all social boundaries, the general picture is relatively uniform. On the other hand, global space produces hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies and a large number of interchangeable situations. Fashion as a mass phenomenon certainly exists, but thanks to pluralistic and liberal democracies, it is also multidimensional.

Klose: *The aforementioned flexible flattening of hierarchies is an important aspect of the emerging developments in the fashion sector. Areas that were rather elitist and segmented in the past are now opening up for a wider market. The desire for individuality, for something that is completely one's own and special, turns the customer – and not just buyers of luxury goods – into a designer of his or her personal preferences and personal taste. Supported by new technologies such as body scanning, computerised, industrial made-to-measure clothes have had a breakthrough over the last few years (customising). From a styling menu (fit, details, material, lining, finish, etc.), customers select what they like – regardless of season or opening hours (online shop). Prosumer (producer – consumer) is the newly created term, defining the customer of the future not simply as a consumer, but also as a “product designer”. For accessories, this concept is also successful – with the “shoe-individualiser” Selve in Munich being one example.*

However, this does not mean a flattening of luxury brands – on the contrary. The luxury market focus-

ing on elitist individualism is growing. Luxury brands participate in this development: Giorgio Armani's Fatto a Manu Su Misura – the male equivalent of the Italian haute couture line Armani Privé – for instance currently celebrates its market launch. Dormeuil, a traditional fabric supplier of high-quality fabrics for men's fashion, meets the demand for elitist individualism with as many as three personalised collections: Platinum, Identity and 3D. This is an innovative, supranational and thus international concept, which is currently very successful in men's wear, but also for accessories, for example for shoes.

Klose: *Fashion moves and becomes more dynamic due to its own amplitudes of adjustment and dissociation. Hence the question: Is there a joint European history of fashion – or conversely – to what extent did national differentiations have an impact on the history of fashion?*

Loschek: Fashion has always been “global“. To be dressed in the fashion of the internationally leading social class was the highest social acknowledgement. Fashion was less limited by national restrictions than by social boundaries. Politically dominant European countries mostly were the leaders in fashion.

In the second half of the 16th century, high nobility dressed in the Spanish fashion. Around 1800, during Napoleon's times, during the French Empire and in the 19th century, German Biedermeier captured the rising European bourgeoisie. The French Cul de Paris during the Gründerzeit reached all the way to Japan and in the fifties, Christian Dior's New Look conquered the world metropolises. In the past, fewer people than nowadays were able to dress after the latest fashion. Nevertheless, the look of large cities was far from monotonous as it was characterised by fashionable clothes as well as very diverse liveries and colourful uniforms. With the introduction of ready-made modern clothes as a result of modern cutting systems and sewing machines in the second half of the 19th century, an increasing number of

people were able to afford fashion – at least in the larger cities, which led to an assimilation of appearances.

Klose: *Every metropolis of the world has luxury stores from Dior to Armani. Is luxury fashion shaped by Europe and globally present and what caused this situation?*

Loschek: As it is often the case, there are several causes besides purely economic reasons. On the one hand, the first organisations to initiate fashion shows and fashion fairs as well as for the protection of the fashion designers' creations were founded in Paris: In 1868, the *Chambre Syndicale de la Couture Parisienne* and in 1914 the *Syndicat de Defense de la Grande Couture Française*. Similar institutions were established in other European countries and have expanded continuously, according to demand. On the other hand, luxury groups such as LVMH, the Pinault Group and AEFEE are focused on France and Italy, as there is a certain natural relaxed attitude towards luxury in those countries. Hence it was possible to establish and sustain family-owned companies such as Hermès, Gucci, Prada, Fendi, Missoni, Ferragamo and Etro in France or Italy. Creative individuals such as Gabrielle Chanel and Giorgio Armani were able to found and sustain their own fashion empires.

Another reason was the growing special focus on logos in Europe – and particular in France. Whereas brand awareness reached its peak in the USA in the eighties, admiration was mainly targeted towards European luxury brands.

Klose: *Yes, the structure of luxury fashion that has evolved over time is very strongly influenced by Italy and France. Nevertheless, particularly over the last few years there have been strong shifts, not only in the luxury fashion segment but within all segments of the fashion industry. Fashion - originally very vertically structured (from avant-garde luxury fashion to trendy ready-to-wear fashion for the masses) - increasingly demonstrates horizontal tenden-*

cies and shifts: The fusion or diffusion of style, product, quality or even the concept of luxury itself has led to blurred traditional boundaries.

Loschek: How does this manifest itself?

Klose: *Well-known designers create limited mini collections for mass fashion groups (Karl Lagerfeld, Stella McCartney, Viktor & Rolf for the Swedish manufacturer of clothes, Hennes & Mauritz, Roland Mourent for Gap and Christopher Kane for TopShop) or for mail order companies – for example Courrèges or Christian Lacroix for La Redoute), meanwhile ready-made clothes for the mass market climb up into the designer league: TopShop appeared at the London Fashion Week with well-known British designers and presented its creations in its own corner of the avant-garde lifestyle shop Colette in Paris. Even sports brands that would have not been considered as designer- and luxury fashion some years ago have conquered the catwalks and thus got into the designer limelight. And in international trendsetting fashion magazine, young, affordable mass-produced fashion is advertised next to exclusive limited editions of designer fashion.*

Klose: *In spite of these increasingly horizontal shifts, branded fashion in Europe is still very significant, particularly abroad, outside of Europe. How would you explain that?*

Loschek: On the one hand, Europe-

Politically dominant European countries mostly were the leaders in fashion.

an branded fashion such as the already mentioned French or Italian fashion, but also English luxury brands like Burberry or the Swiss designer couture brand Akris are a symbol of prestige. On the other hand, brands such as Boss, Escada, Bogner or Pringle of Scotland represent high quality. Hugo Boss is a particular example of a typical European brand, as the group's main office and management is based in Germany, whereas the company is owned by the Italian Marzotti Group.

Klose: *Yves Saint Laurent, Hubert de Givenchy, Thierry Mugler, Kenzo Takada - icons of European fashion - have withdrawn from their fashion houses in order to clear the way for a younger generation of designers. This handover process does not always run smoothly and has already led to enormous fluctuations in the design studios. For that reason, some European fashion houses seem to focus more strongly on their individual brand profile rather than on their design profile. Has brand fashion replaced designer fashion or is the process reversing right now? What is branded fashion in actual fact?*

Loschek: The designer name tag, the logo or the label are primarily semiotic and not fashion attributes, achieving a high level of recognition – with the product promoting itself and thus stirring the desire to buy and also to imitate. With minimal effort, logos and emblems send a maximum of messages – sometimes globally – well-known to us from military uniforms. Until the seventies, designer name tags or labels were generally hidden inside the product and the product came first. In the eighties, tags or labels were attached

on the outside of clothes, which led to the label dominating the product. The label as a mark of authenticity became the brand label - serving marketing instead of design. Exaggerations that went as far as a caricaturing logomania seemed to be unavoidable. In the meantime, most fashion companies have discovered that the design has to come first, before the logo – or at least needs to be at the same level. On the other hand, the extreme focus on the brand label provided individual designers with an opportunity to address those customers who did not want to function as an “advertising puppet”. For that reason, individual designer fashion and small design companies mainly producing in their own country or at least within Europe can lead a successful niche existence.

Klose: *In addition, particularly the logo as a mark of authenticity has a strong influence on the global perception of fashion - thus unbundled from its local market context. The logo is turned into a metaphor for a European and an international brand or design awareness with a transnational style language and unambiguous decoding: wherever I am in the world, three white stripes (Adidas) or the combination of the letters LV (Louis Vuitton) cannot only be decoded internationally, but also communicate individual fashion contents, their “lifestyle visions”.*

Loschek: Over the last decades, an increasing amount of luxury and designer brands have developed from local labels to global players – globally staged through their impressive flagship stores. However, this omnipresence on the international fashion market has also led to the phenomenon that brand or designer fashion is seldom linked to its country of origin. The longing for origin and originals then led to a label correction or label extension – with the aim to reemphasise the local origins of the brand: Hermès Paris, Prada Milano, Burberry London, Donna Karan New York.

Klose: *Do you currently see any other common ground for*





fashion in Europe besides individual brands and design?

Loschek: The changing target groups – for example the hedonism of the 50+ generation or the neo-conservatism of the young middle class are phenomena in all European countries. Hence the fashion industry has to react to these phenomena. It is also a problem of the entire European fashion industry (with only a few national or local exceptions) that the production takes place in Asia. Problems and their solutions do not seem to be restricted to one country, but to the whole of Europe.

Klose: *In 2005, you held guest lectures at the Helwan University in Cairo. Where does European fashion rank in a country that is increasingly influenced by Islamic culture?*

Loschek: I can only speak for Cairo, where young middle-class females walk around in jeans and jumpers as they would in Europe – at the same time wearing headscarves draped in many fashionable ways. Female students of fashion design are almost exclusively interested in European fashion and buy Western fashion magazine and fashion collection books. They want to design for the European and the Egyptian market – the latter by all means with a European orientation in the private realm. But it is also true in this context that design is mainly a phenomenon of the metropolis, whereas the periphery only imports design.

Klose: *Which role do the media play and which role can they play in terms of cultural communication within and outside of Europe?*

Loschek: In theory, due to its evaluation of new products, fashion journalism has a great deal of responsibility. Yet as fashion is perceived as “popular” culture, there is not enough specialist knowledge available. The British psychologist Edward de Bono recognised that people tend to divide unfamiliar situations into familiar elements. The attempt to explain a new fashion mostly wears itself out using familiar patterns, which often leads to the perception of retro looks. Hence,

what is newly introduced also needs a new interpretation by fashion journalists. It is not only desirable to mention the form and the material of individual items, but also to provide a comprehensive stylistic description of the collection, an aesthetic interpretation, comparisons with other fashion designs, with architecture and art, with definitions of fashion as product design. Ultimately, what we need are fashion reviews following the example of theatre or opera reviews.

Klose: *What is the status of European fashion magazines?*

Loschek: Among established fashion magazines, English and French magazines are the most influential, with magazines from other European states frequently using them as role models – particular in terms of actual fashion topics. Outside of Europe, the influence of English and French magazines is also very strong. Hence, we fashion journalism is European. “Wallpaper” and “I-D” from England are still perceived as intellectual avant-garde magazines. New German fashion journals have an international focus and are mostly bilingual – German and English. Yet they are not printed in large number and are often only published quarterly. Already established newcomers “Achtung” and “Deutsch” are supplemented by magazines such as “WeAr”, “Hekmag”, “Zoo Magazine”, “ModeDepeche”, “berliner” (exclusively in English) and “Liebling” (a newspaper); almost all of them are published in Berlin.

Loschek: What opportunities does

the Internet provide for the fashion industry?

Klose: *This question raises quite a large number of issues. I would like to talk about the Internet as a virtual fashion platform briefly. The Internet provides an intercultural insight into fashion production in the different metropolises within seconds – suggesting an assumed understanding of what is in, hip or top at a particular time. Whatever is presented on the catwalks of this world is globally available shortly afterwards. Yet what is presented is the media stage of fashion, not fashion itself. It is the flat reality of images with the inherent apparent truth of images – mostly with the absence of words. The screen cannot provide sensuous access to the subtle quality of design, the haptic and tactile material character of the garments or the movements of the clothes on the body. It does not reveal whether the clothes are comfortable to wear, either – everything is just a faint notion of reality. The Internet is a global image-information carrier of fashion – yet this form of reproduction cannot replace the original or the experience of an original.*

Locally designed – globally available – “read“ and interpreted locally – place has become a volatile concept, replaced by individual cultural perceptions. However, the Internet as an economic multiplier has opened up new dimensions for fashion design – in particular for new designers using it as a presentation and sales platform. Thus e-commerce has long left its original areas of access and its image as cheap common commerce behind, distinguishing and establishing itself as the virtual shop window for luxury and design products. Yoax, which was founded in 2000, was predicted to fail – and is now one of the most successful virtual sales

On the one hand, European branded fashion such as the already mentioned French or Italian fashion, but also English luxury brands like Burberry or the Swiss designer couture brand Akris are a symbol of prestige. On the other hands, brands such as Boss, Escada, Bogner or Pringle of Scotland represent high quality.

platforms of designer and luxury fashion brands on the Internet. In the meantime, design houses also present themselves with their own virtual counters and their own websites – for example the Italian label Marni or the Parisian avant-garde lifestyle shop Colette. This means intercultural shopping without having to find a space to park the car. The interactive Polo Ralph Lauren shop window on Madison Avenue in New York guarantees a different kind of 24-hour shopping: Whatever you see walking past can be bought instantaneously by touching the interactive glass surface – even if the shop is closed – next-day free delivery included.

Loschek: And what is your view on the influence of television and particularly of music channels like MTV?

Klose: *Television reaches even further – it presents us with lifestyles and cultures and thus acts as a fashion catalyst – like Hollywood during its Golden Era with the TV series “Dallas” in the eighties or “Sex in the City“ over the last few years. It is a very unique form of experiencing or coming across certain cultures: At times US-American culture (American Hardcore – 2006, American Beauty – 1999) and sometimes Chinese lifestyle (In the Mood for Love – 2000, Fleurs de Shanghai – 1998, Goodbye my Concubine – 1993, etc.) are guests in European living rooms.*

MTV or VH1 invite us to a visual feast of exploring subcultures through rap, hip hop or electro. The video clips broadcast by the stations have developed into

fashion spots with background music. It is therefore not surprising that MTV has had its own fashion platform with annually staged fashion shows - "Designerama on stage" - for three years now. Young national and international designers can present and sell their extravagant designs online. At the same time, this avant-garde showroom serves as an outfit archive for the performances of their in-house presenters. The unique designer clothes from the MTV Designerama Collection have become sought-after collector's items by now.

As early as the sixties, the Beatles already demonstrated that the combination of music, a certain look and fashion can have an enormous cultural impact.

Loschek: Pop music and fashion as well as sports and fashion are very globally orientated. Pop music and sports have a high status in American fashion culture and thus in American design. What is the situation in Europe? Don't you think that Adidas is a good example in this context?

Klose: *The German sportswear producer Adidas is a very good example for the success concept of internationally successful fashion using intercultural design synergies. The international sportswear brand based in Germany in Central Franconia (Herzogenaurach) cooperates with different designers at a global level. In October 2002, the company started its cooperation with the Japanese fashion designer Yohji Yamamoto for the range Adidas Y-3 and presents it at the prêt-à-porter fashion shows in Paris. Together with the British fashion designer Stella McCartney, Adidas develops designer sportswear for running, fitness and swimming. Meanwhile, the cooperation with the Ameri-*

can singer Missy Elliot - the first female superstar in the US hip-hop scene has influenced different collections - from urban sportswear to streetwear to modern hip-hop fashion.

Loschek: The retail trade is the showcase of European fashion. Yet what is presented in the international lime-light does not necessarily appear in the shop windows. Why is that?

Klose: *The retail trade "presents" a particular pre-selected range of fashion to the end consumer, thus unavoidably turning into a fashion curator with a "business angle" - a role we should not underestimate - similarly to the role of fashion journalists. Fashion produced for the international market is also very much subject to the local and cultural selection of the buying agents. The retailers "filter" and the customers adjust: Inevitably, the items that make it into the shops are fashion and those not in the shops can therefore not be fashion or do not exist.*

Common strategies of fashion marketing support this local polarisation of fashion and thus limit the possibilities of a broader cultural diffusion. The flagship stores and franchise branches of the international designer and fashion brands have to be exactly where the glamorous, cosmopolitan clientele is. Therefore, they all want to be on the respective shopping promenades of the international metropolises. The Englishwoman Rita Britton has successfully demonstrated a different approach with her avant-garde "Pollyanna" in Barnsley, a little known and rather inconspicuous small industrial town in South Yorkshire in the English Midlands. With an international reputation for her selection of fashion and fashion design, not only does she present her hand-picked range of world-class, established designers, but also young avant-garde such as Paul Harnden or the Italian label Carpe Diem on her 500 square metres. For almost four decades now, her shop has not only been among the leading independent fashion stores, it is also one of the oldest worldwide, known for its international clientele that does not travel to London, Paris or Milan to buy international fashion, but pilgrimages to Barnsley instead.

Another new sales concept is the flexible, mobile sales floor, either following international cultural events such as art happenings or avant-garde music festivals or appearing for a short while in urban trendy areas.

The concept of the “guerrilla store” introduced for the first time in Berlin by the Japanese designer label Comme des Garçons focuses on unpredictability – fashion as a revolutionary, urban underground movement with tactical flexibility and the use of surprise effects – newly defining exclusivity. Totally dependent on word-of-mouth, avant-garde fashion has to be “discovered” fast, before it “disappears” again.

The Italian fashion house Prada (Improbable Classics) for instance positions itself with a temporary 10-day boutique installation showing a specially compiled range as a limited edition with the label «Basel 2006» at the prestigious Art Basel – currently the largest contemporary arts fair.

With this innovative concept of the mobile designer boutique as an art installation, fashion marketing searching for the best location takes a whole new turn.

Loschek: In 1981, it was a must for Japanese designers to go to Paris to make their mark – nowadays, it is the other way round. Yet Paris is still and more than ever the centre for the creative avant-garde. How difficult is it for young designers to gain a firm foothold in the European market?

Klose: *At the end of an international fashion show marathon that lasts for almost one month, Paris certainly has a special status! The final orders of the buyers from all over the world are placed here,*

decisions about the most popular collections are made and fashion journalists also pass their verdicts on the flops of the season in Paris.

To get on the guest list of a fashion show is very popular and the demand has become almost unmanageable. According to Didier Grumbach, President of the Fédération de la Couture du Prêt-à-Porter, “Paris is the victim of its success!”. 84 fashion shows in only eight days – a fashion course which is almost impossible to master. It is very difficult for young, up-and-coming designers not yet on the official fashion agenda to win international attention during that time. For quite some time now, it has been considered to provide young European and non-European designers with a separate presentation platform during the biannual haute couture shows in January and July. In January 2007, young European “creators” that had made an international name for themselves with creative unique collections or small ranges of fashion limited edition received an invitation for the first time. Among them were Boudiccy (England), Cathy Pill (Belgium) or Felipe Oliveira Baptista (Portugal). And to answer the second part of your question: Particularly the Japanese market is a very important economic factor impacting on the sales figures of young European designers outside of Europe. Japanese people are very keen and courageous when it comes to “Fun Fashion”, which reveals a great openness for avant-garde fashion from Europe. However, the commercially oriented design enthusiasm for European fashion in Japan does not necessarily reflect back to the country of origin: Media success in Japan does not automatically mean that the designer will conquer the fashion scene in Europe next – at least it does not mean that yet.

Loschek: International fashion does not seem to lack opportunities for presentation, though. Globally, almost 40 noteworthy fashion weeks take place – with new additions every year. Should young designers not focus on other fashion cities or fashion weeks? Wouldn't it be possible that the fashion weeks could potentially even “relieve” the Parisian catwalks/fashion shows or may-

be show them their limitations?

Klose: *Fashion knows no national borders and many fashion designers do not present their collections in the country of origin. There are no objections against moving elsewhere – as long as the young designers can maintain the timeframe from presentation to order, production and delivery. The later the fashion weeks, the more difficult it is to organise and time everything properly.*

The almost inflationary boom of fashion weeks shows to what extent fashion seeks a public-cultural platform and with it the limelight of the media. It is one of the objectives of these fashion weeks – whether they take place in India, Buenos Aires or Australia – to promote the young designers from a particular country, thus promoting national fashion and textile production and move it into the global focus. With a few exceptions, most of these fashion weeks are state-sponsored and therefore represent the commercial and cultural interests of the respective country.

International fashion fairs such as the Berlin avant-garde fashion fair Bread & Butter, definitely shifting its main exhibition focus from Berlin to Barcelona this year, operate with supraregional fashion exhibition concepts. Hence they are represented in Berlin and in Barcelona, maintaining a high level of international flexibility. Another example is the Ispo Munich (international sportswear fair), the Ispo China (Nanjing) or the Paris textile fair “Première Vision“ with “Première Vision International Shanghai“. IGEDO Düsseldorf organises and realises the fairs “Dessous China“ and “Fashion China“ (Shanghai).

Loschek: This takes me back to the

Asian market. Ms Klose, you have taught fashion design in London, Paris and Shanghai. Which status does European fashion have in the Asian world?

Klose: *European fashion has a very high status – particularly in the luxury fashion segment. Economic forecasts predict that China will become the second-largest luxury nation after Japan over the next ten years, with the USA falling back to third position.*

Using a Eurocentric understanding of luxury, we are talking about a process of economic growth and aligning standards of living. Yet the alignment of cultural connotations and thus intercultural harmonisation also has to be considered: Luxury, originally with historic and imperialistic connotations, experienced a marked caesura during the Cultural Revolution: It was traditionally perceived as negative, unnerving and disturbing. Luxury was seen as the antagonist of frugality and simplicity – only appertaining to older people as a sign of respect.

This image has been reversed to turn into the exact opposite: Luxury is product-oriented and synonymous with consumption – no longer reserved for older people, but for the young, spoilt generation of only children.

What we are observing is fast technical growth – the frenzied pace of the Asian fashion industry – without a deeper cultural understanding for China's economic development.

Loschek: What are the prospects of young Chinese avant-garde designers in their own market?

Klose: *The Chinese market is very pro-Western – the level of trust in European products generally seems to be higher than in Chinese products. Unfortunately, this leads to a very low level of perception for the domestic creative and design scene, unless it presents itself with a high level of media impact, as designer Kun Lu aptly demonstrates. Yiyang Wang with the two collections Zuzug and Changang keeps a low profile, but is considered an insider tip.*

Loschek: And looking in the other direction – what are the prospects of fashion design from the Western

world in the Asian market?

Klose: *The prospects are very good – particularly for French and Italian luxury brands and there is a high level of demand among Asian consumers. However, adjustments of fit are required due to different body proportions. The fashion house Givenchy has a second “Asian” couture studio (Givenchy Boutique) in Paris and other fashion houses cooperate with licensees in Asia (Givenchy Japan, Dior Japan).*

Over the last few years, the Chinese market has moved into the centre of economic interest. The demand for standardised body fits and sizes remains unanswered, though, as they still do not exist. A few months ago, the China National Institute of Standardization (CNIS) in cooperation with Lectra started to measure the Chinese consumers digitally in more than ten different provinces. The average standard values of Chinese body proportions (according to different age groups) measured with 3D body scan are intended to lead to a countrywide adjustment of sizes in the clothing industry. Even the car and furniture manufacturing industries have already asked for the statistics.

Loschek: Trademark law, product piracy and copyright protection of fashion design are currently all very sensitive topics. What is your view?

Klose: *One of the greatest obstacles on the way towards cultural and economic exchange between Europe and China as a trade nation is the lack of legal trademark, design and patent protection plus the explicit breach of copyright law. At the beginning of the year, the newspapers published triumphantly that the European fashion houses Burberry, Chanel, Gucci,*

Prada and Louis Vuitton have won a joint lawsuit against product counterfeits at the Civil Court in Beijing, which led to the first successful proceedings against product piracy. In the meantime, this has become the most urgent issue – not only at a European level (Euratex - Brussels), but also at an international level. The fashion associations in Italy, France and the USA work together on a new draft legislation on copyright protection for fashion design and fashion design models to be presented to the US Congress. Among other aspects, concessions are certainly expected from the Chinese government, as the Chinese legal system is patchy. Didier Grumbach, President of the French Fédération de la Couture du Prêt-à-Porter, has a very clear point of view: “As long as there are no straightforward legal guidelines, I cannot advise any European designer to venture into the Chinese market!”

Loschek: Can you see opportunities for Chinese designers in the European market?

Klose: *Asian fashion is already well-represented in Paris with Japanese or South-Korean designer collections. At the beginning of October 2006, a Chinese designer (Frankie Xie from Beijing) introduced his range Jefen in the context of the official prêt-à-porter-fashion shows in Paris – a premiere in the history of Paris fashion shows. The fashion designer who trained in Hangzhou and later at the Bunka College Tokyo, started his designer collection in Beijing six years ago and has presented it at the local fashion week since that time. His collection is successfully represented in the Chinese market with twenty of his own boutiques. For March 2007, additional Chinese designers have announced their presence on the Parisian catwalk. Ekseption from the province Canton already presents his collection at the fashion week in Shanghai.*

Loschek: What are your conclusions?

Klose: *We have discussed or briefly mentioned a large number of different aspects and factors reflecting the diversity and complexity of fashion as a cultural asset as well as an international industry and trade sector.*

Ms Loschek, what would you deem necessary to shift cultural exchange and dialogue to the centre of attention?

Loschek: In order to raise awareness for fashion as a cultural asset as well as a design product, it is mandatory to integrate extraordinary fashion design into museums of art history as well as into design museums. Thus creative fashion can move away from mere commercial aspects and the mass-produced fashion from the Far and Middle East and present itself with a design that is very European in terms of aesthetics and concept. Furthermore, fashion exhibitions have to be curated showing the same diversity as art exhibitions in Europe and have to be presented world-wide. Only a few museums such as the Musée des Arts Décoratifs in Paris, the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, the ModeMuseum in Antwerp or the Groningen Museum (NL), collect design fashion and exhibit it on a regular basis. Fashion exhibitions also make the high conceptual, artistic and technical value of fashion more approachable for a wider audience than elitist fashion shows.

Klose: *I could not agree more. Some academic initiatives already reflect the necessity of this claim. These initiatives need to be expanded: For over a year now, the University of the Arts in London has included curating fashion in its master's degree programme (M.A. Fashion Curating). Other European universities or academies expand their study programme for Curating with Modern Design and Modern Art and are working on new forms of teaching – for example using virtual forums.*

Particularly at an academic level, in-

novative ideas for an enhanced inter- and transcultural exchange are required. First attempts are transnational e-learning programmes. State providers of fashion training courses are often tied to their national regulations and are less flexible than private providers, for example in terms of changing curricula. It would be desirable to ease these restrictions.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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FASHION WORLD – WORLD FASHION

Haute couture has European names – but how European is this fashion nowadays? In the age of transnational fashion groups, large parts of the value chain are transferred to low-wage countries with questionable social standards. Together with fashion, Europe not only sells clothes, but also a particular lifestyle with a strong image factor. But at what price? *By Daniel Devoucoux*



fashion shows in Paris with his “Biedermeier-Punk” collection “Wunderkind“ – German fashion as a new trend.

Identity and consumption

Nowadays, a fashion item is an everyday object – and in front of the mirror – if not earlier – the time has come to adopt a definite position. It is a question of our own self-perception and how we want to present ourselves to the world. Fashion is an image of us, a dynamic image of our body. Fashion exists to be seen – its main role, as it were – and therefore needs an audience.

At present, a fashion item is a consumer good like every other object. Yet on closer observation, it is much more, as it is directly and permanently linked to the body. Both are perceived symbiotically. It is not fashion itself that is fashionable – it is the person. Yet fashion can equally create distance: Distance from the environment, from others or from oneself. The relationship with fashion is a long-term process that starts in childhood. The interest in a certain piece of clothing starts before wearing it. During the shopping

Who claims that fashion is unworldly? With muted colours and clear lines, it reflects global events on the catwalk, “evoking the desire for security and order “. According to Karl Lagerfeld, “you can’t think pink if you read the papers“.¹ However, in Germany the phenomenon of Anastasia created positive vibes.² The Los Angeles pop star was lined up to present the new collection “Anastasia by S.Oliver“. The concept of working with famous stars to present unknown fashion brands such as S.Oliver from Rottendorf near Würzburg has its origins in the United States. Every season, image waves are flooding our daily lives from the catwalks or the streets. And in the autumn of 2006, Germany was flying the flag. Wolfgang Joop opened the

experience, the initial relationship to a particular fashion is established. Feelings of lust are evoked in luxury shops and department stores, on flea markets or second-hand boutiques. Buying antique fashion items often even becomes a memorable experience.

Our fashion behaviour reminds us of the current strong influence of consumption on culture. Fashion is considered as one of the most important parameters of consumer behaviour. It remains open whether fashion consumption is primarily fashion and secondly consumption, vice versa or both at the same time. In any case, the term consumption that spread after World War II goes back to the Latin term “*consumere*“, which means “to consume“ in the sense of “to use“. On the other hand, it also includes the meaning of “*consumare*“ – “to refine something“ or “to accomplish“. Quite a lot of ambivalence here. The German term for fashion (*Mode*) is older and originates from the Latin term “*modus*“. As late as 1690, this German word “*Mode*“ did not mean fashion, but a custom, a way of life or a particular way of manufacturing goods.³ Over the following years, a change took place and the term “*Mode*“ established itself as a term for fashion, yet was still not exclusively used. However, this does not mean that fashion or “*Mode*“ had not existed beforehand. For most historians, it surfaced in Europe with the art of tailoring and the cutting technique as the technological fundamental principle during the height of the Middle Ages. Fashion has a historic dimension and a geo-

graphic background. As a phenomenon of clothing, it is a European invention that has developed from a progressive change of perception.

This change is due to the increasingly complex structures of large cities and the economic and technical developments as well as the socio-cultural order of a globalised society. It has left its most significant traces in the media – hence the history of fashion is also a history of the media.

Nowadays, fashion represents a physical technology for the cultural anthropologists, a creative-artistic process, *Weltanschauung* and a business for the designer, a social process for the sociologists, a production process for the industrial sector and a network of financially lucrative exchange for the retail sector, a cinematic device for film directors, an event for the media and a parallel economy and efficient money-laundering facility of significant importance for criminal organisations. Thus, fashion has many lives and the perception of these different lives changes depending on the perspective. Not only the stylists, catwalks, models, hairstyles, beauticians, photographers, agencies or “*Petites Mains*” ‘make’ fashion, but also trend agencies, media worlds or large retail chains. We change with fashion – yes, it can even transform us. We all know the scene from “*Pretty Woman*“, where Vivian Ward (Julia Roberts) is fitted out in an elegant boutique on Hollywood Boulevard, accompanied by her prince, Edward Lewis (Richard Gere) and a solid credit card after her disappointing shopping experience the day

Fashion has a historic dimension and a geographic background. As a phenomenon of clothing, it is a European invention that has developed from a progressive change of perception.

before. This represents the first step of her transformation from a trashy prostitute into the perfect example of fashion conservatism. This is why some see fashion as a masquerade. For others, it is a medium, and like all other media, it is a constitutive and dynamic element of culture.

The social person is a person wearing clothes. The desire and the claim to style the body is a key to the invention and production of the social concept, with fashion as a subtle negotiation space for questions of economic policy, moral and religious, sexual, ethical, socio-cultural, age- or gender-specific issues. Everybody sees fashion as a means of communication and up to 80 percent of all communication is nonverbal. In addition, depending on context and situation, fashion has a narrative expressiveness which is closely linked to the person wearing the clothes and his or her cultural environment. Fashion is everything related to a person's outer appearance: Clothes, shoes, headdresses, cosmetics, beards, hair and hairstyles plus posture and body language. This is referred to as lifestyle – an awareness of life and the spaces we live in. The practical value of fashion is also less important than the image it creates – although comfort, workmanship and price all play a role. The position of the observers is not neutral, either. Within this communicative model, closeness and distance, movements or physique and body language also play a role. Contrary to earlier epochs, the Western individual is nowadays in charge of managing

his / her look, (self-)perception and way of life.

Stamp of modernity

Today's fashion – at least in Europe and North America – has entered into a new alliance with technology that has become the most important advantage for Europe as a fashion location. At the same time, this alliance produces a visual culture, generating new perceptions reaching right into the fashion industry.

For a long time, fashion was exclusively linked to fashion designers. Designer fashion is still in the focus of fashion discourses, but it has lost its monopoly status – not least because of its high representational value. The different fashion tendencies and trends have merged together into hybrid forms, originating from different socio-cultural spaces. The great difference is that designer and stylist fashion even now creates hand-made unique specimens, whereas other fashion styles have to rely on batch production, which does not necessarily mean anything in terms of their originality.

Designer fashion has become the hallmark of modernity. And Western fashion itself has been infused by foreign elements – from the Middle Ages with the import of exquisite fabrics (like damask and silk) or colouring elements (such as henna, indigo or saffron). Hence from the outset, the European dimension of fashion as a phenomenon is relative.

Today's local and global networks are not a new phenomenon, but a continuation of historic processes. The textile trade goes back all the way to the ancient world, with communication channels of great cultural importance such as the fa-

mous Silk Road. What has changed under the exclusive dominance of the market is the type of relationship between what is considered local and global. Yet it would be a complete misjudgement to believe that Asian or African cultures and their own textile traditions adopted the values of the Western world together with the Westernised style of their clothes. It is much rather the case that dress styles are embedded in the local socio-cultural matrix, to be transformed and reinterpreted. It does not only happen in India that “the way people dress is becoming an arena where individual and cultural conflicts of modernisation are fought and negotiated. New meanings are allocated to Western fashion in the process. Traditional ways of dressing and Western fashion are different options – not alternatives”.⁴

South African cultural scientists are convinced “that the cultural traditions in the individual countries (on the African continent) are so deeply rooted and so solid that their characteristics will survive and continue to inspire cultural diversity in fashion to produce imaginative creations”.⁵

Nowadays, designer fashion not only has a platform in Paris, Milan, London, New York or Tokyo, but also in Moscow, Hong Kong, Mumbai, La Paz, Thessaloniki, Warsaw or Dakar. Historically speaking, fashion in Europe and the United States forms the dynamic core of perceptions of modernity. Hence, the globalisation of fashion can be understood as a spatial-territorial technique, as an instrument of stratification. Fashion also includes playing with materials as well as with their cultural meanings – something the fashion designer Wolfgang Joop showed at the presentation of his spring collection 2007, where parkas were combined

with the flowery designs of sofa covers of the Biedermeier period. Particularly the cultural reinterpretation of a piece of clothing is a creative act.

Techno textiles – a new advantage of location for industrialised nations

The image change is mainly due to new materials – from microfibres to high-tech textiles. Within this niche, the German and the West European textile industries have been particularly successful for a number of decades now. They even expect a new boom and long-term security for Europe as a textile industry location. Due to a number of qualities, these textiles are particularly attractive: Variety, functionality, flexibility, interactivity and resilience. Fascination with the nanoworld equally applies to techno textiles. Marketing strategies focus on the fascination and the aura of technical and scientific images as a new coat for “old fashion”. Whether the consumer actually needs high-tech fashion such as antibacterial clothes for children or sportswear with perfumed lotions against sweat is another question. However, the textile industry continues with its high level of energy consumption, causing environmental problems. It seems to be important to safeguard the European location without considering the global impacts.

Fashion and the luxury industry

In the meantime, fashion designers and their creations have frequently be-

come brand names for large companies. On 18th March 2006, the press reported that the Italian luxury group Prada sold its subsidiary Helmut Lang to the Japanese group Link Theory Holdings. In February, the British investor Change took over Jil Sander's fashion house as a subsidiary. This type of transaction is very common nowadays and indicates that fashion has already been negotiated between transnational groups – particularly Western European and American luxury companies – for a long time. Within the luxury industry, market leaders are constantly pursuing new markets. Particularly small and medium-sized companies or fashion houses are a very suitable “prey“. These activities are labelled as mergers, but we might wonder at times whether they are really effective economic or political strategies or whether a traditional male understanding of power is behind all this. Thus LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessey) of Bernard Arnaud, the largest global luxury producer, owns Louis Vuitton, Kenzo, Donna Karan, Emilio Pucci, Céline, Loewe, Givenchy, Berlutti and Fendi (together with Prada), plus the perfumes Dior, Guerlain, Givenchy, Kenzo, etc. In 2001, this group entered into a joint venture with the South African jewellery producer DeBeers. PPR (Pinaut-Printemps-Redoute) of Bernard Pinaut, the second luxury giant, owns Gucci, Yves Saint-Laurent, Alexander McQueen, Bottega Veneta (leather goods), Sergio Rossi (shoes), Stella McCarthy and Balenciaga. Prada with its autocrat Patrizio Bertelli owns Church and Fendi, but increasingly tries to focus on own brands such as Miu Miu. Gianfranco Ferré belongs to the It-Holding and Finpart Spa owns Cerutti plus further brands. The Diesel-Group Movena, which also manufactures for Vivienne Westwood and Ungaro, belongs

Hence from the outset, the European dimension of fashion as a phenomenon is relative.

to the textile group Noventa, etc. There are many reasons for this development: Most fashion companies do not have enough capital and from the point of view of global economic logic, they remain too fixated on their founders – often without regulating succession.

Nevertheless, these luxury fashion companies are characterised by an exclusive image and a consistent quality culture. If they are stylised to downright myths and dream images in brand communication, modern fashion marketing is interactively playing with the consumers. The basis for success is in the presentation of excellent collections, combined with efficient brand and financial management. Or, as Jil Sander puts it: “It is correct that I follow an aesthetic concept. (...) I want to create frills-free fashion - elegant and modern, feminine, graceful and not without dignity.⁶ Behind a fashion brand are concepts that require global marketing. In spite of all the mergers, the idea is still to maintain the exclusivity and homogeneity of the luxury labels. For that reason, the “luxury groups“ are aiming for total control through multibranding, diversification and accumulation. The market leaders increasingly take marketing and distribution into their own hands and licences are bought back. In the luxury sector, controlled growth takes first priority. A luxury brand thrives on exclusivity, even if the notion of luxury has become more democratic and addresses new target groups. For that purpose, higher margins are introduced in the accessory business, which often generates higher

profit margins than the traditional fashion business. The multibrand strategy requires high investments – an incentive for an increasing number of companies to go public. The luxury industry proves to be very immune to economic cycles, although the 11th September 2001 marked a break. One could speculate that the luxury industry did not need to produce in low-wage countries or to work with methods that harm the environment. However, greed and unscrupulousness are represented in this sector as much as elsewhere. After the flood in New Orleans, the luxury industry was already worrying about the potential lack of crocodiles before people had even been rescued, as 300,000 crocodile skins are imported from Louisiana every year to manufacture bags, shoes, belts or watch bands.

There are also independent designers such as Giorgio Armani, who entered into a joint venture with the gentlemen's tailor Ermenegildo Zegna in 1999. Italian fashion sets the tone anyway. Meanwhile, 53 fashion and luxury entrepreneurs are operating in Italy, with 25 of them still independent. Fashion houses in Milan and Florence are among the fastest-growing in Europe. And in Paris, a large number of independent couturiers and fashion designers are still successful. A new phenomenon has also become noticeable in Berlin. The federal capital and in particular the area around Kastanienallee – often referred to as “Casting Avenue” – established itself as the new centre for young, creative designers and stylists.

Berlin is considered as the location for affordable elegance. Similar trends can be observed in other large cities, for example in Marseille or Thessaloniki and above all in Antwerp, the true capital of young fashion.

Fashion seismographically processes and visualises the consequences and cultural transformations of contemporary times. It illustrates the speed and the scope of change and the transformation within the institutions, but also the resistance and the rejections. Its adjustments to the logic of the market do not remain without side effects.

“Collateral damages“

On 11th April 2005, the textile factory Spectrum Sweaters in Shahriyar in Bangladesh collapsed, leaving 64 people dead and 74 seriously injured. The factory was known as a place of exploitation of the worst kind. Serious injuries and burns occurred frequently and sexual harassment was very common.⁷ Companies like Karstadt, Quelle, Steilmann, New Yorker or Carrefour that had used Spectrum as a manufacturer of their clothes promised to pay compensation. One year after the catastrophe, only three companies had kept their promise. Child labour under extremely bad working conditions is also not uncommon, with some children entering into some kind of debt peonage.⁸ In many textile factories, girls work in twelve-hour shifts from the age of fourteen. According to the ONG Clean Clothes Campaign, nine out of ten manufacturers in China violate international labour standards and their own Chinese labour laws.

However, there is some resistance. In China, there have been massive protests from female textile workers for years. After a textile worker had been killed by the police during a protest in the factory FS Gazipur near Dhaka – among others producing for the French supermarket chain Auchan and the Swedish fashion

group H&M – massive protest followed in May and June 2006, with a particularly violent end in the free-trade zone of Savar, where the police arrested several hundred people.⁹ In the industrial town of Ashulia, thousands set fire to factories. The general public hardly notices these events. However, the large textile companies in Europe and the USA started to worry about the situation. They asked the government of Bangladesh to solve the conflict as soon as possible – “peacefully and constructively”. Among the companies signing the plea were Adidas, C&A Europe, Hennes & Mauritz, Karstadt/Quelle, Levi Strauss & Co., Nike, Carrefour, Li&Fung and Lindex.¹⁰

Fashion and clothing

What is the difference between European and American fashion? Some mention originality, uniqueness and exclusivity (Gaultier), others integration and the desire for a class-independent lifestyle (Tommy Hilfiger, Ralph Lauren, Donna Karan). However, these differences are of secondary importance in the production chain. Designer fashion, clothing and the textile market are inseparable.

The fashion and clothing market has been growing since the middle of the 19th century. In 2004, approximately 67 million tons of textile raw materials were produced world-wide.¹¹ The proportion of chemical fibres – above all polyester, polyamide and PET fibres – has continuously grown, already covering more than half of the global textile production – followed

by a growing decrease in cotton and wool. Jute, silk, bast fibres and hard fibres have a share of around 9 percent in the overall global production. Thus overall textile production has sextupled within 40 years. In the EU, the proportion of new techno textiles was at least 20 percent in 2006.¹² Yet while the European clothing and textile industry had employed 4.2 million people in 1980, that figure was at around 1.8 million in 2004.¹³

From a local and a global perspective, the fashion and clothing industry presents an interesting economic and image factor for at least four reasons:

Firstly, because this industry is leading the way in the globalisation process. As early as the seventies, when nobody was talking about globalisation yet, it already started to shift its production elsewhere.

Secondly, because the fashion and clothing industry has an exceptional position in international trade agreements to the present day.

Thirdly, because the generally growing awareness of environmental problems is particularly affected. The fashion and clothing industry is deemed to be the greatest polluter of the world. To give one example, its water consumption is enormous.

And fourthly, because it reveals a lot of (side) effects of globalisation. Depending on human, social, cultural and environmental factors, it is considered to be a particular success or a complete failure.

Nowadays, the fashion and clothing industry includes a broad spectrum of companies – from the small backyard tailor to the transnational chain. In the international comparison, German and the West European fashion and clothing

industries are characterised by relatively differentiated demand. Recession in Europe, EU Enlargement towards the East, tightened competition, new technological developments and political changes put the fashion and clothing industry in the EU under massive pressures in the nineties of the last century. The expiry of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing at the end of 2004 - formative for the industry for over 40 years - led to fundamental changes. In theory, all bilateral restrictions of textile mass productions were abolished, affecting practically all traditional centres of the fashion and clothing industry in Europe.

Travelling clothes

Sportswear, jeans, t-shirts, suits, shirts and skirts - the majority of clothes seems to be characterised by a sheer lust for travelling. Since the nineties, the concept of globalisation has become multifunctional. It goes back to Marshall McLuhan's metaphor of the "global village" of communication. The concept gives our epoch a name, highlighting the global expansion, acceleration and concentration of relationships. Everybody agrees that globalisation challenges the meaning and the sovereignty of the nation state as well as its state monopoly and ability to steer events for the benefit of the market.¹⁴ In order to stress that this phenomenon does not one-sidedly lead to a hegemony of the Western cultural industry on this planet, but forms a large number of counter-tendencies, the English sociologist Roland Robertson introduced the concept of "Glocalisation". The fashion-industry definition of the phenomenon is more modest - in

line with associated economic perceptions. It mainly differentiates between the globalisation of markets and corporate structures.¹⁵

The World Trade Agreement GATT that has ensured free trade since 1947 also allowed for special terms - primarily used by the fashion and clothing industry (these terms continue with the exemption clauses until the end of 2008). Until 1995, Europe and the USA strictly limited textile and clothing imports from emerging and developing nations through the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. The World Textile Agreement (1995) was supposed to relax the "quotas" in several steps, to then abolish them altogether. In practice, this looks slightly different. However, the industrial countries do not adhere to their liberalisation policies if they do not perceive any advantages. In order to avoid endangering their own textile industry, they liberalise relatively low-value product ranges. With this double standard, liberalisation reluctantly increases, yet is unable to prevent the renewed abrupt decline in the quotas at a rate of 70 to 89 percent.

Outsourcing and relocations

The clothing industry has remained a large mosaic of closely connected activities linked to a trade, where sowing and joining clothing items generate almost one fifth of the overall labour costs. This leads to a relocation of production into countries with low production costs. Textile production is a hi-tech sector, though,

requiring especially trained staff and a complex technical infrastructure.

The relocation of the fashion and clothing industry took place in several stages, with the first taking place in the fifties with the shift from Western Europe to Japan, followed by the seventies and eighties from Japan to Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea and finally in the late eighties and in the nineties from there to China, South-East Asia and Sri Lanka – and as a parallel development in the nineties to Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America. A number of parameters define where and how the products are manufactured: Investment incentives, tax systems, the possibility of share ownership, costs of labour and living, purchase costs (raw materials and supplies), transport costs, political stability, conditions for homeworkers and human rights in off-shore productions (working conditions, women and child labour conditions), etc. At the beginning of the 21st century, regionalisation with three centres began to develop within the process of globalisation: in the USA and Canada with the Caribbean region and Mexico, Japan and Australia with East and South-East Asia and Western and Eastern Europe with Turkey and North Africa, mainly Tunisia and Morocco. The main companies as well as training and technology intense production elements remain in the industrialised countries. While the large commercial enterprises demand the abolishment of quotas, yet at the same time exploit the system by furthering the internationalisation of their supply chains, the companies with their own production in the industrialised countries are asking for state protection. Without their own production sites – as “companies without factories“, the large commercial enterprises represent a concentration of buying power, securing an enormous influence on the textile factories. They are the great winners of liberalisation and its most radical advocates.

The end of the World Textile Agreement

In 2004, around 160 manufacturing countries competed in the sectors clothing, textiles and shoes for the favour of three major markets – in around 30 countries.¹⁶ China joining the WTO (2002) aggravated the situation for those countries less prepared for the competitive market.¹⁷ It was mainly China that benefited from the end of the World Textile Agreement, meanwhile the production in other countries went into a dramatic decline.¹⁸ The conflict goes back to a compromise agreed on 10th June 2005, postponing a solution to the year 2008.¹⁹

Among the great advantages of the Chinese and Indian fashion and clothing industries is that they cover all components of the production cycle – from the cultivation of cotton to the final processing of clothes, which also involves sewing in the name and price tags. Their spectrum of quality patterns has also increased rapidly.²⁰ Hence, China is the largest importer of knitting machines and looms from Italy, Belgium and Germany. However, this modernisation push has hardly any effect on the clothing industry. It mainly consists of innumerable small and medium-sized companies dotting the entire country, with a concentration of firms in the special economic zones on the South-Eastern coast.²¹ Chinese workers are among the cheapest in the world and migrant workers are the large majority. For some years now, Chinese companies have shown an interest

in everything related to fashion and textiles and in English, Swiss, French and particularly German textile retailers and wholesalers, mainly those with a famous name. They are also showing an interest in textile engineering companies. India and to a lesser degree Romania are among the winners of the restructuring process, whereas other countries are paying quite a high price.²²

The actual wages in the clothing sector are decreasing at an alarming speed. Globally, the working conditions in the sector are also a cause for concern. Those protesting against these conditions are mostly punished, bullied, harassed, sacked and in some cases even murdered.²³ The working conditions are increasingly characterised by large-scale exploitation. The behavioural codes some of these textile industry groups would like to respect are only slowly coming into effect and are frequently undermined. IFNGOs like the 'Clean Clothes Campaign' accuse large companies of social dumping, the response generally follows an almost uniform pattern: If the deplorable social situation is unequivocally proven and "attracts public interest, the companies normally refer to their own codes, demanding adherence to specified social standards. If criticism persists, they refer to internal corporate control procedures or cancel the contractual commitments with the disreputable supplier to maintain a clean slate themselves".²⁴ At the same time, companies are achieving record profits.²⁵

Production strategies

Even for Karl Lagerfeld, an avid supporter of competition and competitiveness, the "game" is manipulated in

"today's extremely capitalist fashion world".²⁶ So what does this "game" look like? Summing up, the strategies of the wholesale chains in particular favour outsourcing production where it is cheapest, demand the shortening of production cycles, the shift of the risks to the suppliers and the minimisation of production costs. This leads to aggressive buying practices, the systematic search for the cheapest suppliers forcing factories into increasingly shorter production periods and just-in-time logics. Modern technologies like the Internet support the large conglomerates. Only what is required when, where, in which quality, colour and size is still clearly defined. Strict "non-negotiable" price regulations exist.²⁷

All these practices lead to an exploitative management and a leadership style that either prevents all trade union activity or eliminates it by introducing "black lists" or introduces working conditions where workers can be hired and fired at all times – for example because of pregnancy or illness. In a non-transparent system of suppliers and subcontractors, social and ecological responsibility only play a role for very few companies.

At the end of the chain, the price is particularly high for the staff, especially in the free-trade zones. On top of mostly desolate working conditions, they suffer from health problems, above all in companies without proper standards for light, air conditioning and sanitary installations. Psychological and physical threats, sexual abuse, discrimination, severe accidents at work and even murder cases

and abductions are all part of the picture. Even murder and abductions occur. This is the hidden side of globalisation nobody normally mentions. The share of women working as seamstresses, knitters, pressers or packers is so high – between 75 and 90 percent – that it is appropriate to talk about a feminisation of employment.²⁸ They work according to a piece-work system and are paid per piece of finished product. One main reason why women accept all these hardships is the desire of many young women to flee from their traditional gender role. These aggressive strategies lead to a “Walmartisation” of employment. Bangladesh for example has legalised the 72-hour-week and the Philippines have abolished the minimum wage in the clothing industry. And the giants in the chemical industry are also earning their share with cotton fields and the finishing process.

Black economy in the fashion and clothing industry

The black economy is steadily expanding, basically becoming institutionalised – even more so as transnational corporations have the tendency to transfer the processing of their goods from free-trade zones to even more informal sectors (a non-transparent chain of subcontractors and female homeworkers).

Often, there is not much of a gap between the informal and the criminal sector. According to Manuel Castells, complex financial plans and international trade networks almost tie the criminal economy to the formal economy.²⁹ One example of illegal funding sources is Thailand, where billions of dollars were shifted and thus channelled from the drug trade in the Golden Triangle into the textile industry as early as the middle of the nineties. In contrast, massive cheap textile imports used for money laundering purposes of the Colombian drug trade largely destroyed the local textile industry around the turn of the millennium.

Another undesirable side effect of globalisation has become a threat for various industries: Counterfeits, plagiarism, pirate copies and “stealing ideas”. The focus is on China in this context, but other countries are also involved. In April 2006, the German Textile Association signed an agreement with China to contain the stealing of ideas. Even the Chinese Head of State, Hu Jintao, called for an intensified battle against product piracy during his trip to the USA in 2006.

For 2004, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other experts estimated the damage caused by plagiarism to be between 450 and 700 billion dollars – up to nine percent of global trade. 23.6 percent can be allocated to China and 7.7 percent to Hong Kong.³⁰ Counterfeits are from Thailand (23.5 percent), Turkey (10.2 percent) and the Czech Republic, but also from Korea, Poland, Russia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the USA (still quite significant with 8.4 percent).³¹ The Turkish textile industry had the largest number of brand counterfeiters worldwide. In 2002, German customs seized sweatshirts, t-shirts, jeans and shoes at a total value of over 12.4 million euros.³² In 2005, the amount climbed to 13.5 million and to over 100 million euros for the entire EU.

China has introduced very strict anti-counterfeiting laws. Yet the real problem is the lacking “sense of right and wrong and the enormous amount of cases”, so Wolf-Rüdiger Baumann, Managing Director of the Association of the Textile

and Fashion Industry. The problem of counterfeiting is also a cultural question. It is a Western invention - with its roots going back to the late Middle Ages. Depreciating the act of copying as an inferior activity is alien to most Asian cultures. Yet the aspect that pirate copy producers in countries like China have clearly understood very quickly is the economic logic of the phenomenon - the connection between Western brand production and large profits. In spite of media-effective closures of counterfeiting companies in Beijing, whole industries survive on producing pirate products in some provinces. However, according to industry experts, there is a growing awareness that mere cost leadership only guarantees an insufficient competitive advantage in the long run.

Consumers and global cultural transfer?

The consumers are playing the game. They are spending less on fashion and clothing - in Germany 4.9 percent in 2003 compared to 5.5 percent in 2000 - yet they buy more clothing items.³³ Without a decline in prices, this consumer behaviour would be unimaginable. At the same time, there is a trend towards cheaper products, even if they have to be thrown away after washing them twice. In addition, buying behaviour has changed. In 2004, the Federal Association of German Mail Order Traders announced an increase of 34 percent in Internet sales compared to the previous year - which is a triplication compared to the year 2000. Thus eBay has turned into one of the largest online fashion retailers. In 2006, counterfeiters get the e-business into trouble

with the luxury industry. In addition, children in the Western world are becoming increasingly richer. In 2005, every child between the age of 6 and 13 had more than 1000 euros of pocket money per year.³⁴ When buying sports shoes and clothes, kids have a high level of brand awareness.

Fashion does not make criticism easy: Enjoying consumption and disappointment are coupled and fashion very skilfully uses this alliance.³⁵ Textiles and clothing are also cultural goods and thus important elements of the cultural industry, linked to cultural landscapes and the fabrication of identities. This cultural side of the fashion and clothing production with a stronger regional-local localisation was sacrificed by neoliberal globalisation. Establishing a connection to global developments which could lead to new diversity could be easily achieved, yet it is not realised for reasons of profitability.

The EU remains a factor in the global fashion and textile trade that should not be underestimated - not only in the sphere of consumption. Production opportunities can mainly be exploited in terms of quality or and proximity of location. The shorter the fashion cycles, the riskier it could become to import goods from China or India, as transporting them to Europe in a container ship takes two to three weeks. Transport would be quicker by plane, yet it would increase the price in spite of growing fleets of cargo planes.

With wages as low as in the fashion and clothing industry, the longer itinerary has hardly mattered up to now, which could change rapidly, though, as distribution is still expensive (on average around one third of the value of

transported goods) and the costs for energy and security are accelerating at great speed. According to an estimate of the EU Commission, the EU is still the largest textile exporter in the world. If the manufacturing industry is included, China is at the top. However, it is not intended to play India or China off against Europe, but to introduce rules that no longer produce very few winners and an extremely high amount of losers and also consider the environment, the quality of life and social justice. The implementation of sustainability is an acute problem as the clothing issue will be topical as long as people exist.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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- 16 Neil Kearney. 2. Gewerkschaftstag der Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil. Vienna, 22 June 2004.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 In Pakistan (-37 percent), in Sri Lanka (-25 percent), in Bangladesh (-9 percent), but also in European countries. EU press release. 17 May 2005.
- 19 Until June 2006, the EU had not issued a statement on the practical implementation, which was ruinous for some small and medium-sized retailers.
- 20 In comparison, the EU exported 19 billion and the USA 5,5 billion. Source: WTO.
- 21 The Bei Jiang Delta (Pearl River) is in the centre of the Chinese clothing industry. Most businesses were relocated from Hong Kong long before the seaport was returned to the People's Republic of China.
- 22 For example the 23 participating countries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and Mexico or the 37 participating countries of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
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EUROPE – A SHELL? Architecture all over the world has its roots in Europe. It is as diverse as the different cultures it originates from, not least playing an important role as an economic factor.

The process of European unification is an opportunity for architects to get commissioned abroad - but there is also a danger of standardising architectural styles. *By Hans Ibelings*



For many reasons, Europe (still) does not form a unit in geographical, cultural, social, political and economic terms - in spite of the progressing enlargement of the European Union and in spite of the committed work of several other pan-European organisations.

Europe finds its way into architecture

Amidst all the differences and contrasts, some cultural spheres are particularly internationalised. One apparent indicator is the number of buildings in one country designed by foreign architects. Until the eighties of the 20th century, these architects could be counted on

two hands in the Netherlands (with three projects from the fifties, the Austro-Hungarian architect Marcel Breuer was the unchallenged number one). Over the last two decades, this number has exploded. Initially, the trend started with projects of international star architects such as Renzo Piano, Norman Foster and Steven Holl. However, architects not enjoying an international reputation yet are also increasingly getting involved.

A further indicator is the number of foreign architects in a particular country. I would like to use the Netherlands as an example again: Until recently, an overwhelming majority of employees in architectural firms were of Dutch origin and in most cases, the manager was Dutch. Meanwhile, these firms are adding international staff to their teams on a daily basis. New companies led by foreign architects are opening - from the Spanish duo Helena Casanova & Jesus Hernandez to the Germans André Kempe & Oliver Thill. Considering the country's reputation as an architectural paradise which the Netherlands acquired in the nineties, it might be an atypical example. It is not unseal here for architects to take over major building projects in spite of their lack of experience.

This internationalisation in most European countries can be explained in a

number of ways. One general and equally trivial rationale is that the process is a result of globalisation which does affect architecture like all other areas of life. For most Europeans, globalisation mostly takes place within their own continent, which also applies to European architects, in spite of the allure of Shanghai, Dubai or other up-and-coming megacities with their magnetic appeal for architects.

European-wide tenders for building projects, student exchanges in the context of the European Erasmus programme, international university and research institute cooperation programmes as well as unrestricted passenger traffic, which has made it immensely easier to obtain a work permit and a job in another European country, have all led to an unmistakable Europeanisation of architecture.

Awards like the Mies van der Rohe Award for the best European building, an initiative of the European Union and European, a pan-European competition for young architects, where the winner receives support for the realisation of his project, also support this trend. In addition, there is a large number of international initiatives with a consistently European orientation - from Wonderland and Young European Architects (YEA) to the Centre of Central European Architecture (CCEA) in Prague plus a large number of architecture biennials, triennials and festivals that take place in Istanbul, Rotterdam, in the Canary Islands and in Oslo, to name just four. All of these projects facilitate a lively cultural exchange. Since 2004, the magazine "A10 new European Architecture" as the only European architectural journal has also contributed to this process, with correspondents from

Norway to the Ukraine and with readers from every European country.

Monocultural architecture?

European unity reflected in architecture also holds certain risks. I would like to differentiate between a social and a cultural aspect in this context. The historian Tony Judt provides an accurate description of the social aspect in his much-lauded book "Post-war" about European history after 1945. He illustrates a new division in Europe, with a small group of cosmopolitan Europeans on one side and a larger group of people who live in Europe, but hardly feel like Europeans. Due to their education, their work, their lifestyle and their interests, many architects and certainly the majority of people between 20 and 40 are "real" Europeans. At the same time, this cosmopolitan trend also creates the risk that they do not really fulfil the aims and ideas of people these houses are planned and built for. The cultural aspect of this other side of the coin is that this internationalisation of architecture, the larger operating radius of architects and the similar or shared views of architecture of cosmopolitan Europeans might create a certain standardisation through pan-European fashions and trends, neutralising local and national differences.

This standardisation highlights the correlation that exists and has always existed in architecture. It has its origins in the fact that architecture has been an exclusively European matter for millennia. This is neither Eurochauvinism nor cultural arrogance. For an eternity now, Europe has been defined by architecture.

All general architectural histories are

- whether explicitly or implicitly - histories of architecture in Europe. Even if the different styles have not developed within Europe itself, Europe is still their main reference or most important benchmark. Architectural history featuring in most standard textbooks has focused on Europe for the last two millennia, after a short heyday in the Middle East. Only from the 19th century, North America joins in and is followed by Japan and Latin America as late as the middle of the 20th century. The remaining continents - Asia, Africa and Australia - only play a minor role.

Eurocentric architecture

Architectural history frequently points out a tendency towards Eurocentrism and it would certainly be more appropriate to show a more globally balanced course of history. Luckily, some attempts have been made in this context over the last few years.

It is also worth mentioning that Western Europe is primarily dominated by European architecture - nations such as Italy, France and Germany, which have pushed developments in architecture over many centuries.

The traditionally dominant role of Western European architecture is artificially strengthened by the fact that the most widely read historians have always been and still are in Western Europe and in the United States - with the result that architectural history does not exist east of Vienna. What has always been unknown also remains unknown - the downside of success.

What applies to Eastern and Central Europe is also true for the alleged pe-

riphery of the Continent - with the Polish and Czech avant-garde from the time between the two world wars, the Greek Modernist movement of the sixties, the Slovak and Croatian architecture of the sixties and the seventies of the last century left without a dedicated space in the history books, which they would have most definitely deserved.

Architecture as an economic factor

Within the state-subsidised cultural landscape, architecture is on one level with theatres and museums and only plays a minor role, whereas it is to be taken seriously as a future economic and social factor on the continent with the highest density of architects.

Hence it is a matter of course to include architects in planning public areas and spaces - from council housing to urban planning. In rich countries, private companies following in the wake of public and semi-public clients increasingly recognise the social responsibility inherent in building projects.

The current status of architecture not only becomes extremely apparent in countries with a stable architecture

Even if they live and work outside of the traditional centres, architects can still create an important subculture within the cosmopolitan cultural European upper class - which is the cohesive factor of our professional group across national borders.

such as Spain or France, but also in other places. Over the last few years, Irish architecture caused a furore, Estonian architects attracted some interest and a new generation of architects has emerged in Portugal. Austria experiences a new heyday and young countries like Slovenia and Croatia are finding their own way.

The fact that no particular country, region or city forms the hub of this new architecture or is in the focus of media interest reveals the extent of globalisation of our contemporary world – traditional spatial differences between the centre and its environs are dissolving.

With new communication channels, this difference is largely disappearing – the centre and its environs have become interchangeable: Everything can be the centre and everything can be the periphery. The fact that a number of influential architects work in the traditional cultural centres of Western European capitals is very significant in this context. Currently, the most famous architectural firms are located in Rotterdam (Rem Koolhaas' OMA) and Basel (Herzog & De Meuron). Several important Academies of Architecture – the breeding ground for future generations – are in peripheral cities such as Gothenburg, Graz or Gleiwitz. Once again, this proves that architects no longer necessarily (have to) focus on the capital cities in order to adopt a leading role. Even if they live and work outside of the traditional centres, architects can still create an important subculture within the cosmopolitan cultural European upper class – which is the cohesive factor of our professional group across national borders.

Thanks to today's technologies and enhanced mobility opportunities, nobody

has to live in the capital cities in order to be able to lead a cosmopolitan and metropolitan lifestyle. This does not only affect urban culture in Europe, but ultimately also the entire developed environment. If a village can adopt the characteristics of a metropolis and the city has village characteristics – in short if the contrast between city and country, between metropolis and village becomes increasingly insignificant – this could lead to a new European geography.

Translation: Angelika Welt

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CULTURE REPORT

Culture and cultural policy are of strategic significance in the process of European unification. The question is, what use is made of them? What is the state of cultural relations within Europe? How can European cultural policies contribute to the forming of a European identity?

The culture report "Progress Europe" attempts to find answers to these questions. Among the authors are cultural policy makers, journalists, education experts, theatre and film-makers, festival organisers and scientists from all over the world.